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General  Library       s 

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THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD, 
AND  WILSON 


Books  by 
GEORGE  CREEL 


IRELAND'S  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 
HOW  WE  ADVERTISED  AMERICA 
THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD  AND  WILSON 


Harper  i^  Brothers  Publishers 


THE  ENTRY  INTO, PARIS 

President  Wilson  and  President  PoincarS 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLDj 
AND  WILSON        ; 


B3» 

GEORGE  CREEL 

Author  of 
"IRELANDS  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM" 
"HOW  WE  ADVERTISED  AMERICA" 


HARPER  &  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 
NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 


The  War,  the  World  and  Wilson 

Copyright,  1920.  by  Harper  &  Brothers 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 

Published  June,  igao 

F-U 


To  My  Mother 

VIRQWIA  CREEL 

At  every  step  in  my  life  an  incentivef  an 

inspiration  and  a  standard — this  hook 

is  dedicated  in  love  and  gratitude 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

Foreword i 

The  Man  and  the  President       ....  14 

Neutrality 39 

"Strong  Men" 59 

"The  Roosevelt  Divisions" 75 

The  Case  of  Leonard  Wood 87 

The  Power  and  the  Glory 98 

America's  Moral  Offensives 119 

The  President's  "Partizan  Appeal"   .    .  133 

Why  the  President  Went  to  Paris    .    .  148 

Paris  and  Procrastination 164 

"The  Big  Four" 177 

The  Opening  Battle 189 

The  Stab  in  the  Back 201 

The  Zero  Hour 213 

Mr.  Keynes's  Jeremiad 229 

What  Must  Germany  Pay? 243 

The  Question  of  Coal 258 

XVIII.  Shantung  and  Hypocrisy 271 

XIX.  The  Adriatic  Tangle       283 

XX.  Were  the  Fourteen  Points  Ignored?      .  299 

XXI.  The  League  of  Nations 310 

XXII.  How  the  Treaty  Was  Killed      ....  328 

XXIII.  The  Great  American  Tradition       .    .    .  347 
Conclusion 359 


THE  WAR.  THE  WORLD. 
AND  WILSON 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD, 
AND  WILSON 


FOREWORD 

The  people  of  the  United  States  are  faced  to- 
day by  a  crisis  more  momentous  than  any 
that  has  gone  before,  for  it  is  not  America  only 
that  quivers  in  suspension,  but  the  whole  of  that 
thing  we  know  as  civilization.  It  is  a  world  that 
is  molten — not  the  world  of  Macedon  or  Rome — 
but  a  twentieth-century  world  in  which  there 
are  no  longer  the  safeties  of  space,  the  decent 
reserve  of  barriers,  its  unhappy  peoples  thrown 
into  confused  collision  by  a  shock  that  has 
crumpled  in  all  four  corners.  And  by  the  whirl 
of  chance,  or  maybe  in  obedience  to  some  inexo- 
rable law  working  behind  the  great  screen,  the 
task  of  molding  is  in  the  hands  of  no  ancient 
state,  confident  in  inherited  tradition,  but  waits 
the  experimental  touch  of  a  nation  scarce  one 
hundred  and  forty-four  years  old. 

The  responsibiHties  of  the  United  States  are 
not  a  matter  of  speculation.  Our  material  con- 
tributions, great  and  decisive  as  they  were,  stand 
dwarfed  by  the  power  and  the  glory  that  flowed 
from  the  declaration  of  American  aims.     It  was 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

our  idealism,  put  in  khaki,  that  made  the  Great 
War  a  war  for  democracy.  It  was  not  that 
when  it  began.  It  was  hardly  that  when  we 
entered  it.  Military  pre-eminence  may  occasion 
dispute,  but  the  moral  leadership  of  America  is 
not  subject  to  question. 

On  the  instant  that  we  drew  the  sword  we  told 
our  own  people,  and  all  the  peoples  of  earth, 
that  we  meant  to  fight  a  war  against  war^  that 
what  we  sought  was  the  "destruction  of  arbitrary 
power,"  "the  rights  of  small  nations,"  "the 
reign  of  law  based  upon  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned," an  end  to  the  mad  business  of  competitive 
armaments,  and  the  substitution  of  discussion  for 
bloodshed  by  the  establishment  of  a  League  of 
Nations  to  make  certain  "that  the  combined 
power  of  free  nations  will  check  every  invasion 
of  right,  and  serve  to  make  peace  and  justice 
the  more  secure  by  affording  a  definite  tribunal 
of  opinion  to  which  all  must  submit,  and  by  which 
every  international  readjustment  that  cannot  be 
amicably  agreed  upon  by  the  peoples  directly 
concerned  shall  be  sanctioned." 

Our  might  struck  the  shackles  of  tyranny  from 
the  body  of  the  world,  but  it  was  our  pledges 
that  set  free  the  heart  of  the  world.  America, 
without  dissent,  indorsed  these  great  guaranties 
of  a  new  and  better  order,  and  the  Allied  govern- 
ments accepted  them  and  hailed  them  as  words 
of  light  and  guidance.  At  home  they  gave 
unexampled  unity  and  indomitable  resolve; 
abroad  they  poured  like  wine  into  the  war-weary 
veins  of  the  Allies,  won  the  support  of  neutral 
nations,  «nd  struck  at  the  very  foundations  of 

2 


FOREWORD 

enemy  morale.  The  world,  hopeless,  despairing, 
turned  to  us  as  the  forlorn  of  Galilee  turned  to 
Christ,  not  knowing,  but  believing;  not  asking, 
but  trusting. 

It  was  the  giving  of  these  pledges  that  won 
the  war:  it  is  the  repudiation  of  these  pledges 
that  is  losing  the  peace.  What  is  the  use  of 
mincing  words!  The  moral  leadership  that  was 
our  pride  is  now  our  shame.  The  peoples  of 
earth  are  turning  from  us  even  as  they  turned  to 
us,  and  in  their  hearts  is  a  vaster  bitterness  than 
comes  from  any  mere  betrayal  of  the  body.  It 
is  their  hope  that  we  have  deserted:  it  is  their 
dream  that  we  have  killed.  "The  tents  have 
been  struck,  and  the  great  caravan  of  humanity 
is  again  on  the  march,"  cried  General  Smuts. 
To  where?  And  how?  Ravaged  by  war,  pes- 
tilence, and  famine — disorganized,  leaderless, 
desperate — the  unhappy  nomadism  heads  back 
to  the  same  old  morass  in  which  mankind  has 
struggled  from  the  beginning,  but  now  without 
the  ignorances  and  submissiveness  that  made 
possible  the  ancient  way,  for  they  have  seen  the 
vision  of  a  new  world,  the  world  that  America 
promised. 

These  are  the  problems  that  face  us  to-day! 
Are  we  going  to  redeem  our  pledges  or  are  we 
going  to  indorse  repudiation?  Will  we  assume 
proper  responsibility  for  the  majesties  of  aspira- 
tion that  we  called  into  being,  or  will  we  watch 
them  play  out  as  tragedies  of  disappointment? 
Shall  we  regain  our  moral  leadership,  pointing 
humanity's  caravan  to  the  high  ground,  or  shall 
we  trail  as  camp-followers,  coming  at  last  to  a 
2  3 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

common  quicksand?  President  Wilson  spoke 
truly  when  he  said  that  "the  forces  of  the  world 
do  not  threaten;  they  operate."  Ours  was  the 
voice  that  called  these  forces  into  being — ours 
is  the  voice  that  must  order  them.  Self-preser- 
vation joins  with  self-respect  in  the  demand,  for 
there  are  compulsions  of  interest  as  well  as 
compulsions  of  honor. 

As  a  result  of  the  Senate's  course,  the  world 
to-day  is  as  much  of  an  armed  camp  as  before 
the  armistice.  Germany — sullen,  desperate,  cha- 
otic— has  an  active  army  of  300,000,  also  a  State 
Constabulary  of  75,000,  and  a  "Home  Guard" 
of  600,000,  both  organizations  composed  entirely 
of  war  veterans.  Against  this  threat,  impover- 
ished France  is  com.pelled  to  keep  480,000  men 
under  arms  instead  of  releasing  them  for  the 
task  of  reconstruction.  The  lighting  force  of 
the  Bolshevists  is  estimated  at  600,000  and 
Poland  faces  this  menace  with  close  to  500,000 
men,  all  of  whom  ought  to  be  working.  Italy, 
instead  of  concentrating  upon  her  peace  problems, 
marches  to  bankruptcy  with  an  army  of  half  a 
million,  and  the  Jugoslavs  are  also  in  battle 
array.  The  Serbs,  destitute  as  they  are,  have 
250,000  men  in  the  field,  and  Bulgaria  plots 
revenge  with  a  force  of  100,000.  Greece,  whose 
peace  army  is  30,000,  now  has  300,000  men 
under  arms.  The  Rumanians,  forced  to  guard 
against  the  anger  of  Hungary,  has  an  army  of 
300,000,  and  Hungary,  although  limited  to  an 
army  of  35,000,  is  copying  the  German  "Home 
Guard"  plan  with  success.  Czechoslovakia, 
eager  for  peace,  has  an  army  of  100,000  to  guard 

4 


FOREWORD 

against  the  Germans  and  the  Magyars.  Eng- 
land has  44,000  troops  in  Mesopotamia,  13,000 
in  Palestine,  200,000  in  Ireland,  and  about  50,000 
in  Egypt,  not  to  mention  her  forces  of  iron  re- 
pression in  India.  There  are  25,000  Japanese 
troops  in  Siberia,  12,000  in  Manchuria,  and  a 
large  force  in  Mongolia,  while  in  Japan  itself 
there  is  an  active  army  of  300,000  with  1,500,000 
trained  reserves. 

Wherever  one  looks,  democracy  is  hemmed  in 
on  one  side  by  Trade  ImperiaHsm  and  on  the 
other  by  Bolshevism.  And  America,  the  nation 
that  called  the  democratic  aspiration  into  life 
and  passion,  refuses  aid  and  stands  aloof! 
Must  another  world  war  be  fought  to  drive 
home  the  fact  that  humanity's  one  hope  is  in  an 
international  concert?  What  stands  far  more 
probable  than  any  mere  renewal  of  European 
conflict,  however,  is  a  concentration  of  anger 
and  despair  against  the  selfish  well-being  of 
America. 

It  is  a  situation  in  which  every  fact  has  all 
the  obviousness  of  a  wound.  The  Allies  owe  us 
an  amount  well  above  ten  billions  of  dollars. 
Without  a  League  of  Nations,  able  to  lift  the 
crushing  burdens  of  armies  and  navies  from  the 
backs  of  peoples,  permitting  national  energies  to 
be  concentrated  upon  the  speedy  restoration  of 
normal  economic  processes,  there  is  not  a  chance 
that  the  United  States  will  ever  receive  a  cent 
of  interest,  much  less  a  dollar  of  the  principal. 
Nor  is  that  all.  Debtor  nations  do  not  love 
their  creditor,  especially  when  payment  involves 
bankruptcy,   and   since  repudiation  is   an  ugly 

5 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

policy  to  adopt  in  cold  blood,  what  more  natural 
than  the  release  of  those  passions  that  make  for 
hot  blood?     And  what  less  difficult? 

For  more  than  a  year  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  has  exhausted  effort  in  the  manufacture 
of  enmity.  It  is  not  alone  that  we  have  stood 
aside  from  the  great  adventure  in  fraternity 
that  we  ourselves  proposed,  but  this  program  of 
withdrawal  has  been  companioned  by  a  policy 
of  studied  insult.  The  honor  of  Japan  has  been 
questioned  time  and  again,  the  faith  of  France 
has  been  impugned  repeatedly,  and  there  has 
been  the  mean  insistence  that  self-governing 
dominions  like  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand, 
and  South  Africa  shall  be  put  lower  in  the  scale 
of  countries  than  those  small  republics  of  the 
West  Indies  and  Central  America  that  are  our 
own  political  and  commercial  dependencies. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  very  Httle  sophistry 
would  be  required  to  give  united  attack  upon 
America  all  the  sincerity  and  fervor  of  a  cru- 
sade. A  nation  that  preached  the  faith  and 
then  betrayed  It!  A  people  that  pledged  and 
then  abandoned!  In  such  a  war  there  would 
be  not  only  the  cancelation  of  external  debts 
without  the  shame  of  repudiation,  but  equally 
the  salvation  afforded  by  the  spoils  of  victory. 
Far-fetched,  perhaps,  but  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  we  are  not  dealing  with  the  ordered, 
cautious  world  of  other  days,  but  a  disorganized 
welter  driven  back  upon  its  hopes,  desperate  in 
its  despairs,  and  unspeakably  wretched  in  all 
of  its  conditions. 

Never  was  choice  so  plain.  Either  a  League 
6 


FOREWORD 

of  Nations,  a  great  world  partnership  in  world 
reconstruction,  eager  and  effective  in  restora- 
tion and  stabilization,  abating  the  passions  and 
despairs  of  humanity  by  the  sanities  of  its 
justice,  or  else  a  military  establishment  suffi- 
ciently large  and  powerful  to  guard  our  shores 
against  the  rising  storm.  There  is  no  parallel 
for  the  madness  that  strikes  down  the  Peace 
Treaty  with  one  vote,  insulting  and  alienating 
the  whole  world,  and  with  another  vote  reduces 
naval  appropriations,  denies  universal  training, 
wipes  out  our  merchant  marine,  and  utterly 
annihilates  the  aircraft  program. 

It  is  the  people,  as  always  in  every  great 
crisis,  that  must  meet  these  problems  and  give 
these  answers.  Poisoned  by  partizanship,  the 
bankruptcy  of  Congress  is  utter  and  absolute. 
Government  by  proxy  has  fallen  down.  It  is 
the  men  and  women  of  America  who  must  fight 
the  peace  even  as  they  fought  the  war.  Not 
Republicans  nor  Democrats,  not  conservatives 
nor  radicals,  but  the  people  as  a  whole;  the 
countless  millions  who  are  not  seen  or  heard, 
but  whose  energy  and  hopes  and  devotions  are 
the  strength  of  democracy. 

History  is  not  always  a  sure  guide,  but  often- 
times it  is  an  inspiration,  and  in  the  annals  of 
the  RepubKc  there  are  two  crises  that  may  well 
be  recalled.  On  September  lo,  1787,  the  Con- 
stitutional Convention  finished  its  labors  and 
reported  back  to  the  various  states.  Six  years 
had  passed  since  the  Treaty  of  Paris — barren 
years  full  of  hatreds,  suspicions,  and  distrusts 

7 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

that  gave  victory  the  bitter  taste  of  ashes. 
Commercial  ruin  and  financial  collapse  joined 
to  make  liberty  an  empty  word  and  savage 
forces  of  disintegration  undermined  the  weak 
foundations  of  union.  New  Hampshire,  Massa- 
chusetts, and  Rhode  Island  were  compelled  to 
contend  against  open  rebellion,  the  Territory  of 
Maine  discussed  the  advisabihty  of  setting  up 
an  independent  state,  mobs  closed  the  courts  of 
Connecticut,  North  Carolina  had  witnessed  the 
ugly  attempt  to  form  the  state  of  Frankland, 
and  traitorous  talk  of  foreign  aUiances  bubbled 
like  acid  in  many  sections.  The  mean  prides  of 
local  sovereignty  had  the  malign  force  of  open 
treason;  a  blind  selfishness  dominated  every 
council,  and  tariff  wars  and  boundary  disputes 
were  constant  invitations  to  conflict.  Connec- 
ticut and  Pennsylvania,  after  actual  battles, 
were  parties  to  a  sullen  truce,  and  New  York, 
Vermont,  and  New  Hampshire,  as  the  result  of 
clashing  greeds,  stood  on  the  verge  of  war. 

The  Constitution,  providing  a  central  govern- 
ment with  strength,  power,  and  recognized 
authorities,  was  the  one  visible  hope,  if  not  the 
one  obvious  remedy,  yet  a  campaign  of  nine 
months  was  required  to  secure  the  assent  of  the 
nine  states  necessary  to  ratification.  Visionless 
men,  more  concerned  with  petty  privileges  than 
national  welfare,  denounced  the  document  as  a 
"triple-headed  monster,'*'  and  declared  the  whole 
plan  "as  deep  and  wicked  a  conspiracy  as  ever 
was  invented  in  the  darkest  ages  against  the 
liberties  of  a  free  people.'*  Washington  was 
branded  as  a  "fool"  and  "traitor,"  Franklin  as 


FOREWORD 

a  "dotard,"  and  both  were  burned  in  effigy. 
Riots  were  actually  organized  to  give  support 
to  the  ** protest  of  free  men  against  the  insidious 
restoration  of  monarchy,"  and  mobs  pubHcly 
kindled  bonfires  with  copies  of  the  "accursed 
proposal"  that  was  to  rob  the  states  of  their 
rights. 

Nor  was  ratification,  when  it  did  come,  a 
thing  of  released  enthusiasm,  but  rather  the 
spent  victim  of  a  gantlet.  In  Massachusetts 
there  was  the  small  majority  of  nineteen,  in 
Virginia  it  carried  by  ten  votes  only,  and  in 
New  Hampshire  by  eleven.  New  York,  the 
ninth  state,  remained  in  convention  for  forty 
days,  Governor  Clinton  holding  two-thirds  of 
the  delegates  against  the  Constitution  for  no 
larger  reason  than  that  it  was  the  work  of  his 
political  enemies.  The  unanswerable  arguments 
of  Hamilton  beat  down  the  barriers  of  this 
malignant  partizanship,  and  the  sullen  Clinton 
was  finally  deserted  by  enough  of  his  delegates 
to  change  the  minority  of  twenty-seven  into  a 
majority  of  three. 

In  such  manner  the  people  of  the  Colonies 
met  the  first  great  American  crisis.  Unhappy 
days,  time  of  sick  fears  and  deep  humiliation, 
with  narrowest  of  margins  for  success,  but  still 
a  margin  wide  enough  for  the  passage  of  the 
vision  that  was  to  save  the  world. 

In  1864,  while  Lincoln  sat  by  the  side  of 
America  as  the  one  physician  able  to  save,  the 
sick-room  filled  with  the  same  passion  and  clamor 
that  sent  Washington  to  his  grave  in  loneliness 
and  disillusion.     Not  defeat  could  have  spelled 

9 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

more  disastrous  consequences  than  parley  or 
compromise,  yet  Greeley  spoke  for  no  incon- 
siderable number  when  he  wrote  to  Lincoln  that 
"our  bleeding,  bankrupt,  almost  dying  country 
longs  for  peace — shudders  at  the  prospect  of 
fresh  conscriptions,  of  further  wholesale  devasta- 
tions, and  of  new  rivers  of  human  blood;  and  a 
wide-spread  conviction  that  the  government  and 
its  supporters  are  not  anxious  for  peace,  and  do 
not  improve  proflPered  opportunities  to  achieve 
it,  is  doing  great  harm  now,  and  is  morally 
certain,  unless  removed,  to  do  far  greater  in  the 
approaching  elections." 

The  President  was  charged  with  "feebleness 
and  want  of  principle,"  and  General  Fremont 
declared  that  "if  Mr.  Lincoln  should  be  nomi- 
nated, as  I  believe  it  would  be  fatal  to  the  country 
to  indorse  a  policy  and  renew  a  power  which  has 
cost  us  the  lives  of  thousands  of  men  and  need- 
lessly put  the  country  on  the  road  to  bank- 
ruptcy, there  will  be  no  other  alternative  but  to 
organize  against  him  every  element  of  conscien- 
tious opposition,  with  the  view  to  prevent  this 
misfortune  of  his  re-election." 

The  forces  of  defeatism  were  rich,  organized, 
and  powerful,  yet  Lincoln  was  re-elected  in  a 
passion  of  faith  that  burst  the  bonds  of  party. 
His  policies  were  indorsed,  the  hosts  of  compro- 
mise were  scattered,  and  well  within  the  year 
there  came  the  surrender  at  Appomattox  that 
forever  ended  the  issue  of  human  slavery  and 
forever  lifted  the  indivisibility  of  the  Union 
above  question  or  debate.  Thus  the  people  of 
the  United  States  met  the  second  great  American 

lO 


FOREWORD 

crisis,  standing  like  iron  in  support  of  the  principle 

that  fundamental  truths  do  not  permit  of  truce. 

«  •  ■  •  •  •  • 

For  a  third  time  in  the  history  of  the  Republic 
the  people  are  called  upon  to  decide  organic 
poHcies — to  declare  their  will  with  respect  to 
democracy's  future  course.  The  issues  are  as 
insistent  as  fundamental  and  upon  the  decisions 
hangs  the  fate  of  the  great  dreams  and  high  hopes 
that  gave  courage  to  Washington  and  Lincoln. 
National  destiny  is  a  fine  mouth-filling  phrase, 
but  to-day  it  has  a  poignancy  that  must  pierce 
veneer,  striking  down  to  those  sincerities  that 
are  the  soul  of  America. 

A  first  task  is  to  get  back  to  a  war  footing  as 
far  as  the  national  morale  is  concerned.  En- 
thusiasm, unity,  and  high  resolve  must  be 
regained.  Just  as  party,  creed,  and  color  disap- 
peared when  we  massed  to  fight  the  autocratic 
pretensions  of  the  Imperial  German  government, 
so  must  these  divisions  disappear  to-day  when 
the  crises  of  reconstruction  threaten  our  nadonal 
hfe. 

It  were  well  indeed  could  Washington's  Fare- 
well Address  be  cast  in  bronze  and  set  in  every 
market-place,  for  the  Father  of  His  Country, 
looking  down  the  years,  warned  against  the 
very  danger  that  nets  us  now.  Solemnly,  force- 
fully, he  pointed  out  the  "baneful  eflPects  of  the 
spirit  of  party,"  and  in  words  of  high  prophetic 
value  declared  that  "the  alternate  domination 
of  one  faction  over  another,  sharpened  by  the 
spirit  of  revenge  natural  to  party  dissension  .  .  . 
is  itself  a  frightful  despotism  .  .  .  the  common 

II 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

and  continual  mischiefs  of  the  spirit  of  party  are 
sufficient  to  make  it  the  interest  and  duty  of  a 
wise  person  to  discourage  and  restrain  it.  It 
serves  always  to  distract  the  pubHc  councils 
and  enfeeble  the  public  administration.  It  agi- 
tates the  community  with  ill-founded  jealousies 
and  false  alarms;  kindles  the  animosity  of  one 
part  against  another  ...  a  fire  not  to  be 
quenched,  it  demands  a  uniform  vigilance  to 
prevent  it  bursting  into  a  flame,  lest,  instead  of 
warming,  it  should  consume." 

Can  it  be  said  that  these  evils  have  not  come 
to  pass?  Through  dreary,  humiUating  months 
we  have  heard  the  great  question  of  world 
union  debated  as  though  it  were  a  chattel  mort- 
gage; we  have  seen  humanity's  hopes  sub- 
ordinated to  office  hunger  and  the  future  of 
America  limited  to  the  presidential  election  of 
1920.  And,  crowning  infamy,  the  sorry  chaffer- 
ing has  been  linked  invariably  with  the  names 
of  Washington  and  Lincoln — ^the  two  Americans, 
of  all  our  noble  company,  who  most  despised 
the  sordid  chicane  of  partizans.  These  are  the 
things  that  must  be  swept  away,  even  as  we 
swept  away  all  ignobilities  of  the  spirit  when  we 
ralHed  to  the  defense  of  free  institutions  and  gave 
great  slogans  to  a  despairing  world. 

The  citizen  who  does  not  do  his  own  thinking 
to-day  is  no  less  a  traitor  than  the  man  who 
tried  to  evade  the  draft,  and  those  who  think  in 
terms  of  party  prejudice  or  personal  advantage 
are  America's  enemies.  In  this  hour  when  the 
fate  of  democracy  hangs  in  the  balance,  the 
criminal  mind  is  the  closed  mind. 

12 


FOREWORD 

It  is  in  the  interests  of  public  information  that 
this  book  has  been  written.  It  is,  frankly 
enough,  a  whole-hearted  advocacy  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  yet  a  very  honest  attempt  has 
been  made  to  subject  every  question  to  such 
analysis,  and  to  make  such  presentation  of  facts, 
as  will  permit  the  reader  to  form  his  independent 
judgments.  The  consideration  begins  with  our 
very  entrance  into  the  war  because  imminent 
issues  are  not  intelHgible  unless  considered  in 
relation  to  causes.  It  works  through  the  per- 
sonality of  Woodrow  Wilson,  and  away  from  it, 
because  he  was  and  is,  by  virtue  of  his  office, 
inevitably  the  source  and  center. 


THE   MAN   AND   THE    PRESIDENT 

TT  is  the  misfortune  of  democratic  governments 
*  that  they  tend  inevitably  to  operate  through 
the  emotions  rather  than  the  intellectual  proc- 
esses. The  party  organization,  always  the  mo- 
tive power  in  the  formation  of  political  opinion, 
may  have  its  origin  in  high  ideals,  but  ultimately 
it  becomes  a  business  on  the  success  of  which 
hangs  the  employment  or  disemployment  of 
thousands.  Victory  becomes  the  chief  concern, 
and  it  follows,  naturally  enough,  that  principles 
are  subordinated  to  personaHties.  To  feel  is 
instinctive:  to  think  is  laborious.  To  attack  or 
to  defend  a  candidate  is  infinitely  simpler  and 
more  effective  than  to  attack  or  to  defend  an 
issue,  inasmuch  as  the  one  course  lends  itself  to 
emotions  and  assertions,  while  the  other  calls 
for  intelligence  and  facts.  As  a  consequence, 
the  present  situation  is  not  original  in  any  de- 
gree, but  part  and  parcel  of  an  established 
routine.  The  League  of  Nations,  the  Peace 
Treaty,  questions  domestic  and  international, 
are  not  discussed  fairly  and  informatively,  for 
the  very  simple  reason  that  partizan  purposes 
are  best  served  by  a  direct  personal  attack 
upon  the  President,  designed  to  appeal  to  irrita- 

14 


THE  MAN  AND  THE   PRESIDENT 

tions  and  prejudices.  This  condition,  unfor- 
tunate always,  is  rendered  still  more  unhappy 
by  the  fact  that  Woodrow  Wilson  is,  and  has 
been  from  the  very  first,  an  easy  target  for 
misrepresentation  and  misunderstanding. 

As  far  as  appearances  are  concerned,  there  is 
a  certain  measure  of  justification  for  the  repeated 
charges  that  the  President  is  inclined  to  autoc- 
racy, preferring  to  "play  a  lone  hand"  instead 
of  inviting  counsel;  that  he  is  cold  and  lacks 
human  warmth;  that  he  is  selfish  and  self- 
centered;  that  he  is  without  capacity  for  friend- 
ship; and  that  he  has  worked  disintegration  by 
his  disregard  of  Congress.  These  surface  indica- 
tions are  sufficient  to  the  purposes  of  politicians, 
for  the  Great  American  Public  has  never  been 
particularly  in  love  with  analysis. 

Nothing  is  more  true  than  that  people  do  not 
live  by  bread  alone;  catch-phrases  constitute  a 
staple  article  of  diet,  especially  in  a  democracy. 
All  citizens  worthy  of  the  name  talk  largely  of 
''constitutional  rights,"  yet  not  one  in  a  thou- 
sand has  ever  read  the  Constitution.  Every 
four  years  the  electorate,  or  such  portion  of  it  as 
has  had  the  energy  to  register,  votes  for  a  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  yet  not  one  in  a  hun- 
dred thousand  has  any  definite,  authoritative 
conception  of  the  office  or  its  powers.  It  is 
these  ignorances  that  have  played  so  surely  into 
the  hands  of  partizans. 

The  makers  of  the  Constitution  were  not 
vague  in  their  ideas  of  the  powers  or  functions  of 
the  President,  nor  were  they  less  than  vigorous 
and  explicit  in  defining  them.     The  Fathers  con- 

15 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

ceived  the  office  as  the  keystone  in  the  federal 
arch,  the  one  seat  of  administration,  the  true 
source  of  the  central  control  necessary  to  effi- 
ciency. Not  only  was  the  President  constituted 
one  of  the  three  great  co-ordinate  branches  of 
government,  with  power  to  veto  the  legislative, 
but  other  high  authorities  were  given  him  until 
the  cry  arose  that  his  privileges  ran  far  beyond 
those  of  the  British  Crown.  Madison,  Frank- 
lin, Hamilton,  and  their  associates  were  not 
afraid  of  -power  because  there  was  also  respon- 
sibility to  the  people;  their  real  fear  was  that 
the  President  had  not  been  given  sufficient 
strength  to  make  him  what  they  intended  him 
to  be — a  Chief  Executive  in  fact  as  well  as  name. 

These  doubts  were  only  with  respect  to  the 
peace  powers  of  the  President,  for  when  the 
consideration  of  war  powers  was  reached,  even 
ultra-democrats  conceded  the  necessity  of  a 
supreme  control  virtually  despotic  in  its  sweep. 
It  was  the  one  possible  answer  to  the  well- 
founded  criticism  that  a  democracy,  with  its 
balance  of  power,  could  not  make  war,  since  war 
was  one  thing  that  called  for  centralized  purpose 
and  instancy  of  decision.  A  President  of  the 
United  States,  in  time  of  war,  is  either  a  dictator 
or  a  traitor,  for  dictatorship  in  war  is  the  Con- 
stitution's direct  intent. 

W^oodrow  Wilson  was  in  no  wise  ignorant  of 
the  aim  of  the  Constitutional  Convention.  It 
is  to  be  remembered  that  he  did  not  receive  his 
nomination  as  a  reward  for  the  usual  hack  ser- 
vice of  the  partizan,  but  in  recognition  of  a 
statesmanship    evidenced    in    action    to    some 

i6 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

extent,  but  far  more  in  voluminous  writings 
that  shot  light  through  the  confusions  of  govern- 
ment. It  is  only  necessary  to  read  his  books  to 
discover  that  his  views  on  the  functions  of  the 
President  were  at  one  with  the  thought  and 
purpose  of  the  Constitution's  framers. 

In  Congressional  Government,  written  in  1884, 
he  pointed  out  a  Chief  Executive's  opportunities 
for  service,  and  lamented  that  the  "high  office 
has  fallen  from  its  first  estate  of  dignity  because 
its  power  has  waned;  and  its  power  has  waned 
because  the  power  of  Congress  has  become  pre- 
dominant." The  reason,  as  he  saw  it,  was  a 
steady  usurpation  on  the  part  of  Congress,  its 
growing  habit  of  "investigating  and  managing 
everything,"  and  its  effort  to  club  the  Executive 
into  obedience  by  denying  appropriations  or 
refusing  confirmations. 

In  1879,  when  only  twenty-three  years  of  age, 
his  article  on  "Cabinet  Government  in  the 
United  States"  set  out  his  beUef  that  "there  is 
no  one  in  Congress  to  speak  for  the  nation. 
Congress  is  a  conglomeration  of  inharmonious 
elements;  a  collection  of  men  representing  each 
his  neighborhood,  each  his  local  interest;  an 
alarmingly  large  proportion  of  its  legislation  is 
'special';  all  of  it  is  at  best  only  a  limping 
compromise  between  the  conflicting  interests  of 
the  innumerable  localities  represented." 

In  1900  he  said:  "When  foreign  affairs  play  a 
prominent  part  in  the  politics  and  policy  of  a 
nation,  its  Executive  must  of  necessity  be  its 
guide:  must  utter  every  initial  judgment,  take 
every  first  step  of  action,  supply  the  information 

17 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

upon  which  it  is  to  act,  suggest  and  in  large 
I  measure  control  its  conduct." 

In  191 1  he  said:  "The  increasing  dependence 
of  the  country  upon  its  executive  officers  is 
thrusting  upon  them  a  double  function.  They 
must  undertake  the  business  of  agitation — ^that 
is  to  say,  the  business  of  forming  and  leading 
opinion,  and  it  will  not  be  very  effectual  or 
serviceable  for  them  to  do  that  unless  they  take 
the  next  step  and  make  bold  to  formulate  the 
measures  by  which  opinion  is  to  be  put  into 
effect.'' 

When  Woodrow  Wilson  took  office,  therefore, 
it  was  with  a  political  philosophy  fully  formed — 
a  philosophy  that  held  the  true  powers  of  the 
President  to  be  abridged  at  every  point  by  the 
unconstitutional  encroachments  of  the  legisla- 
tive branch.  Facing  him  was  a  Congress  stub- 
born in  its  resolve  to  retain  the  prerogatives 
filched  from  a  series  of  weak  or  ignorant  execu- 
tives. The  lock  of  wills  was  instant,  also  funda- 
mental, for  on  the  outcome  hung  decision  as  to 
whether  the  President  should  be  the  servant  of 
the  people  or  the  servant  of  Congress,  a  leader 
or  a  follower,  a  spokesman  or  an  echo. 

Truce  was  not  possible;  the  issues  were  too 
clean  cut.  And  Woodrow  Wilson  won.  In 
peace  he  was  the  Chief  Executive  of  the  nation. 
In  war  he  was  the  Commander-in-chief.  This  is 
as  the  Constitution  meant  it  to  be.  He  did  not 
usurp;  he  merely  regained.  The  price  that  he 
paid  for  victory,  however,  cost  him  heavily  in 
popularity.  Congress  has  ever  hated  and  fought 
the  President  it  could  not  rule.     It  was  also  the 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

case  that  the  pubhc,  out  of  its  profound  contempt 
for  Congress,  began  to  feel  that  the  President 
should  take  over  the  duties  of  the  legislative 
branch.  When  he  did  not  do  so,  discontent 
developed.  If  a  needed  law  was  not  passed, 
it  was  Wilson  that  was  to  blame.  Whatever 
went  wrong,  whether  in  a  city,  a  state,  the  nation, 
or  the  world,  there  was  a  general  feehng  that 
Wilson  should  have  ** fixed''  it.  Even  those 
most  blatant  in  crying  "Dictator!"  were  pas- 
sionate in  their  indignation  when  the  President 
refused  to  remedy  the  incompetencies  of  Con- 
gress by  some  usurpation  of  power.  Yet  the 
victory  was  worth  all  that  it  cost,  Woodrow 
Wilson  has  shown  the  country  what  a  President 
should  be,  and  although  people  will  undoubtedly 
apply  the  tests  unconsciously,  the  Chief  Execu- 
tives of  the  future  will  be  measured  by  his 
standard.  Never  again  will  we  rest  content 
with  mountebanks,  mere  partizans,  nonentities, 
or  congressional  errand-boys. 

This  clash  of  diametrically  opposed  concep- 
tions of  power,  while  at  the  bottom  of  the  Presi- 
dent's inharmonious  relations  with  Congress, 
was  given  intensity  by  personal  dissimilarities  no 
less  fundamental.  Woodrow  Wilson  looks  at 
things  from  the  standpoint  of  the  statesman; 
the  average  officeholder  approaches  government 
from  the  standpoint  of  machine  politics.  The 
politician  is  concerned  only  with  votes,  the 
statesman  with  results;  the  one  has  an  eye 
upon  the  popularities  of  the  moment,  the  other 
upon  history.  One  of  the  fixed  traditions  of 
American  political  life  is  that  the  way  to  success 
3  19 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WH.SON 

is  through  compromise,  and  as  a  consequence 
those  have  been  most  admired  and  most  elevated 
who  have  managed  to  sUther  their  way  through 
opposed  ideas  and  irreconcilable  ideals  without 
commitment.  In  sharp  contradiction,  a  funda- 
mental of  the  Wilson  philosophy  is  that  truces 
are  dangerous  when  they  are  not  discreditable. 
Where  disputes  are  personal  he  is  willing  to 
search  for  the  basis  of  concession,  but  when  a 
vital  issue  is  at  stake  he  does  not  know  the 
meaning  of  compromise.  With  all  his  soul  he 
believes  that  principles  have  to  be  fought  out. 

Such  a  passionate  conviction  could  not  pos- 
sibly be  turned  on  or  off  at  will,  as  with  a  spigot 
attachment,  and  his  direct  contacts  were  in- 
evitably affected.  The  intellectually  dishonest 
were  loathsome  to  him,  and  not  by  any  advan- 
tage of  self-interest  could  he  be  induced  to  meet 
and  confer  with  them.  "We  send  men  to 
prison  for  stealing  bread,"  he  once  exclaimed, 
"but  we  send  them  to  Congress  when  they  steal 
faith."  The  popular  habit  of  confusing  ability 
with  mere  cunning,  of  letting  "sHckness"  pass 
for  brains,  was  irritating  to  him,  and  his  pride 
as  an  American  suffered  real  humiliation  at  see- 
ing men  Hke  Reed,  Watson,  and  Penrose  sitting 
in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 

His  partizanship,  based  upon  a  conception  of 
public  service  rather  than  personal  profit,  was 
not  of  the  ardent  kind  that  gave  any  satisfaction 
to  the  members  of  his  own  party.  Years  ago, 
in  an  article  on  Mr.  Cleveland,  he  defined  him 
as  "the  sort  of  President  the  makers  of  the 
Constitution  had  vaguely  in  mind:    more  man 

20 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

than  partizan,  with  an  independent  will  of  his 
own:  hardly  a  colleague  of  the  Houses  so  much 
as  an  individual  servant  of  the  country:  exer- 
cising his  powers  like  a  Chief  Magistrate  rather 
than  Hke  a  party  leader."  With  great  questions 
to  be  decided,  questions  that  concerned  the  lives 
and  hopes  of  milHons,  the  President  evidenced 
a  growing  distaste  for  the  long-winded  visiting 
that  had  no  larger  object  than  the  discussion  of 
a  postmastership,  the  party  outlook  in  a  district, 
or  the  necessity  of  placating  this  or  that  boss. 

Had  this  distaste  confined  itself  to  his  contacts 
with  professional  politicians,  the  injury  would  not 
have  been  irreparable,  but  it  happened  to  be  the 
case  that  the  President  was  not  elected  by  a 
party,  but  by  a  movement — a  great  progressivist 
uprising  of  men  and  women  grown  sick  of 
"machines"  and  eager  for  escape  from  the  old 
Civil  War  ahgnment.  Every  appointment  to 
office  should  have  been  studied  carefully  with  a 
view  to  strengthening  this  movement.  This  was 
what  the  President  did  not  do.  His  keen  disHke 
of  "patronage  brokers"  made  him  hold  aloof 
from  party  bosses,  but  he  failed  to  accompany 
this  attitude  by  any  determined  search  for 
appointees  with  whom  progressivism  was  a 
religion.  Anxious  to  get  rid  of  an  unpleasant 
business,  he  fell  more  and  more  into  the  habit 
of  depending  upon  the  advice  of  those  close  to 
him,  and  as  a  consequence  men  were  selected 
who  satisfied  neither  party  nor  movement. 
Garrison,  McReynolds,  Gregory,  Burleson,  and 
others  like  them  were  not  "machine  men,"  but 
neither  were  they  Wilson's  kind.     As  a  matter  of 

21 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

fact,  every  one  of  them  was  a  Bourbon  of  Bour- 
bons. This  haphazard  method  of  selection,  due 
entirely  to  the  President's  refusal  to  take  keen 
and  continuous  personal  interest  in  appoint- 
ments, worked  a  triple  injury — it  surrounded 
him  with  men  who  did  not  speak  his  language 
or  think  his  thoughts;  it  alienated  the  leaders 
of  his  party,  and  it  weakened  and  eventually 
demoralized  the  progressivist  movement. 

There  is  this  to  say  in  his  behalf,  however: 
the  treadmill  activities  of  the  White  House 
leave  its  occupant  little  time  for  anything  else, 
that  is,  if  he  has  honesty  and  high  purpose.  It  is 
rare  indeed  for  any  one  to  consider  the  Presidency 
in  the  light  of  a  job,  but  it  is  a  fact  that  a  con- 
scientious Chief  Executive  is  called  upon  for  more 
downright  drudgery  than  any  other  official  in  the 
world.  The  position  still  runs  exactly  along  the 
lines  laid  down  in  1787,  when  the  population  of 
the  entire  country  totaled  less  than  the  census 
of  New  York  to-day,  with  the  result  that  the 
duties  are  a  queer,  impossible  jumble  of  tre- 
mendous problems  and  absurd  clerical  routine 
calculated  to  break  the  strongest.  At  a  mo- 
ment when  the  President  is  considering  some 
vital  domestic  question  or  facing  an  interna- 
tional compUcation,  nothing  is  more  likely  than 
an  enforced  halt  while  he  affixes  his  signature 
one  thousand  times  to  papers  that  should  never 
get  beyond  a  third  assistant  secretary. 

The  difficulties  of  the  place  are  added  to  by 
the  popular  point  of  view  with  regard  to  pubHc 
servants.  The  head  of  a  great  corporation 
would  not  hold  his  position  a  day  were  he  to 

22 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

waste  his  energies  in  time-wasting  activities 
designed  only  to  advance  personal  popularity, 
yet  a  President  is  confidently  expected  to  leave 
his  office  door  open  for  all  who  choose  to  "drop 
in."  America  is  now  a  world  power,  and  Amer- 
ican government  has  become  a  tremendous  com- 
plexity that  centers  all  the  ceaseless  striving  of 
iio,cx)o,ooo  people,  and  yet  the  executive  head 
of  this  huge  corporation  is  expected  to  hold  to 
the  formula  of  conduct  laid  down  in  the  days  of 
tallow  dips  and  stage-coaches.  Professional  poli- 
ticians are  largely  to  blame  for  this,  with  their 
continual  emphasis  upon  the  office  rather  than 
the  task,  their  campaign  mummeries  and  their 
buncombe  about  "simple,  rugged  Americanism.'' 
The  vulgar  charlatanism  of  campaigns  has  done 
much  to  confuse  democracy  with  miere  physical 
boisterousness,  and  in  many  minds  there  is  an 
actual  insistence  upon  hand-shaking,  shoulder- 
clapping,  and  abiHty  to  remember  first  names  as 
the  real  democratic  tests. 

Even  had  he  been  strong  enough  to  stand  the 
physical  strain  of  such  a  conception,  it  is  much 
to  be  doubted  if  Woodrow  Wilson  would  have 
attempted  to  live  up  to  this  caricature.  His 
temperament  precludes  the  tricks  of  the  pro- 
fessional office-seeker,  the  labored  lord-of-the- 
manor  graciousness  that  passes  for  "democracy," 
and  his  conscience  forbids  the  fawning,  time- 
wasting  activities  of  the  professional  office-seeker. 
As  a  historian  and  a  pubHcist,  he  had  made  care- 
ful study  of  the  duties  of  the  Chief  Executive, 
and  it  was  in  1908,  long  before  he  had  thought 
of  filling  the  office,  that  he  wrote  this  conclusion: 

23 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

No  other  man's  day  is  so  full  as  his,  so  full  of  the  responsi- 
bilities which  tax  mind  and  conscience  alike,  and  demand 
an  inexhaustible  vitality.  The  mere  task  of  making 
appointments  to  office,  which  the  Constitution  imposes 
upon  the  President,  has  come  near  to  breakmg  some  of  our 
Presidents  down,  because  it  is  a  never-ending  task  in  a 
civil  service  not  yet  put  upon  a  professional  footing,  con- 
fused with  short  terms  of  office,  always  forming  and  dis- 
solving. And  in  proportion  as  the  President  ventures  to 
use  his  opportunity  to  lead  opinion  and  to  act  as  spokesman 
of  the  people  in  affairs,  the  people  stand  ready  to  over- 
whelm him  by  running  to  him  with  every  question,  great 
and  small.  They  are  as  eager  to  have  him  settle  a  literary 
question  as  a  political;  hear  him  as  acquiescently  with 
regard  to  matters  of  expert  knowledge  as  with  regard  to 
public  affairs,  and  call  upon  him  to  quiet  all  troubles  by 
his  personal  intervention.  Men  of  ordinary  physique  and 
discretion  cannot  be  Presidents  and  live,  if  the  strain 
be  not  romehow  relieved.  We  shall  be  obliged  always  to 
be  picking  our  Chief  Magistrates  from  among  wise  and 
prudent  athletes. 

He  knew,  therefore,  that  he  would  have  to 
choose,  at  the  very  outset,  between  popularity 
and  service.  Either  he  could  consider  the  office 
politically,  disregarding  duty  in  the  interests  of 
personal  acclaim,  or  he  could  assume  it  as  a  task 
to  be  discharged  in  honor  and  high  faith,  thereby 
surrendering  all  hope  of  applause.  He  made  his 
decision  as  an  American,  not  as  a  politician. 
After  estimating  the  task  in  terms  of  routine 
and  national  needs,  and  measuring  the  demand 
against  his  strength,  he  saw  plainly  that  the  one 
chance  was  a  careful,  systematic,  scientific  con- 
servation of  every  ounce  of  energy.  Taking  up 
the  study  of  his  problem  with  the  cool  detach- 
ment of  an  engineer  in  charge  of  a  plant,  the 
President  and  his  physician  worked  out  an  iron 

24 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

regimen,  a  fixed  daily  program  that  ordered 
every  minute  of  his  life  with  machine-like 
exactitude. 

Certain  hours  for  work  and  sleep,  regular 
mornings  for  golf  and  regular  nights  for  the 
theater,  a  scientific  diet,  and  stern  caution  against 
waste  effort  of  every  kind.  It  was  not  only 
physical  habits  that  were  forced  under  rigid 
discipline,  but  mental  habits  as  well.  Never  at 
any  time  disposed  to  solitude  or  reticence, 
but  one  of  the  most  companionable  men  that 
ever  lived,  the  President  had  never  failed  to 
find  a  large  part  of  his  pleasure  in  the  give-and- 
take  of  conversation.  The  trouble  was,  as 
with  every  eager,  vivid  personality,  that  he  gave 
more  than  he  took.  His  talk  was  no  mere 
adventure  in  anecdotes,  but  a  broad  sweep 
across  the  whole  of  Hfe,  illuminating  everything 
that  it  touched.  Such  contacts,  inevitably 
entailing  an  expenditure  of  nervous  force,  had 
to  be  surrendered.  Interviews  were  confined 
to  official  importances,  and  personal  approaches 
increasingly  gave  way  to  the  submission  of 
memoranda.  In  the  quiet  of  his  study  every 
paper  received  the  painstaking  attention  of 
the  President,  but  even  this  larger  efficiency 
failed  to  soothe  wounded  vanities.  As  he  was 
permitted  no  excitement  at  meals,  even  eating 
became  a  business.  This  deprived  him  of  one  of 
Roosevelt's  greatest  assets,  making  the  White 
House  table  a  quiet  affair  instead  of  the  gather- 
ing-place that  the  President  would  have  liked. 

Only  his  doctors  knew.  Not  once,  in  all  the 
driving  years,  did  he  confess  the  fight  that  went 

25 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

on  in  loneliness  from  day  to  day.  Some  one 
has  said  that  the  President's  greatest  weakness 
is  an  utter  inability  to  "grand-stand."  This 
lack  was  never  more  apparent  than  in  connection 
with  his  struggle  against  exhaustion.  A  word, 
a  gesture,  would  have  won  him  understanding 
and  sympathy,  but  he  would  not  speak  it, 
would  not  make  it.  He  won  and  continued  to 
win,  but  victory  was  never  assured.  There 
was  always  a  shadow  that  hung  over  him, 
always  the  fear  that  each  new  day  might  bring 
the  added  ounce  of  strain  that  could  not  be 
endured.  And  so  each  hour  that  he  wrested 
from  his  battle  was  devoted  to  the  task,  not 
to  the  man. 

These  conditions  of  the  President's  life  should 
serve  to  explain  many  of  the  inconsistencies 
that  have  baffled  observers,  resulting  in  biog- 
raphies that  are  no  more  than  studies  in  con- 
trast. One  man  sees  him  as  a  thinking-machine, 
cold,  remote,  aloof,  utterly  devoid  of  animal 
heat,  while  another  sees  him  as  a  man  of  warm 
impulses,  intensely  human,  and  winningly  genial. 
Both  are  true  pictures,  one  being  the  man,  the 
other  the  President:  one  a  normal  person, 
impulsive  and  companionable,  the  other  the 
creature  of  an  iron  discipline,  compelled  to  live 
within  himself  because  it  was  the  only  way  in 
which  he  could  live  and  discharge  the  duties 
imposed  upon  him  by  his  official  oath  and  his 
conscience. 

The  results  of  Woodrow  Wilson's  determination 
to  serve  are  written  in  the  bronze  of  history. 
The  administrative  record  of  the  last  eight  years 

26 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

IS  a  record  of  accomplishment  without  parallel 
in  the  annals  of  American  government.  Great 
laws,  dealing  with  the  very  fundamentals  of 
finance,  industry,  tariff  legislation,  human  wel- 
fare, commerce,  and  credit,  were  either  con- 
ceived by  him  or  else  mastered  by  him  in  the 
interests  of  intelligent  advocacy. 

Confronted  from  the  first  by  a  press  of  prob- 
lems handed  down  from  the  Roosevelt  and  Taft 
administrations — faced  by  the  necessity  of  end- 
ing the  rule  of  Special  Privilege,  in  no  instance 
did  he  evade  or  ignore.  Tariff  revision,  the  Fed- 
eral Reserve  Act,  the  Federal  Trade  Commission, 
rural  credits,  the  Clayton  anti-trust  law,  the 
child-labor  law,  the  eight-hour  day,  workmen's 
compensation,  development  of  natural  resources, 
road-building,  the  Seamen's  Act,  the  shipping  bill 
— these  were  some  of  his  measures  that  put 
foundations  under  honest  business,  defeated 
cruelty  and  injustice,  threw  the  mantle  of  pro- 
tection over  the  weak  and  helpless,  and  restored 
the  pride,  the  courage,  and  creative  genius  of 
the  American  people.  With  it  all  he  had  to 
meet  one  international  complication  after  the 
other,  and  always  there  was  the  wretched  weight 
of  an  enormous  routine. 

It  did  not  seem  possible  that  human  strength 
could  stand  additional  strain,  yet  when  America 
entered  the  war  he  seemed  to  find  new  wells  of 
energy  on  which  to  draw.  Throughout  the 
struggle  he  did  the  work  of  ten  men.  While  it 
is  true  enough  that  no  one  was  "close"  to  the 
President,  it  is  also  true  that  he  himself  was 
close  to  every  man  connected  with  government. 

27 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

He  had  his  hand  on  the  pulse  of  each  department, 
and  his  knowledge  of  detail  was  as  amazing 
as  it  was  often  disconcerting  in  the  hour  of  re- 
port. He  did  not  seem  able  to  divest  himself 
of  a  feeling  of  personal  responsibility  for  every 
soldier  that  he  sent  to  France,  and  this  virtual 
obsession  drove  him  relentlessly.  What  the 
youth  of  America  was  doing  appealed  to  him 
as  so  wonderfully  fine,  so  shot  through  with  a 
splendor  of  sacrifice,  that  he  looked  upon  any 
sparing  of  himself  as  nothing  short  of  betrayal. 
After  a  crowded  day — for,  despite  alleged  "aloof- 
ness," he  saw  people  in  a  steady  stream  of  five, 
ten,  and  fifteen-minute  interviews — he  gave  his 
evening,  to  the  papers  that  stacked  his  desk, 
typing  ofF  comment,  suggestion,  or  instructions 
on  his  own  battered  little  machine.  It  took  six 
weeks  invariably  to  get  a  ruling  from  the  State 
Department,  but  the  President  repKed  either 
at  once  with  a  dictated  letter  or  else  on  the 
morning  of  the  second  day  there  came  the  small 
envelope  with  its  little  typewritten  page,  all 
curiously  neat,  signed  "W.  W." 

I  saw  him  many  times  when  his  face  had  the 
gray  of  ashes,  but  the  one  complaint  that  I  ever 
heard  was  on  the  score  of  sleepiness.  "Fm 
getting  like  Dickens's  fat  boy,"  he  laughed  one 
day.  "I  could  go  to  sleep  at  an  angle  of  ninety- 
five  degrees."  The  importance  of  husbanding 
his  energies,  however,  made  him  less  and  less 
willing  to  spend  them  upon  the  trivial,  and  the 
immaterial  and  irrelevant  became  increasingly 
unbearable.  There  was  so  much  to  do,  and 
always  the  fear  of  being  hampered  in  the  doing 

28 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

by  some  rebellion  of  the  body.  I  felt  always 
that  any  standing  possessed  by  me  with  the 
President  was  due  to  the  fact  that  at  the  very 
outset  I  divined  this  sense  of  urgency.  Before 
an  interview  with  him,  I  would  prepare  for  it 
just  as  a  lavA^er  prepares  a  brief,  putting  each 
subject  down  in  its  proper  order,  heading  and 
subheading,  and  working  up  the  manner  of 
presentation  in  order  to  strip  away  every  vestige 
of  the  non-essential.  Within  ten  seconds  after 
shaking  hands  I  had  commenced  my  memoran- 
dum and  followed  it  through  without  pause  or 
change.  So  few  did  this.  During  the  war  I 
took  scores  of  visitors  to  the  White  House,  many 
of  them  men  of  large  affairs  and  high  reputation 
as  executives,  and  it  was  seldom  indeed  that 
any  of  them  drove  hard  and  straight  at  the 
point.  One  man  that  I  remember  particularly 
had  twenty  minutes  to  present  a  most  important 
matter  and  he  did  not  even  touch  upon  it  until 
after  nineteen  minutes  had  passed. 

Thomas  Garrigues  Masaryk,  that  great  states- 
man now  President  of  Czechoslovakia,  once 
remarked  to  me  on  the  "amazing  impracticality" 
of  America's  so-called  "practical  men,'*  and 
whimsically  commented  that  of  all  the  people 
he  had  met  "your  visionary,  idealistic  President 
is  by  far  and  away  the  most  intensely  practical.'' 
Franklin  Lane  had  a  habit  of  referring  to  him 
as  "an  idealist  in  action,"  but  the  only  other  who 
ever  seemed  to  grasp  this  very  obvious  charac- 
teristic of  the  President  was  Charles  H.  Grasty, 
who  touched  on  it  as  follows  in  the  course  of  a 
recent  article  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly: 

29 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

After  seeing  him  at  Paris,  I  would  expect  him  to  succeed 
if,  upon  his  retirement  from  the  Presidency  at  sixty-four 
years  of  age,  he  took  the  highly  improbable  step  of  entering 
the  field  of  industry.  In  a  large  executive  position,  say 
the  presidency  of  the  Steel  Corporation,  I  confidently 
believe  that  he  would  make  an  unprecedented  success. 
He  has  the  keenest  and  truest  sense  of  what  is  real.  Irrele- 
vance cuts  him  to  pieces.  When  he  is  at  work  on  a  thing  that 
engages  his  interest  he  is  like  a  hound  on  the  scent.  Waste 
of  time  or  any  kind  of  lost  motion  is  like  poison  to  him. 
A  member  of  the  Big  Four  once  said  to  me:  "Wilson  works. 
The  rest  of  us  play,  comparatively  speaking.  We  Euro- 
peans can't  keep  up  with  a  man  who  travels  a  straight 
path  with  such  a  swift  stride,  never  looking  to  the  right 
or  left.  We  cannot  put  aside  our  habit  of  rambling  a  bit 
on  the  way." 

The  reason,  perhaps,  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
of  all  our  misused  words,  practicality  has  been 
most  twisted  away  from  its  original  meaning. 
Owing  to  the  general  habit  of  measuring  accom- 
plishment in  terms  of  profit,  it  has  come  to 
stand  for  acquisitiveness,  for  a  certain  mean 
shrewdness,  for  the  successes  of  greed.  The 
man  who  dreams  the  dream  of  tunneling  a 
mountain  so  that  locked  waters  may  turn  the 
desert  into  orchard,  and  then  allows  himself 
to  be  cheated  of  the  financial  reward,  is  **  im- 
practical," but  the  glorified  pawnbroker  that 
does  the  cheating  is  hailed  as  "practical." 

Watching  the  President's  mind  work  was  like 
watching  the  drive  of  a  perfectly  tuned  engine. 
Intellectual  discipline,  supplementing  naturai 
ability,  has  placed  every  faculty  at  his  immediate 
call,  and  there  is  never  a  hint  of  waste  nor  delay. 
What  often  passes  for  "peremptoriness"  with 
him  is  really  nothing  more  than  his  habit  of 

30 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

thinking  straight  and  thinking  through.  Having 
certainties  of  his  own,  he  pays  people  the  com- 
pKment  of  assuming  that  they  themselves  have 
equally  definite  conclusions,  and  he  invites 
the  clash  of  ideas.  Instead  of  disliking  argu- 
ment, there  was  never  any  one  who  had  higher 
appreciation  of  the  value  of  argument.  What 
he  does  not  Hke,  to  be  sure,  is  the  blithe  custom 
of  substituting  mere  assertions  for  established 
facts  and  placing  rehance  upon  opinions  rather 
than  logic. 

I  was  in  Washington  from  the  first  week  of 
the  war  to  the  last,  occupying  a  position  that 
brought  me  into  intimate  contact  with  the  head 
of  every  department,  bureau,  and  committee, 
and  I  can  say  truthfully  that  of  all  those  assem- 
bled minds  the  President's  was  the  most  open. 
This  does  not  mean  the  usual  catch-basin  type 
of  mind  into  which  any  passer-by  may  throw 
his  mental  trash,  but  a  mind  receptive  to  sug- 
gestions, one  with  a  welcome  for  new  ideas.  He 
comes  to  his  conclusions  too  carefully  to  give 
them  up  quickly,  but  once  let  his  facts  be  dis- 
puted successfully  and  he  surrenders  without 
question.  And  of  all  the  men  who  gathered  to 
direct  the  progress  of  the  great  war  machine, 
the  President  was  the  most  modest  and  the  most 
courteous.  No  man  ever  heard  him  utter  a 
vainglorious  word  or  a  rude  one.  What  was 
always  most  impressive,  however,  was  his  re- 
markable control  over  as  hot  a  temper  as  ever 
burned  within  a  human  being. 

A  habit  of  emphasizing  the  Scotch  strain  in 
Wilson's  blood  has  curiously  obscured  the  fact 

31 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

that  on  the  paternal  side  his  grandfather  and 
grandmother  were  both  Irish.  Never  in  any 
one  were  two  blood  strains  more  apparent  or 
more  evenly  balanced.  The  result  is  the  very 
unusual  combination  of  strength  and  sensi- 
bility. "Strong  men"  are  too  often  lacking 
in  the  emotional  necessities,  while  delicacies 
of  perception  and  feehng  are  generally  compan- 
ioned by  a  sort  of  wishy-washiness.  The  mixt- 
ure is  Hkewise  responsible  for  a  very  definite 
cross-pull,  and  no  one  is  more  aware  of  it  than 
the  President  himself.  As  he  said  to  me  one 
day:  "The  Irish  is  always  the  first  to  react  and 
its  invariable  command  is  to  go  ahead.  The 
Scotch,  however,  is  never  more  than  a  second 
behind,  and  always  catches  me  by  the  coattail 
with  the  warning  to  wait  a  minute  and  think  it 
over." 

As  a  result,  his  conclusions  are  invariably 
reached  by  a  process  of  incubation,  assisted  at 
every  point  by  the  most  painstaking  study  and 
thorough  investigation.  Instead  of  an  "im- 
patience of  counsel  and  failure  Xo  subject  him- 
self to  the  corrective  process  of  association," 
the  very  reverse  is  true.  To  use  his  own  favorite 
phrase,  he  "borrows  brains"  wherever  he  finds 
them,  and  many  important  decisions  are  delayed 
unwisely  while  he  waits  to  see  persons  assumed 
to  have  certain  special  knowledge.  Complete 
information  is  a  passion  with  him,  and  it  was  in 
this  connection  that  Colonel  House  proved  so 
valuable.  Soft-spoken,  selfless,  unassertive,  but 
an  epitome  of  alertness,  the  colonel  was  a  high- 
class  sponge,  with  the  added  beauty  of  being 

32 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

easy  to  squeeze.  Once  in  possession  of  every 
fact  in  the  case,  the  President  withdraws,  com- 
mences the  business  of  consideration,  compari- 
son, and  assessment,  and  then  emerges  with  a 
decision. 

This  habit  of  thought  is  by  no  means  a  short 
cut  to  popularity.  There  is  a  certain  vanity 
in  all  of  us  that  makes  us  like  to  feel  that  our 
views  carry  weight,  that  our  conclusions  have 
the  quality  of  convincing,  and  a  certain  chill 
is  bound  to  come  when  we  see  views  and  con- 
clusions carted  away  to  be  sorted  over  with  a 
lot  of  others.  Also,  in  the  case  of  politicians, 
advice  usually  means  control.  The  charge  that 
the  President  "dislikes  advice"  is  simply  that 
the  President  prefers  to  form  his  own  conclu- 
sions instead  of  letting  others  form  them  for 
him. 

If,  however,  the  Scotch  strain  disposes  him  to 
slowness  in  making  a  decision,  the  Irish  strain 
assumes  command  when  the  decision  has  been 
reached,  and  he  brings  to  his  advocacies  a 
fighting  spirit  that  takes  no  account  of  odds. 
Slow  to  take  fire,  he  burns  inextinguishably 
when  once  alight.  Here  again,  however,  the 
President  suffers  by  contrast.  By  comparison 
with  the  opportunism  and  pliability  of  the 
average  politician,  the  Wilson  tenacity  of  pur- 
pose inevitably  takes  on  the  look  and  feel  of 
granite. 

Mental  habits  have  a  clutch  as  strong  as  the 
physical.  As  time  went  by,  with  increasing 
necessity  for  husbanding  hours  and  energy, 
it  was  easy  to  see  the  growing  dominance  of  the 

33 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

intellectual  factor  in  the  President's  equation. 
He  came  more  and  more  to  view  every  problem 
mentally,  to  look  into  the  minds  of  men  rather 
than  into  the  hearts  of  men.  America  possessed 
him  to  the  exclusion  of  Americans,  and  in 
increasing  degree  he  gave  his  thought  to  the 
people  as  a  whole  rather  than  to  individuals. 
A  revolt  against  the  charlatanism  of  politics, 
with  its  emphasis  on  palliatives,  gave  intensity 
to  his  search  for  causes  and  cures.  On  every 
side  he  saw  politicians  and  papers  trying  to 
content  people  with  thrills,  and  his  determina- 
tion grew  to  make  people  think.  With  his 
mastery  of  language,  his  rare  ability  to  give 
words  poignancy  as  well  as  point,  it  would  have 
been  easy  for  him  to  dramatize  himself,  but  he 
shrank  from  this  usual  political  trick  as  unutter- 
ably cheap,  wholly  unworthy.  On  his  trip  in 
support  of  the  League  of  Nations,  for  instance, 
it  was  suggested  to  him  that  it  might  be  well  to 
"warm  up  a  bit,''  and  his  answer  was  an  indig- 
nant refusal  to  "capitalize  the  dead." 

It  was  a  course  that  had  no  other  end  than 
unpopularity,  for  the  American  people  prefer  to 
confine  the  business  of  thinking  to  their  own 
personal  affairs.  When  they  turn  to  politics 
it  is  for  amusement,  for  excitement,  for  indigna- 
tion, but  never  for  intellectual  activity.  The 
President,  by  his  continual  appeals  to  mentality 
rather  than  to  the  emotions,  became  a  trial. 
The  war,  with  its  opportunity  for  intense  feeling, 
saved  him  from  actual  disfavor  for  a  while,  but 
the  reactions  of  the  armistice  sealed  his  doom. 
People  turned   back  definitely   and   irritatedly 

34 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

to  their  own  personal  concerns,  and  the  continued 
insistence  of  the  President  upon  national  and 
international  affairs  both  bored  and  angered. 
Couldn't  he  see  that  they  were  busy!  Yet  only 
the  President  has  lost.  Every  word  that  he 
said,  every  appeal  that  he  cried,  has  found  a 
lodgment  in  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  men  and 
women  of  the  United  States,  and  while  they  may 
disHke  him  for  making  them  think,  the  thinking 
is  being  done.  He  has  been,  in  truth,  a  school- 
master, and  not  all  that  we  get  from  a  teacher 
ever  softens  humanity's  curious  resentment  at 
having  to  be  taught. 

Such  a  type  was  naturally  disappointing  to 
the  newspapers,  and  this  disappointment  is 
at  the  heart  of  the  "aloofness'*  that  grew  up 
between  the  President  and  the  Washington 
correspondents.  They  wanted  drama  and  he 
refused  to  furnish  it.  They  wanted  something 
that  would  lend  itself  to  "scareheads*'  and  he 
responded  with  an  "exposition.''  In  the  first 
years  of  his  administration  the  President  received 
the  correspondents  regularly.  He  talked  to 
them  with  the  utmost  freedom,  and  the  discon- 
tinuance of  the  interviews  was  not  based  upon 
any  violation  of  confidence,  but  upon  his  con- 
viction of  their  futility.  In  the  group  that  would 
stand  before  him  were  men  of  high  character 
and  brilliant  attainments,  able  to  talk  and 
think  on  terms  of  equality  with  any  statesman  X 
or  great  executive.  Also  in  the  group,  however, 
were  immature  boys,  ignorant  of  Hfe  in  any  of 
its  larger  aspects  and  unconcerned  with  issues 
since  they  were  without   knowledge  of  them. 

4  35 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

These  undeveloped  minds  played  with  small 
things  and  put  continual  emphasis  upon  them. 
They  were  more  interested  in  the  sheep  on  the 
White  House  lawn  than  in  any  analysis  of 
policy,  more  eager  to  find  out  what  the  President 
had  for  dinner  than  to  receive  the  explanation 
of  a  proposed  law. 

The  principal  distaste  of  the  President,  how- 
ever, was  based  upon  what  he  termed  "con- 
jectural journalism."  He  felt  that  the  press 
was  not  interested  in  what  had  happened,  or 
what  would  happen,  but  only  in  what  might 
happen.  As  he  phrased  it,  their  idea  of  news 
was  "the  satisfaction  of  curiosity."  Every  one 
will  admit  the  folly  of  taking  the  eggs  from 
under  a  hen  every  five  minutes  in  order  to  note 
the  process  of  incubation,  yet  when  great  ques- 
tions of  domestic  or  international  import  are 
in  process  of  settlement,  the  press  insists  upon 
its  right  to  examine  them  at  every  stage  of  the 
hatching  process.  This  claim  was  abhorrent 
to  the  orderly  habits  of  the  Wilson  mind,  with 
its  regard  for  established  facts,  and  it  became 
his  battle  to  conceal  decisions  until  they  were 
completely  formed.  At  Paris,  as  in  Washing- 
ton, much  of  the  complaint  of  press  and  politi- 
cians was  due  to  the  President's  refusal  to 
"guess." 

Once  he  might  have  taken  a  chance  on  the 
hazards  of  "conjecture,"  once  he  might  have 
endured  stupidity,  selfishness,  low  thinking,  and 
time-wasting,  once  he  might  have  thought  in 
terms  of  personal  popularity  or  partizan  ad- 
vantage,  but   if  ever  there  was   such   a   time, 

36 


THE  MAN  AND  THE  PRESIDENT 

it  was  before  he  became  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  a  time  before  he  sat  face  to  face 
with  America,  heard  her  call  and  saw  her  needs. 
What  happened  to  Woodrow  Wilson  was  the 
thing  that  happened  to  Lincoln,  that  happened 
to  Washington — the  dream  of  a  race,  the  spiritual 
passions  of  a  people,  the  necessities  of  menaced 
liberties,  joined  to  lift  him  from  the  homely 
companionships  of  the  average  to  the  loneliness 
of  the  type. 

What  is  America,  after  all — not  the  America 
that  we  sing  when  the  verses  are  remembered — 
but  the  America  that  is  in  the  hearts  of  men, 
that  is  the  hope  of  mothers,  the  inheritance  of 
children?  It  is  a  light  that  has  never  failed 
since  first  it  rose,  a  dream  of  ideals  more  glorious 
than  armies,  a  vision  of  struggle  against  the 
injustices  of  life,  a  working  theory  of  spiritual 
progress  that  shall  make  to-morrow  finer  and 
better  than  to-day. 

No  people  in  all  history  were  ever  less  con- 
cerned with  the  material.  Money  is  merely  the 
symbol  of  achievement;  our  passion  is  progress, 
and  high  endeavor  our  happiness.  At  once 
pacific  and  militant,  incurably  religious  yet  in- 
cessantly questing,  clamorously  emotional  but 
hard  and  shrewd  withal,  conservative  and  revo- 
lutionary in  the  same  breath,  curiously  sophisti- 
cated and  unalterably  naive,  freedom  is  the  one 
note  that  brings  every  discord  into  harmon3^ 
Controlled  by  a  law  of  averages  for  the  most 
part,  giving  mediocrity  an  easy  indulgence,  it  is 
only  when  danger  reaches  down  to  the  soul  of 
America  that  the  type  is  demanded  and  evolved. 

37 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

And  well  for  these  great  souls  if,  like  Lincoln, 
they  pass  on  in  the  moment  of  supreme  achieve- 
ment, for  there  is  nothing  more  cruel,  more 
savage,  than  a  people's  reaction  from  high 
emotionalism. 


\ 


II 

NEUTRALITY 

THE  peace  tangle  will  not  unravel  unless  re- 
lated to  war  aims,  and  war  aims  stand 
unsupported  and  somewhat  overstrained  unless 
related  to  the  various  emotional  stages  that 
marked  the  period  of  our  neutrality.  The  web 
of  confusion  in  which  the  nation  struggles  is  no 
simple  skein,  but  a  compUcated  weave  of  every 
falsehood  and  prejudice  evolved  by  the  political 
and  spiritual  upheavals  of  the  last  six  years. 

One  has  only  to  read  the  public  prints  of  1914 
to  realize  how  entirely  the  Great  War  took 
America  by  surprise.  Such  a  sudden,  unpro- 
voked assault  on  the  ideals  of  civilization  was 
not  only  incomprehensible  to  us,  but  almost 
incredible.  Naturally,  well-nigh  instinctively, 
the  mind  of  the  nation  reacted  on  the  instant  to 
old  habits  of  thought  and  famiUar  courses  of 
action. 

More  than  any  other  tradition  or  poHcy,  the 
gospel  of  democracy  declared  by  James  Monroe 
has  dominated  the  expanding  life  of  America. 
Flung  at  the  monarchies  of  Europe  in  1823  as  a 
grim  ultimatum  that  their  interference  in  the 
political  affairs  of  the  New  World  would  be 
resisted  to  the  death,  it  was  equally  our  promise 
not  to  interfere  in  the  wars  and  disputes  of  the 

39 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Old  World.  At  the  time  no  more  than  a  simple 
warning,  it  grew  in  the  popular  mind  to  be  an 
expression  of  national  independence,  the  great 
foundation  stone  in  the  wall  of  American  safety. 
It  was  at  all  times  questionable  whether  we 
could  have  upheld  the  famous  Doctrine  in  event 
of  attack,  but  there  was  never  a  moment  when 
the  country  would  not  have  taken  arms  in  its 
defense.  The  cables,  the  wireless,  fast  mails, 
and  the  growth  of  foreign  trade  all  joined  to 
end  the  isolation  that  was  the  very  heart  of  the 
policy,  but  changed  conditions  had  no  power  to 
weaken  faith  in  its  desirability  and  importance. 
Even  in  the  Hague  Conference  of  1899  the  dele- 
gates of  the  United  States  signed  the  arbitration 
convention  with  this  proviso: 

Nothing  contained  in  this  convention  shall  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  require  the  United  States  of  America  to  depart 
from  its  traditional  policy  of  not  intruding  upon,  interfering 
with,  or  entangling  itself  in  the  political  questions  or  policy 
or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign  state;  nor  shall 
anything  contained  in  the  said  convention  be  construed 
to  imply  a  relinquishment  by  the  United  States  of  America 
of  its  traditional  attitude  toward  purely  American  questions. 

We  sent  delegates  to  the  Algeciras  Conference 
called  in  1906  to  adjust  the  affairs  of  Morocco, 
but  while  approving  the  arrangement  that  re- 
sulted, we  disclaimed  any  responsibility  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  treaty  provisions  that  guaran- 
teed the  independence  and  integrity  of  Morocco. 
Five  years  later,  when  these  guaranties  were 
ruthlessly  set  aside,  we  affirmed  our  traditional 
attitude  by  refusal  to  enter  protest. 

Another  great  American  tradition,  second  in 
40 


NEUTRALITY 

our  hearts  only  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  was  the 
advocacy  of  arbitration  as  a  substitute  for  war. 
From  the  day  that  the  thirteen  original  states 
agreed  to  abide  by  the  decisions  of  a  federal  tri- 
bunal, Americans  have  had  the  conviction  that 
similar  agreements  on  the  part  of  nations  would 
achieve  similar  results.  It  was  this  plan  of 
judicial  settlements,  rather  than  military  de- 
cisions, that  we  took  to  The  Hague  in  1899  and 
again  in  1907,  and  that  we  failed  in  our  purpose 
was  entirely  due  to  the  resistance  of  the  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  Empires.  Defeated  in 
our  purpose,  as  far  as  international  concert  was 
concerned,  our  enthusiasm  suffered  no  abate- 
ment. To  nation  after  nation  we  carried  our 
statement  of  aims,  and  by  1914  w^e  had  effected 
dual  arbitration  treaties  with  thirty  countries, 
twenty  of  which  had  been  duly  ratified  and 
proclaimed. 

These  traditions,  these  aspirations,  were  as 
much  a  part  of  American  life  as  the  breath  of 
the  body,  and  the  President  spoke  for  a  whole 
people  when  he  issued  his  proclamation  of  neu- 
trality on  August  4th,  supporting  it  later  in  these 
noble  words: 

Every  man  who  really  loves  America  will  act  and  speak 
in  the  true  spirit  of  neutrality,  which  is  the  spirit  of  im- 
partiality and  fairness  and  friendliness  to  all  concerned. 
...  It  will  be  easy  to  excite  passion  and  difficult  to  allay 
it.  Such  divisions  among  us  .  .  .  might  seriously  stand 
in  the  way  of  the  proper  performance  of  our  duty  as  the 
one  great  nation  at  peace,  the  one  people  holding  itself 
ready  to  play  a  part  of  impartial  mediation  and  speak 
counsels  of  peace  and  accommodation,  not  as  a  partizan, 
but  as  a  friend. 

41 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

This  thought,  springing  inevitably  from  the 
American  faith  in  arbitration,  our  horror  of  war, 
dominated  all  of  the  President's  earlier  speeches, 
and  the  response  of  the  country  was  sincere. 
Not  at  the  time,  nor  for  months,  was  any  Amer- 
ican right  assailed,  and  the  whole  dispute  seemed 
entirely  European.  It  was  not  until  a  full  year 
had  passed  that  the  full  tragedy  of  Germany's 
treatment  of  Belgium  burned  inta  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  United  States,  and  it  was  an 
even  longer  period  before  the  full  purpose  of  the 
Imperial  German  government  dawned  upon  the 
democratic  mind. 

It  is  one  of  the  paradoxes  of  politics  that  those 
partizans  who  attack  the  League  of  Nations 
because  it  carries  the  danger  of  American  en- 
tanglement in  European  affairs  also  declare  in 
the  same  breath  that  America  was  shamed  and 
betrayed  by  the  President's  refusal  to  thrust 
America  into  the  World  War  at  the  time  of  Bel- 
gium's invasion.  It  is  this  falsity  that  must  be 
considered  at  the  very  outset,  for  it  is  respon- 
sible for  much  of  the  prejudice  that  clouds 
judgment. 

The  answer  is  simple  and  does  not  admit  of 
challenge.  It  is  not  the  right  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States  to  declare  war,  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  vesting  that  power  in 
Congress  absolutely  and  entirely.  No  con- 
straint of  any  kind  rested  upon  Senator  or 
Representative.  It  was  the  privilege  of  any 
single  member  of  Congress  to  introduce  a  war 
resolution  or  to  ask  a  protest.  This  power  was 
not   exercised.     No   resolution  was   introduced. 

42 


NEUTRALITY 

Neither  at  the  time  of  the  German  invasion  of 
Belgium  nor  during  the  first  year  of  the  German 
occupation  was  war  or  protest  even  suggested 
in  Congress  or  out  of  it. 

Speaking  on  February  i6,  1916,  EHhu  Root, 
then  a  full-fledged  presidential  candidate,  as- 
serted that  *'the  American  people  are  entitled 
not  merely  to  feel,  but  to  speak  concerning  the 
wrong  done  to  Belgium.  The  law  protecting 
Belgium  which  was  violated  was  our  law  and  the 
law  of  every  other  civilized  nation."  Better 
than  any  one  else  EHhu  Root  knew  that  the 
United  States  was  bound  by  neither  law  nor 
treaty.  The  Hague  Declaration  that  the  "ter- 
ritory of  neutral  powers  is  inviolable''  contained 
no  means  of  enforcement,  and,  as  far  as  1914  was 
concerned,  nullified  itself  entirely  by  Article  20: 
"The  provisions  of  the  present  Convention  do 
not  apply  except  as  between  contracting  parties, 
and  then  only  if  all  the  belligerents  are  parties  to 
the  Convention."  Neither  Great  Britain  nor 
Serbia  ever  ratified  the  convention.  What  is 
even  more  to  the  point,  Mr.  Root  was  in  the 
Senate  for  one  year  and  six  months  after  the 
invasion  of  Belgium  and  not  once  during  that 
time  did  he  open  his  mouth  to  suggest  a  protest. 

As  for  Mr.  Roosevelt,  who  devoted  the  latter 
part  of  191 5  and  the  first  six  months  of  1916  to 
attacking  President  Wilson  for  his  failure  to  pro- 
test In  the  matter  of  Belgium,  the  following 
article  from  his  pen  appeared  in  The  Outlook 
under  date  of  September  23,  191 5: 

A  deputation  of  Belgians  has  arrived  in  this  country  to 
invoke  our  assistance  in  the  time  of  their  dreadful  need. 

43 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

What  action  our  government  can  or  will  take  I  know  not. 
It  has  been  announced  that  no  action  can  be  taken  that  will 
interfere  with  our  entire  neutrality.  It  is  certainly  emi- 
nently desirable  that  we  should  remain  entirely  neutral  and 
nothing  but  urgent  need  would  warrant  breaking  our 
neutrality  and  taking  sides  one  way  or  the  other. 

Neutrality,  however,  argued  no  surrender 
whatsoever  of  American  rights.  In  this  con- 
nection, disputes  with  Great  Britain  gave  small 
occasion  for  real  alarm,  as  the  existence  of  a 
treaty  provided  means  of  peaceful  adjustment. 
Such  was  not  the  case  with  the  Imperial  German 
government,  which  had  specifically  and  repeat- 
edly refused  to  enter  into  arbitration  agreements 
with  us.  It  was  apparent,  therefore,  that  dis- 
sensions arising  between  the  United  States  and 
Germany  held  promise  of  grave  danger,  for 
diplomatic  conversations,  ineffective  at  best, 
are  hopeless  unless  exchanged  in  good  faith. 
The  absence  of  this  good  faith  was  made  mani- 
fest at  the  very  outset  by  the  organized  German 
attempt  to  arouse  outcry  against  our  sale  of 
munitions  to  the  Allies. 

The  contention  was  dishonest,  for  as  recently 
as  the  Balkan  wars  of  191 2  and  191 3  both 
Germany  and  Austria  had  sold  munitions  to 
the  belligerents.  Their  appeals  to  us,  therefore, 
"were  not  to  observe  international  lavv^,  but  to 
revise  it  in  their  interest.''  The  stand  taken 
by  the  United  States  was  consistent  not  only 
with  international  law  and  traditional  policy, 
but  also  with  obvious  common  sense.  For,  as 
we  pointed  out,  "if  we  had  refused  to  sell 
munitions    to    belligerents    we    could    never    in 

44 


NEUTRALITY 

time  of  a  war  of  our  own  obtain  munitions  from 
neutrals,  and  the  nation  which  had  accumulated 
the  largest  reserves  of  war-supplies  in  time  of 
peace  would  be  assured  of  victory.  The  mili- 
tarist state  that  invested  its  money  in  arsenals 
would  be  at  a  fatal  advantage  over  the  free 
people  who  invested  their  wealth  in  schools. 
To  write  into  international  law  that  neutrals 
should  not  trade  in  munitions  would  be  to  hand 
over  the  world  to  the  rule  of  the  nation  with  the 
largest  armament  factories.  Such  a  policy  the 
United  States  of  America  could  not  accept.' 

This  dispute,  and  others  like  it,  however,  were 
merely  irritating  when  compared  to  the  dyna- 
mite contained  in  another  historic  tradition. 
Only  second  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been 
our  deep  and  continuing  interest  in  the  "freedom 
of  the  seas."  In  the  early  days  of  the  Republic, 
long  before  the  West  opened  its  rich  resources 
to  our  energies,  we  sought  prosperity  in  the 
ocean  lanes,  and  America's  fast  clipper  ships 
carried  our  expanding  commerce  to  every  corner 
of  the  world.  As  a  consequence,  the  law  of  the 
seas  was  of  vital  interest  to  as,  and  from  the 
very  outset  our  diplomacy  has  had  a  just  mari- 
time code  as  one  of  its  principal  objectives. 
At  every  point  in  history  we  denied  the  theory 
that  any  nations  possessed  proprietary  rights 
in  world  waters,  and  entered  invariable  protest 
against  all  policies  of  belligerents  that  abridged 
the  rights  of  neutrals  to  sail  the  seas  in  peace  and 
independence. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the 


45 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

"freedom  of  the  seas"  was  a  gospel  that  we  were 
at  all  times  ready  to  defend  with  our  lives  and 
fortunes.  The  civil  wars  of  the  Barbary  States 
were  of  small  interest  to  us,  but  when  their 
piracies  limited  the  liberties  of  ocean  traffic  we 
declared  war  against  them.  Napoleon's  cam- 
paigns were  interesting  to  us  only  as  news, 
but  his  continental  blockade  struck  down  our 
sea  rights,  and  in  1798  we  drove  our  navy 
against  the  privateers  of  France  and  called 
Washington  from  his  retirement  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  army.  England's  war  against 
France  could  be  viewed  with  indifference,  but 
British  Orders  in  Council  affected  the  lives  of  our 
citizens  instantly  and  disastrously,  and  in  181 2 
we  took  arms  in  defense  of  the  freedom  of  the 
seas. 

The  typical  Americanism  of  the  President 
reacted  to  this  American  tradition  even  as  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  as  early  as  August  6, 
1914,  he  sounded  a  sharp  warning  to  the  belliger- 
ents, despatching  an  identical  note  to  all  of  them 
in  which  attention  was  called  to  the  sea  rights 
of  neutrals.  Again  on  February  10,  191 5,  as  a 
result  of  Germany's  proclamation  of  a  war  zone 
around  the  British  Isles,  President  Wilson  in- 
formed the  German  government  that  "if  the 
commanders  of  German  vessels  of  war  should 
act  upon  the  presumption  that  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  was  not  being  used  in  good  faith 
and  should  destroy  on  the  high  seas  an  American 
vessel  or  the  lives  of  American  citizens,  it  would 
be  difficult  for  the  government  of  the  United 
States  to  view  the  act  in  any  other  light  than 

46 


NEUTRALITY 

as  an  indefensible  violation  of  neutral  rights, 
.  .  .  the  government  of  the  United  States  would 
be  constrained  to  hold  the  Imperial  German 
government  to  a  strict  accountability  for  such 
acts  of  their  naval  authorities  and  to  take  any 
steps  it  might  be  necessary  to  take  to  safeguard 
American  lives  and  property  and  to  secure  to 
American  citizens  the  full  enjoyment  of  their 
acknowledged  rights  on  the  high  seas." 

Also  on  March  30,  191 5,  a  long  note  was  sent 
to  the  British  government,  protesting  against  the 
Order  in  Council  of  March  15th  that  we  held  to  be 
"a  practical  assertion  of  unlimited  belligerent 
rights  over  neutral  commerce  within  the  whole 
European  area,  and  an  almost  unqualified  denial 
of  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  nations  now  at 
peace."  In  note  after  note  we  laid  down  our 
ancient  claim  that  the  high  seas  are  common 
territory  to  every  nation. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  our  grievances  against  Eng- 
land were  far  more  acute  than  those  against 
Germany  when  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania 
worked  its  tremendous  revulsion  in  public 
feehng.  Even  before  this  tragedy,  however, 
the  mind  of  the  President  had  freed  itself  from 
the  shackles  of  tradition.  Just  as  our  interest 
in  the  seas  had  forced  us  into  every  great  war, 
so  was  it  a  certainty  that  we  would  be  drawn 
into  the  conflict  then  raging.  Our  "isolation," 
never  anything  more  than  fancied,  was  finally  a 
proved  absurdity.  As  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
German  victory  meant  its  surrender  or  else  its 
defense  by  armed  force.  These  truths  stood 
plain  to  the  President,  but  with  vision  no  less 

47 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

clear  he  saw  also  that  American  unity  was  no 
longer  a  substance,  but  a  shadow,  and  that 
through  the  careless  years  great  forces  of  disin- 
tegration had  been  permitted  to  work  at  wilL 
Ghb  references  to  the  "melting-pot"  instead  of 
some  sane  and  continuous  process  of  assimilation; 
inteUigent  nationaHsm  split  into  parochial  rival- 
ries by  the  dangerous  growth  of  sectionalism. 

In  the  days  of  the  Colonies  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board zvas  America,  but  in  the  twentieth  century 
it  cannot  truthfully  be  looked  upon  as  other  than 
a  fringe.  It  is  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the 
Rockies  that  the  real  America  lies — an  America 
careless  of  Eastern  opinion  when  it  is  not  con- 
temptuous. New  England  and  New  York  might 
wax  hysterical  over  a  European  war,  but  the 
great  Middle  West  went  its  way  in  indifference. 
Added  to  a  very  intense  belief  that  war  was  a 
medieval  madness,  one  found  also  a  very  definite 
pro-Germanism.  Great  centers  like  Milwaukee, 
St.  Louis,  and  Chicago  were,  in  many  respects, 
as  Teutonic  as  Berlin,  and  from  these  cities 
poured  a  steady  stream  of  propaganda  that 
subtly  influenced  public  opinion  in  favor  of  the 
German  cause.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that 
Congress,  the  war-making  body,  took  no  action 
whatsoever  as  a  result  of  the  Lusitania  tragedy, 
and  that  press  and  politicians,  while  condem- 
natory indeed,  divided  sharply  on  the  abstract 
issue.  The  infamous  German  charge  that  the 
Lusitania  carried  ammunition  "destined  for  the 
destruction  of  brave  German  soldiers"  found 
many  supporters,  and  from  the  Middle  West 
actually   came   the   suggestion   that   Americans 

48 


NEUTRALITY 

ought  to  keep  off  the  sea.  Slowly  but  surely 
the  President  addressed  himself  to  the  discovery 
of  truth  and  the  affirmation  of  ideals  in  the 
interests  of  American  unity. 

The  feeling  that  great  issues  were  at  stake 
was  not  enough.  There  had  to  be  the  burning 
conviction  that  those  issues  and  their  proper 
solution  were  bound  up  with  the  permanent 
safety  of  America  here  and  now  and  forever. 
War  might  come  as  a  result  of  some  outburst 
of  national  feeling,  but  national  passions  and 
hatred  were  without  the  necessary  carrying 
power.  The  imperative  thing  was  such  deep 
understanding  of  national  ideals  as  would  fur- 
nish unity  and  indomitableness  throughout  the 
days,  perhaps  the  years,  of  suffering  and  sacri- 
fice— an  understanding  that  would  reach  down 
to  the  souls  of  one  hundred  millions,  cross 
sectioning  race  and  creed  and  circumstance, 
firing  all  with  a  common  faith.  One  has  only  to 
read  the  President's  notes  to  follow  the  mighty 
drive  of  an  inflexible  purpose.  Fools  laughed  at 
them,  but  they  will  stand  for  all  time  as  mile- 
stones in  America's  longest  march  to  the  heights. 

In  the  first  Lusitania  note,  dated  May  i,  191 5, 
we  stated  plainly  that  "the  Imperial  German 
government  will  not  expect  the  government  of 
the  United  States  to  omit  any  word  or  any  act" 
to  safeguard  our  rights.  In  the  note  of  June 
9th  we  said:  "Whatever  be  the  other  facts 
regarding  the  Lusitania^  the  principal  fact  is 
that  a  great  steamer,  primarily  and  chiefly  a 
conveyance  for  passengers,  and  carrying  more 
than  a  thousand  souls  that  had  no  part  or  lot  in 

49 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  conduct  of  the  war,  was  sunk  without  so 
much  as  a  challenge  or  a  warning,  and  that  men, 
women,  and  children  were  sent  to  their  death  in 
circumstances  unparalleled  in  modern  warfare. 
The  government  of  the  United  States  is  con- 
tending for  something  much  greater  than  mere 
rights  of  property  or  privileges  of  commerce. 
It  is  contending  for  nothing  less  high  and  sacred 
than  the  rights  of  humanity.'* 

In  the  third  note,  dated  July  2ist,  it  was  as- 
serted clearly  that  "the  repetition  of  certain 
acts  must  be  regarded  by  the  government  of 
the  United  States,  when  they  affect  American 
citizens,  as  deliberately  unfriendly.'' 

On  September  ist  the  Imperial  German  govern- 
ment gave  assurance  that  its  submarines  would 
sink  no  more  liners  without  warning,  seemingly 
a  notable  victory  for  international  law  as  well 
as  for  America.  The  President,  however,  realized 
that  the  assurance  rested  entirely  upon  the 
honor  of  Germany,  having  no  basis  in  legal 
agreement.  On  January  i8,  1916,  he  set  forth 
a  declaration  of  principles  regarding  submarine 
attacks  and  asked  assent  to  them  by  the  warring 
nations.  The  German  answer  was  a  curt  notice 
to  all  neutral  powers  that  armed  merchant- 
ships  would  be  treated  as  war-ships  and  sunk 
without  warning.  Instantly  and  with  unparalleled 
vigor  the  German  propaganda  organization 
in  the  United  States  commenced  a  campaign 
to  gain  popular  support  for  the  policy. 

America's  unreadiness  for  war  was  never  more 
apparent  than  at  this  moment.  The  old  cry 
against  "traffic  in  human  lives"  was  revived, 

50 


NEUTRALITY 

and  powerful  political  and  business  groups 
went  so  far  as  to  urge  the  President  to  advise 
American  citizens  not  to  travel  on  armed  mer- 
chant-ships. Mr.  Bryan  and  the  West  censured 
the  administration  for  being  too  militaristic, 
while  Mr.  Roosevelt  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
attacked  on  the  ground  of  ultra-pacifism.  The 
President's  answer  was  specific  assertion  of  the 
right  of  commercial  vessels  to  carry  arms  in 
self-defense,  and  an  equally  explicit  refusal  to 
consent  to  the  amazing  theory  that  Americans 
had  no  right  on  the  sea  that  Germany  was 
bound  to  respect. 

At  every  point  in  the  proceedings  there  was 
clear  evidence  of  Germany's  conviction  that  the 
United  States  stood  helpless  by  reason  of  our 
high  percentage  of  citizens  of  German  birth  or 
descent.  Relying  upon  the  immunity  afforded 
by  this  presumption  of  disloyalty,  and  in  abso- 
lute defiance  of  the  Lusitania  pledge,  a  submarine 
torpedoed  the  Sussex  without  warning  on  March 
24th,  killing  and  wounding  American  citizens. 
The  shot  at  Concord  was  no  more  explicit  than 
the  ultimatum  of  the  President  that  unless 
Germany  abandoned  such  methods  of  submarine 
warfare  diplomatic  relations  would  be  severed 
at  once.  His  speech  before  Congress  was  a 
more  terrible  arraignment  of  Germany  than  had 
yet  been  put  in  words,  and  under  the  scourge 
of  this  reprobation  Berlin  cowered  and  sur- 
rendered. Acknowledging  their  guilt  in  the 
matter  of  the  Sussex,  the  Germans  gave  pledges 
that  met  the  main  demands  of  the  United  States. 
There  was  nothing  conclusive  in  such  a  settle- 
5  51 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

ment,  however.  The  Kaiser  meant  it  as  a 
truce,  and  the  President  so  recognized  it.  Even 
as  BerHn  ralHed  its  American  sympathizers  to 
defeat  his  re-election,  so  did  the  President  pro- 
ceed to  prepare  for  the  grapple  of  principles 
that  he  now  felt  to  be  inevitable.  Speaking 
before  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  on  May  27, 
1916,  he  called  upon  the  people  to  face  facts 
even  as  he  himself  had  been  compelled  to  face 
them.  After  conclusive  establishment  of  the 
truth  that  America  no  longer  enjoyed  a  "detached 
and  distant  situation,"  that  our  "isolation" 
was  fancied,  not  real,  he  declared  that  the  nation 
must  stand  prepared  to  assume  the  authorities 
and  responsibilities  of  a  world  power,  and  set 
forth  this  new  article  of  faith : 

So  sincerely  do  we  believe  these  things  that  I  am  sure 
that  I  speak  the  mind  and  wish  of  the  people  of  America 
when  I  say  that  the  United  States  is  willing  to  become  a 
partner  in  any  feasible  association  of  nations  formed  in 
order  to  realize  these  objects  and  make  them  secure  against 
violation. 

Again  speaks  the  typical  Americanism  of  the 
man.  Though  bound  by  tradition  as  firmly  as 
any  ancient  people,  it  is  the  salvation  of  America 
that  we  have  the  courage  to  blaze  new  trails 
when  it  is  seen  that  the  old  paths  are  no  longer 
trustworthy.  Prior  to  1916  the  address  of  the 
President  would  have  shocked  and  alienated, 
but,  viewed  in  the  red  light  that  flowed  from 
the  battle-fields  of  Europe,  it  was  recognized  as 
truth.  The  approval  of  the  nation  marked  the 
beginning  of  America's  surrender  of  the  illusion 
of  isolation,  the  dawn  of  America's  realization 

52 


NEUTRALITY 

that  freedom  of  the  seas  could  not  be  separated 
from  freedom  of  the  land,  and  that  the  world 
peace  of  our  dreams  depended  on  our  willingness 
to  enter  into  a  world  partnership  for  the  preser- 
vation of  that  peace.  From  this  time  on  the 
speeches  of  the  President  were  marked  by 
certainty.  He  felt  that  he  was  not  merely  a 
leader,  but  a  spokesman;  that  he  was  not  sup- 
plying impulse,  but  receiving  it.  Throughout  the 
whole  of  1916  his  words  had  the  ring  of  a  clarion: 

We  are  not  going  to  invade  any  nation's  right,  but  sup- 
pose, my  fellow-countrymen,  some  nation  should  invade 
our  right?  What  then?  ...  I  have  come  here  to  tell  you 
that  the  difficulties  of  our  foreign  policy  .  .  .  daily  increase 
in  number  and  intricacy  and  in  danger,  and  I  would  be 
derelict  to  my  duty  to  you  if  I  did  not  deal  wath  you  in 
these  matters  with  the  utmost  candor,  and  tell  you  what  it 
may  be  necessary  to  use  the  force  of  the  United  States  to  do. 

America  up  to  the  present  time  has  been,  as  if  by  de- 
liberate choice,  confined  and  provincial,  and  it  will  be 
impossible  for  her  to  remain  confined  and  provincial. 
Henceforth  she  belongs  to  the  world  and  must  act  as  part 
of  the  world. 

The  United  States  will  never  be  what  it  has  been.  The 
United  States  was  once  in  enjoyment  of  what  we  used  to 
call  splendid  isolation.  .  .  .  And  now,  by  circumstances 
which  she  did  not  choose,  over  which  she  had  not  control, 
she  has  been  thrust  out  into  the  great  game  of  mankind, 
on  the  stage  of  the  world  itself,  and  here  she  must  know 
what  she  is  about,  and  no  nation  in  the  world  must  doubt 
that  all  her  forces  are  gathered  and  organized  in  the  interest 
of  just,  righteous,  and  humane  government. 

The  issues  of  the  election  were  clean-cut. 
Germany  was  under  no  delusion.     Berlin  knew 

53 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

that  the  President  had  come  at  last  to  exact 
appreciation  of  Potsdam's  plan  of  world  con- 
quest and  meant  to  array  the  strength  of  democ- 
racy against  it.  Every  force  that  German  money 
and  influence  could  control  was  hurled  into  the 
campaign  against  the  President,  but  the  people 
were  no  less  aroused  to  the  issues  involved  and 
Americanism  triumphed  over  partizanship. 

The  march  of  events  was  swift  and  logical. 
On  December  i8,  1916,  the  President  addressed 
a  note  to  the  belligerent  nations  in  which  he 
pointed  out  that  each  side  claimed  to  be  fighting 
a  defensive  war;  each  side  asserted  interest  in 
the  rights  of  small  nations;  each  side  declared 
itself  to  be  "ready  to  consider  the  formation  of  a 
league  of  nations  to  insure  peace  and  justice 
throughout  the  world/'  As  the  objects  for 
which  both  sides  were  fighting,  "stated  in 
general  terms  .  .  .  seem  to  be  the  same,"  the 
President  asked  the  belligerent  powers  if  it 
would  not  be  possible  for  them  to  avow  the 
"precise  objects  which  would,  if  attained,  satisfy 
them  and  their  people."  He  justified  the  re- 
quest by  stating  that  America  was  "as  vitally 
and  directly  interested  as  the  governments  now 
at  war"  in  the  "measures  to  be  taken  to  secure 
the  future  peace  of  the  world." 

The  reception  of  this  note  will  be  recorded  by 
historians  as  a  proof  of  how  far  the  statesman- 
ship of  the  modern  world  had  fallen  away  from 
intelligence.  Partizans  in  America  berated  the 
communication  as  a  shameful  confession  of 
ignorance,  regarding  it  as  nothing  more  than  an 
effort  to  "find  out  what  the  war  was  about." 

54 


Ill 


"strong  men" 


THE  sweep  of  a  cftptury  leaves  nothing  remem- 
bered but  fundamentals  and  a  few  great 
names.  Historians,  writing  of  events  that  time 
has  withered  until  only  the  fadeless  essentials 
remain,  are  not  concerned  with  the  Hving  pas- 
sions that  colored  and  confused  those  events 
in  the  day  of  their  happening.  A  contemporary 
chronicler  may  take  no  such  privilege,  for  he 
deals  with  the  ferment  rather  than  the  solution, 
and  must  treat  of  things  in  their  present  im- 
portance without  waiting  until  the  years  have 
settled  the  question  of  relative  value.  History 
can  afford  to  be  a  concentration  of  the  impersonal 
and  important,  but  life,  as  it  runs  along  from 
day  to  day,  is  made  up  of  little  things,  and 
public  opinion  of  the  moment  is  more  controlled 
by  passing  rages,  clashing  vanities,  and  the 
hour's  excitement  than  by  the  larger  purposes 
that  do  not  reveal  themselves  until  the  winds 
of  time  have  blown  away  the  smoke  and  ashes 
of  the  human  struggle. 

America's  war  rush  and  overwhelming  vic- 
tory, the  Peace  Treaty,  and  the  League  of 
Nations,  will  stand  alone  before  the  future, 
but  to-day  they  move  obscurely  through  clouds 
of  confusion,   and   it   is   idle  to   consider  them 

59 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

until  some  attempt  has  been  made  to  settle 
the  yeasty  ferment  of  angers  and  resentments. 
Such  matters  as  the  failure  to  form  a  coalition 
Cabinet,  the  refusal  to  permit  Mr.  Roosevelt 
to  go  to  France,  the  case  of  General  Wood,  and 
the  President's  "partizan  appeal,''  while  tran- 
sient and  trivial  in  comparison  with  the  great 
issues  of  the  day,  nevertheless  cloud  these 
larger  questions  to  an  extent  that  demands 
attention. 

The  War  Message  haa  not  ceased  to  echo  before 
the  cry  for  *' strong  men"  burst  upon  the  ears  of 
the  President.  Raised  by  Republican  poli- 
ticians as  an  opening  wedge  in  the  drive  for  a 
bipartizan  government,  it  was  nevertheless  a 
slogan  of  direct  appeal  to  the  millions  of  Amer- 
icans who  were  girding  themselves  for  service, 
and  who  wanted  the  assurance  that  civilian 
leadership  was  to  be  no  less  expert  than  the  mili- 
tary direction  itself.  Because  a  coalition  Cab- 
inet was  not  formed,  the  feehng  grew  that  the 
President  meant  to  "play  a  lone  hand,"  a  par- 
tizan  hand,  and  its  persistence  as  a  conviction 
is  at  the  bottom  of  much  of  the  ugly  anger  that 
imperils  our  unity  to-day. 

It  was,  and  is,  a  confusion  that  proceeds  from 
the  unfortunate  fact  that  the  great  majority  of 
Americans  are  as  little  familiar  with  their  govern- 
ment as  with  their  history.  Because  of  this 
Ignorance  concerning  plain  facts  of  administra- 
tion it  was  the  general  opinion  that  the  Presi- 
dent's refusal  to  form  a  coalition  Cabinet  was 
due  to  a  dislike  of  "counsel,"  an  unwillingness 
to  subject  himself  to  the  independences  of  "ad- 

60 


"STRONG  MEN'* 

vice"  that  might  result  from  the  inclusion  of 
Republicans  in  his  "official  family/'  Cabinet 
members  are  in  no  sense  counselors  or  advisers 
to  the  President,  nor  have  they  ever  been.  They 
are  the  real  executives  of  the  administration, 
each  one  the  head  of  a  department  with  exact 
duties  to  discharge,  and  coming  into  regular 
contact  with  the  President  only  for  purposes  of 
report,  conference,  and  cohesion.  The  Presi- 
dent has  the  responsibility,  but  his  Cabinet 
members  have  the  power.  If  they  fail  him  in 
faith,  in  loyalty,  in  understanding,  or  even  in 
agreement,  his  reputation  and  regime  are  alike 
endangered. 

Because  of  the  general  ignorance  concerning 
history,  it  is  the  wide-spread  opinion  that  co- 
alition Cabinets  are  customary  in  times  of 
stress  and  that  the  idea  has  the  indorsement 
of  efficiency.  Both  assumptions  are  groundless. 
When  urged  to  take  Democrats  into  his  Cabinet 
in  1898,  President  McKinley  refused  flatly. 
No  less  than  Woodrow  Wilson  he  had  read  his 
history  and  knew  that  the  first  need  of  a  war 
President  was  a  working-force  trained  in  team- 
play,  a  close  association  of  trusted  lieutenants, 
not  a  sudden  importation  of  strange  captains. 
Nor  did  Lincoln  call  a  coalition  Cabinet  into 
being.  Yet  even  though  all  were  members  of 
his  own  party,  he  paid  a  bitter  penalty  for  having 
selected  them  with  reference  to  factional  divi- 
sions rather  than  in  accord  with  his  own  prefer- 
ences. The  "strong  men"  of  his  official  family 
were  of  such  abounding  strength  that  each 
imagined  himself  the  President,  and  utter  dis- 

61 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

organization  was  averted  only  by  Mr.  Lincoln's 
decision  to  assert  his  right  to  unquestioned 
obedience. 

"We  pretend  to  no  state  secrets,"  said  the 
New  York  Evening  Post  in  1862,  "but  we  have 
been  told,  upon  what  we  deem  good  authority, 
that  no  such  thing  as  a  combined,  unitary,  de- 
liberative administration  exists;  that  the  Presi- 
dent's brave  willingness  to  take  all  responsibility 
has  quite  neutralized  the  idea  of  a  joint  respon- 
sibility; and  that  orders  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance are  issued,  and  movements  commanded, 
which  Cabinet  officers  learn  of  as  other  people 
do,  or,  what  is  worse,  which  the  Cabinet  officers 
disapprove  and  protest  against." 

Washington,  alone  of  all  the  Presidents,  en- 
joyed the  peculiar  privileges  of  a  coalition 
Cabinet,  for  when  he  assumed  the  direction  of 
the  new  Republic  it  was  his  feehng  that  all  po- 
litical faiths  should  have  fair  representation. 
As  a  result,  Hamilton  and  Jefferson,  opposed  in 
every  thought  and  principle,  were  handcuffed 
together,  and  their  pull  and  haul  came  close  to 
swamping  the  frail  bark  of  government.  Do- 
mestic policies  waited  while  the  two  factions 
fought,  and  international  relations  fell  into  new 
discords  while  Washington  studied  as  to  how  he 
should  decide  between  the  conflicting  recom- 
mendations of  the  two  rivals.  Peace  came  only 
when  Jefferson  resigned  to  lead  the  party  that 
was  to  carry  his  beliefs  to  victory. 

Even  if  government  and  history  both  be  put 
aside,  however,  a  third  and  stronger  reason  is  at 
hand  to  prove  the  impossibility  of   a  coalition 

62 


"STRONG  MEN" 

Cabinet.  It  must  be  admitted,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  that  a  prime  requisite  in  the  choice  of  the 
new  men  was  general  agreement  as  to  their 
suitability.  It  would  not  have  been  enough  for 
the  President  to  say,  "These  are  strong  men/* 
Judgment  of  their  strength  was  primarily  the 
province  of  the  Republican  party,  and  second- 
arily the  right  of  the  country  as  a  whole.  The 
demand  for  a  coalition  Cabinet  was  not  the  de- 
mand of  the  President,  and  therefore  his  idea  of 
what  constituted  "strong  men''  was  read  out  of 
court  at  the  start. 

What  figures,  then,  stood  out  so  boldly  from 
the  rank  and  file  of  the  RepubHcan  party  as  to 
make  their  selection  a  thing  of  unanimous 
applause,  a  choice  by  acclamation  ^  The  poverty 
of  America's  public  service  was  never  more 
apparent  than  when  such  a  search  began.  An 
interesting  essay  could,  and  should,  be  written 
on  the  reasons,  but  for  the  purposes  of  this 
consideration  they  may  be  stated  briefly.  Our 
public  life  dooms  itself  to  mediocrity  because 
it  offers  neither  reward  nor  honor.  Alexander 
Hamilton,  studying  the  results  achieved  by  the 
unpaid  pubHc  service  of  England,  grafted  the 
British  plan  upon  our  own  governmental  plant. 
In  England,  however,  there  was  a  leisure  class, 
inheritors  of  wealth  and  idleness,  able  and 
willing  to  serve  without  pay  as  some  sort  of 
justification  for  their  existence.  In  the  New 
World  it  was  as  headless  a  proposition  as  sane 
men  ever  advanced.  Lacking  a  leisure  class, 
unpaid  positions  and  nominal  salaries  either 
invited   chicane   or   compelled   impoverishment. 

63 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

To  take  a  case  in  point,  a  member  of  Congress 
receives  compensation  in  the  sum  of  ^8,(XX)  a 
year.  Out  of  this  salary  he  is  expected  to  Hve 
and  entertain  and  also  to  provide  the  expenses 
of  a  never-ending  campaign.  Elected  for  two 
years  only,  the  wretched  man  is  forced  to  com- 
mence "running"  again  within  a  day  of  his 
election.  As  an  indication  of  expense  the 
campaign  for  the  re-election  of  the  Speaker 
of  the  New  York  State  Assembly — a  ^1,500 
office — cost  ^29,000. 

These  conditions  have  forced  the  party  or- 
ganization into  complete  power.  Naturally 
enough,  since  it  furnishes  the  funds  and  the 
"workers,"  it  exercises  the  privilege  of  selection, 
and  still  more  naturally  its  preference  is  for 
"grateful"  men.  The  average  officeholder, 
therefore,  is  of  the  type  that  is  wilHng  to  act  as 
a  combination  errand-boy  and  patronage  broker. 
Now  and  then  a  Lincoln,  a  Wilson,  or  a  Roose- 
velt is  able  to  break  through  the  iron  alignment, 
but  public  office,  for  the  most  part,  is  the  reward 
of  a  tireless  enthusiastic  "regularity."  This 
theory  of  politics  as  a  vast  employment  agency 
has  its  logical  development  in  the  perfection  of 
slander  and  abuse  as  legitimate  campaign  weap- 
ons. As  a  result,  public  life  has  become  a 
gantlet  as  cruel  as  any  ever  devised  by  savages. 
An  officeholder  has  no  rights  that  partizanship 
is  bound  to  respect,  and  not  even  the  common 
decencies  are  permitted  to  stand  in  the  way 
of  assault  upon  a  candidate.  Inevitably  public 
life  holds  out  its  invitation  chiefly  to  the 
mediocre  or  the  rascal,  the  one  so  small  as  to 

64 


"STRONG  MEN" 

be  flattered  by  any  notice,  the  other  too  shame- 
less to  mind  it. 

Force  and  administrative  genius,  therefore, 
by  reason  of  the  price  that  poHtics  demands, 
have  turned  to  private  enterprise  in  increasing 
degree.  There  is  no  more  striking  characteris- 
tic of  American  Hfe  to-day  than  the  complete 
divorcement  of  politics  and  business  so  far  as 
genuine  public  service  is  concerned.  To  be  sure, 
there  are  certain  contacts,  but  the  very  slyness 
of  them,  and  their  corrupt  selfishness,  has  done 
as  much  to  discredit  the  "business  man"  in  the 
opinion  of  the  electorate  as  it  has  done  to 
besmirch  the  politician.  It  is  a  gulf  that  must 
and  will  be  bridged,  but  it  was  not  bridged  in 
1917,  and  selection  of  a  "captain  of  industry*' 
for  the  Cabinet  would  have  forfeited  the  con- 
fidence of  workers  even  as  it  would  have  aroused 
the  distrust  of  the  country  as  a  whole. 

These  remarks,  offered  assertively  because 
briefly,  may  explain  the  poverty  of  public  life 
that  made  it  impossible  to  find  "practical 
statesmen''  without  "anxious  search  or  perilous 
trial."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  most  careful 
poll  of  suggestions  afforded  no  larger  number  of 
names  than  could  be  counted  on  the  fingers  of 
two  hands.  Even  so,  not  one  of  the  Hst  met  the 
primary  requisite  of  general  acceptability. 

Colonel  Roosevelt,  while  offering  his  services 
on  the  instant,  was  specific  from  the  first  in  his 
insistence  that  he  should  be  permitted  to  go 
to  France  at  the  head  of  a  volunteer  division 
of  his  own  enlistment.  When  this  request  was 
denied  he  entered  straightway  upon  the  "broom- 

65 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

stick  drill"  and  "coffin  order"  tirades  that  did 
so  much  to  convince  neutral  nations  and  the 
Central  Powers  that  America  would  never  be 
able  to  figure  in  the  war  in  a  military  sense. 
Gen.  Leonard  Wood,  now  hailed  as  a  great 
administrator,  was  then  putting  entire  emphasis 
upon  his  military  ability,  and  his  ambition  had  no 
other  thought  than  to  command  the  American 
Expeditionary  Force  when  it  went  to  France. 

Mr.  Taft  has  experienced  a  curious  rehabilita- 
tion in  the  last  few  years,  but  in  191 7  there  was 
still  keen  remembrance  of  the  fact  that  he  had 
been  denied  re-election  in  191 2  because  of  his 
proved  inefficiency  as  an  Executive.  The  Dol- 
liver  characterization  of  him  as  a  "large  body 
surrounded  by  men  who  knew  exactly  what 
they  wanted"  had  by  no  means  been  forgotten. 
The  President  liked  Mr.  Taft,  admired  and 
trusted  him,  and  meant  to  use  him,  as  he  did 
later,  but  not  in  any  capacity  where  dynamic 
energy  and  quick  decisions  were  necessities. 

As  for  Charles  E.  Hughes,  the  campaign  of 
1916  was  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  people,  and 
the  revulsion  of  feeling  against  him,  particularly 
in  his  own  party,  made  it  almost  a  certainty 
that  his  selection  for  a  high  executive  post  would 
have  aroused  resentment  rather  than  enthusiasm. 
This  general  attitude  extended  also  to  Mr. 
William  R.  Willcox,  chairman  of  the  Republican 
National  Committee. 

Campaign  necessities,  exercising  their  usual 
pressure,  have  somewhat  blurred  the  sharp  lines 
of  Republican  division,  but  in  1917  Senator 
Lodge  was   a  rather  unimportant  figure,  only 

66 


"STRONG  MEN" 

lifted  above  mediocrity  by  the  conviction  of  the 
Progressives  that  he  was  one  of  the  operators  of 
the  "steam-roller"  that  had  crushed  them  in 
Chicago  in  1912.  His  selection  at  that  time 
would  have  been  resented  not  only  by  a  large 
Senate  group,  headed  by  men  like  Kenyon, 
Norris,  and  Borah,  but  by  the  rank  and  file  of 
Western  Repubhcanism. 

All  of  these  various  objections  were  freely 
admitted  by  every  person  of  intelHgence  at  the 
time,  and  the  one  man  able  to  elicit  any  una- 
nimity of  approval  was  EHhu  Root.  As  in  the 
case  of  Mr.  Taft  and  Senator  Lodge,  however, 
Mr.  Root  stood  in  the  public  mind  as  the  very 
high  priest  of  stand-pattism.  He  was  not  only 
an  offense  to  all  Democrats  and  Republicans  of 
progressive  thought,  but  no  man  in  our  pubHc 
life  is  so  absolutely  distrusted  by  the  workers  of 
the  nation.  The  President  recognized  his  values 
as  he  recognized  the  values  of  Mr.  Taft,  but  he 
knew  in  his  heart,  as  every  other  sane  man  knew, 
that  any  elevation  of  Mr.  Root  to  a  high  place 
in  the  war  machine  meant  the  chiUing  of  liberal 
sentiment  and  the  planting  of  an  ugly  doubt  in 
the  minds  of  labor. 

Curiously  enough,  the  President  himself  de- 
sired certain  Cabinet  changes,  and  was  preparing 
to  make  them  when  war  forced  a  surrender  of 
the  plan.  Mr.  Lansing,  elevated  to  be  Secretary 
of  State  at  the  time  of  Mr.  Bryan's  sudden 
resignation,  was  never  anything  but  a  disap- 
pointment. His  ideas  were  annual,  and,  what 
was  even  worse,  he  approached  every  question 
from  the  standpoint  of  a  hidebound  conser- 
6  67 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

vatism.  His  slow  mind,  unwilling  and  unable 
to  cope  with  the  midstream  of  life,  clung  like  a 
limpet  to  the  rocks  of  the  backwater.  The 
President  might  have  endured  dullness,  but  Mr. 
Lansing's  utter  inability  to  think  in  terms  of  the 
twentieth  century  made  his  elimination  desir- 
able. It  is  also  probable  that  a  change  would 
have  been  made  in  the  office  of  Attorney-General, 
for  while  the  President  had  high  regard  for  Mr. 
Gregory's  honesty  and  ability,  he  felt  him  to  be 
a  legalistic  type  of  mind  lacking  alike  in  dynamic 
values  and  progressivist  tendencies. 

The  other  Cabinet  members  ranked  high 
above  the  average.  Mr.  McAdoo's  conduct  of 
the  Treasury  had  even  won  the  grudging  admira- 
tion of  the  country's  great  financiers.  Secretary 
of  the  Interior  Lane  was  universally  popular. 
Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson  and  Secretary  of 
Agriculture  Houston  enjoyed  general  confidence, 
and  the  Postmaster-General  had  not  yet  for- 
feited popularity  by  his  advocacy  of  the  Postal 
Zone  law  or  his  enforcement  of  the  Espionage 
Act.  The  President  knew  the  attack  on  Secre- 
tary Daniels  to  be  malignant  and  unjust,  and  he 
had  complete  faith  in  Secretary  Baker's  ability 
to  operate  the  War  Department  along  lines  of 
democracy  as  well  as  efficiency.  Conditions, 
however,  forced  him  to  stand  firm  on  the  Cabinet 
as  a  whole.  Even  had  he  been  inclined  to  run 
the  grave  risk  of  intrusting  departments  of 
government  to  new  men,  untried  men,  it  was 
still  the  case  that  our  public  life  contained  no 
figures  sufficiently  commanding  to  win  unani- 
mous selection.      Any  attempt  to  change  would 

68 


"STRONG  MEN" 

have  precipitated  instant  and  bitter  disputes 
between  parties,  factions,  creeds,  and  classes, 
and  at  a  time  when  unity  and  purpose  were 
imperative  needs  the  country  would  have  been 
distracted  by  the  pull  and  haul  of  contending 
candidacies.  Not  only  was  the  President  wise 
in  avoiding  this  danger,  but  he  was  still  more 
prudent  in  guarding  against  the  lost  time  and 
waste  effort  that  would  have  inevitably  resulted 
from  the  displacement  of  men  who,  whatever 
their  failings,  were  still  in  possession  of  four 
years  of  practice  and  experience  in  the  conduct 
of  the  executive  departments  of  government. 
As  a  consequence,  Lansing  and  Gregory  became 
fixtures  along  with  the  rest. 

History,  however,  will  record  that  while  the 
President  shrank  from  the  obvious  dangers  of  a 
coalition  Cabinet,  he  went  beyond  any  other 
in  the  formation  of  a  coalition  administration. 
It  was  more  than  ill-advised,  when  Chair- 
man Hays,  Senator  New,  and  Senator  Wat- 
son wrote  this  daring  manifesto  into  the 
Indiana  Republican  platform  of  191 8:  **This 
is  the  war  of  no  political  party.  This  is 
the  country's  war,  and  we  charge  and  de- 
plore that  the  party  in  power  is  guilty  of 
practising  petty  partizan  politics  to  the 
serious  detriment  of  the  country's  cause.  We 
insist  that  this  cease,  and  we  appeal  to  all 
patriots,  whatever  their  politics,  to  aid  us  in 
every  way  possible  in  our  efforts  to  require 
that  partizan  politics  be  taken  out  and  kept  out 
of  the  war  management." 

The  search  for  "the  best  man  for  the  place" 
69 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

was  instituted  without  regard  to  party,  faction, 
blood  strain,  or  creed,  and  the  result  was  a 
composite  organization  in  which  Democrats, 
RepubUcans,  and  Independents  worked  side  by- 
side,  partizanship  forgotten  and  service  the  one 
consideration. 

It  stood  recognized  as  a  matter  of  course  that 
the  soldier  selected  to  command  our  forces  in 
France  might  well  develop  into  a  presidential 
possibiHty,  yet  this  high  place  was  given  with- 
out question  to  Gen.  John  J.  Pershing,  a  life- 
long RepubHcan  and  the  son-in-law  of  Senator 
Warren,  one  of  the  masters  of  the  Republican 
machine. 

Admiral  William  S.  Sims,  a  vociferous  Re- 
publican, was  sent  to  English  waters  in  high 
command,  and  while  Secretary  Daniels  was 
warned  at  the  time  that  Sims's  partizanship  was 
of  the  kind  that  would  not  recognize  the  obliga- 
tions of  loyalty  or  patriotism,  he  waved  the 
objection  aside  out  of  his  belief  that  Sims  was 
"the  best  man  for  the  job.'* 

For  the  head  of  the  Aircraft  Board,  with  its 
task  of  launching  America's  great  aviation  pro- 
gram, Mr.  Howard  E.  Coffin,  a  RepubHcan,  was 
selected,  and  at  his  right  hand  Mr.  Coffin  placed 
Col.  Edward  A.  Deeds,  also  a  RepubHcan  of  vigor 
and  regularity.  It  is  to  be  remembered  also 
that  when  failure  and  corruption  were  charged 
against  the  Aircraft  Board,  the  man  appointed 
by  the  President  to  conduct  the  highly  im- 
portant investigation  was  Charles  E.  Hughes. 

Three  Assistant  Secretaries  of  War  were  ap- 
pointed by  Mr.  Baker — Mr.  Benedict  Crowell,  a 

70 


"STRONG  MEN" 

Cleveland  contractor;  Dr.  F.  E.  Keppel,  dean  of 
Columbia  University,  and  Emmet  J.  Scott, 
formerly  Booker  Washington's  secretary — and 
all  three  were  Republicans.  Mr.  E.  R.  Stet- 
tinius  of  the  J.  P.  Morgan  firm  and  a  Republican 
was  made  special  assistant  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  placed  in  charge  of  supplies,  a  duty 
that  he  had  been  discharging  for  the  Allies. 
Maj.-Gen.  George  W.  Goethals,  after  his  un- 
fortunate experience  in  ship-building,  was  given 
a  second  chance  and  put  in  the  War  Department 
as  an  assistant  Chief  of  Staff.  The  Chief  of 
Staff  himself.  Gen.  Peyton  C.  March,  was  a 
Republican  no  less  definite  and  regular  than 
General  Goethals.  Mr.  Samuel  McRoberts, 
president  of  the  National  City  Bank  and  one  of 
the  pillars  of  the  Republican  party,  was  brought 
to  Washington  as  chief  of  the  procurement  sec- 
tion in  the  Ordnance  Section,  with  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general;  Maj.-Gen.  E.  H.  Crowder  was 
appointed  Provost-Marshal-General,  although 
his  Republicanism  was  well  known,  and  no  ob- 
jection of  any  kind  was  made  when  General 
Crowder  put  Charles  B.  Warren,  the  Republican 
National  Committeeman  from  Michigan,  in 
charge  of  appeal  cases,  a  position  of  rare 
power. 

The  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  was  virtu- 
ally turned  over  to  Republicans  under  Charles 
M.  Schwab  and  Charles  Piez.  Mr.  Vance  Mc- 
Cormick,  chairman  of  the  Democratic  National 
Committee,  was  made  chairman  of  the  War 
Trade  Board,  but  of  the  eight  members  the 
following  five  were  Republicans:  Albert  Strauss 

71 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

of  New  York,  Alonzo  E.  Taylor  of  Pennsylvania, 
John  Beaver  White  of  New  York,  Frank  C. 
Munson  of  New  York,  and  Clarence  M.  WooUey 
of  Chicago. 

The  same  conditions  obtained  in  the  Red 
Cross.  A  very  eminent  Republican,  Mr.  H.  P. 
Davison,  was  put  in  supreme  authority,  and  on 
the  Red  Cross  War  Council  were  placed  ex- 
President  Taft;  Mr.  Charles  D.  Norton,  Mr. 
Taft's  secretary  while  President;  and  Mr.  Cor- 
nelius N.  BHss,  former  treasurer  of  the  Repub- 
lican National  Committee.  Not  only  was  Mr. 
Taft  thus  honored,  but  upon  the  creation  of  a 
National  War  Labor  Board  the  ex-President  was 
made  its  chairman  and  virtually  empowered  to 
act  as  the  administration's  representative  in  its 
contact  with  industry. 

Mr.  Frank  A.  Vanderlip,  a  Republican  of  iron 
regularity,  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  War 
Savings  Stamps  Campaign,  and  when  Mr.  Mc- 
Adoo  had  occasion  to  name  Assistant  Secretaries 
of  the  Treasury  he  selected  Prof.  L.  S.  Rowe  of 
the  University  of  Pennsylvania  and  Mr.  H.  C. 
Leffingwell  of  New  York. 

Harry  A.  Garfield,  son  of  the  Republican 
President,  was  made  Fuel  Administrator,  and  Mr. 
Herbert  Hoover,  now  a  candidate  for  President 
on  a  platform  of  unadulterated  Republicanism, 
was  nominated  as  head  of  the  Food  Administra- 
tion. 

The  Council  of  National  Defense  was  an 
organization  of  high  importance  and  one  of 
tremendous  influence  from  a  partizan  standpoint, 
yet  its  executive  body  was  divided  as  follows: 

72 


"STRONG  MEN" 

Republicans — Howard  E.  Coffin,  Julius  Rosen- 
wald,  Dr.  Hollis  Godfrey,  Dr.  Franklin  Martin, 
Walter  S.  GifFord,  Director;  Democrats — Daniel 
Willard  and  Bernard  M.  Baruch;  Independent — 
Samuel  Gompers. 

So  much  for  a  sorry  subject  that  should  never 
have  had  to  be  mentioned.  When  judged  in 
accordance  with  the  facts  and  the  evidence, 
the  war  record  of  the  administration  is  remark- 
ably free  from  the  shame  and  stain  of  partizan- 
ship.  Always  more  concerned  with  party  ac- 
complishment than  party  organization,  war 
worked  an  even  more  complete  forgetfulness 
of  party  lines  in  President  Wilson,  and  his  spirit 
communicated  itself  to  the  entire  war  machinery. 
It  was  a  tremendous  thing  that  all  were  called 
to  do,  and  in  the  doing  of  the  thing  there  was 
thought  of  nothing  save  America.  Men  and 
women  of  every  party,  race,  creed,  and  cir- 
cumstance worked  side  by  side  in  Washington 
as  in  the  trenches,  fraternity  in  their  hearts, 
the  glory  of  sacrifice  in  their  souls,  and  service 
the  one  rivalry.  I  came  into  direct  contact 
with  every  detail  of  the  vast  organization,  and 
my  reports  from  the  country  were  daily  and 
authoritative,  and  I  can  say  truthfully  that 
throughout  the  year  and  a  half  of  war  partizan- 
ship  existed  as  the  sole  and  undivided  possession 
of  a  small  congressional  group. 

This  group,  however,  made  up  in  virulence 
what  it  lacked  in  numbers.  Every  one  con- 
nected with  the  drive  of  America's  great  war 
machine  knew  that  there  were  two  enemies  to 
be  fought — the  Germans  in  front,  and  Penrose, 

73 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Smoot,  New,  Watson,  Moses,  and  Longworth 
from  behind.  From  first  to  last  these  wretched 
souls  thought  only  in  teims  of  officeholding  and 
office-seeking,  the  sordid  habits  of  their  lives 
blinding  them  to  America's  terrible  necessities. 
They  tore  at  public  confidence  with  their  daily 
lies,  hampered  executive  activities  by  their  mean 
obstructions,  and  broke  many  a  spirit  by  their 
unscrupulous  persecutions.  At  a  time  when 
every  dollar  was  needed  by  the  nation  they  com- 
menced the  collection  of  the  great  campaign  fund 
that  was  to  restore  the  idyllic  days  of  Hanna,  and 
in  an  hour  when  the  war  hung  in  the  balance 
they  were  sending  Hays,  their  party  chairman, 
on  a  coast-to-coast  tour  for  the  mobilization  of 
the  "machine."  The  decadence  of  American 
public  Hfe  is  not  a  matter  of  any  argument  as 
long  as  such  men  hold  positions  of  prominence 
and  power. 


IV 


"the    ROOSEVELT  DIVISIONS*' 


THE  average  American  has  no  higher  faith 
than  fair  play,  and  not  supreme  statesman- 
ship nor  administrative  genius  is  permitted  to 
compensate  for  lack  of  generosity  in  the  treat- 
ment of  a  defeated  rival.  At  the  bottom  of 
much  of  the  feeling  against  Woodrow  Wilson — 
a  feeHng  that  transfers  itself  unconsciously  to  his 
advocacies — is  a  general  belief  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  entirely  responsible  for  the  refusal  of 
Mr.  Roosevelt's  offer  to  enhst  a  volunteer  force 
for  service  in  France,  and  that  his  reasons  were 
personal  rather  than  pubHc.  He  is  judged  as 
having  failed  in  magnanimity  and  the  resulting 
prejudice  has  had  a  wide  sweep. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Roosevelt's  offer  was 
never  brought  to  the  official  notice  of  the  Presi- 
dent until  Mr.  Roosevelt  called  in  person,  and 
Mr.  Roosevelt  did  not  present  his  request  to 
the  President  until  after  it  had  been  rejected 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  General  Staff.  Instead  of  being 
moved  by  any  personal  ill  will,  the  whole  incHna- 
tion  of  the  President  was  to  overrule  the  General 
Staff  in  Mr.  Roosevelt's  favor,  and  even  when 
he  realized  that  the  iron  necessities  of  war  forbade 

75 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

such  a  course  he  confessed  a  deep  and  sincere 
regret. 

It  was  on  February  2,  191 7,  two  months  before 
America  entered  the  conflict,  that  Mr.  Roosevelt 
first  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  requesting 
permission  to  raise  a  division  of  infantry  and  a 
divisional  brigade  of  cavalry.  Mr.  Baker,  reply- 
ing under  date  of  February  9th,  and  again  on 
March  20th,  pointed  out  that  the  enlistment 
of  such  divisions  was  expressly  prohibited  by 
Congress  unless  directly  sanctioned,  and  stated 
also  that  "a  plan  for  a  very  much  larger  army 
than  the  force  suggested  by  your  telegram  has 
been  proposed  for  the  action  of  Congress  when- 
ever required.  Militia  officers  of  high  rank  will 
naturally  be  incorporated  with  their  commands, 
but  the  general  officers  for  all  our  forces  are  to 
be  drawn  from  the  regular  army."  Mr.  Roose- 
velt, answering  on  March  23d,  made  the  point 
that  he  was  "a  retired  commander-in-chief  of 
the  United  States  army,"  and  referred  to  General 
Young,  General  Sumner,  and  Leonard  Wood 
for  opinion  as  to  his  "fitness  for  the  command  of 
troops." 

The  plan  referred  to  by  the  Secretary  of  War 
was  based  upon  the  principle  of  compulsory 
military  service  and  every  force  of  the  adminis- 
tration was  committed  to  it.  The  President, 
Mr.  Baker,  and  the  entire  Cabinet,  no  less  than 
the  General  Staff",  were  as  iron  in  the  resolve 
that  the  criminal  wastes  and  inefficiencies  of  the 
volunteer  system  should  not  be  permitted  to 
discount  America's  determination.  On  April 
7th,  the  day  after  the  war  declaration,  Mr.  Baker 

76 


"THE  ROOSEVELT  DIVISIONS" 

informed  the  House  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs  that  the  Selective  Service  law  was  abso- 
lutely essential,  and  the  President  followed  with 
the  statement  that  "the  safety  of  the  nation 
depended  upon  the  measure/'  The  answer  of 
Congress  was  a  stubborn  demand  that  the 
volunteer  system  be  given  a  fair  test  before  any 
adoption  of  conscription. 

Mr.  Roosevelt  came  to  Washington  on  April 
nth  to  urge  the  acceptance  of  his  volunteer 
divisions,  and  telephoned  the  President  for  an 
appointment  that  was  instantly  made.  The  two 
men,  strangely  enough,  had  never  met  before, 
and  during  the  forty-five  minutes  of  the  inter- 
view official  Washington  held  its  breath.  At 
the  end  of  that  time  Mr.  Roosevelt  emerged  in 
high  good  humor,  informed  the  waiting  corre- 
spondents that  the  President  had  received  him 
w^ith  "the  utmost  courtesy  and  consideration'' 
and  would  doubtless  "come  to  a  decision  in  his 
own  good  time."  Mr.  Wilson  himself  said 
nothing,  and  that  was,  and  is,  the  trouble. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  to  his  utter  failure 
to  appreciate  the  compulsions  of  curiosity  that 
the  President  disappoints  most  deeply.  He 
himself  is  entirely  lacking  in  the  intense  interest 
in  personal  things  that  dominates  the  Hfe  of 
the  average  man  and  woman.  He  never  gossips, 
and  while  his  conversation  is  always  brilliant 
and  amazingly  stimulating,  it  has  none  of  the 
salt  of  the  "he-said-and-I-said"  chit-chat  that 
constitutes  90  per  cent,  of  human  talk.  Much 
of  this  is  due  to  the  forward-looking  habit  of 
his  mind,  its   preoccupation  with  things  to  be 

77 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON        i 

done,  rather  than  things  that  have  been  done, 
but  part  of  it  is  a  very  definite  preference  for 
ideas    above    personalities.     Happening  to   call 
at  the  White  House  the  very  next  day,  it  was 
natural  to  expect  that  some  mention  would  be     ; 
made  of  the  famous  interview,  but  not  a  word 
was    volunteered    by    the    President.     When    I 
finally  took  the  liberty  of  asking  about  it,  how- 
ever, he  talked  freely  and  interestedly,  giving  a 
very  vivid  picture  of  the  meeting.     My  keenest     ! 
impression    at    the    time    was    the    President's     | 
appreciation  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  intense  virility,     | 
picturesque  personality,  and  love  of  fighting.  i 

One  of  the  first  remarks  made  by  Mr.  Roose-     | 
velt  was  to  the  effect  that  if  he  were  given  per- 
mission to  go  to  France  "he'd  promise  not  to 
come  back."     Although  put  forward  jocularly,     ; 
the  President  refused  to  let  even  a  hint  of  past     i 
disagreements  creep  into  the  talk,  and  the  two     j 
approached  each  other  finally  in  a  spirit  of  abso-    | 
lute  frankness.     Mr.  Roosevelt  made  a  strong,     I 
convincing  case  for  his  plan  to  enlist  four  volun- 
teer   divisions,    pointing    out    the    speed    with 
which  they  could  be  raised,  the  enthusiasm  that    ■ 
would  be  aroused,  and  the  necessity  for  convinc-    ; 
ing  the  Allies  that  America  was  in  the  war  with 
men  as  well  as  money.  ! 

The  President,  in  answer,  explained  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Selective  Service  law,  and  cited    i 
Mr.    Roosevelt's  own   bitter   attacks   upon   the    ' 
criminality  of  the  volunteer  system.     He  dwelt 
on  the  obvious  fact  that  the  opposition  of  Con- 
gress undoubtedly  reflected  the  sentiment  of  the    ; 
country  in  large  degree,  and  was  of  the  opinion 

78  ■ 


"THE  ROOSEVELT  DIVISIONS" 

that  It  would  be  no  easy  matter  to  wean  the 
people  away  from  their  most  cherished  tradition. 
Any  sign  of  compromise  would  be  the  signal  for 
defeat,  and  to  make  one  exception,  even  for  an 
ex-President,  was  to  open  the  gates  to  every 
politician  with  an  ounce  of  military  knowledge. 
His  desk,  he  said,  was  piled  high  with  requests 
from  war  veterans,  Indian-fighters,  Texan 
Rangers,  and  Southern  "colonels,"  none  of  them, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  able  to  compare  with  Mr. 
Roosevelt  in  position  or  popularity,  yet  each 
one  a  volcano  of  courage  and  sincerity.  He  had 
the  conviction  that  the  attitude  of  Congress 
was  largely  due  to  their  desire  to  accommodate 
this  spirit,  but  it  was  an  accommodation  that 
could  not  end  in  anything  but  disaster.  The 
war  in  France  was  no  "Charge  of  the  Light 
Brigade,"  but  the  grim  subordination  of  human 
valor  to  the  cold-blooded  science  of  killing. 
Moreover,  it  was  a  "boys'  war."  Tragic,  to  be 
sure,  but  middle  age  must  realize  that  the  strain 
and  fatigue  of  the  trenches  were  for  the  'twenties. 
Mr.  Roosevelt  was  willing  to  admit  that  his 
volunteer  divisions  might  not  prove  a  material 
contribution  to  the  struggle,  but  he  stood  firm 
on  the  proposition  that  their  "moral  effect" 
would  be  of  incalculable  value.  James  Bryce 
and  General  JofFre  alike  had  advised  him  of  the 
necessity  of  stimulating  the  AUied  morale,  and 
he  challenged  Mr.  V^ilson  to  point  out  a  quicker, 
surer  way  than  the  spectacle  of  an  ex-President 
of  the  United  States  entering  France  at  the  head 
of  a  division  of  men  of  proved  reputation  for 
courage  and  achievement. 

79 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

The  President  agreed  to  this,  but  held  firmly 
that  the  situation  demanded  more  than  a  gesture. 
As  he  saw  it,  Europe  inclined  to  the  behef  that 
America  was  a  country  of  large  flourishes,  and 
nothing  would  confirm  this  feeling  more  surely 
than  the  dramatic  arrival  of  a  body  whose  general 
unreadiness  must  soon  become  apparent.  He 
demurred  also  to  the  imposing  list  of  officers 
that  Mr.  Roosevelt  requested,  urging  that  it 
deprived  the  new  draft  army  of  the  very  men 
that  it  would  most  need.  His  principal  and 
unalterable  objection,  however,  was  based  upon 
the  fact  that  any  exception  for  the  benefit  of 
Mr.  Roosevelt  would  imperil  the  adoption  and 
operation  of  the  Selective  Service  bill  upon 
which  the  administration  depended.  He  urged 
Mr.  Roosevelt  to  put  his  powerful  influence  be- 
hind the  draft  bill,  and  asked  him  as  a  personal 
favor  to  see  certain  members  of  Congress  for 
purposes  of  conversation. 

Against  the  decision  Mr.  Roosevelt  hurled  all 
the  weight  of  his  personality,  and  while  the 
President  made  no  promises,  he  was  persuaded 
to  the  point  of  agreeing  to  make  the  matter  the 
subject  of  discussion  with  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  the  General  Staff".  At  every  point  he  tried 
to  give  Mr.  Roosevelt  the  sense  of  deep  sym- 
pathy with  his  wish,  his  full  understanding  of  a 
very  natural  ambition.  At  the  moment,  I  saw 
for  myself  how  all  that  was  ardent  in  the  Presi- 
dent, the  adventurousness  that  made  him  want  to 
be  a  sailor  in  his  youth,  went  out  to  Mr.  Roosevelt 
and  his  dream  of  leading  the  first  Americans  across 
the  water  to  fight  in  the  land  of  Lafayette  and 

80 


''THE  ROOSEVELT  DIVISIONS" 

Rochambeau.  What  a  crown  to  a  picturesque, 
colorful,  and  ever  strenuous  career!  What  finer 
death,  if  death  should  come!  Every  impulse  of 
the  President  supported  Mr.  Roosevelt's  re- 
quest, and  it  was  the  one  time  when  his  emotional 
processes  interfered  in  any  degree  with  cool, 
intellectual  analysis  of  the  values  of  a  proposi- 
tion. Not  then  only,  but  a  score  of  times 
thereafter  I  saw  him  show  an  almost  passionate 
envy  for  the  men  lucky  enough  to  spend  their 
strength  of  body  and  strength  of  patriotism  in 
the  supreme  exaltation  of  the  battle-field,  and 
it  was  this  feeling  of  his  own  that  gave  him 
appreciation  of  Theodore  Roosevelt's  desire. 

After  some  discussion  of  the  probability  of 
domestic  disaffection  and  the  general  situation 
on  the  western  front,  the  two  parted  in  genuine- 
ness, and  Mr.  Roosevelt  set  to  work  at  once 
on  the  conversion  of  Congressmen  to  the  draft 
plan.  He  failed,  however,  for  an  informal  poll 
of  the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs, 
taken  April  i6th,  showed  that  the  volunteer 
system,  still  possessed  a  majority.  It  was  then 
that  the  President  sent  for  the  House  leaders 
and  informed  them  flatly  that  the  administra- 
tion would  not  "yield  an  inch  of  any  essential 
part  of  the  program  for  raising  an  army  by 
conscription."  He  recited  our  own  experience 
in  the  war  with  Spain,  and  presented  facts  that 
proved  the  volunteer  plan  to  be  directly  respon- 
sible for  England's  early  disasters.  As  a  con- 
sequence, the  House  passed  the  Selective  Service 
bill  on  April  29th,  although  only  after  a  debate 
of  intense  bitterness. 

8i 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

In  the  mean  time  Mr.  Roosevelt  had  in  no 
wise  abated  his  demand  for  permission  to  raise  the 
volunteer  divisions,  nor  had  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  the  General  Staff  changed  their  minds 
in  any  degree.  During  Mr.  Roosevelt's  stay 
in  Washington  Mr.  Baker  called  upon  him 
personally,  and,  as  a  result  of  the  interview, 
wrote  him  a  letter  on  April  13th  that  contained 
this  definite  refusal: 

Co-operation  between  the  United  States  and  the  Entente 
Allies  has  not  yet  been  so  far  planned  as  that  any  decision 
has  been  reached  upon  the  subject  of  sending  an  expedi- 
tionary force;  but  should  any  force  be  sent,  I  should  feel 
obliged  to  urge  that  it  be  placed  under  the  command  of  the 
ablest  and  most  experienced  professional  military  man  in 
our  country,  artd  that  it  be  officered  by  and  composed  of 
men  selected  because  of  their  previous  military  training, 
and,  as  far  as  possible,  actual  military  experience.  My 
judgment  reached  this  conclusion  for  the  reason  that  any 
such  expedition  will  be  made  up  of  young  Americans  who 
will  be  sent  to  expose  their  lives  in  the  bloodiest  war  yet 
fought  in  the  world,  and  under  conditions  of  warfare  in- 
volving applications  of  science  to  the  art,  of  such  a  char- 
acter that  the  very  highest  degree  of  skill  and  training 
and  the  largest  experience  are  needed  for  their  guidance 
and  protection.  I  could  not  reconcile  my  mind  to  a  recom- 
mendation which  deprived  our  soldiers  of  the  most  experi- 
enced leadership  available,  in  deference  to  any  mere  senti- 
mental consideration,  nor  could  I  consent  to  any  expedition 
being  sent  until  its  members  have  been  seasoned  by  most 
thorough  training  for  the  hardships  which  they  would  have 
to  endure.  I  believe,  too,  that  should  any  expeditionary 
force  be  sent  by  the  United  States,  it  should  appear  from 
the  very  aspect  of  it  that  military  considerations  alone 
had  determined  its  composition,  and  I  think  this  appear- 
ance would  be  given  rather  by  the  selection  of  the  officers 
from  the  men  of  the  army  who  have  devoted  their  lives 
exclusively  to  the  study  and  pursuit  of  military  matters 

82 


"THE  ROOSEVELT  DIVISIONS" 

and  have  made  a  professional  study  of  the  recent  changes 
in  the  art  of  war.  I  should,  therefore,  be  obliged  to  with- 
hold my  approval  from  an  expedition  of  the  sort  you 
propose. 

The  entire  correspondence,  beginning  Febru- 
ary 2d  and  ending  May  nth,  was  printed  by 
Mr.  Roosevelt  in  the  Metropolitan  Magazine 
for  August,  1917,  and  is  available  for  reference 
and  study.  While  the  Secretary  of  War  assumed 
full  responsibility  for  the  refusal,  Mr.  Roosevelt 
knew  well  that  the  decision  was  the  decision  of 
the  General  Staff,  and  his  letter  of  April  22d 
was  a  direct  attack  upon  "well-meaning  military 
men  of  the  red-tape  and  pipe-clay  school,  who 
are  hidebound  in  the  pedantry  of  that  kind  of 
wooden  militarism  which  is  only  one  degree 
worse  than  its  extreme  opposite,  the  folly  which 
believes  that  an  army  can  be  improvised  between 
sunrise  and  sunset.'*  With  acid  in  every  word 
he  commented  upon  the  fact  that  the  large 
number  of  men  who  rise  high  in  the  army 
"owe  more  to  the  possession  of  a  sound  stomach 
than  to  the  pKDSsession  of  the  highest  qualities 
of  head  and  heart,"  and  flatly  urged  the  Secre- 
tary to  regard  his  military  advisers  as  unwise 
counselors. 

Mr.  Roosevelt's  point  of  view  was  that  of  the 
civilian,  and  it  is  impossible  for  the  civilian 
not  to  feel  sympathy  with  it.  About  the  de- 
cisions of  every  General  Staff  there  is  a  certain 
effect  of  class  arrogance,  a  sort  of  contemptuous 
disregard  for  everything  except  their  own  opin- 
ions, that  inevitably  arouses  the  anger  of  the 
lavman.  At  the  same  time  there  must  be 
7  83 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

understanding  of  Mr.  Baker's  position.  The_ 
members  of  the  General  Staff  were,  by  our  law, 
his  duly  constituted  advisers  in  all  military 
matters,  and  to  overrule  them  in  a  fundamental 
policy  at  the  very  outset  was  to  invite  bitter-' 
ness  and  disorganization.  Because  of  this  con- 
dition, and  by  reason  of  his  own  intense  advocacy 
of  compulsory  service,  he  stood  firm  in  his 
refusal  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  petition. 

Returning  to  Congress,  the  favorable  vote  of 
the  House  on  April  29th  transferred  the  battle 
to  the  Senate.  All  hope  of  swift  action  was 
killed  almost  instantly  by  the  adoption  of  an  ^ 
amendment  that  gave  Mr.  Roosevelt  the  right 
to  raise  four  volunteer  divisions.  The  Republi- 
can leaders — Lodge,  Harding,  Penrose,  Curtis, 
and  Weeks — led  the  fight,  and  the  debate  was 
marked  by  a  tone  of  ugly  and  disturbing  parti- 
zanship.  The  House  refused  to  concur  in  the 
amendment,  a  deadlock  resulted,  and  for  two 
weeks  this  single  question  paralyzed  the  war 
effort  of  an  embattled  nation.  On  May  15th, 
however,  a  compromise  was  reached,  the  Senate 
agreeing  to  withdraw  the  mandatory  feature 
of  the  amendment,  making  it  optional  with  the 
President  to  accept  or  request  the  four  volunteer 
divisions  offered  by  Mr.  Roosevelt. 

By  reason  of  the  transfer  of  the  dilemma 
from  the  Congress  to  the  White  House,  the 
President  was  confronted  with  this  situation: 
to  refuse  Mr.  Roosevelt  was  to  give  an  impression 
of  ungenerousness,  an  effect  of  partizan  narrow- 
ness; on  the  other  hand,  to  authorize  the  volun- 
teer enlistment  of  four  divisions  was  to  upset 

84 


"THE  ROOSEVELT  DIVISIONS" 

the  whole  machinery  of  the  draft,  to  make  a 
flagrant  exception  that  would  inevitably  anger 
and  alienate  the  supporters  of  the  volunteer 
system,  and,  worst  of  all,  to  serve  notice  upon 
the  General  Staflf  that  its  recommendations 
were  at  all  times  subject  to  personal  and  political 
considerations.  His  statement  of  May  5th 
did  not  attempt  to  evade  the  issue,  but  met  it 
decisively.  After  setting  June  5th  as  registra- 
tion-day, and  announcing  the  choice  of  Gen. 
John  J.  Pershing  to  head  an  Expeditionary 
Force  that  would  sail  for  France  at  the  earliest 
possible  date,  the  President  took  position  in 
support  of  the  General  Staff  and  the  unfaltering 
execution  of  the  Selective  Service  law.  It 
would  have  been  his  pleasure,  he  said — 

to  pay  Mr.  Roosevelt  the  compliment  and  the  Allies 
the  compliment  of  sending  to  their  aid  one  of  our  most 
distinguished  public  men,  an  ex-PresIdent  who  has  ren- 
dered many  conspicuous  public  services  and  proved  his 
gallantry  In  many  striking  ways.  But  this  Is  not  the  time 
or  the  occasion  for  compliment  or  for  any  action  not  calcu- 
lated to  contribute  to  the  immediate  success  of  the  war. 
The  business  now  in  hand  is  undramatic,  practical,  and  of 
scientific  definiteness  and  precision.  I  shall  act  with 
regard  to  It  at  every  step  and  In  every  particular  under 
expert  advice  from  both  sides  of  the  water.  That  advice 
is  that  the  men  most  needed  are  men  of  the  ages  con- 
templated in  the  draft  provision  of  the  present  bill,  not 
men  of  the  age  and  sort  contemplated  in  the  section  which 
authorizes  the  formation  of  volunteer  units,  and  that  for 
the  preliminary  training  of  the  men  who  are  to  be  drafted 
we  shall  need  all  of  our  experienced  officers.  Mr.  Roose- 
velt told  me,  when  I  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  him  a  few 
weeks  ago,  that  he  would  wish  to  have  associated  with 
him  some  of  the  most  efrectlve  officers  of  the  regular  army. 
He  named  many  of  these  whom  he  would  desire  to  have 

8s 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

designated  for  the  service,  and  they  were  men  who  can- 
not possibly  be  spared  from  the  too  small  force  of  officers 
at  our  command  for  the  much  more  pressing  and  necessary 
duty  of  training  regular  troops  to  be  put  into  the  field 
in  France  and  Belgium  as  fast  as  they  can  be  got  ready. 
The  first  troops  to  France  will  be  taken  from  the  present 
forces  of  the  regular  army,  and  will  be  under  the  command 
of  trained  soldiers  only.  The  responsibility  for  the  suc- 
cessful conduct  of  our  part  in  this  great  war  rests  upon  me. 
I  could  not  escape  it  if  I  would.  I  am  too  much  interested 
in  the  cause  we  are  fighting  for  to  be  interested  in  anything 
but  success.  The  issues  involved  are  too  immense  for  me 
to  take  into  consideration  anything  whatever  except  the 
Best,  the  most  effective,  and  most  immediate  means  of 
military  action. 


THE    CASE   OF   LEONARD   WOOD 

EMOTIONAL  excitement  causes  a  certain 
suspension  of  the  mental  processes,  and 
when  national  feeUng  is  at  high  pitch  the  im- 
portant and  unimportant  almost  invariably 
sufFer  curious  inversion.  America  sent  more 
than  two  million  soldiers  across  the  Atlantic  to 
engage  in  a  struggle  that  meant  the  life  or 
death  of  free  institutions,  yet  throughout  that 
tryixig  time,  when  the  issue  hung  in  the  bal- 
ance, there  were  papers  and  people  whose  in- 
terest had  no  larger  manifestation  than  the 
fortunes  of  Gen.  Leonard  Wood.  At  this  very 
time  of  writing  the  man  himself  is  a  conspicu- 
ous figure  in  pubhc  life  by  reason  of  the  fact 
that  he  was  kept  at  home  in  a  training-camp 
instead  of  being  permitted  to  match  his  military 
genius  against  the  abilities  of  Hindenburg  and 
LudendorfF. 

General  Wood  was  not  sent  to  France  for  the 
very  good  reason  that  Gen.  John  J.  Pershing, 
commander  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces,  did  not  ask  to  have  him  sent,  plain  in- 
dication that  he  was  neither  needed  nor  wanted 
in  France.  The  decision  was  not  the  decision  of 
the  President  nor  the  Secretary  of  War  nor  the 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Chief  of  Staff,  but  the  weighed  judgment  of 
General  Pershing,  the  soldier  selected  for  the 
high  post  of  field  command,  and  given  full 
power  even  as  he  was  held  to  full  responsibility. 
All  of  the  generals  in  charge  of  American  training- 
camps  were  sent  to  France  in  the  summer  of 
191 7,  not  only  that  they  might  see  for  them- 
selves the  goal  to  which  they  were  pointed,  the 
style  of  fighting,  and  the  kind  of  soldiers  that 
would  have  to  be  made,  but  equally  for  the  pur- 
pose of  permitting  General  Pershing  to  pass  upon 
their  personalities,  character,  and  abilities.  The 
generals  returned  from  their  pilgrimage,  applied 
themselves  to  the  work  of  turning  raw  boys  into  fit 
defenders,  and  in  due  time  Pershing  sent  to  the 
Chief  of  Staff  a  list  of  the  commanders  that  he 
desired  to  accompany  their  divisions  to  France 
when  the  stage  of  embarkation  should  be  reached. 
The  name  of  Gen.  Leonard  Wood  was  not  on  the 
list. 

As  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Public  In- 
formation, with  duty  to  stimulate  and  guard  the 
national  morale,  I  made  it  my  business  to  inquire 
into  the  facts  in  the  case.  At  the  time  of  General 
Pershing's  departure  for  France  I  knew,  as  did 
every  one  else  in  government,  that  it  had  been 
made  plain  to  him  that  he  would  not  be  hampered 
by  home  meddling.  Even  as  he  was  held  to  full 
responsibility,  so  was  he  given  full  power  in  the 
selection  of  those  men  upon  whom  he  would 
have  to  depend.  His  list,  therefore,  was  ap- 
proved as  a  matter  of  course,  and  went  into  the 
War  Department  files  until  further  action  should 
be  demanded.     As  I   remember  it,   the  whole 

88 


THE  CASE  OF  LEONARD  WOOD 

trouble  arose  from  the  fact  that  General  March 
treated  the  circumstance  as  one  of  mihtary 
routine  entirely,  utterly  faiHng  to  realize  its 
political  importance.  Instead  of  informing  Gen- 
eral Wood  at  once  that  he  had  not  been  chosen 
to  go  to  France,  he  followed  the  established 
procedure  and  waited  for  the  completion  of  the 
training  period  before  issuing  orders  to  the 
division  commanders.  General  Wood,  however, 
left  Camp  Funston  in  advance  of  the  division 
and  without  waiting  to  receive  his  orders. 
General  March  sent  them  to  him  in  New  York, 
and  in  consequence  there  was  an  appearance 
of  eleventh-hour  action,  an  effect  of  jerking 
General  Wood  from  the  very  deck  of  the  trans- 
port. 

As  a  matter  of  course,  General  Wood  carried 
his  complaint  to  the  President  and  was  told 
plainly  that  the  list  would  not  be  revised  in  the 
personal  interest  of  any  soldier  or  politician. 
When  the  President  took  office  in  191 3  the  one 
army  man  that  he  knew  was  Gen.  Hugh  L. 
Scott.  Wood  was  then  Chief  of  Staff,  and, 
owing  to  many  and  bitter  complaints  against 
him,  the  President  sent  for  Scott  and  asked  for 
information  and  advice  with  respect  to  the  re- 
tention of  Wood.  General  Scott,  a  generous 
and  kindly  man,  urged  the  President  to  take  no 
action,  and  Wood  was  permitted  to  remain  in  the 
office  until  his  term  expired  in  1914.  Throughout 
that  period  the  atmosphere  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment was  one  of  spite  and  jealousy  and  intrigue. 
When  Wood  took  command  of  the  Department 
of  the  East  in   19 14,  there  was  no  change  in 

89 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

strategy  or  tactics.  At  all  times  the  President 
was  explicit  with  regard  to  Wood.  His  sense 
of  justice  had  been  outraged  by  the  political 
elevation  of  a  doctor  over  the  heads  of  sol- 
diers who  had  given  laborious  years  to  the 
study  and  practice  of  their  profession,  and  his 
sense  of  taste  was  offended  by  the  spectacle  of 
a  soldier  in  uniform  plying  the  trade  of  a  poli- 
tician. He  felt  that  this  allowance  of  special 
privilege,  this  grant  of  immunity  to  insult  and 
insubordination,  struck  a  blow  at  the  discipline 
of  the  army. 

As  for  Mr.  Baker's  views,  no  one  knew  at  the 
time  nor  does  any  one  know  to-day.  At  the 
outbreak  of  war  there  was  plain  evidence  that 
the  Secretary  of  War  had  decided  upon  a  policy 
of  impersonality,  a  sort  of  judicial  detachment 
that  would  lift  him  above  the  human  wrangle, 
permitting  him  to  make  his  decisions  unin- 
fluenced either  by  likes  or  disUkes.  This  poHcy 
worked  out  in  his  case  as  it  works  out  in  every 
case.  He  went  to  absurdities  of  fairness  in 
dealing  with  his  enemies,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
charge  of  prejudice,  and  swung  back  to  an  ex- 
treme of  unfairness  where  his  friends  were 
concerned  in  order  to  guard  against  the  sus- 
picion of  being  swayed  by  his  preferences.  As 
a  consequence  Leonard  Wood  looked  after  his 
personal  interests  during  the  war,  even  as  he 
has  been  allowed  to  make  a  presidential  cam- 
paign in  the  uniform  of  a  major-general  of  the 
army  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Baker's  silence, 
to  be  sure,  lends  itself  to  a  finer,  nobler  view, 
and   I   have   always  thought   that   it   was   the 

90 


THE  CASE  OF  LEONARD  WOOD 

right  one.  Had  he  spoken,  telling  of  General 
Pershing's  list  and  the  fact  that  Wood's  name 
did  not  appear  upon  it,  he  would  have  escaped 
attack,  but  America  might  have  suffered.  It 
mattered  little  that  the  Secretary  of  War  should 
be  attacked  and  abused,  but  it  was  an  entirely 
different  matter  for  the  commander-in-chief  of 
the  American  forces  in  France,  face  to  face  with 
crisis,  to  be  dragged  into  a  domestic  political 
wrangle. 

All  of  which  would  not  be  deserving  of  at- 
tention but  for  certain  curious  exaggerations 
in  the  public  mind  that  have  given  both  the 
man  and  the  incident  an  importance  out 
of  all  proportion  to  value.  It  is  by  his  un- 
canny ability  to  create  these  exaggerations 
that  Wood  rose  above  the  average  to  which 
he  seemed  doomed  by  his  mediocrities,  and 
is  to-day  a  national  figure.  The  American 
habit  of  dissociating  public  and  private  busi- 
ness, treating  political  affairs  as  an  emotional 
relaxation  rather  than  an  importance,  has 
resulted  in  many  incredibilities,  some  tragic, 
some  humorous,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  in 
all  history  there  is  record  of  anything  so 
utterly  incredible  as  the  story  of  Leonard 
Wood. 

The  reputation  of  Wood  is  built  upon  as- 
sumption rather  than  fact,  on  clever  suggestion 
rather  than  provable  statement.  His  military 
genius  is  made  a  matter  of  general  belief  by 
reason  of  constant  allusion  to  Indian  campaigns 
in  which  he  played  heroic  part,  assuming  com- 
mand of  an  infantry  battalion  after  it  had  **lost 

91 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

its  last  officer,"  and  conducting  himself  in  such 
manner  as  to  win  a  medal  of  honor;  also  upon 
his  achievements  in  the  war  with  Spain,  when 
he  led  the  Rough  Riders  to  victory  at  San  Juan 
Hill.  His  administrative  genius  rests  upon  his 
record  in  Cuba  from  1899  to  1902,  where,  ac- 
cording to  one  of  his  biographers,  he  built  so 
permanently  that  he  left  behind  him  "an  inde^ 
pendent  proud  democracy"  strong  to  withstand 
the  storms  of  revolution.  This  record,  when 
taken  to  pieces,  is  seen  to  be  an  absurd  jumble 
of  baseless  claims. 

According  to  the  War  Department  records, 
Wood  entered  the  military  service  as  a  "contract 
surgeon,"  a  civilian  employee  entirely  without 
military  status.  During  June  and  July,  1886, 
he  was  assigned  to  duty  under  Capt.  H.  W. 
Lawton  of  the  4th  Cavalry,  at  that  time  in  the 
field  in  pursuit  of  Geronimo.  In  addition  to  the 
cavalry.  Captain  Lawton  had  under  him  a  small 
detachment  of  infantry,  about  eighteen  or  twenty 
in  number,  that  had  been  sent  to  him  without 
any  officers. 

On  July  2d,  when  the  need  arose  to  have 
this  small  body  captained  by  some  one. 
Doctor  Wood  asked  for  the  command  and 
was  given  it,  and  for  twenty-eight  days  was 
by  way  of  being  an  officer.  It  was  in  this 
period  that  the  historic  encounter  took  place 
that  gives  Doctor  Wood  his  claim  to  a  niche 
in  the  Hall  of  Fame.  The  following  extract 
from  the  official  report  of  Captain  Lawton  sets 
forth  the  facts  as  they  were  seen  by  that 
officer  at  the  time: 

92 


THE  CASE  OF  LEONARD  WOOD 

En  Route  to  Fort  Marion,  Fla., 

September  p,  1886. 
Sir, — I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report 
of  operations  against  Geronimo's  and  Natchez's  bands  of 
hostile  Indians  made  by  the  command  organized  in  com- 
pliance with  the  following  order: 

On  the  6th  of  July  the  command,  consisting  of  infantry 
and  scouts,  marched  from  Oposura.  No  officer  of  infantry 
having  been  sent  with  the  detachment,  and  having  no 
officers  with  the  command  except  Second-Lieutenant 
Brown,  4th  Cavalry,  commanding  scouts,  and  Second- 
Lieutenant  Walsh,  4th  Cavalry,  commanding  cavalry, 
Assistant-Surgeon  Wood  was,  at  his  own  request,  given 
command  of  the  infantry. 

The  work  during  June  having  been  done  by  the  cavalry, 
they  were  too  much  exhausted  to  be  used  again  without 
rest,  and  they  were  left  in  camp  at  Oposura  to  recuperate. 

On  the  14th  of  July  a  runner  was  sent  back  by  Lieutenant 
Brown  of  the  scouts,  with  the  information  that  the  camp 
had  been  located  and  that  he  would  attack  at  once  with 
his  scouts,  asking  for  the  infantry  to  be  sent  forward  to 
his  support.  I  moved  forward  with  the  infantry  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  and  did  not  reach  Lieutenant  Brown  until 
after  he  had  entered  the  hostile  camp.  The  attacking 
party  had  been  discovered  and  all  the  hostiles  escaped. 
Their  animals  and  camp  equipage,  with  a  large  amount  of 
dried  beef,  etc.,  fell  into  our  hands,  but  the  hostiles  scat- 
tered and  escaped  on  foot. 

*H.  W.  Lawton, 

Captain  4th  Cavalry. 
Adjutant-General,  Department  of  Arizona. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  Captain  Lawton, 
writing  at  the  time,  did  not  look  upon  the 
twenty    infantrymen     as     a    **  battalion,''    but 

93 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

merely  as  a  detachment;  that  he  stated  clearly 
that  officers  were  not  sent  to  him  with  the 
detachment,  and  that  no  attempt  was  made  by 
him  to  claim  that  Wood  and  the  infantry  were 
present  at  the  attack  upon  the  Indian  camp, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  there  is  exphcit  admission 
that  they  did  not  reach  the  place  of  encounter 
until  after  its  occupation  by  the  scouts  and 
after  the  flight  of  every  Indian. 

It  was  not  until  August  ii,  1886,  that  Doctor 
Wood  ceased  to  be  a  civilian  employee,  on  that 
date  receiving  an  appointment  from  Massachu- 
setts as  Assistant  Surgeon  in  the  United  States 
army.  From  this  point  on  nothing  is  heard 
of  him  until  1898,  when  he  emerged  into  the 
limelight  as  the  personal  physician  of  President 
McKinley  and  the  valued  medical  adviser  of 
Secretary  of  War  Alger.  In  March,  when  it 
was  a  certainty  that  we  would  go  to  war  with 
Spain,  the  country  and  the  army  were  stunned 
by  the  announcement  that  Doctor  Wood  had 
been  awarded  the  medal  of  honor  "for  distin- 
guished conduct  in  campaign  against  the  Apache 
Indians  in  1886  while  serving  as  medical  and 
line  officer  of  Captain  Lawton's  expedition.'* 

Russell  A.  Alger  has  much  to  answer  for,  what 
with  "embalmed  beef,"  paper  shoes,  and  fever 
camps,  and  other  peccadilloes,  but  it  cannot  be 
held  against  him  that  he  ever  permitted  the 
obHgations  of  pubhc  service  to  interfere  with 
proper  rewards  for  true  Republicanism.  Not 
only  did  his  enthusiasm  blaze  back  across  the 
long  stretch  of  twelve  years,  but  by  its  light 
he   was    able   to   see   the   occurrence   far   more 

94 


THE  CASE  OF  LEONARD  WOOD 

vividly  than  even  Captain  Lawton,  on  the 
ground  at  the  time.  Instead  of  a  "detachment" 
of  eighteen  or  twenty  men,  Secretary  Alger  saw 
Doctor  Wood's  command  as  a  "battalion'*; 
not  only  had  officers  been  sent  with  this  detach- 
ment, contrary  to  Captain  Lawton's  report, 
but  the  noble  souls  had  "died  of  exposure,'' 
j>ermitting  Doctor  Wood  to  leap  forward  to  fill 
all  of  the  vacant  posts;  the  affair  at  the  Indian 
camp  was  no  skirmish,  but  a  "battle,"  and 
Doctor  Wood,  instead  of  being  miles  away,  was 
in  the  very  forefront  of  the  attack. 

Evidently  the  medal  of  honor  also  carried 
with  it  the  award  of  Seven  League  Boots,  for 
from  this  time  on  the  strides  of  Doctor  Wood 
were  many  and  mighty.  On  May  8,  1898, 
scarce  six  weeks  after  receiving  the  magic  medal, 
he  was  made  commanding  colonel  of  the  ist 
U.  S.  Volunteer  Cavalry;  on  July  8th  he  was 
made  a  brigadier-general  for  services  at  Las 
Guasimas  and  San  Juan  Hill,  and  on  December 
7th  he  was  made  a  major-general. 

There  is  not  any  large  need  for  consideration 
of  Wood's  Cuban  War  record,  for  even  his 
biographers  admit  that  it  is  confined  to  two 
battles.  There  is  public  testimony  to  the  effect 
that  he  did  not  participate  personally  in  the 
battle  of  San  Juan  Hill,  as  it  is  a  matter  of  mili- 
tary record  that  he  owed  his  rescue  at  Las 
Guasimas  to  the  courage  of  colored  troops. 
The  point  of  importance,  however,  lies  in  these 
undisputed  facts:  that  the  military  record  of 
Leonard  Wood  rests  upon  the  command  of  twenty 
men  for  twenty-eight  days  during  which  but  one 

95 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

engagement  was  fought  and  in  which  he  played 
no  part,  and  upon  several  months  of  service  in 
Cuba,  where,  even  if  the  San  Juan  Hill  claim 
is  allowed,  he  participated  in  but  two  battles. 
On  the  strength  of  this  record  he  was  made  a 
major-general  in  the  regular  army  of  the  United 
States  by  Roosevelt  in  1903,  chief  of  staff  by 
President  Taft  in  1910,  urged  for  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  in 
1 91 7,  and  boomed  for  the  Presidency  in  1920 
on  a  Prussian  platform. 

The  Wood  reputation  as  a  "great  administra- 
tor" rests  upon  foundations  no  less  flimsy. 
As  a  matter  of  course  he  made  Cuba  a  better 
place  in  which  to  live.  Not  only  were  conditions 
at  a  point  where  improvement  was  the  one 
possible  change,  but  he  had  with  him  the  very 
flower  of  America's  sanitarians  and  municipal 
experts. 

House-cleaning,  however,  is  not  "administra- 
tive genius."  Street-sweeping,  while  important, 
is  scarcely  the  sole  concern  of  a  President  of 
the  United  States.  The  thing  by  which  Wood's 
governorship  must  be  judged,  in  the  light  of  his 
aspirations,  is  the  permanency  of  the  structure 
that  he  built.  He  went  into  Cuba  when  the 
ground  was  clear  and  he  had  a  free  hand  backed 
by  all  the  power  of  the  United  States.  What 
was  the  result.?  The  structure  that  he  raised 
fell  to  pieces  in  exactly  four  years.  In  July, 
1906,  revolution  rocked  the  island  to  a  demorali- 
zation as  complete  as  any  ever  suffered  before, 
and  in  September  of  that  year  American  troops 
landed    for    a    second    intervention.     For   three 

96 


THE  CASE  OF  LEONARD  WOOD 

years  we  kept  our  soldiers  and  administrators 
in  charge  of  Cuban  affairs,  and  when  they  left 
in  1909  they  had  builded  so  well  that  the  re- 
public endures  to  this  day,  a  period  of  eleven 
years  as  compared  to  the  four  years'  life  of  the 
former  creation.  And  in  this  second  interven- 
tion Leonard  Wood  had  no  part  or  lot. 


VI 

THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

A  PROFOUND  sense  of  unnecessariness  is 
bound  to  check  many  post-war  explanations, 
even  as  it  imparts  a  perfunctory  quality  to 
those  that  are  made,  for,  after  all,  the  complete 
answer  to  every  charge  of  fault,  failure,  and  mis- 
conduct is  given  by  the  fact  of  victory  as  swift 
as  it  was  decisive.  In  the  hour  when  the  fate  of 
free  nations  hung  uncertainly  the  organized 
major  force  of  America  struck  the  blow  that 
crushed  the  mightiest  military  organization  in 
history.  Not  one  pennyweight  of  credit  is  to 
be  taken  away  from  the  Allies,  war-weary  after 
four  terrible  years,  but  at  the  time  we  entered 
the  struggle  the  Germans  were  in  positions  of 
virtual  dominance  on  every  front — insolent,  as- 
sured, powerful.  Twenty  months  from  Amer- 
ica's declaration  of  war  their  arrogance  was 
bowed,  their  leaders  in  flight,  their  ultimatums 
changed  to  pleas. 

It  was  inevitable  that  politicians  would  seek 
to  ignore  this  fact  of  victory,  but  that  a  whole 
people  should  shut  their  eyes  to  splendid  achieve- 
ment will  undoubtedly  excite  the  puzzled  atten- 
tion of  the  historians  of  the  future.  A  more 
amazing,  incomprehensible  change  has  never 
been  suffered  by  a  race.     The  day  of  the  armis- 

98 


THE   POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

tice  America  stood  on  the  hilltops  of  glory, 
proud  in  her  strength,  invincible  in  her  ideals, 
acclaimed  and  loved  by  a  world  free  of  an  an- 
cient fear  at  last:  to-day  we  writhe  in  a  pit  of 
our  own  digging,  despising  ourselves  and  de- 
spised by  the  betrayed  peoples  of  earth.  Instead 
of  unity  a  vast  disintegration,  instead  of  enthu- 
siasm an  intolerable  irritation,  instead  of  fixed 
purpose  a  strange  and  bewildering  indecision. 
A  certain  reaction  was  natural  and  is  perfectly 
understandable.  After  a  year  and  a  half  of 
intense  emotionalism,  with  every  Hfe  keyed  to 
service  and  sacrifice,  taut  nerves  were  bound  to 
go  slack.  With  people  picking  up  old  threads 
and  finding  them  sadly  tangled,  a  high  degree  of 
irritability  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  The 
natural  has  long  since  been  left  behind,  however, 
and  it  is  the  stage  of  obsession  that  has  been 
reached.  Criticism  has  changed  to  vile  abuse, 
and  the  shining  arch  of  victory  goes  unseen  while 
snooping  hundreds  crawl  around  the  base,  hope- 
fully searching  for  cracks  and  flaws.  Heroes 
pushed  aside  by  camp-followers,  men  most 
applauded  whose  partizanship  drips  like  acid  on 
the  war  record  of  America,  and  statesmanship 
discarded  for  the  pull  and  haul  of  parochial 
politicians.  The  common  decencies  of  patriotism 
call  a  halt  before  the  wells  of  public  opinion  are 
poisoned  beyond  all  cleansing! 

It  is  our  pride  as  a  people  that  we  must  re- 
cover— a  pride  that  springs  from  no  effervescence 
of  conceit,  but  a  pride  bed-rocked  in  supreme 
accomplishment.  It  was  not  alone  that  we  did 
the  thing  we  set  out  to  do,  but  in  the  doing  we 
8  99 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

established  records  of  energy,  initiative,  and 
determination  that  have  no  parallel  in  history. 
The  Allies  had  only  faint  hope  of  aid  from  our 
man-power,  while  the  Germans  themselves  were 
confident  that  they  would  have  ample  time  to 
win  the  war  before  America  could  possibly  prove 
a  factor  in  the  fighting.  They  stimulated  their 
morale,  civil  as  well  as  military,  by  repeated 
assurances  that  "the  Yankees"  could  not  raise 
an  army;  that  even  if  it  were  raised  it  could  not 
be  trained  properly;  that  even  if  raised  and 
trained  it  could  not  be  transported. 

Within  a  month  from  the  declaration  of  war 
the  traditional  policy  of  the  nation  was  reversed 
by  the  enactment  of  the  Selective  Service  Act. 
A  vast  machinery  of  registration  was  created  that 
ran  without  a  hitch,  and  on  June  5th  more  than 
10,000,000  men  were  registered  quickly  and 
efficiently. 

Thirty-two  encampments — virtual  cities,  since 
each  had  to  house  40,000  men — were  built  in 
ninety  days  from  the  driving  of  the  first  nail, 
complete  in  every  municipal  detail,  a  feat  de- 
clared impossible,  and  which  will  stand  for  all 
time  as  a  building  miracle. 

In  June,  scarcely  two  months  after  the  Presi- 
dent's appearance  before  Congress,  General 
Pershing  and  his  staff  reached  France,  and  on 
July  3d  the  last  of  four  groups  of  transports 
landed  American  fighting-men  in  the  home  of 
Lafayette  and  Rochambeau.  On  October  loth 
our  soldiers  went  on  the  firing-line. 

Training-camps  for  officers  started  in  June, 
and    in    August    there    were    graduated    27,341 

100 


THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

successful  aspirants,  ready  to  assume  the  tasks 
of  leadership. 

What  was  the  situation  in  France?  Every 
possible  port  pre-empted,  every  mile  of  railroad 
used  to  its  uttermost  capacity,  supplies  sufficient 
for  French  forces  only,  and  an  utter  lack  of 
proper  housing  facilities  for  the  Americans  who 
were  to  come.  A  tidewater  port  was  the  best 
that  we  could  get,  great  docks  had  to  be  built, 
our  own  railroad  Hues  had  to  be  constructed; 
there  were  storage  depots  to  build,  and  13,000 
foresters,  equipped  with  the  latest  American 
inventions  in  lumbering  machinery,  had  to  go 
into  the  woodlands  of  France  and  cut  down  the 
trees  for  barracks,  railroad  ties,  and  construc- 
tion timber.  Not  in  any  degree  was  it  the  case 
that  our  problem  was  merely  to  get  men  to 
France.  Not  only  did  we  have  to  get  them 
there,  but  we  also  had  to  build  our  own  debarka- 
tion facilities,  our  own  transportation,  our  own 
housing,  hospitals,  ordnance  bases,  etc.,  and  we 
had  to  devise  the  stable  mechanism  that  would 
keep  supphes  of  every  kind  flowing  steadily 
across  3,000  miles  of  water.     And  it  was  done! 

Shipping  was  an  abandoned  craft.  It  had  to 
be  revived,  workmen  trained  and  yards  built; 
yet  such  were  our  ingenuities  that  by  November 
I,  191 8,  the  transport  service  of  the  army  alone 
numbered  431  ships,  totaling  over  3,000,000 
deadweight  tons. 

In  June  12,261  troops  and  2,798  marines  were 
embarked.  In  December  embarkations  had 
reached  50,000  a  month.  In  March  the  number 
had  grown  to  84,000.     Then  came  what  Europe 

lOI 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

called  "America's  transport  miracle."  In  April 
the  embarkations  were  1 18,637;  ^^  May,  245,950; 
in  June,  278,756;  in  July,  306,185.  At  the  time 
of  the  armistice  the  total  embarkations  amounted 
to  2,045,169  troops  and  30,665  marines. 

The  first  shipment  of  supplies  was  about 
16,000  tons  in  June,  1917.  By  October  we  were 
shipping  750,000  tons  a  month.  Altogether  we 
shipped  5,153,000  tons  of  supplies  to  our  soldiers 
in  France,  95  per  cent,  of  it  in  American  bottoms. 

Ships  had  to  be  altered  to  carry  the  1,145 
locomotives  that  we  sent;  there  were  problems 
in  connection  with  the  shipping  of  flat-cars 
"ready  to  run";  there  was  also  a  cross- 
channel  fleet  that  had  to  be  assembled,  but 
these  things  were  all  done,  not  slowly,  but  at 
top  speed. 

With  what  result  ^  Before  our  aid  was  deemed 
a  possibility  we  were  relieving  French  and 
English  divisions  in  quiet  sectors;  in  May,  191 8, 
a  year  after  our  declaration  of  war,  we  fought 
side  by  side  with  veterans  at  Cantigny;  in  June 
we  met  the  Germans  hand  to  hand  in  Belleau 
Wood  and  proved  ourselves  their  masters;  in 
July,  with  the  Germans  almost  at  the  gates  of 
Paris,  we  disdained  the  general  retreat  and  won 
the  battle  of  Chateau-Thierry,  a  victory  that  was 
the  turning-point  of  the  war. 

In  September  we  wiped  out  the  St.-Mihiel 
salient,  held  by  the  Germans  against  every  attack 
for  four  long  years;  in  October  we  dealt  the 
Prussians  that  succession  of  terrible  hammer 
blows — twenty-eight  American  divisions  in  the 
firing-line — that  drove  them  back  up  the  Meuse 

102 


THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

until  we  entered  the  outskirts  of  Sedan  and 
definitely  cut  the  German  supply  line.  That  was 
the  war's  end! 

Is  it  in  the  face  of  these  glories  and  tremendous 
achievements  that  we  are  to  whine  and  nag  and 
meanly  quarrel? 

Our  achievements  on  the  high  seas  were  no 
less  notable  than  those  on  land.  The  navy  of 
the  United  States,  held  up  to  derision  as  a  junk- 
pile,  proved  an  invincible  first  line  of  defense, 
not  only  guarding  the  shores  of  America,  but 
able  also  to  send  fighting-craft  of  every  kind  to 
English  waters.  South  American  waters,  the 
Mediterranean,  and  the  North  Sea.  Our  navy 
guarded  over  two  million  men  on  the  way  to 
Irance;  our  navy  escorted  tonnage  to  France 
with  a  loss  of  only  0.009  P^r  cent,  and  tonnage 
out  of  France  with  a  loss  of  0.013  per  cent. 

Our  destroyers  proved  themselves  in  the  war 
zone,  our  mine-layers  dropped  the  submarine  bar- 
rages that  made  the  North  Sea  safe,  our  officers, 
with  their  courage,  initiative,  and  inventive 
genius,  gave  new  force  to  the  fight  against  the 
U-boats. 

The  greatest  single  constructive  agency  of 
naval  warfare,  which  did  more  to  break  the 
German  naval  morale  than  any  other  one  thing, 
was  the  mine-barrage  across  the  North  Sea,  a 
sweep  of  230  miles.  In  April,  1917,  within  a  few 
days  after  the  United  States  entered  the  war, 
the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  proposed  such  a  bar- 
rage, the  General  Board  of  the  Navy  approved, 
and  we  drove  it  through  against  the  doubt  and 
opposition  of  the  British  Admiralty,  who,  not 

103 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

having  thought  of  it  during  three  years  of  war, 
insisted  that  the  idea  was  without  merit. 

In  the  "Summary  of  Activities  of  United 
States  Naval  Forces  Operating  in  European 
Waters,"  made  up  and  issued  from  Admiral 
Sims's  headquarters  in  London,  it  was  stated 
that  "a  total  of  over  256  attacks  by  United 
States  vessels  occurred.  In  183  of  these  cases 
there  was  definite  chart  evidence  of  a  submarine 
in  the  vicinity." 

Disregarding  the  numerous  reports  of  sighting 
submarines  or  periscopes  which  were  classed  as 
doubtful  or  problematical,  the  records  of  the 
Armed  Guard  Section  contain  reports  of  227 
encounters  of  armed  American  merchant-ships 
with  submarines,  in  193  of  which  the  attacks 
were  successfully  combated.  Thirty-four  U-boats 
were  reported  damaged  by  Armed  Guard  gun- 
fire, of  which  there  was  evidence  that  several 
were  sunk.  Of  the  227  encounters,  44  were 
surface  engagements,  some  of  them  long-con- 
tinued gun-fire  contests. 

One  of  the  most  notable  and  successful  naval 
actions,  after  this  country  entered  the  war, 
was  the  attack  on  the  Austrian  naval  base  at 
Durazzo,  October  2,  191 8.  In  this  operation  a 
flotilla  of  American  submarine-chasers,  under 
command  of  Capt.  Charles  P.  Nelson  and 
Lieut.-Com.  E.  H.  Bastedo,  took  a  prominent 
part,  leading  the  way  and  clearing  the  path  of 
mines,  sinking  one  submarine,  and  damaging 
and  apparently  destroying  another  U-boat; 
screening  larger  ships  from  torpedo  attack, 
going  to  the  aid  of  a  British  cruiser  which  was 

104 


THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

torpedoed,  and  taking  under  escort  an  enemy 
hospital-ship — all  this  under  heavy  fire  during 
bombardment  from  the  Austrian  forts.  A  num- 
ber of  engagements  with  enemy  submarines  by 
United  States  naval  vessels  operating  from  Gib- 
raltar were  also  reported.  Another  report 
compiled  and  issued  by  Admiral  Sims's  head- 
quarters in  London  stated  that  "between  the 
dates  of  their  arrival  in  European  waters  and 
signing  of  the  armistice  United  States  battle- 
ships were  attacked  six  times  by  enemy  sub- 
marines, and  on  one  occasion  the  New  York 
colHded  with  a  submarine." 

It  IS  in  the  face  of  this  record,  in  the  face 
of  his  own  admissions,  that  Admiral  Sims  an- 
nounces: "Our  navy  was  not  in  this  war  in 
a  fighting-sense.  We  were  acting  as  motor- 
lorries  behind  the  army,  except  that  we  w^ere 
on  the  water.  There  was  no  fighting  on  the 
sea." 

A  better  witness  is  Mr.  Herbert  Hoover, 
who  in  his  testimony  before  the  Senate  stated 
flatly  that  at  the  time  of  America's  entrance 
into  the  war  the  German  submarine  campaign 
had  brought  the  Allies  to  "the  border-line  of 
starvation,"  and  that  it  was  our  vigorous  and 
instant  co-operation  that  crushed  the  U-boat 
menace. 

Aircraft  achievements,  so  bitterly  attacked 
by  partizan  malice  throughout  the  war,  show 
no  less  fine  and  inspiring  when  subjected  to  fair 
analysis.  An  April  6,  191 7,  the  United  States 
had  3  small  aviation-fields,  55  training-'planes, 
only  4  of  which  were  in  use,  and  an  air  personnel 

105 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

of  65  officers  and  1,120  men.  By  the  time  of  the 
armistice  we  had  34  aviation-fields,  and  our 
aviation  training-schools  had  graduated  8,602 
men  from  elementary  courses  and  4,028  from 
advanced  courses.  More  than  5,000  pilots  and 
observers  were  sent  overseas. 

From  July  24,  1917,  when  the  appropriation 
was  made,  up  to  the  time  of  the  armistice,  there 
were  produced  in  the  United  States  more  than 
8,000  training-'planes  and  more  than  16,000 
training-engines. 

Of  De  Havilland  4's,  the  observation  and  day 
bombing-'planes,  3,227  were  completed  and  1,885 
shipped  overseas  for  work  at  the  front. 

Of  Liberty  engines,  13,574  were  completed, 
4,435  shipped  to  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces,  and  1,025  delivered  to  the  Allies. 

By  orders  placed  in  France  and  Italy  at  the 
outset  of  the  war,  for  all  of  which  we  paid,  and 
for  many  of  which  we  furnished  the  materials, 
we  received  from  these  sources  3,800  service- 
'planes,  in  which  we  put  American  fliers. 

In  nineteen  months  we  were  able  to  display  a 
machine  built  in  America,  of  American  materials, 
built  by  American  labor,  and  of  American 
design,  of  each  of  the  types  used  on  the  battle-fronts 
in  Europe,  and  each  of  them  as  good  as,  if  not 
better  than,  any  other  made  anywhere  else 
in  the  world. 

In  our  nineteen  months  we  did  more  than  was 
done  by  any  other  belligerent  nation  in  its  first 
nineteen  months.  Our  second  year  of  war 
equaled  England's  record  in  her  third. 

We  gave  to  the  world  its  greatest  airplane 
106 


THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

engine  —  the  Liberty.  We  produced  typical 
American  machines  that  were  acknowledged 
to  be  the  superior  of  Europe's  best. 

The  Allies,  after  three  years  of  war,  had 
developed  only  one  machine-gun  that  could  be 
successfully  synchronized  to  fire  through  a  re- 
volving airplane  propeller.  In  twelve  months 
we  produced  two,  both  susceptible  to  quantity 
production. 

We  invented  new  airplane  cameras,  electric- 
heated  clothing  for  aviators  in  high -altitude 
work,  also  the  oxygen  mask,  equipped  with  tele- 
phone connections  that  enabled  the  flier  to  endure 
any  altitude  without  losing  speaking-contact 
with  his  fellows. 

We  developed  the  miHtary  parachute  to  a 
degree  of  safety  undreamed  of  by  Europeans. 
During  the  entire  war  there  was  not  a  casualty 
due  to  parachute  failure. 

We  developed  in  quantity  the  wireless  airplane 
telephone  that  placed  the  flier  in  easy  and  instant 
communication  with  his  ground  station  and  his 
commander  in  the  air. 

At  the  time  of  the  armistice  the  American  air 
force  on  the  firing-Hne  numbered  forty-five 
squadrons  with  an  equipment  of  740  'planes,  and 
these  squadrons  played  great  parts  in  the  battles 
of  Chateau-Thierry,  St.-Mihiel,  and  the  Meuse- 
Argonne.  We  brought  down  755  enemy  'planes 
in  open  combat. 

In  plain  words,  at  the  time  of  the  armistice, 
after  only  nineteen  months  of  eff'ort,  we  had 
training-'planes,  De  Havilland  4's,  and  Liberty 
engines   in   quantity   production,   and  we  were 

107 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

ready  with  the  Lepere,  a  two-place  fighting- 
machine  built  around  a  Liberty  engine,  and  held 
by  the  greatest  experts  in  the  world  to  be  the 
last  word  in  clean-cut  perfection. 

The  story  of  our  aircraft  is  the  story  of  the 
whole  war;  for  not  only  does  it  take  in  the  tre- 
mendous grapple  with  problems  as  new  as  huge 
and  imperative,  but  it  also  brings  into  promi- 
nence those  impatiences  and  intolerances  that  are 
the  manifestations  of  our  youth  as  a  nation. 
When  we  want  a  thing  we  want  it,  and  woe  to 
those  who  commit  the  unforgivable  crime  of 
disappointment.  Perhaps  this  has  figured  as  an 
asset  in  our  fight  for  success,  and  yet  there  is 
something  very  brutal  about  the  quality,  a 
certain  definite  unfairness  that  borders  on  cold- 
blooded cruelty.  Our  cUmb  to  greatness  is 
thick  with  the  shattered  reputations  of  men  who 
dreamed  splendidly  and  wrought  hugely,  yet, 
faiKng  in  the  time  or  manner  of  delivery,  were 
cast  aside,  while  others  came  forward  to  reap  the 
credit  of  vision,  struggle,  and  achievement. 

When  we  entered  the  war  and  turned  to  the 
building  of  aircraft  it  was  much  as  though  the 
Babylonians  had  been  called  upon  suddenly  to 
construct  automobiles.  The  secrecies  of  belliger- 
ents had  kept  our  automotive  engineers  from 
keeping  abreast  with  the  myriad  changes  and 
improvements;  only  one  or  two  factories  had 
any  equipment  for  the  new  industry,  few 
workers  were  familiar  with  the  thousand  and 
one  delicate  operations  of  'plane  manufacture, 
and  the  bulk  of  necessary  material  was  all  in  the 
raw.     It  was  not  knov^n  that  forty-five  trained 

io8 


THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

men  were  necessary  to  keep  one  'plane  in  the 
air,  that  each  'plane  had  to  have  an  extra  engine 
as  well  as  a  mulcitude  of  spare  parts,  that  flying- 
fields  constituted  a  problem  all  their  own,  and 
that  the  constant  play  of  extraordinary  inventive 
genius  made  junking  a  daily  occupation. 

None  of  these  considerations  had  any  weight 
with  the  American  people,  however.  We  wanted 
to  become  the  world's  greatest  airplane  power 
overnight,  and  that  was  all  there  was  to  it! 
The  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Technical  Board 
caught  the  spirit  and  announced  that  they  must 
have  22,000  training  and  battle  'planes  in  twelve 
months,  which,  counting  extra  engines  and  spare 
parts,  meant  a  total  of  40,000  in  one  year. 
Twining  vine  leaves  in  its  own  hair,  the  Senate 
voted  ^640,000,000  for  aircraft  production,  and 
the  spree  w^as  on. 

Let  it  be  remembered  also  that  even  the  order 
for  what  amounted  to  40,000  'planes  in  one  year 
did  not  appease  the  editorial  and  fireside  ex- 
perts. Such  as  these  demanded  that  America 
must  have  50,000  'planes  in  the  air  at  one  time, 
and  Admiral  Peary  never  became  reconciled  to 
any  smaller  figure.  Many  editors  refused  to 
admit  any  difference  between  airplanes  and 
"flivvers,"  and  grew  querulous  at  the  delay  in 
turning  out  hourly  batches. 

Even  to  this  day  I  marvel  at  the  courage  of 
the  men  who  went  up  against  that  stone  wall  of 
expectation,  and  even  more  do  I  admire  the 
superb  enthusiasm,  the  invincible  optimism,  that 
never  failed  to  illumine  the  darkest  hours. 
Never  a  whine  out  of  them,  never  a  moment's 

109 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

pause  to  search  for  alibis,  but  always  the  in- 
sistence, "We  can  do  it  because  it's  just  got  to 
be  done.'* 

Howard  Coffin  was  the  man  with  vision  enough 
to  see  down  to  the  very  heart  of  American 
genius  and  energy;  Deeds,  Waldon,  and  Mont- 
gomery put  sohd  foundations  under  the  vision; 
Vincent  and  Hall  conceived  and  built  the  Liberty 
motor,  and  to  their  call  came  others  who  joined 
to  write  a  record  of  romantic  achievement  that 
ought  to  be  put  into  school  readers  for  the 
inspiration  of  children.  First,  there  was  the 
problem  of  the  spruce  and  the  fir  that  go  into 
the  wingbeams  and  other  'plane  parts.  In  many 
cases,  stands  of  timber  had  to  be  surveyed  and 
railroads  built  to  connect  them  with  mills. 
Special  saws  had  to  be  designed,  and  experts 
trained  in  the  selection  and  judging  of  logs. 
The  usual  processes  of  seasoning  were  too  slow, 
and  new  kiln  processes  had  to  be  developed  to 
dry  out  the  lumber  more  quickly,  and  yet  in 
such  manner  as  to  preserve  its  strength. 

On  top  of  everything  labor  troubles  developed, 
and  the  whole  production  of  spruce  and  fir  was 
threatened  with  stoppage.  Col.  Bruce  P.  Disque 
was  materialized,  and  before  he  got  through  he 
had  organized  75,000  lumbermen  into  the  Loyal 
Legion  of  Loggers,  every  man  pledged  to  give  his 
best  to  the  government. 

Castor-oil  was  recognized  as  the  one  satis- 
factory lubricant  for  airplane  motors.  The 
supply  was  not  sufficient,  and  we  secured  from 
Asia  a  quantity  of  castor  beans  large  enough  to 
seed  100,000  acres. 

no 


THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

When  we  entered  the  war  it  was  supposed 
that  the  only  possible  fabric  for  covering  the 
flying  surfaces  of  a  'plane  was  linen.  England, 
after  promising  to  meet  all  our  requirements 
from  Ireland's  supply  of  flax,  fell  down  on  the 
job.  To  meet  the  need,  the  Bureau  of  Standards 
developed  a  fabric  of  long-fiber  cotton  that  was 
even  superior  to  linen.  Over  10,000,000  yards 
were  woven  and  delivered  to  the  government, 
which,  put  end  to  end,  would  have  stretched 
from  California  to  France. 

Then  there  was  the  difficulty  of  "dope,"  a 
sort  of  varnish  with  which  the  cotton  covering 
had  to  be  filled  in  order  to  stretch  it  tight  and 
give  a  smooth  surface.  We  figured  that  our 
dope  had  to  be  made  from  acetone  and  its  kin- 
dred products.  But  the  world's  supply  of  ace- 
tone was  insufficient  to  meet  the  demand,  and 
so  it  was  that  the  government  had  to  enter  into 
a  partnership  for  the  establishment  of  ten  large 
factories  for  the  production  of  acetone. 

All  the  aeronautic  experts  of  the  world  were 
convinced  that  mahogany  was  the  one  suitable 
wood  for  propellers.  Our  supply  was  scant,  so 
we  conducted  experiments  with  walnut,  oak, 
cherry,  and  ash,  and  by  improved  seasoning 
processes  gained  results  as  splendid  as  with 
mahogany. 

Then  there  was  the  question  of  the  engine. 
The  slightest  observation  showed  that  the 
European  engines  were  being  scrapped  with 
alarming  regularity,  owing  to  constant  better- 
ments. It  would  have  been  folly  indeed  to 
equip  our  factories  for  the  production  of  machines 

III 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

that  we  knew  would  be  out  of  date  by  the  time 
we  commenced  to  produce  in  quantity. 

Colonel  Deeds  and  his  associates  reached  the 
decision  that  the  thing  for  America  to  do  was  to 
produce  an  engine  of  her  own  that  would  be  so 
far  ahead  of  all  others  as  to  be  safe  from  any 
danger  of  scrapping.  Jesse  G.  Vincent  and 
E.  J.  Hall,  each  in  his  own  way,  had  been  working 
on  an  engine,  and  the  two  were  asked  to  give 
up  their  individual  experiments  and  pool  their 
inventive  genius  for  the  good  of  America.  Mr. 
Hall  and  Mr.  Vincent,  with  Colonel  Deeds  and 
Colonel  Waldon  beside  them,  set  to  work  on 
May  29,  191 7.  As  fast  as  the  detail  drawings 
were  made  they  went  at  top  speed  to  the  twelve 
factories  among  which  the  work  was  divided. 
The  greatest  engineers  in  the  country  went  over 
the  plans  in  detail,  practical  production  men  were 
then  called  in,  and  even  builders  of  the  machine- 
tools  were  called  for  counsel.  As  fast  as  the 
various  parts  were  turned  out  they  were  rushed 
to  the  Packard  Company  for  assembling. 

On  July  14,  1917,  the  first  8-cylinder  Liberty 
engine  was  delivered  in  Washington,  and  on 
August  25th  the  i2-cyhnder  Liberty  passed  its 
hard  fifty-hour  test  successfully. 

A  good  engine  in  six  v/eeks  and  the  best  in 
the  world  in  three  months !  And  delivery  in  series 
began  in  five  months!  It  stands  as  an  achieve- 
ment absolutely  without  parallel.  The  best  ever 
done  by  any  other  country  was  a  year. 

Is  all  this  miracle  to  be  discounted  because 
"there  was  not  speed  enough"?  All  the  honest 
pride  that  should  be  ours  to  be  buried  in  queru- 

112 


THE   POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

lousness  because  we  were  promised  delivery  on 
Thursday  and  did  not  get  it  until  Saturday? 

As  in  the  case  of  mobilization,  building,  ship- 
ping, and  aircraft,  the  provision  of  rifles,  machine- 
guns,  ammunition,  and  ordnance  presented 
problems  as  new  as  stupendous.  We  had  enough 
Springfield  rifles  on  hand  to  equip  an  army  of 
1,000,000,  but  their  intricate  construction  made 
immediate  quantity  production  an  impossibility. 
Yet  quantity  production  of  ammunition  for  the 
Springfields  was  p>ossible.  American  initiative 
met  the  problem  by  changes  that  not  only 
simplified  and  improved  the  British  Enfield, 
but  fitted  it  for  the  use  of  the  Springfield 
cartridge.  This  modified  Enfield  came  into 
quantity  production  in  August,  1917,  and  at  the 
time  of  the  armistice  the  output  had  reached  a 
total  of  2,300,000.  Added  to  this  was  a  produc- 
tion of  300,000  Springfields.  In  the  matter  of 
ammunition  we  produced  3,500,000,000  rounds 
of  our  own  as  compared  to  100,000,000  rounds 
that  we  bought  from  the  French  and  British. 

Congress,  in  191 2,  sanctioned  the  allowance 
of  four  machine-guns  to  a  regiment.  When 
America  entered  the  war  the  use  of  machine- 
guns  had  developed  to  336  machine-guns  per 
regiment.  To  meet  initial  needs  we  bought 
Hotchkiss  machine-guns  and  Chauchat  auto- 
matics from  the  French,  but  at  the  same  time 
started  work  on  the  perfection  of  a  gun  of  our 
own  that  would  be  "better  than  the  best."  The 
answer  of  American  inventive  genius  was  the 
*' light"  Browning  and  the  "heavy"  Browning, 
admittedly  superior  to  anything  possessed  either 

113 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

by  the  Allies  or  the  Germans.  Both  types  were 
brought  into  production  in  February  and  April, 
191 8,  and  at  the  time  of  the  armistice  227,000 
had  been  delivered. 

With  respect  to  artillery,  it  was  decided  at 
the  outset  that  speed  and  effectiveness  alike 
pointed  to  the  wisdom  of  using  guns  of  French 
manufacture.  Not  only  was  French  artillery 
the  best,  but  French  production  outran  the 
demand.  Inventions  of  our  own  were  perfected, 
however,  and  manufacture  pushed,  with  the  re- 
sult that  the  armistice  found  America  producing 
complete  artillery  units  sufficient  for  every  need. 
Great  plants  had  to  be  erected  for  the  manu- 
facture of  high  explosives,  whole  industries  had 
to  be  taken  over,  the  production  of  toxic  gases 
called  for  government  ownership  and  operation, 
and  each  day  demanded  new  exhibitions  of  in- 
ventive genius  and  driving  initiative.  With  what 
results  ? 

At  the  time  of  the  armistice  we  were  pro- 
ducing gas  more  rapidly  than  England,  France, 
or  Germany. 

At  the  end  of  the  war  American  production  of 
smokeless  powder  was  45  per  cent,  greater  than 
the  French  and  British  production  combined. 

At  the  end  of  the  war  American  production 
of  high  explosives  was  40  per  cent,  greater  than 
Great  Britain's  and  nearly  double  that  of 
France. 

Out  of  every  100  days  that  our  combat  divi- 
sions were  in  Hne  in  France  they  were  supported 
by  their  own  artillery  for  75  days,  by  British 
artillery  for  5  days,  and  by  French  for  i>^  days. 

114 


THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

Of  the  remaining  i8>2  days  that  they  were  in 
line  without  artillery,  i8  days  were  in  quiet 
sectors,  and  only  ^  of  i  day  in  each  loo  was 
in  active  sectors. 

Greatest  source  of  pride,  however,  is  the  care 
that  every  fighting-man  received.  From  first 
to  last  not  an  "embalmed-beef*'  horror  such 
as  shamed  the  Spanish-American  War,  not  a 
case  of  "paper-soled  shoes,"  not  a  single  dupHca- 
tion  of  the  "fever  camps'*  that  brought  unneces- 
sary grief  into  thousands  of  American  homes  in 
1898.  The  death-rate  per  1,000  during  the  war 
with  Spain  was  26.  In  the  war  just  ended  the 
death-rate  per  1,000  was  6.4  in  the  United 
States,  and  4.7  in  the  American  Expeditionary 
Force,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  even 
these  percentages  were  made  much  larger  by 
the  influenza  epidemic  that  swept  the  country. 
No  soldiers  of  any  nation  ever  received  such 
care.  Among  the  39,000  officers  of  the  Medical 
Corps  were  the  best  men  of  the  profession — 
the  greatest  specialists  in  every  line — and  not 
even  the  sons  of  the  rich  in  civil  life  were  given 
more  painstaking  attention  than  that  bestowed 
upon  the  humblest  private. 

Nor  was  this  all.  The  War  Risk  Insurance 
Bureau,  originated  and  administered  by  Secre- 
tary McAdoo,  made  the  government  of  the 
United  States  the  largest  and  safest  insurance 
company  in  the  world,  and  at  the  same  time  a 
"helping  hand"  that  went  out  to  the  wives 
and  children  of  the  fighting-men.  In  the  very 
first  year  of  its  operation  the  Bureau  wrote 
4,000,000  policies  in  an  amount  exceeding  $40,- 
9  IIS 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

000,000,000  and  distributed  ^450,000,000  to  the 
dependent  families  of  soldiers  and  sailors. 

Honesty  is  no  less  a  glory.  In  addition  to 
^10,000,000,000  loaned  to  the  Allies,  the  govern- 
ment expended  more  than  $27,000,000,000  for 
the  prosecution  of  the  war,  a  sum  as  large  as 
the  total  expenses  of  the  federal  government 
from  1783  to  1917.  Although  this  huge  amount 
was  disbursed  in  the  hurry  and  confusion  of 
war,  the  utmost  zeal  of  congressional  commit- 
tees has  been  unable  to  unearth  graft  or  serious 
misconduct  on  the  part  of  responsible  officials  or 
of  the  citizens  who  responded  to  the  call  of  the 
administration.  The  completeness  of  these  in- 
vestigations may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that  they 
have  cost  the  taxpayers  more  than  $2,000,000 
to  date.  When  the  scandals  and  shames  of  1898 
are  remembered,  a  great  satisfaction  can  be 
taken  in  the  honor  and  faith  of  191 7  and  191 8. 

Raising  $37,000,000,000  was  a  task  faced  by 
as  many  new  and  difficult  problems  as  were  met 
with  in  aircraft  and  ordnance.  Billions  were  an 
immediate  necessity,  and  Secretary  McAdoo 
met  the  emergency  by  the  inspiration  of  short- 
time  certificates  of  indebtedness,  followed  im- 
mediately by  the  announcement  of  bond  issues. 
The  financiers  of  the  country  naturally  assumed 
that  these  issues  would  be  floated  through  the 
banks  on  the  usual  com.mission  basis,  but  Secre- 
tary McAdoo  had  the  courage  and  vision  to 
conceive  a  plan  that  would  save  money  even  as 
it  would  manufacture  war  spirit.  Coining  the 
name  "Liberty  Loan,"  he  went  straight  to  the 
people,  and  although  the  idea  was  fought  with 

116 


THE  POWER  AND  THE  GLORY 

bitterness,  each  of  five  bond  issues  was  over- 
subscribed. It  was  likewise  the  genius  of  Mc- 
Adoo  that  conceived  the  idea  of  War  Savings  and 
Thrift  Stamps,  a  plan  that  made  the  smallest 
child  a  partner  of  the  government  in  the  pros- 
ecution of  the  war. 

A  wonderful  achievement,  whether  taken  as  a 
whole  or  subjected  to  piecemeal  analysis.  The 
committee  appointed  by  President  McKinley 
to  examine  the  conduct  of  the  war  with  Spain 
prefaced  its  report  by  asking  the  people  to 
remember  that  "the  task  of  mobilizing,  training, 
and  equipping  275,000  men  was  of  such  massive 
proportions  that  all  of  the  criticisms  and  com- 
ments that  were  made  in  regard  to  it  must  be 
read  with  regard  to  the  size  of  the  task."  Only 
nineteen  years  later  America  was  called  upon, 
almost  overnight,  to  mobilize,  train,  equip,  and 
maintain  an  army  of  5,000,000  men — to  send 
2,000,000  of  them  across  the  Atlantic — and  met 
that  call  without  one  of  the  scandals  or  failures 
that  shamed  the  record  of  1898. 

Glory  in  the  highest,  and,  what  is  best,  glory 
enough  for  all.  By  no  means  was  it  the  war  of 
an  administration  or  the  war  of  a  party.  In  the 
tremendous  accomplishment  Republicans  and 
Democrats  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder,  partizan- 
ship  forgotten,  nothing  remembered  save  that 
they  were  Americans.  Nor  was  it  merely  the 
war  of  soldiers  and  sailors.  Behind  the  trenches 
and  the  battle-ships  stretched  the  army  of  the 
second  lines,  the  men,  women,  and  children  of 
the  United  States,  serving  and  sacrificing  with 
no  less  devotion  than   the  fighting-force  itself. 

117 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

These  are  things  to  remember  when  partizanship 
deals  only  in  sneers  and  detraction.  The  future 
of  America  is  not  limited  to  the  presidential 
campaign  of  1920,  and  the  hopes  of  that  future 
are  linked  inseparably  to  the  prides  and  resolves 
born  of  unparalleled  achievement. 


VII 

America's  moral  offensives 

GREAT  and  splendid  as  were  the  military 
achievements  of  the  United  States,  they 
were  not  more  effective  than  the  projectile  force 
of  American  ideals.  No  credit  may  be  taken 
from  the  2,000,000  men  in  khaki  who  beat  back 
German  might  at  Chateau-Thierry  and  St.- 
Mihiel,  and  whose  presence  and  courage  gave 
heart  to  the  Allied  armies  in  an  hour  of  despair, 
but  there  were  moral  victories  no  less  far-reaching 
and  conclusive.  Our  war  aims,  declared  in  the 
various  state  papers  of  the  President,  gave  us 
domestic  unity,  won  us  the  friendship  and  sup- 
port of  neutral  nations,  and  crumbled  the  foun- 
dation of  fear  and  lies  that  upheld  the  evil 
structure  of  Prussian  militarism.  Sent  by  cable 
and  wireless  to  every  corner  of  earth,  translated 
into  every  tongue,  printed  by  the  milHons  on 
native  presses,  the  pronouncements  of  the  Presi- 
dent had  the  force  of  armies,  conquering  the 
mind  of  mankind  and  delivering  humanity  from 
age-old  bondages.  As  long  as  the  world  lasts,^ 
these  addresses,  of  singular  power  and  beauty, 
will  stand  as  the  ultimate  exposition  of  human 
faith  in  the  practicability  of  liberty,  justice,  and 
fraternity. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  Great  War  was 
119 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

not  a  war  for  democracy  when  it  commenced^ 
nor  even  at  the  time  we  entered  it.  Trade 
imperiaHsm  ruled  the  world  in  1914  and  the 
breakdown  of  civiHzation  was  the  logical  result 
of  theories  of  government  that  put  weakness 
at  the  mercy  of  greed.  Ireland,  India,  and 
Egypt  struggled  in  the  grip  of  the  British  Em- 
pire; France  held  Morocco;  Italy  clutched 
Tripoli;  England  and  Russia  strangled  Persia; 
in  China  and  Africa  the  French,  English,  and 
Germans  were  rival  annexationists;  Russia  kept 
the  Poles,  the  Finns,  and  the  Ruthenes  in  sub- 
jection; the  Austro-Hungarian  Alliance  enslaved 
Czechs,  Slovaks,  Croats,  Slovenes,  and  Jugo- 
slavs; Japan  ruled  Korea  and  parts  of  Man- 
churia; and  Germany  exercised  brutal  sway  over 
kingdoms  and  colonies.  Wherever  one  looked 
there  was  a  cynical  disregard  of  human  rights, 
an  almost  blasphemous  exaltation  of  the  privi- 
leges of  trade. 

It  was  merely  the  case  that  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man government  came  to  disdain  the  slow  and 
undramatic  processes  of  "peaceful  penetration." 
Its  masters,  unbalanced  by  the  incantations 
and  prophecies  of  militarism's  high  priests  and 
drunk  in  contemplation  of  colossal  power, 
reverted  suddenly  to  the  savage  methods  of 
tribalism  and  resolved  upon  one  great  blow 
that  should  give  them  world  dominion.  Through 
the  eyes  of  hate  and  paranoia,  they  saw  Belgium 
annexed,  France  crushed,  occupation  of  the 
Channel  ports,  Serbia  reduced  to  vassalage, 
and  the  rest  of  the  Balkan  States  instructed  in 
obedience;   Turkey,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Italy 

120 


AMERICA'S  MORAL  OFFENSIVES 

mere  suzerainties;  Asia  and  Africa  left  helpless 
for  the  taking;  Russia,  England,  and  America 
to  be  dealt  with  at  leisure.  A  dream  of  mad- 
men, perhaps,  but  one  that  had  every  chance  of 
success. 

The  disclosure  of  these  purposes,  the  very- 
ferocity  of  the  sudden  and  unprovoked  assault, 
and  the  horror  of  German  war  practices  inevi- 
tably placed  the  Allies  in  the  finer  position  of 
standing  for  civilization,  humanity,  and  inter- 
national law.  Their  struggle,  however,  was 
essentially  one  of  self-defense  and  remained 
just  that,  not  a  leader  having  the  vision  to  grasp 
the  necessity  of  a  new  and  better  order  as  a 
substitute  for  the  outworn  system  of  balanced 
power,  responsible  not  only  for  the  present 
madness,  but  equally  certain  to  breed  other 
wars  if  continued.  President  Wilson  was  under 
no  illusions.  He  knew  that  France  and  Prussia 
were  once  in  alliance,  that  Italy  was  the  ally 
of  Germany  in  1914,  that  England  had  always 
hated  Russia  and  feared  her,  that  England  and 
France  were  ready  to  fight  over  Fashoda  in  1900, 
and  he  saw  at  J:he  end  of  the  war,  even  in  event 
of  AUied  victory,  nothing  more  conclusive  than 
reaHgnments  and  new  "balances  of  power." 
Out  of  his  souFs  rebellion  against  the  sorry 
drama  of  despair  and  futility  he  harked  back 
to  the  innate  ideaKsm  of  the  race  and  brought 
forth  his  proposal  for  a  League  of  Nations,  a 
world  partnership  of  self-governing  peoples  in 
the  interests  of  justice,  liberty,  and  a  peace  of 
permanence.  The  idea  itself  was  as  old  as 
Christ,    but   it   was    not    until   the    President's 

121 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

address  of  May  27,  1916,  that  it  took  shape 
and  form  in  the  heart  of  sick  and  hopeless 
humanity. 

Again  on  December  i8th,  in  his  note  to  the 
belligerent  nations,  Woodrow  Wilson  showed 
that  he  was  looking  beyond  the  war  to  the  peace, 
and  that  the  compelling  interest  of  America 
was  in  some  settlement  that  would  guard  the 
world  against  a  recurrence  of  barbarism.  The 
war  we  entered  must  be  a  war  against  war,  and 
the  whole  purpose  of  the  note  was  to  hft  the 
thought  of  the  world  above  the  accepted  and 
habitual.  The  President  knew  well  where  Ger- 
many stood;  what  he  wanted  was  to  force  the 
Allies  to  take  higher,  firmer  ground.  The  plan 
succeeded.  The  Imperial  German  government 
answered  in  the  terms  and  spirit  of  Attila;  the 
reply  of  the  Allies  showed  grasp  of  the  American 
aspiration  and  full  sympathy  with  it.  Of  supreme 
significance  was  the  declaration  of  "whole- 
hearted agreement  with  the  proposal  to  create 
a  League  of  Nations  which  shall  assure  peace 
and  justice  throughout  the  world."  The  address 
of  the  President  to  the  Senate  on  January  22, 
1917,  transformed  the  war  from  a  struggle 
between  dynasties  to  a  holy  war  in  behalf  of 
imperishable  ideals,  even  as  it  marked  the 
flowering  of  his  individual  patriotism  into  the 
genius  of  the  race.  It  was  to  a  world  that  the 
President  spoke,  and  it  was  the  world  that 
answered  this  noble  outline  of  a  Peace  of  the 
People: 

I  am  proposing,  as  it  were,  that  the  nations  should  with 
one  accord  adopt  the  doctrine  of  President  Monroe  as  the 


AMERICA'S  MORAL  OFFENSIVES 

doctrine  of  the  world;  that  no  nation  should  seek  to  extend 
its  policy  over  any  other  nation  or  people,  but  that  every 
people  should  be  left  free  to  determine  its  own  polity, 
its  own  way  of  development,  unhindered,  unthreatened, 
unafraid,  the  little  along  with  the  great  and  powerful. 

I  am  proposing  that  all  nations  henceforth  avoid  en- 
tangling alliances  which  would  draw  them  into  com- 
petitions of  power,  catch  them  in  a  net  of  intrigue  and 
selfish  rivalry,  and  disturb  their  own  affairs  with  influences 
intruded  from  without.  There  is  no  entangling  alliance 
in  a  concert  of  power.  When  all  unite  to  act  in  the  same 
sense  and  with  the  same  purpose,  all  act  in  the  common 
interest  and  are  free  to  live  their  own  lives  under  a  common 
protection. 

Mere  agreements  may  not  make  peace  secure.  It  will 
be  absolutely  necessary  that  a  force  be  created  as  a  guaran- 
tor of  the  permanency  of  the  settlement  so  much  greater 
than  the  force  of  any  nation  now  engaged  or  any  alliance 
hitherto  formed  or  projected  that  no  nation,  no  probable 
combination  of  nations,  could  face  or  withstand  it.  If 
the  peace  presently  to  be  made  is  to  endure,  it  must  be  a 
peace  made  secure  by  the  organized  major  force  of  man- 
kind. 

The  War  Message  of  April  2d  had  in  it  nothing 
of  the  tentative.  Sure  of  his  ground  at  last, 
confident  alike  in  the  ideaUsm  of  America  and  in 
the  aroused  vision  of  Allied  peoples,  the  President 
declared  that — 

The  world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy.  Its  peace 
must  be  planted  upon  the  tested  foundations  of  political 
liberty.  We  have  no  selfish  ends  to  serve.  We  desire  no 
conquests,  no  dominion.  We  seek  no  indemnities  for  our- 
selves, no  material  compensation  for  the  sacrifices  we  shall 
freely  make.  We  are  but  one  of  the  champions  of  the  rights 
of  mankind.  We  shall  be  satisfied  when  those  rights  have 
been  made  as  secure  as  the  faith  and  ths  freedom  of  nations 
can  make  them. 

The  right  is  more  precious  than  peace,  and  we  shall 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

fight  for  the  things  which  we  have  always  carried  nearest 
our  hearts — for  democracy,  for  the  right  of  those  who 
submit  to  authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their  own  govern- 
ments, for  the  rights  and  Hberties  of  small  nations,  for  a 
universal  dominion  of  right  by  such  a  concert  of  free  people 
as  shall  bring  peace  and  safety  to  all  nations  and  make 
the  world  itself  at  last  free. 

The  projectile  force  of  the  President's  idealism, 
its  full  military  value,  may  be  measured  by  the 
fact  that  between  April  6  and  December  8,  191 7, 
sixteen  states,  great  and  small,  declared  war 
against  Germany  or  severed  diplomatic  relations 
with  her.  From  the  very  first  the  Allies  accepted 
the  President  as  their  spokesman.  Shrewd  for 
all  their  cynicism,  they  saw  that  the  old  order 
was  out  of  tune  and  favor,  and  that  Mr.  Wilson 
spoke  the  language  of  a  new  order,  that  his  was 
the  gift  of  understanding  human  hopes,  and  they 
sat  silent  when  his  voice  was  lifted.  The  papal 
overtures  of  August,  191 7,  were  answered  by 
ttie  President  alone,  and  again  the  world  thrilled 
to  the  assertion  of  unconquerable  resolve  in 
connection  with  the  estabhshment  of  a  peace 
of  justice  and  permanence. 

The  last  months  of  1917  marked  the  zero 
hour  for  the  AUied  cause  so  far  as  military  opera- 
tions were  concerned.  The  great  German-Aus- 
trian counterdrive  into  Italy  was  quickly  followed 
by  the  overthrow  of  Kerensky,  Lenin's  instant 
submission  to  Germany,  and  the  infamous  Treaty 
of  Brest-Litovsk.  With  the  flourish  of  the  con- 
queror. Count  Czernin  laid  down  a  set  of  peace 
terms  in  behalf  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  it 
was  the  answer  of  the  President  on  January  8, 

124 


AMERICA'S  MORAL  OFFENSIVES 

191 8,  that  shot  light  through  the  falHng  dark- 
ness. In  the  declaration  of  America's  peace 
terms  there  was  a  certainty  and  confidence  that 
carried  reassurance  to  the  Allies  even  as  it  struck 
mightily  at  the  weak  foundations  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  ** program  of  the  world's  peace" 
was  set  forth  in  Fourteen  Points  that  were  im- 
mediately accepted  by  the  world  as  great 
commandments.^ 

Speaking  on  July  4th,  at  Mount  Vernon,  he 
formulated  the  fundamental  principles  for  which 
we  were  fighting  in  four  supplementary  points: 

There  can  be  but  one  issue.  The  settlement  must  be 
final.  There  can  be  no  compromise.  No  half-way  decision 
would  be  tolerable.  No  half-way  decision  is  conceivable. 
These  are  the  ends  for  which  the  associated  peoples  of  the 
world  are  fighting  and  which  must  be  conceded  them 
before  there  can  be  peace: 

(i)  The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  anywhere 
that  can  separately,  secretly,  and  of  its  single  choice  dis- 
turb the  peace  of  the  world;  or,  if  it  cannot  be  presently 
destroyed,  at  the  least  its  reduction  to  virtual  impotence. 

(2)  The  settlement  of  every  question,  whether  of  terri- 
tory, of  sovereignty,  of  economic  arrangement,  or  of  politi- 
cal relationship,  upon  the  basis  of  the  free  acceptance  of 
that  settlement  by  the  people  immediately  concerned 
and  not  upon  the  basis  of  the  material  interest  or  advantage 
of  any  other  nation  or  people  which  may  desire  a  different 
settlement  for  the  sake  of  its  own  exterior  influence  or 
mastery. 

(3)  The  consent  of  all  nations  to  be  governed  in  their 
conduct  toward  each  other  by  the  same  principles  of  honor 
and  of  respect  for  the  common  law  of  civilized  society  that 
govern  the  individual  citizens  of  all  modern  states  in  their 
relations  with  one  another;  to  the  end  that  all  promises 
and  covenants  may  be  sacredly  observed,  no  private  plots 

^  For  full  text  see  Chapter  XX. 
125 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

or  conspiracies  hatched,  no  selfish  injuries  wrought  with 
impunity,  and  a  mutual  trust  established  upon  the  hand- 
some foundation  of  a  mutual  respect  for  right. 

(4)  The  establishment  of  an  organization  of  peace  which 
shall  make  it  certain  that  the  combined  power  of  free 
nations  will  check  every  invasion  of  right  and  serve  to 
make  peace  and  justice  the  more  secure  by  affording  a 
definite  tribunal  of  opinion  to  which  all  must  submit  and 
by  which  every  international  readjustment  that  cannot  be 
amicably  agreed  upon  by  the  peoples  directly  concerned 
shall  be  sanctioned. 

In  the  New  York  address  of  September  27th 
the  President  touched  again  upon  the  funda- 
mentals of  peace,  seeking  to  bed-rock  them  in 
the  granite  of  a  universal  and  explicit  under- 
standing.    He  said  then: 

And,  as  I  see  it,  the  constitution  of  that  League  of  Na- 
tions and  the  clear  definition  of  its  objects  must  be  a  part, 
is  in  a  sense  the  most  essential  part,  of  the  peace  settlement 
itself.  It  cannot  be  formed  now.  If  formed  now,  it  would 
be  merely  a  new  alliance  confined  to  the  nations  associated 
against  a  common  enemy.  It  is  not  likely  that  it  would  be 
formed  after  the  settlement.  It  is  necessary  to  guarantee 
the  peace;  and  the  peace  cannot  be  guaranteed  as  an  after- 
thought. The  reason,  to  speak  in  plain  terms  again,  why 
it  must  be  guaranteed  is  that  there  will  be  parties  to  the 
peace  whose  promises  have  proved  untrustworthy,  and 
means  must  be  found  in  connection  with  the  peace  settle- 
ment itself  to  remove  that  source  of  insecurity.  It  would 
be  folly  to  leave  the  guaranty  to  the  subsequent  voluntary 
action  of  the  governments  we  have  seen  destroy  Russia  and 
deceive  Rumania. 


These    twenty-three    specific    points,    taken  ; 

together,  constituted   President  Wilson's   peace  I 

charter  for  the  world,   and  the  unquaHfied  in-  I 

dorsement    of   the    Allies    gave    them    binding  ' 

126  i 


AMERICA'S  MORAL  OFFENSIVES 

authority.  Not  until  the  renascence  of  trade 
imperiaUsm  at  Paris  in  February,  1919,  was  there 
the  slightest  disposition  to  question  either  the 
feasibihty  of  a  League  of  Nations  or  the  con- 
tractual obligation  to  make  it  a  primary  and 
integral  part  of  the  Peace  Treaty  itself. 

The  full  force  of  the  President's  "moral  offen- 
sives" now  commenced  to  be  felt.  It  was  not 
only  that  they  had  won  the  "verdict  of  mankind/* 
but,  driving  into  the  Central  Powers  as  well, 
they  disintegrated  military  and  civilian  morale, 
and  forced  the  fears  that  made  autocratic 
governments  sue  for  peace.  On  October  5th, 
scarcely  more  than  a  week  after  the  President's 
address  of  September  27th,  the  Germans  begged 
an  armistice,  and  on  October  7th  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  government  presented  a  similar  plea. 
It  may  be  stated  at  this  point,  in  answer  to  the 
charges  of  a  "lone  hand"  and  "bad  faith,"  that 
every  detail  of  the  correspondence  that  followed 
was  known  to  the  Allied  leaders  and  received 
their  complete  approval. 

The  President,  replying  to  Germany  on  Octo- 
ber 8th,  asked  if  he  was  to  understand  definitely 
that  the  German  government  accepted  the  terms 
laid  down  in  the  Fourteen  Points  and  in  subse- 
quent addresses  and  "that  its  object  in  enter- 
ing into  discussion  would  be  only  to  agree  upon 
the  practical  details  of  their  appHcation."  He 
added  also  that  the  immediate  evacuation  of 
invaded  territory  was  an  essential  to  the  good 
faith  of  further  discussion.  On  October  12th 
the  German  government  replied  affirmatively, 
and  on  October  14th  the  President  made  this 

127 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

statement  of  decision:  that  the  conditions  of  the 
armistice  must  be  left  to  the  mihtary  advisers 
of  the  United  States  and  the  AlHes,  and  that  no 
arrangement  could  be  accepted  that  did  not 
provide  "absolutely  satisfactory  safeguards  and 
guaranties  of  the  maintenance  of  the  present 
military  supremacy  of  the  armies  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Allies  in  the  field";  that  an 
armistice  could  not  be  considered  until  submarine 
warfare  ceased;  and  that  further  guaranties 
of  the  representative  character  of  the  German 
government  would  have  to  be  given. 

On  October  20th  Germany  accepted  the  new 
conditions  and  pointed  out  that  she  now  had  a 
constitution  and  a  government  dependent  for 
its  authority  on  the  Reichstag.  On  October 
23d  the  President  informed  Germany  that, 
having  received  the  solemn  and  explicit  assurance 
of  the  German  government  that  it  unreservedly 
accepts  the  terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  his 
address  to  the  Congress  of  the  Unked  States  on 
January  8,  191 8,  and  the  principles  of  settlement 
enunciated  in  his  subsequent  addresses,  and  that 
it  is  ready  to  discuss  the  details  of  their  applica- 
tion, he  had  communicated  the  above  corre- 
spondence to  the  governments  of  the  Allied 
Powers  with  the  suggestion  that,  if  they  were 
disposed  to  effect  the  peace  upon  the  terms  and 
principles  indicated,  they  will  ask  their  military 
advisers  to  draw  up  armistice  terms  of  such  a 
character  as  to  **  insure  to  the  associated  govern- 
ments the  unrestricted  power  to  safeguard  and 
enforce  the  details  of  the  peace  to  which  the  German 
government  has  agreed^* 

128 


AMERICANS  MORAL  OFFENSIVES 

Meanwhile  events  in  other  directions  had 
been  moving  rapidly.  Replying  to  Austria- 
Hungary  on  October  i8th,  the  President  pointed 
out  that  a  radical  change  had  been  worked  in 
Point  Ten,  which  read:  "The  peoples  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  whose  place  among  the  nations  we 
wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should 
be  accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of  autono- 
mous development." 

"Since  that  sentence  was  written  and  uttered 
to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,"  he  said, 
**the  government  of  the  United  States  has  recog- 
nized that  a  state  of  belHgerency  exists  between 
the  Czechoslovaks  and  the  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empires,  and  that  the  Czechoslovak 
National  Council  is  a  de  facto  belligerent  govern- 
ment clothed  with  proper  authority  to  direct 
the  military  and  political  affairs  of  the  Czecho- 
slovaks. It  has  also  recognized  in  the  fullest 
manner  the  justice  of  the  nationalistic  aspira- 
tions of  the  Jugoslavs  for  freedom." 

On  October  28th  the  Austro-Hungarian  gov- 
ernment submitted  to  the  conditions  of  the 
President,  and  on  November  4th  accepted 
armistice  terms  that  amounted  to  a  complete 
surrender.  Bulgaria  had  already  withdrawn 
on  September  29th,  and  Turkey  had  capitulated 
on  October  31st.  On  November  5th  the  Pres- 
ident transmitted  to  Germany  the  decision  of  the 
AUied  governments.  Subject  to  two  quahfica- 
tions,  they  declared  their  willingness  to  make 
peace  with  the  government  of  Germany  on  the 
terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  the  President's 
address  to   Congress   of  January   8,   191 8,   and 

129 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON      | 

the  principles  of  settlement  enunciated  in  his 
subsequent  addresses.  The  qualifications  were: 
(i)  Freedom  of  the  seas,  being  open  to  various  j 
interpretations,  must  be  left  to  the  Peace  Con-  ; 
ference,  and  in  the  discussion  they  "reserved  to  | 
themselves  complete  freedom!'*  (2)  Further,  ■ 
in  the  conditions  of  peace  laid  down  in  his  ad-  < 
dress  to  Congress  on  the  8th  of  January,  191 8,  \ 
the  President  declared  that  invaded  territories  \ 
must  be  restored  as  well  as  evacuated  and  made  ; 
free.  The  Allied  governments  feel  that  no  ' 
doubt  ought  to  be  allowed  to  exist  as  to  what  ; 
this  provision  implies.  By  it  they  understand  i 
that  compensation  will  be  made  by  Germany  1 
for  "all  damage  done  to  theciviUan  population  of  i 
the  Allies  and  to  their  property  by  the  aggres-  \ 
sion  of  Germany  by  land,  by  sea,  and  from  the  j 
air."  ; 

The  acceptance  of  the  German  government  ! 
was  given  on  October  27th;  the  armistice  terms  j 
w^ere  submitted  on  November  8th,  and  were 
signed  by  the  Germans  to  become  effective  on  ; 
November  nth.  At  the  time  the  Germans  had  1 
2,000,000  men  under  arms  on  the  western  front,  i 
and  to  the  east  there  were  the  armies  of  Macken-  • 
sen  and  von  Sanders.  What  happened  to  them  < 
was  an  utter  spiritual  collapse,  a  disintegration  i 
of  morale  both  on  the  firing-line  and  among  the  - 
civiUan  population.  And  history  will  say  that  j 
this  was  due  to  the  words  of  Wilson  in  even  \ 
larger  degree  than  to  the  hammer  blows  of  Foch.  i 

There  is  a  tendency  in  certain  quarters  to-day 
to  attack  the  Peace  Treaty  on  the  theory  that  the 
German  capitulation  was  in  no  sense  a  surrender, 

130 


AMERICA'S  MORAL  OFFENSIVES 

but  merely  a  cessation  of  hostilities  on  certain 
fixed  terms.  This  view,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is 
the  very  base  of  The  Economic  Consequences  of 
the  Peace,  the  book  in  which  J.  M.  Keynes  appeals 
to  the  world  in  behalf  of  Germany.  The  con- 
tention entirely  ignores  the  second  stipulation 
of  the  Allies*  answer,  the  specific  statement  that 
"compensation  will  be  made  by  Germany  for 
all  damage  done  to  the  civil  population  of  the 
AUies  and  to  their  property  by  the  aggression  of 
Germany  by  land,  by  sea,  and  from  the  air." 

This  all-embracing  clause,  agreed  to  by  the 
President,  meant  unconditional  surrender,  and 
the  Germans  were  in  no  doubt  as  to  the  intent. 
LudendorfF,  in  his  Memoirs,  says: 

On  October  23  d  or  24th  Wilson's  answer  arrived.  It  was 
a  strong  answer  to  our  cowardly  note.  This  time  he  made 
it  quite  clear  that  the  armistice  conditions  must  be  such 
as  to  make  it  impossible  for  Germany  to  resume  hostilities 
and  to  give  the  powers  allied  against  her  unlimited  power 
to  settle  themselves  the  details  of  the  pc-ace  accepted  by 
Germany.  In  my  view,  there  could  no  longer  be  doubt 
in  my  mind  that  we  must  continue  the  fight. 

Hindenburg  held  to  the  same  view,  and  on 
October  24th  signed  an  order  "for  the  informa- 
tion of  all  troops"  that  made  these  statements: 

He  (Wilson)  will  negotiate  with  Germany  for  peace  only 
if  she  concedes  all  the  demands  of  America's  allies  as  to 
the  internal  constitutional  arrangements  of  Germany.  .  .  . 
Wilson's  answer  is  a  demand  for  unconditional  surrender. 
It  is  thus  unacceptable  to  us  soldiers. 

The  closing  words  were  a  passionate  appeal  to 
"continue  resistance  with  all  our  strength." 
The  order,  however,  was  never  promulgated,  j 
10  131 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff  were  both  over- 
ruled, and  the  note  of  submission  went  forward 
to  the  President,  a  note  that  accepted  the  terms 
that  every  German  fighting-man  knew  to  be 
unconditional  surrender, 

A  second  opportunity  to  choose  between  war 
or  surrender  was  afforded  the  Germans  by  the 
presentation  of  the  armistice  terms.  A  more 
definite  and  detailed  document  was  never  framed. 
It  set  down  provision  after  provision  that  were 
the  essence  of  unconditional  surrender,  and  at 
every  point  it  made  clear  what  the  Peace  Treaty 
itself  would  contain.  It  was  in  the  power  of  the 
Germans  to  denounce  the  terms  as  being  in 
violation  of  the  President's  assurances  of  a  "just 
peace."  They  made  no  such  denunciation. 
Instead  they  signed  and  accepted  the  armistice 
terms,  and  it  remained  for  an  English  economist, 
writing  a  year  later,  to  discover  that  the  Germans 
did  not  surrender  and  that  the  Allies  were  falce 
to  promises. 


VIII 


THE  congressional  elections  in  November, 
191 8,  merit  detailed  consideration  by  reason 
of  the  sweep  and  force  of  their  consequences. 
Not  only  were  ugly  passions  aroused  that  shat- 
tered domestic  unity,  turning  the  United  States 
over  to  a  very  madness  of  pull  and  haul,  but  the 
results  worked  an  evil  change  in  Europe  as  well, 
giving  the  elder  statesmen  of  the  Allies  the  hope 
that  "practical  programs"  might  be  substituted 
for  "idealistic  theories/'  Only  by  analysis  of 
the  various  incidents  can  clear  understanding  be 
gained  of  an  action  that,  on  its  face,  bears  every 
appearance  of  aberration. 

In  September  various  Democratic  members  of 
Congress  waited  upon  the  President  and  told 
him  frankly  that  if  he  desired  to  retain  a  party 
majority  in  the  House  and  Senate  his  one  hope 
was  to  make  an  open,  non-partizan  appeal  to 
the  people.  They  were  explicit  in  the  statement 
that  the  Democratic  organization  itself  was  in 
no  position  to  conduct  a  vigorous  campaign,  and 
with  a  certain  approach  to  resentment  gave  him 
specific  explanations.  For  more  than  a  year 
the  party  had  been  without  leadership,  as  Vance 
McCormick,  chairman  of  the  Democratic  Na- 
tional  Committee,   had   devoted   himself  exclu- 

133 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

sively  to  the  direction  of  the  War  Trade  Board. 
This  lack  of  executive  authority,  and  the  Presi- 
dent's own  failure  to  act  as  a  party  leader,  had 
resulted  naturally  in  the  disintegration  of  ma- 
chinery and  in  a  war  chest  too  depleted  to  meet 
even  the  mechanical  expenses  of  a  campaign. 
On  the  other  hand.  Will  H.  Hays,  chairman  of 
the  RepubUcan  National  Committee,  was  giving 
entire  time  to  travel  and  conference  in  the  in- 
terests of  party  harmony  and  enthusiasm,  as 
well  as  collecting  funds  in  larger  amounts  than 
had  been  known  since  the  days  of  Hanna. 

The  President,  always  impatient  of  the  me- 
chanics of  politics,  was  doubly  unwilling  to  con- 
sider them  at  a  moment  when  the  fate  of  a  world 
hung  in  the  balance.  Somewhat  curtly,  and  very 
decisively,  he  rejected  the  suggestion  made  him, 
and  turned  to  the  tremendous  questions  that 
pressed  upon  him.  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria, 
and  Turkey  were  trembling  on  the  verge  of  sur- 
render, and  the  notes  of  the  President,  each  one 
with  the  cutting  edge  of  a  sword,  were  slashing 
the  bonds  that  held  these  countries  to  continued 
support  of  the  Imperial  German  government. 
Not  only  did  the  Allies  have  instant  and  intimate 
knowledge  of  every  detail  of  this  correspondence, 
but  they  indorsed  it  so  fully  as  to  give  the  Presi- 
dent authority  to  speak  for  them.  Far  better 
than  any  one  in  America  they  knew  the  exhaus- 
tion of  their  own  countries  and  the  strength  of 
Germany,  and  both  statesmen  and  soldiers  fol- 
lowed with  eagerness  every  point  in  the  Presi- 
dent's diplomatic  correspondence,  seeing  hope 
of   winning   by  words  the   victory   that    might 

134 


THE   PRESIDENTS  "PARTIZAN  APPEAL" 

otherwise  have  to  be  purchased  by  still 
greater  expenditures  of  blood  and  money  and 
suffering. 

On  October  13th,  at  the  most  critical  stage  of 
the  correspondence,  Mr.  Roosevelt  publicly  de- 
nounced the  President  for  attempting  to  bring 
about  a  "negotiated  peace/'  accused  him  of 
"bad  faith''  to  the  Allies,  and  berated  him  for 
his  "weakness."  As  if  in  response  to  a  signal, 
the  Republican  speakers  rose  in  their  places  and 
elaborated  the  attack.  Almost  instantly  the 
plan  of  campaign  was  broadened  to  take  in  the 
Fourteen  Points.  To  be  sure,  it  was  the  case 
that  these  specifications  of  the  President,  de- 
clared in  his  speech  of  January  8th,  had  been 
accepted  unquestioningly  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States  and  by  the  Allied  governments  as 
well,  and  nothing  was  more  obvious  than  that 
the  high  justice  of  these  pledges  had  been  po- 
tent factors  in  winning  the  approval  and  support 
of  neutral  nations.  Mr.  Roosevelt,  however, 
sounded  a  general  assault  by  his  statement  that 
"When  it  comes  to  peace  negotiations,  we  should 
emphatically  repudiate  these  famous  Fourteen 
Points." 

The  campaign,  in  its  first  stages,  seemed  so 
entirely  poHtical,  rather  than  popular,  that  ::mall 
attention  was  paid  to  it.  Certain  partizan  Sena- 
tors had  spared  no  effort  to  embarrass  and  harass 
the  administration  in  its  prosecution  of  the  war, 
but  never  at  any  time  had  the  people  shown  any 
signs  of  being  gulled.  The  President  had  the 
conviction  that  Americans  were  interested  but 
little  in  the  election,  and  he  was  particularly  of 

135 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  opinion  that  the  reactionary  Senate  group 
did  not  reflect  the  sentiment  of  the  Republican 
rank  and  file  in  any  degree.  As  time  went  by, 
however,  two  things  became  increasingly  appar- 
ent; first,  that  the  so-called  "Old  Guard"  was 
in  undisputed  control  of  the  Republican  ma- 
chinery; second,  that  the  forces  of  "invisible 
government"  v/ere  preparing  to  emerge  from  the 
retirement  thrust  upon  the  unities  of  war. 
Realizing  that  German  defeat  was  only  a  matter 
of  weeks.  Big  Business  felt  that  the  time  was 
ripe  for  a  successful  attempt  to  regain  the  power 
lost  in  191 2.  What  took  evil  and  definite  shape 
in  the  shadows  was  no  mere  uprising  of  a  partizan 
clique,  but  a  carefully  planned  revolt  against 
Wilson  and  his  "crazy  ideals."  The  orders  that 
went  out  from  the  headquarters  of  Privilege 
were  peremptory,  and  money  in  huge  amounts 
followed  the  orders.  The  hands  of  the  President 
were  to  be  upheld  no  longer;  they  were  to  be  tied. 
The  movement's  power  in  men,  money,  and 
machinery  began  to  be  appreciated,  and  appre- 
hension took  the  place  of  easy  confidence. 

There  was  not  a  man  in  the  whole  war  ma- 
chinery. Republican  or  Democrat,  who  did  not 
react  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  It  was 
not  only  that  a  Republican  majority  in  the  House 
or  Senate  meant  divided  leadership  at  a  moment 
when  the  President's  undisputed  central  control 
was  a  necessity,  but  it  was  a  certainty  that 
such  result  would  be  regarded  by  Europe  as  a 
repudiation  of  the  President  and  his  war  policies. 
The  Central  Powers  and  the  Allied  governments 
alike  would  interpret  it  as  a  weakening  of  our 

136 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  "PARTIZAN  APPEAL" 

war  will,  and  while  the  enemy  would  be  strength- 
ened, our  associates  would  be  correspondingly 
depressed.  It  was  not  a  party  that  was  at 
stake,  but  America,  and  Americans,  without 
regard  to  political  beliefs,  urged  the  President 
to  reconsider  his  decision  with  respect  to  an 
appeal  to  the  people.  He  did  so,  and  on  October 
24th  issued  the  following  statement: 

My  Fellow-countrymen:  The  congressional  elections 
are  at  hand.  They  occur  in  the  most  critical  period  our 
country  has  ever  faced  or  is  likely  to  face  in  our  time. 
If  you  have  approved  of  my  leadership  and  wish  me  to 
continue  to  be  your  unembarrassed  spokesman  in  affairs 
at  home  and  abroad,  I  earnestly  beg  that  you  will  ex- 
press yourself  unmistakably  to  that  effect  by  returning  a 
Democratic  majority  to  both  the  Senate  and  the  House  of 
Representatives. 

I  am  your  servant  and  will  accept  your  judgment  without 
cavil,  but  my  power  to  administer  the  great  trust  assigned 
to  me  by  the  Constitution  would  be  seriously  impaired 
should  your  judgment  be  adverse,  and  I  must  frankly  tell 
you  so  because  so  many  critical  issues  depend  upon  your 
verdict.  No  scruple  or  taste  must  in  grim  times  like 
these  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  speaking  the 
plain  truth. 

I  have  no  thougnt  of  suggesting  that  any  political  party 
is  paramount  in  matters  of  patriotism.  I  feel  too  deeply 
the  sacrifices  which  have  been  made  in  this  war  by  all  our 
citizens,  irrespective  of  party  affiliations,  to  harbor  such  an 
idea.  I  mean  only  that  the  difficulties  and  delicacies  of 
our  present  task  are  of  a  sort  that  makes  it  imperatively 
necessary  that  the  nation  should  give  its  undivided  support 
to  the  government  under  a  unified  leadership,  and  that  a 
Republican  Congress  would  divide  the  leadership. 

The  leaders  of  the  minority  in  the  present  Congress  have 
unquestionably  been  pro-war,  but  they  have  been  anti- 
administration.  At  almost  every  turn  since  we  entered 
the  war  they  have  sought  to  take  the  choice  of  policy, 
.137 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

and  the  conduct  of  the  war  out  of  my  hands  and  put  it 
under  the  control  of  instrumentahties  of  their  own 
choosing. 

This  is  no  time  either  for  divided  counsels  or  for  divided 
leadership.  Unity  of  command  is  as  necessary  now  in 
civil  action  as  it  is  upon  the  field  of  battle.  If  the  control 
of  the  House  and  the  Senate  should  be  taken  away  from  the 
party  now  in  power,  an  opposing  majority  could  assume 
control  of  the  legislation  and  oblige  all  action  to  be  taken 
amid  contest  and  obstruction. 

The  teturn  of  a  Republican  majority  to  either  House  of 
the  Congress  would,  moreover,  be  interpreted  on  the  other 
side  of  the  water  as  a  repudiation  of  my  leadership.  Spokes- 
men of  the  Republican  party  are  urging  you  to  elect  a 
Republican  Congress  in  order  to  back  up  and  support  the 
President,  but,  even  if  they  should  in  this  impose  upon 
some  credulous  voters  on  this  side  of  the  water,  they  would 
impose  on  no  one  on  the  other  side.  It  is  well  understood 
there  as  well  as  here  that  the  Republican  leaders  desire 
not  so  much  to  support  the  President  as  to  control  him. 

The  peoples  of  the  Allied  countries  with  whom  we  are 
associated  against  Germany  are  quite  familiar  with  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  elections.  They  would  find  it  very  difficult 
to  believe  that  the  voters  of  the  United  States  had  chosen 
to  support  their  President  by  electing  to  the  Congress  a 
majority  controlled  by  those  who  are  not  in  fact  in  sym- 
pathy with  the  attitude  and  action  of  the  administration. 

I  need  not  tell  you,  my  fellow-countrymen,  that  I  am 
asking  your  support  not  for  my  own  sake  or  for  the  sake 
of  a  political  party,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  nation  itself  in 
order  that  its  inward  duty  of  purpose  may  be  evident  to 
all  the  world.  In  ordinary  times  I  would  not  feel  at  liberty 
to  make  such  an  appeal  to  you.  In  ordinary  times  divided 
counsels  can  be  endured  without  permanent  hurt  to  the 
country.     But  these  are  not  ordinary  times. 

If  in  these  critical  days  it  is  your  wish  to  sustain  me 
with  undivided  minds,  I  beg  that  you  will  say  so  in  a  way 
which  it  will  not  be  possible  to  misunderstand,  either  here  at 
home  or  among  our  associates  on  the  other  side  of  the  sea. 
I  submit  my  difficulties  and  my  hopes  to  you. 

138 


THE   PRESIDENTS  "PARTIZAN  APPEAL" 

Such  an  appeal  was  in  no  sense  extraordinary. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  had  high  warrant  in 
distinguished  precedent.  In  various  elections 
George  Washington  pleaded  for  "united  leader- 
ship," and  Lincoln  specifically  urged  upon  the 
people  the  unwisdom  of  "swapping  horses  in 
midstream/'  It  was  Lincoln  also  who  made  the 
following  election  statement: 

There  is  an  important  sense  in  which  the  government 
is  distinct  from  the  administration.  One  is  perpetual,  the 
other  is  temporary  and  changeable.  A  man  may  be  loyal 
to  his  government  and  yet  oppose  the  peculiar  principles  and 
methods  of  the  administration.  I  should  regret  to  see  the 
day  in  which  the  people  should  cease  to  express  intelligent, 
honest,  generous  criticism  upon  the  policy  of  their  rulers. 
It  is  true,  however,  that,  in  time  of  great  peril,  the  dis- 
tinction ought  not  to  be  so  strongly  urged;  for  then  criti- 
cism may  be  regarded  by  the  enemy  as  opposition,  and  may 
weaken  the  wisest  and  best  efforts  for  the  public  safety. 
If  there  ever  was  such  a  time,  it  seems  to  me  it  is  now. 

In  a  speech  delivered  at  Boone,  Iowa,  October 
II,  1898,  President  McKinley  pleaded  for  a 
Republican  Congress  in  these  words: 

This  is  no  time  for  divided  councils.  If  I  would  have 
you  remember  anything  I  have  said  in  these  desultory 
remarks,  it  would  be  to  remember  at  this  critical  hour  in 
the  nation's  history  we  must  not  be  divided.  The  triumphs 
of  the  war  are  yet  to  be  written  in  the  articles  of  peace. 

Theodore  Roosevelt,  when  a  candidate  for 
Governor  of  New  York,  appealed  to  the  people 
to  give  President  McKinley  a  Republican  Con- 
gress, saying: 

Remember  that  whether  you  will  or  not,  your  votes  this 
year  will  be  viewed  by  the  nations  of  Europe  from  one 

139 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

standpoint  only.  They  will  draw  no  fine  distinctions.  A 
refusal  to  sustain  the  President  this  year  will,  in  their 
eyes,  be  read  as  a  refusal  to  sustain  the  war  and  to  sustain 
the  efforts  of  our  peace  commission  to  secure  the  fruit  of 
war.  Such  a  refusal  may  not  inconceivably  bring  about  a 
rupture  of  the  peace  negotiations.  It  will  give  heart  to 
our  defeated  antagonists;  it  will  make  possible  the  inter- 
ference of  those  doubtful  neutral  nations  who  in  this 
struggle  have  wished  us  ill. 

Ex-President  Benjamin  Harrison,  also  urging 
the  people  to  "stand  behind  the  President"  by 
electing  a  Republican  Congress,  said: 

If  the  word  goes  forth  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  are  standing  solidly  behind  the  President,  the  task 
of  the  peace  commissioners  will  be  easy,  but  if  there  is  a 
break  in  the  ranks — if  the  Democrats  score  a  telling  victory, 
if  Democratic  Senators,  Congressmen,  and  governors  are 
elected — Spain  will  see  in  it  a  gleam  of  hope,  she  will  take 
fresh  hope,  and  a  renewal  of  hostilities,  more  war,  may  be 
necessary  to  secure  to  us  what  we  have  already  won. 

Theodore  Roosevelt,  as  President,  did  not 
feel  that  such  an  appeal  was  improper  even 
in  time  of  peace,  for  on  August  i8,  1906,  he  wrote 
as  follows  to  James  E.  Watson,  then  the  Republi- 
can whip : 

If  there  were  only  partizan  issues  involved  in  this  con- 
test, I  should  hesitate  to  say  anything  publicly  in  reference 
thereto.  But  I  do  not  feel  that  such  is  the  case.  On  the 
contrary,  I  feel  that  all  good  citizens  who  have  the  welfare 
of  America  at  heart  should  appreciate  the  immense  amount 
that  has  been  accomplished  by  the  present  Congress, 
organized  as  it  is,  and  the  urgent  need  of  keeping  this 
organization  in  power.  To  change  the  leadership  and  or- 
ganization of  the  House  at  this  time  means  to  bring  con- 
fusion upon  those  who  have  been  successfully  engaged 
in  the  steady  working  out  of  a  great  and  comprehensive 

140 


THE   PRESIDENTS  "PARTIZAN  APPEAL" 

scheme  for  the  betterment  of  our  social,  Irv^ustrial,  and 
civic  conditions.  Such  a  change  would  su4!fstitute  a  pur- 
poseless confusion,  a  violent  and  hurtful  oscillation  between 
the  positions  of  the  extreme  radical  and  the  extreme  re- 
actionary for  the  present  orderly  progress  along  the  lines 
of  a  carefully  thought  out  policy. 

In  every  war  in  America's  history  the  man  in 
the  White  House  at  the  time  has  asked  to  have 
his  party  majority  confirmed  at  the  polls,  and 
common  sense  approves  the  wisdom  and  justice 
of  such  a  request.  It  is  upon  the  President, 
named  in  the  Constitution  as  Commander-in- 
Chief,  that  war  responsibility  rests,  and  fairness 
and  prudence  join  to  point  the  necessity  of 
guarding  him  against  partizan  harassment. 

Mr.  Wilson's  appeal,  however,  was  denounced 
as  "unprecedented,'*  and  straightway  subjected 
to  bitter  attack.  Mr.  Hays,  chairman  of  the 
Repubhcan  National  Committee,  in  the  course 
of  an  intemperate  speech,  charged  that  the  Presi- 
dent had  impugned  the  loyalty  of  Republicans 
and  denied  their  patriotism,  and  said: 

A  more  ungracious,  more  unjust,  more  wanton,  more 
mendacious  accusation  was  never  made  by  the  most  reck- 
less stump  orator,  much  less  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  for  partizan  purposes.  It  is  an  insult,  not  only  to 
every  loyal  Republican  in  Congress,  but  to  every  loyal 
Republican  in  the  land.  It  fully  merits  the  resentment 
which  rightfully  and  surely  will  find  expression  at  the  polls. 

Mr.  Roosevelt  declared  that  the  President  had 
asked  the  people  to  elect  a  Congress  made  up 
exclusively  of  Democrats,  and  in  his  Carnegie 
Hall  speech  made  this  flat  statement,  "No  man 
who  is  a  Republican,  and  no  man,  whether  a  Re- 

141 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

publican  or  not,  who  puts  loyalty  to  the  people 
ahead  of  loyalty  to  the  servants  of  the  people  is 
to  have  a  voice  in  determining  the  greatest 
questions  ever  brought  before  this  nation/* 
This,  of  course,  was  nonsense.  What  the  Presi- 
dent asked  for  was  not  a  unanimous  vote,  but 
a  majority  vote.  Had  every  Democrat  been 
elected,  or  had  every  Democrat  b^en  defeated, 
neither  party  would  have  had  two-thirds  of  the 
Senate,  the  majority  necessary  to  ratify  a  peace 
treaty,  for  instance.  Regardless  of  the  elec- 
tion's outcome.  Republican  votes  retained  im- 
portance and  power. 

As  the  campaign  progressed  the  hand  of  Big 
Business  became  increasingly  apparent.  Mr. 
Hays,  carried  away  by  his  bitterness,  betrayed 
true  objectives  in  these  words: 

But  Mr.  Wilson's  real  purpose  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  He  wants  just  two  things.  One 
is  full  power  to  settle  the  war  precisely  as  he  and  his  sole, 
unelected,  unappointed,  unconfirmed  personal  adviser 
may  determine.  The  other  is  full  power  as  the  "unem- 
barrassed spokesman  in  affairs  at  home,"  as  he  actually 
demands  in  his  statement,  to  reconstruct  in  peace-times 
the  "great  industrial  affairs  of  the  nation  in  the  same  way, 
in  unimpeded  conformity  with  whatever  socialistic  doctrines, 
whatever  unlimited  government  ownership  notions,  what- 
ever hazy  whims  may  happen  to  possess  him  at  the  time, 

^  but  first  and  above  all  with  absolute  commitment  to  free 
trade  with  all  the  world,  thus  giving  to  Germany  out  of 
hand  the  fruits  of  a  ;victory  greater  than  she  could  win  by 
fighting  a  hundred  years.  A  Republican  Congress  will 
never  assent  to  that.     Do  you  want  a  Congress  that  will? 

'  Germany  does. 

Germany  looks  to  Mr.  Wilson  to  get  it  for  her,  as  he 
pledged  himself  to  do  in  one  of  the  few  of  his  famous  articles 

142 


THE   PRESIDENTS  "PARTIZAN  APPEAL" 

which  are  explicable.  Germany  understands  that.  See 
the  New  York  Worldy  spokesman  of  the  administration, 
of  last  Saturday,  and  read  the  testimony  of  Henry  C. 
Emery,  former  head  of  the  Tariff  Commission,  just  returned 
from  seven  months  in  Germany.  "The  German  people," 
he  says,  "seemed  to  realize  that  in  President  Wilson  lay 
their  only  salvation.  They  have  turned  to  him  in  the 
belief  that  he  is  the  one  great  political  leader  who  can  be 
trusted  to  make  a  permanent  peace  which  will  permit 
equal  economic  development."  He  is.  All  others  demand 
that  the  Germans  shall  pay  the  full  penalty  of  their  crimes. 

To-day,  when  the  German  vote  is  again  a 
power  t«  be  soothed  and  wooed,  the  RepubHcan 
leaders  are  crying  out  against  the  President  for 
his  harsh  treatment  of  the  Central  Powers;  but  - 
at  the  time  of  Mr.  Hays's  speech  the  war  was 
still  on,  the  German  vote  was  cowed,  and  it  was 
good  campaign  strategy  to  denounce  the  Presi- 
dent as  the  friend  of  Germany,  the  champion  of 
a  "negotiated  peace"  instead  of  the  uncondi- 
tional surrender  that  the  warriors  of  the  Home 
Guards  demanded.  Under  all  the  buncombe, 
however,  there  coiled  the  selfish  purposes  of 
reaction — protective  tariffs,  ship  subsidies,  special 
privileges,  private  ownership,  and  the  feudal 
operation  of  free  mstitutions. 

The  campaign  of  the  Democrats,  necessarily 
weak,  by  lack  of  funds,  was  made  still  more 
futile  by  a  combination  o^  unfortunate  circum- 
stances. At  the  time  when  they  were  preparing*  ♦ 
to  take  the  field  in  earnest  the  sweep  of  the 
influenza  epidemic  put  an  end  to  public  meetings. 
It  is  doubtful  if  the  speech  of  the  President  had 
been  read  carefully  by  one  citizen  in  ten  thou- 
sand.    Certainly  there  was  no  remembrance  of 

143 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  paragraph  in  which  he  said:  "I  have  no 
thought  of  suggesting  that  any  poHtical  party  is 
paramount  in  matters  of  patriotism.  I  feel  too 
deeply  the  sacrifices  which  have  been  made  in 
this  war  by  all  our  citizens,  irrespective  of  party 
affiHations,  to  harbor  such  an  idea."  Repub- 
lican papers  drove  home  the  He  that  the  Presi- 
dent had  said  that  Republicans  were  not  patriots. 
Democratic  speakers  had  no  chance  to  answer  it. 
The  fundamental  mistake,  however,  was  in 
permitting  "patriotism"  to  remain  the  issue. 
In  no  sense  was  this  the  nature  of  the  fight.  As 
in  191 2,  the  battle-Hnes  were  drawn  between 
progress  and  reaction,  between  politics  and 
public  service,  between  the  hosts  of  democracy 
and  the  forces  of  Special  Privilege.  This  align- 
ment was  not  touched  upon;  the  real  issues  were 
not  made  clear.  Greatest  misfortune  of  all, 
the  President  did  not  have  at  his  back  the 
inspired,  unselfish  fighting  forces  that  swept 
him  to  victory  in  1912  and  1916.  As  has  been 
pointed  out,  his  rooted  distaste  for  the  business 
of  appointments  had  blinded  him  to  the  impor- 
tance of  putting  none  but  progressivists  on  guard, 
and  as  a  result  of  his  neglect  the  movement  had 
fallen  into  discouragement  and  disintegration. 
Bad  enough  prior  to  1917,  it  was  a  condition 
that  grew  into  hopelessness  after  America's 
entrance  into  the  war.  The  leading  reaction- 
aries of  the  country  were  permitted  to  capture 
the  War  Department  and  a  majority  of  the  newly 
created  civil  bodies,  and  each  man,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  swiftly  installed  his  standpat  following. 
Not  for  a  day  nor   an    hour   did  a  single   one 

144 


THE   PRESIDENTS  "PARTIZAN  APPEAL" 

of  them  surrender  his  political  convictions  or 
domestic  prejudices.  Under  direct  partizan 
inspiration  reactionary  organizations,  such  as 
the  National  Security  League  and  the  American 
Defense  Society,  sprang  into  evil  being.  A 
chauvinistic  hue  and  cry  was  raised  at  once, 
and  while  *' disloyalty"  was  the  asserted  object 
of  attack,  the  real  purpose  was  to  crush  the 
liberal  movement  in  the  United  States.  Men 
and  women  of  any  reputation  as  progressivists 
were  excluded  from  war-work  and  even  subjected 
to  continual  harassment  and  attack. 

It  was  these  forces  that  were  foremost  in 
crying  that  the  President  had  "insulted  the 
patriotism'*  of  every  Republican.  The  Demo- 
cratic organization,  utterly  demoralized,  could 
not  beat  back  the  He.  The  progressivist  move- 
ment, that  might  have  stemmed  the  tide,  was 
scattered  and  besmirched.  As  a  consequence, 
the  people  reverted  to  partizanship,  and,  without 
thought  of  the  war  or  the  peace,  rushed  to  the 
polls  and  voted  on  the  question  as  to  whether 
Republicans  were  "traitors."  My  feeling  at 
the  time,  and  my  conviction  to-day,  were  ex- 
pressed in  the  following  letter  sent  under  date 
of  November  8th: 

My  dear  Mr.  President, — ^You  have  indeed  made 
this  war  a  war  to  "make  the  world  safe  for  democracy." 
But  it  was  not  that  sort  of  war  when  it  began.  And  it 
was  not  that  sort  of  war  when  we  entered  it. 

Before  we  got  into  it,  our  entrance  had  its  chief  impul- 
sion from  our  most  reactionary  and  least  democratic  ele- 
ments. Consequently  nearly  all  our  most  progressive 
and  liberal  leaders  had  marked  themselves  as  opposed  to 
it.     The  Republican  representatives  of  Big  Business  made 

145 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON    * 

a  clear  record  of  patriotic  support  of  what  was  then,  in 
outward  appearance,  a  reactionary  trade-imperialistic  war. 
Many  radicals,  progressives,  and  Democrats  spoke  and 
voted  against  it. 

When  you  raised  it  to  the  level  of  a  war  for  democracy^ 
you  rallied  to  the  support  of  the  war  all  the  progressive 
and  democratic  elements.  The  Big  Business  patriots  went 
with  you,  ostensibly  on  your  own  terms,  because  they  saw 
that  only  on  your  terms  could  the  war  be  won.  They 
came  into  conspicuous  leadership  as  Red  Cross  executives, 
as  heads  of  State  Councils  of  Defense,  as  patriotic  dollar-^ 
a-year  men. 

All  the  radical  or  liberal  friends  of  your  anti-imperialist 
war  policy  were  either  silenced  or  intimidated.  The  Depart- 
ment of  Justice  and  the  Post-office  were  allowed  to  silence 
or  intimidate  them.  There  was  no  voice  left  to  argue 
for  your  sort  of  peace. 

When  we  came  to  this  election,  the  reactionary  Republi- 
cans had  a  clean  record  of  anti-Hun  imperialistic  patriotism. 
Their  opponents,  your  friends,  were  often  either  besmirched 
or  obscure.  No  one  had  been  able  to  tell  the  public  what 
was  really  at  issue  in  the  elections.  The  reactionaries 
knew,  but  they  concealed  it.  They  could  appeal  to  their 
patriotism  against  what  looked  like  a  demand  for  a  partizan 
verdict  for  the  Democrats.  The  Democrats,  afraid  of 
raising  the  class  issue,  went  on  making  a  political  campaign. 
Secretary  Daniels  and  you  spoke  too  late. 

It  seems  to  me  if  the  defeat  is  to  be  repaired,  the  issue 
as  between  the  imperialists  and  the  democracy  will  have 
to  be  stated.  You  will  have  to  give  out  your  program  for 
peace  and  reconstruction  and  find  friends  for  it.  Other- 
wise the  reactionary  patrioteers  will  defeat  the  whole 
immediate  future  of  reform  and  progress. 
Respectfully, 

George  Creel. 

Every  one  of  our  present  troubles  traces  back 
to  the  election  of  191 8.  Lodge  v^as  lifted  from 
mediocrity  to  evil  pov^er,  and  has  been  able  to 
translate    his    personal    hatreds    into    national 

146 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  "PARTTZAN  APPEAL" 

policies.  The  war  aims  of  the  United  States 
have  been  repudiated  and  we  have  been  kept 
out  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Worst  of  all, 
the  Wilson  program  for  reconstruction — a  great 
plan  for  the  restoration  of  our  national  health — 
was  handed  over  to  the  mercy  of  such  men  as 
Penrose,  Snioot,  \Vatson,  Sherman,  and  Brande- 
gee.  Had  it  been  the  dehberate  intent  of  the 
electorate  to  destroy  America  nationally  and 
internationally,  it  could  not  have  worked  more 
surely.  ^ 

11 


IX 

i 

i 
WHY  THE    PRESIDENT  WENT  TO   PARIS  \ 

1 

IT  is  safe  to  say  that  on  the  day  of  the  armistice 
Woodrow  Wilson  was  the  most  loved  and  [ 
admired  man  in  all  the  world.  In  foreign  lands  i 
they  burned  candles  before  his  picture,  named  ' 
squares  and  streets  in  his  honor,  and  hailed  him  ' 
as  an  apostle  of  light,  the  invincible  champion  ; 
of  human  rights;  in  the  United  States  the  sweep  ' 
of  victory  cleansed  the  popular  mind  of  prejudice  : 
and  irritations,  leaving  only  an  intense  apprecia-  \ 
tion  of  the  man's  true  greatness.  With  courage  j 
and  devotion  never  surpassed,  the  President  i 
threw  this  universal  popularity  upon  the  gaming-  j 
board  of  Paris,  risking  himself  in  one  tremen-  ; 
dous  hazard  for  a  peace  of  justice,  a  peace  of  i 
permanence. 

As  clearly  as  though  the  future  mirrored  Itself  ; 
before  him,  he  saw  the  tragedy  of  reaction  and  : 
intrigue  that  would  stage  itself  at  the  Peace  ; 
Conference.  Never  at  any  time  under  delusions  ^ 
as  to  the  character  of  the  statesmen  of  Europe,  \ 
he  knew  well  that  the  lifting  of  war's  necessities  ] 
would  restore  them  to  their  old  habits  of  thought  j 
— habits  formed  through  long  years  of  tortuous  j 
diplomacy,  **  practical"  politics,  and  careful 
balancing  of  power.  What  they  had  promised 
in  the  hour  of  defeat,  when  American  aid  was 

148 


WHY  THE  PRESIDENT  WENT  TO  PARIS 

the  one  salvation,  was  bound  to  lose  importance 
in  the  hour  when  a  cruel  and  merciless  enemy 
lay  at  their  feet.  Against  an  enforced  ideahsm, 
resented  by  their  experience  as  "visionary"  and 
"Utopian,"  there  would  be  a  revolt  of  minds 
accustomed  to  think  in  terms  of  victor  and 
vanquished,  spoils  and  revenge. 

What  more  natural?  For  close  to  five  years 
the  armies  of  the  Central  Powers  had  ravaged 
Belgium,  France,  Italy,  and  Serbia,  their  sub- 
marines had  swept  the  seas  of  Allied  shipping, 
and  their  aircraft  had  wrought  desolation  in 
great  cities.  For  close  to  five  years,  through 
no  fault  of  their  own,  French,  English,  Italians, 
Belgians,  and  Serbians  had  sat  face  to  face 
with  death  and  despair,  and  the  future  that 
stretched  out  before  them  was  gray  with  the 
smoke  that  rose  from  burning  homes.  A  League 
of  Nations,  a  peace  of  justice,  were  fine  faiths 
when  a  world  shook  to  the  sound  of  guns,  but 
with  victory  won,  what  more  intelligent  than 
to  attend  first  to  the  redress  of  immediate 
wrongs,  to  the  exaction  of  indemnities,  to  the 
imposition  of  punishments  that  would  rid  them 
at  once  and  forever  of  the  German  menace? 
Then  the  ideals! 

There  was  no  doubt  in  the  mind  of  the  Presi- 
dent as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  Allied  peoples. 
Their  passion  of  belief  in  the  righteousness  and 
practicability  of  a  new  order  came  to  him  across 
the  sea,  inexpressibly  inspiring.  He  knew,  how- 
ever, that  between  citizenship  and  government, 
especially  in  European  countries,  there  yawned 
a  gulf  not  to   be  bridged  without   infinite  time 

149 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

and  labor,  and  that  so  far  as  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence was  concerned,  decision  would  be  in  the 
hands  of  politicians,  the  young  more  plausible 
than  the  old,  but  all  master  opportunists  su- 
premely skilled  in  the  art  of  appealing  to  the 
human  passions  of  gain  and  revenge. 

Working  also  to  their  advantage  was  the  fact 
that  the  surrender  of  Germany  was  in  every 
sense  unconditional.  It  was  not  only  the  case 
that  the  Allies  held  the  written  promise  of  Ger- 
many to  make  compensation  "for  all  damage 
done  to  the  civiHan  population  of  the  Allies 
and  to  their  property  by  the  aggression  of 
Germany  by  land,  by  sea  and  from  the  air." 
There  was  also  that  grim  provision  in  the  armis- 
tice itself  "that  any  future  claims  and  demands 
of  the  Allies  and  the  United  States  of  America 
remain  unaffected.'*  It  was  legitimately  in  the 
power  of  the  Peace  Conference  to  present  just 
claims  that  would  put  the  Central  Powers  in 
bondage  for  generations  to  come,  that  would 
destroy  them  forever  as  a  free  people,  an  inde- 
pendent nationality. 

The  one  restraint  was  in  the  Fourteen  Points, 
accepted  by  the  Allied  governments  as  the  basis 
of  settlement.  Better  than  any  one  else,  how- 
ever, the  President  knew  that  these  terms  were 
far  removed  from  being  an  easily  enforceable 
pledge  in  the  sense  that  a  contract  is  enforceable. 
They  were  articles  of  faith,  rather  than  the  hard 
and  fast  clauses  of  a  commercial  agreement,  and 
if  they  were  to  be  dealt  with  in  a  mean,  legalistic 
spirit,  every  one  of  them  could  be  denied  without 
loss  of  face. 

150 


WHY  THE  PRESIDENT  WENT  TO  PARIS 

This  phase  of  the  difficulty  was  exaggerated 
by  the  situation  in  America  itself.  Throughout 
the  whole  of  October,  during  the  congressional 
campaign,  the  RepubHcan  party  had  indulged 
in  wholesale  repudiation  of  the  Fourteen  Points, 
denouncing  them  as  part  of  a  mollycoddle  poHcy 
inspired  by  secret  concern  for  Germany's  wel- 
fare. "Blood  and  iron"  was  the  prize  election 
compound  as  far  as  the  Republicans  were  con- 
cerned, and  nothing  was  more  abhorrent  to  their 
thought  than  the  idea  of  a  "negotiated  peace,'* 
a  peace  that  considered  Germany's  future  in 
any  degree.  Mr.  Hays,  chairman  of  the  Re- 
publican National  Committee,  sounded  the  key- 
note when  he  declared  that  America  "will 
uphold  her  allies  in  whatever  reparation  they 
may  exact  for  the  frightful  outrages  inflicted 
upon  them  by  the  accursed  Huns."  And  the 
RepubHcans  had  won  the  election!  Already, 
in  every  capital  in  Europe,  statesmen  were  ad- 
justing themselves  to  the  new  situation,  secretly 
rejoicing  in  the  turn  of  the  wheel  that  seemed 
to  lift  the  burdensome  obKgations  that  had  been 
placed  upon  them  by  the  Fourteen  Points. 

For  the  President  to  have  stayed  in  Wash- 
ington would  have  been  the  easy  way.  En- 
throned in  the  White  House,  high  above  the 
jangles  of  Paris,  it  was  in  his  power  to  have 
placed  entire  responsibility  upon  an  appointed 
Peace  Commission,  reserving  an  Olympian  de- 
tachment for  himself.  But  even  as  he  knew 
that  this  would  save  him  his  popularity,  just  as 
surely  did  he  know  that  it  would  lose  the  peace. 
The  one  chance  for  the  League  of  Nations,  for 

151 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

?,  peace  of  justice  and  permanence,  was  for  him 
to  go  to  Paris  in  person,  to  sit  at  the  Peace  Table 
himself,  fighting  face  to  face  for  the  fulfilment 
of  the  pledges  that  he  had  framed.  To  sit  in 
Washington  was  to  invite  defeat.  With  a  situa- 
tion that  would  change  with  every  word,  it  was 
idle  to  dream  that  intelligent  communication 
could  be  maintained  by  cable  and  wireless. 
His  absence  would  be  regarded  as  the  assumption 
of  a  dictator's  role,  and  the  premiers  would  be 
quick  to  use  it  to  their  advantage.  Advice  and 
counsel,  unless  in  line  with  their  wishes,  would 
be  construed  as  ultimatums  and  commands. 

There  was  also  the  possibility  that  his  presence 
might  stabilize  the  situation  in  large  degree. 
It  would  disprove  the  theory  of  "autocratic 
aloofness,"  and,  by  giving  direct  evidence  of  a 
willingness  to  share  in  common  counsel,  might 
result  in  larger  regard  for  the  American  position. 
With  all  the  passion  of  his  soul  the  President 
desired  a  Conference  of  friends ,  unchanged, 
unchanging,  animated  in  peace  by  the  same 
ideals  that  had  thrilled  in  war,  and  had  it  been 
necessary  to  achieve  such  result  he  would  have 
made  the  pilgrimage  on  his  knees.  These  were 
the  considerations  that  formed  his  decision  to  go 
to  Paris  as  head  of  the  American  Commission  to 
Negotiate  Peace — a  decision  made  in  spite  of  the 
attack  of  political  enemies  and  the  implorations 
of  his  friends.  The  responsibility  was  still  his: 
he  would  not  shirk  it! 

The  general  ignorance  of  our  basic  law  was 
never  more  apparent  than  in  the  widely  held 
belief  that  the  Senate  is  part  of  the  treaty-making 

152 


WHY  THE  PRESIDENT  WENT  TO  PARIS 

power  of  government,  and  that  the  President 
acted  autocratically  in  refusing  to  take  that 
august  body  to  Paris  with  him  in  its  entirety. 
The  Constitution,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  places 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  nation  in  the  hands 
of  the  President  alone.  No  one  else  has  power  or 
voice.  The  making  of  a  treaty  with  any  foreign 
nation  is  the  duty  of  the  President,  and  responsi- 
bility rests  upon  him  and  upon  no  other.  The 
sole  business  of  the  Senate  is  to  ratify  or  to 
reject  the  treaty  when  the  President  has  made 
it.  In  this,  as  in  a  score  of  other  ways,  the 
Constitution  is  unwieldy,  for  it  was  written  in  a 
day  when  we  boasted  of  our  isolation,  and  its 
framers  did  not  conceive  of  a  time  when  foreign 
relations  would  furnish  the  country  its  most 
important  and  complex  questions.  Until  the 
defect  is  remedied  by  amendment,  however, 
it  is  the  lawy  and  the  President  was  faced  by  a 
responsibility  that  he  could  not  have  evaded 
had  he  so  desired. 

The  selection  of  the  personnel  of  the  Commis- 
sion came  next,  and,  as  is  generally  the  case 
in  the  United  States,  personalities  dwarfed  prin- 
ciples. Within  a  week  both  press  and  people 
were  far  more  concerned  with  the  men  who 
were  to  go  to  Paris  than  with  what  they  were  to 
do  in  Paris.  The  number  decided  upon  was 
four,  exclusive  of  the  President,  and  two  of  the 
places  were  filled  from  the  first.  The  Secretary 
of  State,  by  virtue  of  his  position,  was  compelled 
to  be  chosen,  although  there  was  the  exact  knowl- 
edge that  he  would  contribute  nothing  to  the 
general  strength.     Colonel  House  was  equally  in- 

153 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

evitable,  owing  to  the  President's  continuous  use 
of  his  services  in  foreign  affairs  and  the  intimate 
knowledge  of  European  conditions  thus  gained. 

Looking  back,  there  is  no  question  that  much 
bitterness  and  antagonism  would  have  been 
averted  had  the  President  selected  ex-President 
Taft  and  Mr.  Root  for  the  two  remaining  places. 
They  were  logical  choices,  for  at  the  time  both 
were  more  or  less  committed  to  the  League  of 
Nations  and  to  a  peace  of  justice,  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  these  eminent  Republicans  would 
have  appealed  to  the  country  as  big  and  broad. 
After  prolonged  dehberation,  the  President  de- 
termined against  them.  He  knew  that  the 
Allied  countries  seethed  in  unrest,  and  that 
radicalism  was  the  ruling  force  in  Europe,  not 
reaction.  Mr.  Root  had  failed  with  his  Russian 
mission  by  reason  of  his  reputation  as  America's 
foremost  champion  of  the  "capitalistic  system," 
and  the  President  feared  that  his  presence  as  a 
peace  delegate  would  work  prejudice  at  the  out- 
set. As  for  Mr.  Taft,  there  was  his  indehble 
record  as  a  genial,  peace-loving  soul  who  never 
let  convictions  stand  in  the  way  of  concord. 
Although  the  moving  spirit  in  the  League  to 
Enforce  Peace,  and  an  ardent  champion  of  the 
President's  program  throughout  the  war,  he 
commenced  to  wabble  at  the  beginning  of  the 
congressional  campaign,  and  by  the  time  his 
Republican  associates  had  finished  their  per- 
suasions his  performances  were  truly  acrobatic. 
As  the  President  saw  it,  the  prime  qualification 
of  a  commissioner  was  an  ability  to  hold  to 
convictions  for  more  than  a  day  at  a  time. 

154 


WHY  THE  PRESIDENT  WENT  TO  PARIS 

With  these  two  men  eUminated,  the  field  of 
selection  was  left  bare  and  sterile.  Judge 
Hughes  might  have  passed  muster,  although  this 
is  doubtful,  but  in  his  case  the  President  was 
explicit.  The  evasions  of  the  ex-justice  in  the 
campaign  of  1916,  the  behef  among  many  people 
that  he  was  angling  for  the  German  vote,  his  re- 
fusal to  take  a  position  on  any  question  of  the  day, 
had  disgusted  the  President  even  more  than  it  had 
chilled  the  Republican  party.  As  for  Mr.  Roose- 
velt, his  antagonism  to  the  Fourteen  Points  was 
open  and  bitter,  and  throughout  the  campaign  he 
had  stood  for  a  "dictated  peace,"  insisting  that 
America  was  without  right  to  interfere  in  the  im- 
position of  such  terms  as  the  Allies  saw  fit.  W^hen 
it  came  to  making  a  selection  from  the  Senate  the 
case  was  hopeless.  From  Senator  Lodge  straight 
down  the  line  every  Republican  had  followed 
Mr.  Roosevelt,  and  stood  committed  irrevocably 
against  the  Fourteen  Points  that  had  been 
accepted  by  the  Allies  as  the  base  of  settlement. 

Never  very  patient  in  such  matters,  for  the 
business  of  appointment  was  always  an  irrita- 
tion to  him,  the  President  ended  his  difficulties 
by  selecting  Secretary  of  War  Baker  and  Mr. 
Henry  White.  The  choice  of  Mr.  Baker  was  a 
wise  one,  for,  whatever  his  lacks  in  other  direc- 
tions, he  has  a  mind  that  is  as  quick  as  it  is 
tireless,  as  deep  as  it  is  brilliant,  and  he  is  never 
more  impressive  than  in  those  mental  clashes 
that  call  for  the  nice  commingling  of  firmness 
and  adroitness.  Realizing,  as  the  President  did 
not,  that  his  presence  was  more  necessary  in  the 
United  States  than  in  Paris,  Mr.  Baker  declined 

155 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  honor,  an  exhibition  of  unselfish  devotion  to 
duty  for  which  he  has  never  been  given  credit. 
The  man  to  have  put  in  his  place  was  ex-Secre- 
tary McAdoo,  not  only  by  reason  of  his  force  and 
genius,  but  because  of  the  fact  that  his  control  of 
the  Treasury  throughout  the  war  had  given  him 
an  intimate  familiarity  with  European  condi- 
tions and  needs.  There  was  never  any  chance 
of  this,  however,  for  the  President's  horror  of 
nepotism  is  close  akin  to  mania.  Gen.  Tasker 
H.  BHss,  while  a  man  of  rare  scholarship  and 
very  real  ability,  stood  in  the  public  mind  merely 
as  a  soldier.  The  selection  of  Mr.  Henry  White 
was  a  very  honest  effort  to  please  the  Republicans 
as  well  as  a  very  sincere  attempt  to  strengthen 
the  Commission  by  a  very  necessary  note.  Mr. 
White  had  been  an  ambassador  to  Italy  and 
France  by  the  appointment  of  RepubHcan 
Presidents,  had  served  as  the  head  of  many 
American  delegations  to  international  confer- 
ences, and  he  knew  the  European  diplomatic 
mind  as  a  fox  knows  its  burrow. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  American 
Commission  to  Negotiate  Peace  was  not  an  im- 
portant body  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word. 
When  one  thought  of  France,  England,  and 
Italy  it  was  not  in  terms  of  commissions, 
but  in  terms  of  Sonnino,  Clemenceau,  Lloyd 
George  and  Orlando.  Just  as  each  of  these  was 
the  sole  source  of  power,  his  nation's  picked 
champion,  so  was  it  a  foregone  conclusion  that 
Woodrow  Wilson  would  have  to  stand  out  as 
America's  source  of  power,  America's  picked 
champion.     What  forecast  itself  was  no  round- 

156 


WHY  THE  PRESIDENT  WENT  TO  PARIS 

table  argument,  shared  in  by  scores  of  com- 
missioners, but  a  grapple  o^  four  wills,  a  test  of 
strength  confined  to  four  chosen  leaders.  What 
the  President  needed  on  the  Commission,  and 
he  knew  it,  was  not  counselors,  but  men  who 
would  guard  his  back. 

The  truly  important  body — and  this  the 
President  realized  from  the  first — was  the  group 
,  of  experts  that  went  along  with  the  Commission, 
*  the  pick  of  the  country's  most  famous  specialists 
in  finance,  history,  economics,  international  law, 
colonial  questions,  map-making,  ethnic  dis- 
tinctions, and  all  those  other  matters  that  were 
to  come  up  at  the  Peace  Conference.  They 
constituted  the  President's  arsenal  of  facts,  and 
even  on  board  the  George  fVashingtoriy  in  the 
very  first  conference,  he  made  clear  his  de- 
pendence upon  them. 

"You  are,  in  truth,  my  advisers,"  he  said, 
"for  when  I  ask  you  for  information  I  will  have 
no  way  of  checking  it  up,  and  must  act  upon  it 
unquestioningly.  We  will  be  deluged  with  claims 
plausibly  and  convincingly  presented.  It  will  be 
your  task  to  estabhsh  the  truth  or  falsity  of  these 
claims  out  of  your  specialized  knowledges,  so 
that  my  positions  may  be  taken  fairly  and 
intelligently." 

It  was  this  expert  advice  that  he  depended 
upon,  and  it  was  a  well  of  information  that  never 
failed  him.  At  the  head  of  the  financiers  and 
economists  were  such  men  as  Bernard  Baruch, 
Herbert  Hoover,  Norman  Davis,  and  Vance 
McCormick.  As  head  of  the  War  Industries 
Board,  in  many  respects  the  most  powerful  of 

157 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

all  the  civil  organizations  called  into  being  by 
the  war,  Mr.  Baruch  had  won  the  respect  and 
confidence  of  American  business  by  his  courage, 
honesty,  and  rare  ability.  At  his  side  were  such 
men  as  Frank  W.  Taussig,  chairman  of  the 
Tariff  Commission;  Alex.  Legg,  general  man- 
ager of  the  International  Harvester  Com- 
pany; and  Charles  McDowell,  manager  of  the 
Fertilizer  and  Chemical  Departments  of  Armour 
&  Co. — both  men  familiar  with  business  con- 
ditions and  customs  in  every  country  in  the 
world;  Leland  Summers,  an  international  me- 
chanical engineer  and  an  expert  in  manufactur- 
ing, chemicals,  and  steel;  James  C.  Pennie,  the 
international  patent  lawyer;  Frederick  Neilson 
and  Chandler  Anderson,  authorities  on  interna- 
tional law;    and  various  others  of  equal  caliber. 

Mr.  Hoover  was  aided  and  advised  by  the 
men  who  were  his  representatives  in  Europe 
throughout  the  war,  and  Mr.  McCormick,  head 
of  the  War  Trade  Board,  gathered  about  him 
in  Paris  all  of  the  men  who  had  handled  trade 
matters  for  him  in  the  various  countries  of  the 
world. 

Mr.  Davis,  representing  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment, had  as  his  associates  Mr.  Thomas  W. 
Lamont,  Mr.  Albert  Strauss,  and  Jeremiah 
Smith  of  Boston. 

Dr.  Sidney  E.  Mezes,  president  of  the  College 
of  the  City  of  New  York,  went  with  the  President 
at  the  head  of  a  brilliant  group  of  specialists, 
all  of  whom  had  been  working  for  a  year  and 
more  on  the  problems  that  would  be  presented 
at    the    Peace    Conference.     Among    the    more 

158 


WHY  THE  PRESIDENT  WENT  TO  PARIS 

important  may  be  mentioned:  Prof.  Charles 
H.  Raskins,  dean  of  the  Graduate  School  of 
Harvard  University,  speciaHst  on  Alsace-Lor- 
raine and  Belgium;  Dr.  Isaiah  Bowman,  di-  * 
rector  of  the  American  Geographical  Society, 
general  territorial  specialist;  Prof.  Allyn  A. 
Young,  head  of  the  Department  of  Economics  at 
Cornell;  George  Louis  Beer,  formerly  of  Colum-yv 
bia,  and  an  authority  on  colonial  possessions; 
Prof.  W.  L.  Westermann,  head  of  the  History 
Department  at  the  University  of  Wisconsin  and  y^ 
specialist  on  Turkey;  R.  H.  Lord,  professor 
of  history  at  Harvard,  specialist  on  Russia  and 
Poland;  Roland  B.  Dixon,  professor  of  ethnog- 
raphy at  Harvard;  Prof.  Clive  Day,  head  of  the 
Department  of  Economics  at  Yale,  specialist 
on  the  Balkans;  W.  E.  Lunt,  professor  of  his- 
tory at  Haverford  College,  specialist  on  northern 
Italy;  Charles  Seymour,  professor  of  history  at 
Yale,  specialist  on  Austria-Hungary;  Mark  Jef- 
ferson, professor  of  geography  at  Michigan 
State  Normal,  and  Prof.  James  T.  Shotwell, 
professor  of  history  at  Columbia. 

These  groups  were  the  President's  real  coun- 
selors and  advisers,  and  there  was  not  a  day 
throughout  the  Peace  Conference  that  he  did 
not  call  upon  them  and  depend  upon  them. 

And  so  the  expedition  sailed.  As  the  George 
Washington  left  its  anchorage  and  slipped  down 
the  Hudson  to  the  sea,  a  thousand  whistles 
screamed,  a  million  onlookers  cheered,  and  a 
great  city  rocked  to  the  waves  of  an  exultant 
patriotism.  An  old  naval  officer,  standing  on 
the  deck,  recalled  the  return  of  Dewey  in  il 

159 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  madness  of  welcome  that  awaited  the  hero 
of  Manila,  and  reflected  in  bitterness  that  in 
less  than  a  year  the  cheers  had  turned  to  abuse. 
He  harked  back  to  Washington,  beloved  and 
honored  in  the  day  of  victory,  yet  leaving  office 
in  humiliation  and  heartsickness,  followed  by 
jeers  and  imprecations.  "We  are  people  of  the 
hive,"  he  said.  "When  the  king  bee  has  per- 
formed we  kill  him." 

Signs  were  not  wanting  to  support  the  gloomy 
prophecy.  Already  the  signal  fires  of  partizan- 
ship  were  blazing  from  every  hilltop,  and  Re- 
publican leaders  were  sending  the  burning  arrow 
from  state  to  state.  On  November  27th,  five 
days  before  the  President's  departure,  Mr.  Roose- 
velt had  cried  this  message  to  Europe,  plain 
intimation  that  the  Republican  majority  in  the 
Senate  would  support  the  Alhes  in  any  repudia- 
tion of  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  Fourteen 
Points: 

Our  allies  and  our  enemies  and  Mr.  Wilson  himself  should 
all  understand  that  Mr.  Wilson  has  no  authority  whatever 
to  speak  for  the  American  people  at  this  time.  His  leader- 
ship has  just  been  emphatically  repudiated  by  them. 
'The  newly  elected  Congress  comes  far  nearer  than  Mr. 
Wilson  to  having  a  right  to  speak  the  purposes  of  the 
American  people  at  this  moment.  Mr.  Wilson  and  his 
Fourteen  Points  and  his  four  supplementary  points  and  his 
five  complementary  points  and  all  his  utterances  every 
which  way  have  ceased  to  have  any  shadow  of  right 
to  be  accepted  as  expressive  of  the  will  of  the  American 
people. 

He  is  President  of  the  United  States.  He  is  a  part  of 
the  treaty-making  power;  but  he  is  only  part.  If  he  acts 
in  good  faith  to  the  American  people,  he  will  not  claim 
on  the  other  side  of  the  water  any  representative  capacity 

160 


WHY  THE  PRESIDENT  WENT  TO  PARIS 

in  himself  to  speak  for  the  American  people.  He  will  say 
frankly  that  his  personal  leadership  has  been  repudiated 
and  that  he  now  has  merely  the  divided  ojB&cial  leadership 
which  he  shares  with  the  Senate. 

.  .  .  America  played  in  the  closing  months  of  war  a 
gallant  part,  but  not  in  any  way  the  leading  part,  and  she 
played  this  part  only  by  acting  in  strictest  agreement 
with  our  allies  and  under  the  joint  high  command.  She 
should  take  precisely  the  same  attitude  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. We  have  lost  in  this  war  about  236,000  men 
killed  and  wounded.  England  and  France  have  lost  about 
7,000,000.  Italy  and  Belgium  and  the  other  Allies  have 
doubtless  lost  3,000,000  more.  Of  the  terrible  sacrifice 
which  has  enabled  the  Allies  to  win  the  victory,  America 
has  contributed  just  about  2  per  cent. 

It  is  our  business  to  act  with  our  allies  and  to  show  an 
undivided  front  with  them  against  any  move  of  our  late 
enemies.  I  am  no  Utopian.  I  understand  entirely  that 
there  can  be  shifting  alliances. 

But  in  the  present  war  we  have  won  only  by  standing 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  our  allies  and  presenting  an 
undivided  front  to  the  enemy.  It  is  our  business  to  show 
the  same  loyalty  and  good  faith  at  the  Peace  Conference. 
Let  it  be  clearly  understood  that  the  American  people 
absolutely  stand  behind  France,  England,  Italy,  Belgium, 
and  the  other  Allies  at  the  Peace  Conference,  just  as  she  has 
stood  with  them  during  the  last  eighteen  months  of  the 
war.  Let  every  difference  of  opinion  be  settled  among  the 
Allies  themselves,  and  then  let  them  impose  their  com- 
mon will  on  the  nations  responsible  for  the  hideous  disaster 
which  has  almost  wrecked  mankind. 

What  Mr.  Roosevelt  did,  in  words  as  plain 
as  his  pen  could  marshal,  was  to  inform  the 
Allies  that  they  were  at  liberty  to  disregard  the 
President,  the  League  of  Nations,  and  the  Four- 
teen Points,  and  that  the  RepubHcan  party 
would  stand  as  a  unit  for  as  hard  a  peace]  as 
Foch  chose  to  dictate.     Had  he  signed  a  power 

161 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

of  attorney  he  could  not  have  given  any  freei 
hand  to  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau. 

The  President  was  at  all  times  aware  of  the 
risks  that  he  ran,  the  dangers  that  he  faced.  The 
joy  of  the  armistice,  that  caught  every  one  in  its 
tidal  sweep,  was,  perhaps,  his  last  experience 
with  unalloyed  happiness.  I  was  on  the  George 
Washington  as  his  guest,  my  errand  to  France 
having  no  other  object  than  to  wind  up  the 
affairs  of  the  Committee  on  Public  Information. 
The  legends  that  associated  my  work  with 
censorship  and  repression  made  demobilization 
the  part  of  wisdom,  and  the  same  reasons  forced 
the  conclusion  that  any  personal  connection  with 
the  Peace  Conference  would  be  distorted  and 
attacked.  One  evening,  as  we  walked  the  deck, 
I  spoke  to  the  President  of  the  tremendous  help 
that  his  addresses  had  been  to  us  in  our  work — 
of  the  wholehearted  response  of  the  peoples  of 
earth,  their  gladness  in  his  words,  the  joyful 
liberation  of  their  thought.  The  one  incom- 
pleteness was  in  connection  with  the  Central 
Powers.  In  a  score  of  ways  we  had  reached  the 
public  opinion  of  these  countries  with  the  mes- 
sage of  America,  but  what  seemed  necessary 
now  was  to  put  the  story  of  American  idealism 
before  them  in  all  of  its  splendid  fullness.  New 
governments  were  forming  in  Poland,  Czecho- 
slovakia, and  Jugoslavia  and  not  only  was  it 
important  to  impress  them  with  the  true  nobility 
of  our  purpose,  but  there  were  also  the  sullen- 
nesses  of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Hungary  that 
might  be  wiped  out  by  an  explicit  relation  of  the 
facts. 

162 


WHY  THE  PRESIDENT  WENT  TO  PARIS 

The  President  stood  silent  for  quite  a  while,  and 
when  he  turned  to  me  at  last  his  face  was  as 
bleak  as  the  gray  stretch  of  sunless  water. 

"It  is  a  great  thing  that  you  have  done,"  he 
said,  "but  I  am  wondering  if  you  have  not  un- 
consciously spun  a  net  for  me  from  which  there 
is  no  escape.  It  is  to  America  that  the  whole 
world  turns  to-day,  not  only  with  its  wrongs, 
but  with  its  hopes  and  grievances.  The  hungry 
expect  us  to  feed  them,  the  roofless  look  to  us 
for  shelter,  the  sick  of  heart  and  body  depend 
upon  us  for  cure.  All  of  these  expectations 
have  in  them  the  quality  of  terrible  urgency. 
There  must  be  no  delay.  It  has  been  so  always. 
People  will  endure  their  tyrants  for  years,  but 
they  tear  their  deliverers  to  pieces  if  a  millennium 
is  not  created  immediately.  Yet  you  know,  and 
I  know,  that  these  ancient  wrongs,  these  present 
unhappinesses,  are  not  to  be  remedied  in  a  day 
or  with  a  wave  of  the  hand.  What  I  seem  to 
see — with  all  my  heart  I  hope  that  I  am  wrong — 
is  a  tragedy  of  disappointment." 

12 


X 

PARIS   AND    PROCRASTINATION 

BREST  brimmed  with  flower-bearing  children 
— it  seemed  as  if  the  jardins  des  enfants  of 
France  had  been  poured  into  the  streets  of  the 
town — and  on  the  way  to  Paris  the  train  passed 
through  a  veritable  lane  of  women  and  little 
ones  crying:  ^^  Vive  V Ameriquel  Vive  le  Presi- 
dent!" They  crowded  the  stations,  they  hned 
the  fields,  and  their  shrill  pipings  were  the  last 
thing  we  heard  at  night,  the  first  thing  in  the 
early  dawn.  Paris  was  splendid!  All  that  was 
fine  and  brave  and  generous  in  the  nation  poured 
out  like  wine  in  those  first  days. 

Dear  and  heart-warming  as  it  was,  however, 
the  President  had  not  come  to  France  for  his 
gratification,  but  on  a  stern  errand  that  brooked 
no  delay.  He  asked  at  once  about  the  Con- 
ference, and  there  began  the  series  of  delays 
that  were  carefully  and  skilfully  planned  to 
give  time  for  the  subsidence  of  popular  emotion. 
It  was  explained  that  Lloyd  George  was  fighting 
for  his  political  life  in  the  English  elections, 
that  Orlando  and  the  Italians  were  not  ready, 
that  France  could  not  bear  to  let  him  commence 
serious  conversations  until  he  had  received  her 
full  tribute — and  seen  the  devastated  area;  and 
there  were  also  the  plans  that  had  been  arranged 

164 


PARIS  AND  PROCRASTINATION 

for  his  visits  to  England,  Italy,  and  Belgium. 
The  statesmen  knew  well  that  had  the  Con- 
ference convened  upon  the  President's  arrival, 
it  would  have  been  suicide  to  resist  a  single 
Wilson  proposition,  for  the  peoples  of  the  Allied 
countries  were  still  in  the  grip  of  a  great  joy,  a 
great  gratitude,  and  a  great  faith.  In  equal 
degree  these  wise  old  men  knew  that  it  would  be 
only  a  matter  of  weeks  before  these  very  people, 
going  back  to  their  ruined  homes  and  desolate 
lives,  would  be  thinking  in  terms  of  victory  and 
indemnities. 

The  President  was  bitterly  disappointed  at  the 
delay,  but,  since  there  was  no  other  alternative, 
he  accepted  the  situation  with  good  grace. 
His  one  successful  resistance  was  to  the  repeated 
effort  to  have  him  visit  the  devastated  area. 
It  was  obviously  the  French  desire  to  stir  him 
to  a  passion  of  resentment  against  the  Germans, 
and,  keen  as  were  Mr.  Wilson's  sympathies,  he 
did  not  mean  to  let  himself  be  swayed  from 
high  purposes  by  any  process  of  harrowing.  At 
every  point,  and  at  every  moment,  there  was 
this  organized  campaign  on  the  part  of  the 
politicians  to  center  thought  on  France's  wrongs 
and  to  keep  discussion  away  from  the  League 
of  Nations  and  the  Fourteen  Points.  All  the 
while  the  Paris  papers  filled  their  columns  with 
despatches  from  the  United  States,  telling  of 
the  President's  repudiation  by  the  Repubhcan 
Senate  majority,  and  informing  Europe  that 
the  American  people  were  behind  France,  not 
Wilson. 

In   England   an   even   more  disturbing  mani- 
i6s 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

festation  of  intent  was  witnessed.  To  win  the 
election  of  December  i8th  Lloyd  George  was 
forswearing  himself  and  his  pledges  with  a 
shamelessness  that  was  equaled  only  by  that 
of  the  English  people  in  forcing  and  applauding 
such  a  course.  Speaking  on  November  nth, 
the  day  that  the  armistice  was  signed,  Lloyd 
George  made  this  declaration  of  faith : 

}  They  [the  conditions  of  peace]  must  lead  to  a  settlement 
which  will  be  fundamentally  just.  No  settlement  that 
contravenes  the  principles  of  eternal  justice  will  be  a  per- 
manent one.  The  peace  of  1871  imposed  by  Germany 
on  France  outraged  all  the  principles  of  justice  and  fair 
play.  Let  us  be  warned  by  that  example. }  We  must  not 
allow  any  sense  of  revenge,  any  spirit  of  greed,  any  grasping 
desire,  to  override  the  fundamental  principles  of  righteous- 
ness. Vigorous  attempts  will  be  made  to  hector  and  bully 
the  government  in  an  endeavor  to  make  them  depart  from 
the  strict  principles  of  right,  and  to  satisfy  some  base, 
sordid,  squalid  idea  of  vengeance  and  of  avarice.  We  must 
relentlessly  set  our  faces  against  that.  .  .  . 

A  large  number  of  small  nations  have  been  reborn  in 
Europe,  and  these  will  require  a  League  of  Nations  to 
protect  them  against  the  covetousness  of  ambitious  and 
grasping  neighbors.  In  my  judgment  a  League  of  Nations 
is  absolutely  essential  to  permanent  peace.  We  shall 
go  to  the  Peace  Conference  to  guarantee  that  a  League  of 
Nations  is  a  reality. 

On  December  nth,  at  a  time  when  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  was  on  the  sea,  coming 
to  Europe  to  receive  the  fulfilment  of  the 
pledges  made  him,  Lloyd  George  was  begging 
votes  on  a  platform  of  "Hang  the  Kaiser"  and 
"Make  Germany  pay  the  zvhole  cost  of  the  war.'*. 
As  he  said  in  Paris,  grinning  as  though  it  were 
all  a  joke,  "Heaven  only  knows  what  I  would 

166 


PARIS  AND  PROCRASTINATION 

have  had  to  promise  them  if  the  campaign  had 
lasted  a  week  longer." 

England  cheered  the  President  even  more 
enthusiastically  than  Paris — the  same  England 
that  had  voted  to  repudiate  his  program  just 
one  week  before — and  even  as  the  ovation  rang 
loudest  Clemenceau  was  informing  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  that  the  old-fashioned  system 
of  alliances  must  be  maintained.  Fairly  shouting 
his  defiance  to  the  League  of  Nations,  he  de- 
clared on  December  31st  that  "there  is  an  old 
system  which  appears  condemned  to-day,  and 
to  which  I  do  not  fear  to  say  that  I  remain 
faithful  at  this  moment.  Countries  have  or- 
ganized the  defense  of  their  frontiers  with  the 
necessary  elements  and  the  balance  of  power ." 

The  Italian  situation  also  had  its  disquieting 
features.  While  in  Paris  on  December  19th  the 
King  of  Italy  and  his  advisers  had  sounded  out 
the  President  on  the  subject  of  annexing  Fiume 
and  a  large  section  of  the  Dalmatian  coast. 
This  plan  did  not  have  the  full-hearted  support 
of  either  the  King  or  Orlando,  and  as  yet  had 
not  been  mentioned  to  the  Italian  people,  but 
was  entirely  the  jingoistic  conception  of  the 
reactionary  Sonnino.  The  President  did  not 
attempt  to  conceal  either  his  sense  of  shock  or 
his  unalterable  opposition.  He  made  it  clear 
that  he  stood  for  every  Italian  claim  that  had 
been  openly  advanced,  and  would  support  the 
return  to  Italy  of  the  Trentino,  Triest,  and 
part  of  Istria,  but  that  he  saw  nothing  but  in- 
justice and  new  war  in  the  original  and  startling 
proposition  to  seize  the  only  possible  seaport  of 

167 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  Jugoslavs.  The  Italians  seemed  to  ac- 
quiesce, but  the  surrender  was  more  apparent 
than  real. 

On  the  journey  to  Rome  Ambassador  Page 
boarded  the  President's  train  at  Modane,  and  in 
his  party  was  a  messenger  from  Mr.  Hearley, 
the  Commissioner  for  Italy  of  the  Committee 
on  PubHc  Information.  He  told  me  that  the 
program  for  the  President,  as  arranged  by  Or- 
lando and  Sonnino,  had  excited  wide-spread 
discontent  by  its  exclusion  of  the  people  them- 
selves. I  looked  over  the  sheet  brought  by  the 
ambassador  and  saw  for  myself  that  the  plan  of 
entertainment  considered  only  the  royal  and 
official  circles.  Mr.  Hearley's  suggestion  was 
that  the  President  had  an  empty  hour  after  his 
luncheon  with  the  Queen  Mother,  and  that  as  he 
drove  back  to  the  Quirinal  the  citizens  of  Rome 
were  eager  to  have  him  stop  at  the  Piazza  Vene- 
zia  for  a  meeting  that  would  be  the  people's  own. 
I  took  the  matter  up  with  the  President  at  once, 
and  after  consultation  with  the  ambassador, 
who  saw  no  impropriety  in  the  arrangement,  I 
was  given  permission  to  telegraph  the  Presi- 
dent's consent  to  Mr.  Hearley. 

At  twelve  o'clock  of  the  day  Admiral  Grayson 
brought  word  that  the  "official  entertainers"  had 
entered  a  very  vigorous  protest  against  the  plan 
and  that  the  President  thought  it  wise  to  cancel 
the  engagement.  I  explained  to  the  admiral 
that  this  was  impossible,  as  thousands  were  al- 
ready gathered  at  the  Piazza  Venezia  and 
nothing  but  misunderstanding  and  bitter  dis- 
appointment could  result  from  the  announcement 

i68 


PARIS  AND   PROCRASTINATION 

that  the  President  had  changed  his  mind  at  the 
last  moment.  The  invitation  had  been  extended 
and  accepted  in  good  faith,  and,  as  the  pledge  of 
the  President  had  been  given,  surely  the  Italian 
government  would  not  wish  to  put  him  in  a 
position  of  extreme  embarrassment.  The  mes- 
sage came  back  that  the  President  would  keep 
the  appointment,  but  that  the  hour  would  have 
to  be  four  o'clock  instead  of  two-thirty  o'clock. 
Orlando  and  Sonnino,  working  quickly,  had 
arranged  for  a  number  of  interviews  that  were 
not  on  the  program. 

As  early  as  one  o'clock  the  great  square  facing 
the  Umberto  Memorial  was  filled  with  men, 
women,  and  children,  and  by  two  there  must 
have  been  50,000  people  packed  in  the  Piazza 
and  the  near-by  streets.  Four  o'clock  came,  and 
with  it  a  message  from  the  President  to  tell  the 
waiting  throngs  that  he  was  being  delayed  for 
half  an  hour.  Alpini,  Arditi,  and  plain  citizens 
ran  through  the  crowd  like  mad,  shouting  the 
news.  Despite  the  fact  that  all  had  been  stand- 
ing for  four  hours,  a  great  and  happy  cheer  went 
up  when  it  was  learned  that  the  President  would 
come  eventually.  Time  dragged  on,  and  it  was 
not  until  six  o'clock  that  we  heard  the  trumpets 
and  saw  the  outriders  that  marked  the  approach 
of  the  King  and  the  President.  Every  one 
figured,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  a  stop  would 
be  made,  but  the  procession  swept  by  at  full 
speed  on  its  way  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 
A  groan  went  up  from  the  gathered  thousands, 
and  with  the  Latin  emotionahsm  that  one  finds 
only  in  Italy  women  cried  and  men  threw  their 

169 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

hats  upon  the  ground  and  tore  wildly  at  their 
hair. 

It  was  not  until  the  next  day  that  I  learned 
the  full  story  of  the  wretched  afternoon.  Un- 
able to  change  the  President's  plans,  Orlando  and 
Sonnino  went  to  work  dehberately  to  block  them. 
Interview  after  interview  was  arranged  in  haste 
and  thrust  forward  with  peremptoriness,  and 
when  the  President,  out  of  all  patience,  was 
about  to  put  on  his  coat  to  go  out  the  King 
himself  was  produced  for  the  purpose  of  an  offi- 
cial conference  on  matters  of  state.  At  last 
there  was  the  understanding  that  the  car  would 
be  stopped  at  the  Piazza  Venezia,  but  this  was 
not  done.  It  was  told  to  me  later,  by  a  sym- 
pathetic member  of  the  court  circle,  that  the 
reason  for  it  all  was  Sonnino's  fear  that  the 
President,  speaking  extemporaneously  to  the 
people,  might  bring  up  the  Fiume  proposal. 
This  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  plans  of  the 
politicians,  for  they  had  not  yet  commenced 
their  propaganda  campaign,  and  all  Italy  was 
thinking  in  terms  of  peace  and  justice,  not  in 
terms  of  annexation  and  renewed  hostilities. 
Undoubtedly  the  President  guessed  at  this,  for 
in  his  speech  before  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
he  declared  that  the  full  independence  of  the 
Balkan  States  must  not  be  interfered  with  by 
any  dream  of  annexation. 

The  planned  interruptions  of  the  afternoon, 
reaching  a  climax  in  the  deceit  that  carried  him 
by  the  Piazza  Venezia  without  a  halt,  stirred 
the  President  to  a  deep  and  bitter  resentment, 
and  the  last  act  of  the  drama  added  to  his  dis- 

170 


PARIS  AND   PROCRASTINATION 

trust  of  Sonnino.  A  statement  of  the  affair, 
cautious  enough  to  guard  against  offense  and 
yet  sufficiently  expHcit  to  absolve  the  President 
in  the  minds  of  the  people,  was  killed  by  the 
Italian  censorship.  In  its  stead  the  official 
press  carried  the  bland  announcement  that  the 
President  had  never  had  any  intention  of  speak- 
ing to  the  people  at  the  Piazza  Venezia,  the  false 
report  being  the  work  of  trouble-makers. 

Throughout  the  stay  in  Rome  it  was  amus- 
ingly apparent  that  only  the  King  and  the  peo- 
ple believed  in  the  President  and  his  ideals. 
The  Cabinet,  dominated  by  Sonnino,  epitomized 
reaction.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  King  himself 
was  the  only  man  in  the  Italian  government 
who  seemed  to  have  any  faith  in  democracy  at 
all.  A  sturdy  little  figure,  homely,  but  very 
appealing,  his  simplicity  went  home  to  the 
heart  of  the  President  on  the  occasion  of  their 
first  meeting  in  Paris. 

"Good  Lord!'*  the  King  groaned  as  he  looked 
around  him  at  the  splendors  of  the  Hotel  Murat, 
*'we  can't  give  you  anything  like  this  at  the 
Quirinal." 

The  President  reached  Paris  on  the  morning 
of  January  7th,  and  was  dismayed  to  learn  that 
Lloyd  George  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  that  a 
visit  to  Belgium  was  in  process  of  arrangement. 
As  firmly  as  might  be,  the  President  served 
notice  that  touring  was  at  an  end  and  that  he 
must  insist  upon  an  instant  convocation  of  the 
Peace  Conference.  His  very  evident  indigna- 
tion forced  an  end  to  the  deHberate  dawdhng, 
and  on  January  12th  the  first  meeting  of  the 

171 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Supreme  Council  was  held.  A  primary  task 
was  the  amendment  of  the  armistice  terms, 
and,  this  done,  the  President  drove  straight  at 
the  fundamental  point,  inviting  a  test  of  strength 
on  the  question  of  the  League  of  Nations.  He 
won.  When  the  discussion  ended  announcement 
was  made  that  the  League  of  Nations  would 
be  "at  the  head  of  the  order  of  the  day  at  the 
first  full  meeting  of  the  Peace  Conference." 

On  January  15th,  however,  he  suffered  a 
reverse,  the  Council  deciding  against  open 
sessions. 

M.  Tardieu  in  the  course  of  a  recent  article 
attempts  to  prove  that  Clemenceau  was  at  all 
times  an  advocate  of  publicity.  Nothing  is 
farther  from  the  truth.  The  President  and 
Lloyd  George  made  the  fight  for  the  admission 
of  the  press,  and  were  voted  down  by  the  union 
of  France,  Italy,  and  Japan.  It  was  only  under 
the  pressure  of  an  aroused  public  opinion  that 
Clemenceau  and  his  two  supporters  yielded  to 
the  extent  of  permitting  the  full  sessions  of  the 
Conference  to  be  open.  Frankly,  the  French 
government's  attitude  toward  publicity  was  a 
source  of  irritation  throughout  the  entire  Con- 
ference. Before  leaving  Washington  the  Presi- 
dent had  announced  the  suspension  of  American 
censorship  of  every  kind,  and  had  requested 
both  France  and  England  to  pursue  a  similar 
course,  stating  his  beHef  that  the  peoples  of  the 
world  were  entitled  to  the  fullest  possible  in- 
formation with  respect  to  the  Peace  Treaty. 
Both  governments  agreed,  but  on  arrival  in 
Paris   it  was   discovered   that  the   British  were 

172 


PARIS  AND  PROCRASTINATION 

living  up  to  their  pledge  only  in  part,  while  the 
French  were  disregarding  it  entirely.  The  Presi- 
dent's protests  were  specific  and  repeated,  but 
only  England  heeded  them. 

The  cleverness  of  the  French  was  never  more 
apparent  than  in  their  concealment  of  responsi- 
bihty  for  the  unfortunate  condition,  for  it  was 
even  the  case  that  they  persuaded  many  to 
beheve  that  President  Wilson  himself  was  the 
source  of  repression.  So  intelligent  an  observer 
as  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon  was  deceived,  and  has  writ- 
ten as  follows  in  his  Inside  Story  of  the  Peace 
Conference: 

It  was  characteristic  of  the  system  that  two  American 
citizens  were  employed  to  read  the  cablegrams  arriving 
from  the  United  States  to  French  newspapers.  The 
object  was  the  suppression  of  such  messages  as  tended  to 
throw  doubt  on  the  useful  belief  that  the  people  of  the 
great  American  Republic  were  solid  behind  their  Presi- 
dent, ready  to  approve  his  decisions  and  acts,  and  that  his 
cherished  Covenant,  sure  of  ratification,  would  serve  as  a 
safe  guaranty  to  all  the  states  which  the  application  of  his 
various  principles  might  leave  strategically  exposed.  In 
this  way  many  interesting  items  of  intelligence  from  the 
United  States  were  kept  out  of  the  newspapers,  while 
others  were  mutilated  and  almost  all  were  delayed.  Pro- 
tests were  unavailing.  Nor  was  it  until  several  months 
were  gone  by  that  the  French  public  became  aware  of  the 
existence  of  a  strong  current  of  American  opinion  which 
favored  a  critical  attitude  toward  Mr.  Wilson's  policy  and 
justified  misgivings  as  to  the  finality  of  his  decisions. 
It  was  a  sorry  expedient  and  an  unsuccessful  one. 

Nothmg  could  be  farther  from  the  facts. 
There  was  no  such  censorship,  and  never  at  any 
time  were  "two  American  citizens"  employed 
for  any  such  purpose.     The  proof  of  it  may  be 

173 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

found  in  the  Paris  press  of  December  and  Janu- 
ary. Every  paper,  on  its  front  page,  carried 
daily  despatches  from  Washington  informing 
the  French  people  that  Wilson  was  not  the  spokes- 
man of  the  United  States,  but  only  a  repu- 
diated politician.  On  December  i8th  Sena- 
tor Knox  made  a  bitter  attack  upon  the  League 
of  Nations,  declaring  that  the  whole  question 
should  wait  "until  the  AUies  had  imposed  their 
terms,''  and  on  December  20th  Senator  Lodge 
delivered  a  lengthy  address  along  the  same  hnes. 
Both  of  these  speeches  were  "played  up"  in  the 
French  and  Enghsh  press,  and  other  regular 
features  were  the  assaults  of  Roosevelt.  Also 
on  December  21st  Senator  Lodge  made  a  speech 
in  favor  of  Clemenceau's  appeal  for  "secret 
sessions,"  and  this  was  reprinted  with  keen 
dehght.  As  early  as  January  ist  such  papers  as 
UEcho  de  Paris  and  the  London  Post  were 
carrying  editorials  stating  that  the  attitude 
of  the  Repubhcan  Senate  majority  "placed  full 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies,"  but  that  this 
power  must  be  used  wisely,  as  any  open  humilia- 
tion of  Mr.  Wilson  might  be  resented. 

Mr.  Ray  Stannard  Baker,  attached  to  the 
American  Peace  Commission  at  the  time,  has 
given  proof  of  the  extent  to  which  the  campaign 
was  organized  and  directed: 

A  secret  document  showing  how  the  French  press — 
a  large  part  of  which  is  notoriously  controlled  by  the 
government — was  being  marshaled  against  the  influence 
of  the  President  and  in  support  of  French  interests  actually 
came  into  the  possession  of  one  of  the  American  commis- 
sioners.     It   was   in   the    form    of   official    suggestions   of 

174 


PARIS  AND  PROCRASTINATION 

policy  of  French  newspaper  editors,  and  it  contained  three 
items: 

First,  they  were  advised  to  emphasize  the  opposition  to 
Mr.  Wilson  in  America,  by  giving  all  the  news  possible 
regarding  the  speeches  of  Republican  Senators  and  other 
American  critics. 

Second,  to  emphasize  the  disorder  and  anarchy  in  Russia, 
thereby  stimulating  the  movement  toward  Allied  military 
intervention. 

Third,  to  publish  articles  showing  the  ability  of  Germany 
to  pay  a  large  indemnity. 

At  all  times  there  was  plain  evidence  of  this 
secret  relation  between  the  French  government 
and  the  French  press.  The  President,  induced 
to  regard  private  discussions  as  sacredly  con- 
fidential, kept  his  pledge  to  the  point  of  an 
absurd  reticence.  No  American  newspaper  man 
could  win  a  word  from  him  with  reference  to 
any  controversial  matter  until  decisions  were 
reached  and  duly  announced.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  French  contentions,  the  French  points 
of  view,  were  communicated  secretly  but  regu- 
larly to  the  French  press,  a  pleasant  practice 
that  continued  until  the  President  served  warn- 
ing that  he  would  not  submit  to  it  a  day  longer. 

Repudiated  and  assailed  by  the  Repubhcan 
majority,  every  attack  being  reprinted  with 
joyousness  by  a  French  and  Enghsh  press,  meet- 
ing at  every  turn  the  stubborn  antagonism  of 
cynical  statesmen  bent  upon  a  policy  of  delay 
until  they  were  ready  to  stab,  and  faced  by  the 
patent  fact  that  the  "power  of  the  people'*  was 
confined  to  the  presentation  of  flowers  and  city 
keys,  it  was  only  the  driving  force  of  the  Presi- 
dent's faith  that  compelled  the  meeting  of  the 

175 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Supreme  Council  of  January  12th  and  secured 
the  selection  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  a  first 
order  of  business.  And  with  this  faith  as  his 
sole  support  he  turned  now  to  the  first  meeting 
of  the  Peace  Conference,  where  the  real  battle 
was  to  be  fought. 


XI 


"the  big  four" 


No  council-chamber  ever  witnessed  the  meet- 
ing of  four  more  widely  dissimilar  person- 
alities than  those  that  faced  in  Paris  for  the  pur- 
pose of  restoring  peace  and  order  to  a  distracted, 
war-torn  world.  In  character,  temperament, 
training,  culture,  ideas,  and  ideals  the  President, 
Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  and  Sonnino  stood 
out  as  studies  in  contrast,  and  these  differences 
were  rendered  more  acute  by  a  conflict  in  aims 
that  was  as  instant  as  it  was  fundamental.  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Italy  were  gathered  as  victors 
to  impose  terms  upon  a  defeated  enemy,  their 
whole  intent  embittered  by  the  wretchedness 
and  desolation  at  their  backs.  The  settlement 
with  Germany  accomplished,  and  accomplished 
according  to  the  Mosaic  formula,  they  were  willing 
to  talk  of  world  peace  and  international  concert, 
but  not  until  then.  Only  the  mind  of  the 
President  was  unclouded  by  any  passion  of  anger 
or  self-interest. 

The  Allied  point  of  view  found  a  vigorous  and 
complete  expression  in  Clemenceau,  better  known 
as  "The  Tiger.''  Mr.  Keynes,  more  concerned 
with  striking  phrase  than  true  characterization, 
may  call  Clemenceau  "dry  in  soul  and  empty 

177 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

of  hope,"^  but  no  one  else  gained  any  such  impres- 
sion. The  whole  soul  of  the  man  flamed  with 
a  passion  for  France,  his  hopes  for  France  were 
insistent  demands,  and  to  the  support  of  an 
aggressive  nationalism  he  brought  the  strength 
of  a  bull  and  the  direct  charge  of  a  rhinoceros. 
As  a  youth  he  had  writhed  under  the  Prussian 
entry  into  Paris;  from  1871  to  1914  he  had  seen 
his  country  exist  as  a  nation  by  the  sufferance  of 
Berlin,  and  it  was  the  memory  of  these  un- 
happy, humiliating  years  that  dominated  him  at 
every  stage  of  the  Conference.  Reparation  was 
not  a  determining  consideration  with  him  by 
any  means.  What  he  wanted,  what  France  de- 
manded, was  security.  Better  a  prostrate  Ger- 
many, too  weak  to  pay,  than  a  Germany  strong 
enough  to  pay,  and  therefore  srong  enough  to 
repeat  the  assaults  of  1870  and  1914.  It  was 
this  fear,  burned  into  French  consciousness  by 
a  half-century  of  dread,  that  Clemenceau  felt 
and  expressed.  When  he  presented  claims  that 
violated  the  principles  of  settlement  it  was 
in  no  spirit  of  mean  rapacity,  but  in  obedience 
to  a  very  natural  instinct  of  self-preservation. 
France  was  sick  of  living  under  the  Prussian 
sword.  The  simplicity  of  Clemenceau's  problem 
added  immeasurably  to  the  innate  strength  of 
the  man.  He  stood  for  France,  for  France 
alone,  and  the  devastated  area  was  a  background 
that  not  only  robbed  the  stand  of  sordidness, 
but  gave  it  a  certain  heroic  quality.  Squat  and 
powerful,  his  long  arms  reaching  well  below  his 
knees,  his  old  face  gnarled  into  the  shape  of  a 

*  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace. 

178 


"THE   BIG  FOUR" 

bludgeon,  he  was  an  embodiment  of  the  primi- 
tive, the  savage,  as  he  stood  over  the  bleeding, 
prostrate  form  of  France  and  bellowed  his 
challenges. 

The  President,  on  the  other  hand,  was  cast 
in  no  such  picturesque  role.  He  fought  for 
principles,  always  less  dramatic  than  the  personal, 
and  neither  could  he  point  behind  him  to  a  war- 
ravaged  land.  He  had  to  find  his  foothold 
among  seeming  abstractions,  while  Clemenceau 
was  privileged  to  fix  his  feet  on  the  soHd  gran- 
ite of  an  uncompromising  demand.  Clemenceau 
could  talk  concretely,  while  the  President  was 
forced  to  talk  generally.  He  could  appear  the 
man  of  action,  while  the  President,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  had  to  look  the  man  of  words. 

Orlando,  the  Italian  delegate,  was  a  plump, 
cheery  little  man,  blessed  with  some  approach  to 
democratic  vision  as  well  as  a  very  real  ability, 
but  at  his  back,  controlling  and  directing,  was 
always  Baron  Sidney  Sonnino,  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  Son  of  an  Italian  Jew  and  an 
English  mother,  Sonnino  had  the  age  and 
cynicism  of  Clemenceau  without  a  single  one  of 
the  Frenchman's  generous  passions.  Hair  white 
as  snow,  his  age-stooped  shoulders  and  hawk 
face  joined  to  give  him  the  appearance  of  a  bird 
of  prey.  An  imperialist  in  every  inch  of  his  old 
body,  believing  implicitly  in  secret  diplomacy 
and  the  balance  of  power,  Sonnino  foresaw  the 
triumphs  of  the  Allies  at  the  time  Italy  entered 
the  war,  and  dreamed  a  dream  of  divided  spoils 
that  would  restore  the  ancient  glories  of  his 
country.  The  claim  to  Fiume,  cutting  off  the 
13  179 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Slavic  hinterland  from  any  Adriatic  port,  was 
his  conception  entirely,  and  at  every  point  in 
the  Conference  he  stood  hke  iron  against  "Uto- 
pian theories"  and  "emotional  experiments.'* 

Working  by  himself,  Orlando  would  have  been 
of  inestimable  value  to  his  country,  but  Sonnino 
was  a  millstone  that  dragged  him  down.  Taci- 
turn to  the  point  of  sullenness,  offensive  to  the 
point  of  insolence,  and  holding  himself  aloof 
at  all  times,  Sonnino  was  the  most  disliked  man 
in  Paris.  His  constant  pull  and  haul  with 
Orlando  also  had  the  effect  of  giving  a  weird 
effect  of  contrariety  to  every  Italian  position. 
What  was  said  or  done  one  day  would  be  unsaid 
and  undone  the  next,  and  as  a  result  even  the 
best  friends  of  Italy  were  always  in  doubt  as 
to  how  she  wished  to  be  served. 

As  for  Lloyd  George,  there  is  no  parallel  for 
him  in  American  politics,  or  in  world  politics, 
for  that  matter.  So  completely  does  the  quick- 
silver quality  of  the  man  defy  terse  characteriza- 
tion that  it  is,  perhaps,  the  safest  course  to  let 
his  political  record  define  him.  It  was  by  rea- 
son of  his  savage  assault  upon  England's  estab- 
lished order  and  the  Enghsh  ruHng  class  that 
Lloyd  George  first  rose  to  power.  The  House 
of  Lords  was  anathema  to  him,  and  not  even 
WiUiam  D.  Haywood  ever  inveighed  so  elo- 
quently against  the  tyrannies  and  oppressions 
of  Special  Privilege  and  Vested  Interest.  I  was 
in  England  in  1910  at  the  time  when  he  was 
driving  through  the  Parliament  act  that  stripped 
the  Lords  of  their  veto  power,  and  every  true 
Briton  able  to  support  a  white  collar  and  a  top- 

180 


"THE  BIG  FOUR" 

hat  cried  out  against  the  Welshman  as  an  assas- 
sin who  meant  to  "murder  them  in  their  beds," 
a  form  of  death  that,  for  some  reason,  seems  to 
hold  a  peculiar  horror  for  Englishmen. 

By  his  passionate  championship  of  labor  and 
his  strenuous  advocacy  of  home  rule  for  Ire- 
land he  was  the  idol  of  these  groups,  and  Asquith, 
forced  to  recognize  his  power  in  the  Liberal 
party,  had  to  make  a  place  for  him  in  the  Cabinet. 
Growing  in  radicalism,  in  order  to  effect  a  dis- 
tinction between  himself  and  Mr.  Asquith's 
more  conservative  leadership,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  Lloyd  George  was  reaching  out  for  the  reins 
of  power,  but  the  sudden  explosion  of  war  com- 
pelled a  change  in  his  plans.  His  patriotism 
may  not  be  questioned,  but  even  the  most  ardent 
patriotism  can  be  made  to  take  on  the  color 
of  one*s  desires.  Out  of  his  alliance  with  North- 
clifFe  came  the  bitter,  unceasing  attack  upon 
Asquith  that  eventually  enabled  Lloyd  George 
to  aid  in  the  overthrow  of  his  party  leader  with 
every  appearance  of  sincere  purpose.  He  failed, 
however,  to  carry  the  bulk  of  the  Liberal  party 
with  him  in  his  desertion,  and  this  compelled 
an  alliance  with  his  ancient  enemies,  the  Tories. 
No  matter  what  the  country,  reactionaries  are 
ever  hard  bargainers  and  skilful  traders,  and 
while  Lloyd  George  rose  to  be  Premier,  the  price 
that  he  paid  was  the  recantation  of  many  of  his 
labor  principles,  complete  abandonment  of  home 
rule,  and  the  placing  of  such  Tories  as  Bonar 
Law,  Carson,  Milner,  Curzon,  and  Balfour  at 
his  right  hand  in  seats  of  power. 

From  that  day  to  this  his  career  has  been 
i8i 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

marked  by  one  patent  opportunism  after  the 
other.  Even  while  basing  his  December  cam- 
paign upon  assertions  that  Germany  would  be 
squeezed  to  the  last  pfennig  and  that  the  Kaiser 
would  be  tried  and  hanged  in  the  Tower  of  Lon- 
don, he  was  solemnly  assuring  the  liberal  thought 
of  England  that  he  would  stand  for  the  League 
of  Nations  and  a  "peace  of  justice."  In  Paris 
he  fairly  bubbled  with  enthusiasm  over  the 
"rights  of  small  peoples"  and  at  the  same  time 
ordered  fresh  troops  to  Ireland,  Egypt,  and 
India  to  crush  the  rebellions  of  unhappy  peoples. 
One  moment  with  Clemenceau  and  Sonnino, 
the  next  a  fine  supporter  of  the  President,  he 
swung  like  a  pendulum  between  the  compulsions 
of  his  own  decent  principles  and  the  necessity 
of  placating  his  Tory  masters.  To  quote  the 
words  of  Doctor  Dillon,  an  Englishman  and 
a  former  admirer  of  the  Premier,  "his  conduct 
appeared  to  careful  observers  to  be  traced  mainly 
by  outside  influences,  and  as  these  were  various 
and  changing,  the  result  was  a  zigzag.  One 
day  he  would  lay  down  a  certain  proposition 
as  a  dogma  not  to  be  modified,  and  before  the 
week  was  out  he  would  advance  the  contrary 
proposition  and  maintain  that  with  equal  warmth 
and  doubtless  with  equal  conviction.  Guided  by 
no  sound  knowledge  and  devoid  of  the  ballast 
of  principle,  he  was  tossed  and  driven  hither 
and  thither  like  a  wreck  on  the  ocean." 

A  curious  compound  of  drama,  oratory,  craft, 
cynicism,  vision,  demagoguery,  and  idealism,  the 
perfection  of  the  blend  made  Lloyd  George  at 
once  a  hope  and  a  despair.     Only  the  briUiant 

182 


"THE  BIG  FOUR" 

audacity  of  the  man,  his  humor,  bubbling 
gaiety,  and  charm,  enabled  him  to  carry  off 
situations  that  would  have  shamed  another. 

At  no  time  was  the  President  deceived  as  to 
the  character  or  intent  of  his  colleagues.  One  of 
his  most  valuable  possessions  is  an  uncanny  gift 
of  appraisement,  and  from  the  first  he  assessed 
each  man  fairly  and  accurately.  The  impas- 
sioned nationalism  of  Clemenceau,  the  medie- 
valism of  Sonnino,  and  the  "grasshopper  mind" 
of  Lloyd  George  were  simple  of  understanding 
after  the  first  few  meetings,  and  with  every  per- 
sonal obstacle  clear  in  his  mind,  he  set  to  work 
on  the  accomplishment  of  the  purposes  that 
had  brought  him  to  Paris.  Mr.  Keynes,  with 
glib  authoritativeness,  may  declare  "that  the 
President  had  thought  out  nothing;  when  it  came 
to  practice  his  thoughts  were  nebulous  and 
incomplete,"  but  the  facts  dispute  this  impudent 
assertion  at  every  turn.  What  the  President 
carried  to  the  Peace  Conference  was  a  definite, 
concrete  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations,  not  as  an 
afterthought,  but  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
treaty,  its  very  foundation,  in  fact,  for  he  saw 
plainly  that  the  one  hope  of  a  just  peace,  a 
world  peace,  was  in  the  quick  creation  of  an 
independent,  impartial  machinery  of  adjustment 
and  adjudication. 

In  driving  to  his  goal,  however,  he  was  arbitra- 
rily limited  both  by  internal  and  external  re- 
straints. Every  warm  impulse  of  his  nature 
stirred  to  the  pathos  of  the  desolated  homesteads 
of  France,  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Italy,  and 
even  while  he  opposed  many  of  the  demands  of 

183 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

their  spokesmen  as  calculated  to  continue  the 
very  evils  that  had  worked  the  wretchedness, 
his  sympathy  was  at  all  times  with  them.  Com- 
radeship is  an  instinct  with  him,  and  he  could  not 
have  forgotten,  had  he  wished  to  do  so,  that 
America  had  fought  side  by  side  with  these 
peoples.  This  very  real  understanding  of  their 
wrongs,  this  sense  of  blood  brotherhood,  made 
him  patient  of  chicane,  unfalteringly  tolerant  of 
deceit  and  selfishness,  and  robbed  him  of  weapons 
that  it  would  otherwise  have  been  in  his  power 
to  use. 

There  is  also  this  to  bear  in  mind.  When  the 
President,  in  behalf  of  America,  served  notice 
upon  the  world  that  the  Conference  must  present 
a  "peace  of  justice,"  he  did  not  mean  a  "peace 
of  parole"  by  any  means.  Much  of  the  mis- 
understanding that  muddles  pubHc  thought 
to-day  is  due  to  this  confusion  of  justice  with 
such  words  as  mercy,  leniency,  escape,  con- 
donement,  etc.  The  President  suffered  from 
no  such  confusion.  What  Germany  had  at- 
tempted was  an  intolerable  thing,  and  it  was 
right  that  she  should  be  made  to  pay  for  the 
attempt.  The  wrong  that  Germany  had  sought 
to  do  the  world  and  to  civilization  was  the 
greatest  wrong  in  all  history,  and  there  must  be 
no  weak  purpose  with  regard  to  punishment. 
There  was  to  be  no  thought  of  crushing  the 
German  people,  but  what  had  to  be  burned  into 
the  consciousness  of  the  German  people  was 
a  due  sense  of  responsibility  for  the  horrors 
wrought  by  their  mad  ruler.  Thus  the  President 
spoke  and  thus  he  thought. 

184 


"THE  BIG  FOUR" 

Another  difficulty  in  the  path  of  the  President 
was  the  American  situation.  Each  day  saw 
the  French  and  EngHsh  press  filled  with  quota- 
tions from  the  speeches  of  Republican  Senators 
and  Republican  politicians  in  which  both  the 
President  and  his  policies  were  repudiated  and  a 
"peace  of  victory''  urged.  Particular  emphasis 
was  placed  upon  Mr.  Hays's  declaration  that 
"America  will  uphold  her  alHes  in  whatever 
reparation  they  may  exact  for  the  frightful 
outrages  inflicted  upon  them  by  the  accursed 
Huns." 

That  no  sympathy  went  out  to  the  President 
is  either  a  compliment  to  the  strength  of  the 
man  or  else  a  bitter  commentary  upon  the  fair 
play  of  America,  for  his  position  was  pitiable 
and  desperate.  Instead  of  support  from  the 
people  whose  declared  ideals  he  championed, 
there  came  only  the  steady  shriUing  of  the  Senate, 
vile  in  its  abuse,  treacherous  in  its  desertion 
of  war  aims,  enthusiastic  in  its  encouragement 
of  every  attack  upon  the  President  and  his 
principles.  Facing  him  were  men  who  jeered 
him  in  their  souls  and  whose  minds  were  set 
on  his  defeat.  The  obvious  course  was  forbidden 
to  him  by  his  conscience.  If,  for  instance,  he 
appealed  to  the  peoples  of  Europe  against  their 
rulers,  what  then?  Granting  that  the  iron  cen* 
sorship  of  France,  England,  and  Italy  would  have 
permitted  his  message  to  be  printed,  does  any 
one  imagine  that  they  would  have  presented  it 
fairly.?  Nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  a 
great  cry  of  "pro-Germanism"  would  have  been 
raised  at  once,  and  that  the  wild  angers  aroused 

i8s 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

would  have  been  deaf  to  argument  or  reason. 
America  itself,  still  hot  with  battle  anger,  would 
have  joined  in  the  clamor  no  less  than  the  AlHed 
countries,  and  the  world  would  have  surged 
again  to  its  former  hates. 

For  him  to  have  returned  to  the  United  States, 
as  a  protest,  would  have  been  not  merely  deser- 
tion, but  actual  betrayal.  Left  to  themselves, 
with  every  restraint  removed,  the  AlUes  would 
have  harked  back  to  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
for  their  inspiration,  giving  themselves  entirely 
over  to  their  fears,  hates,  and  rapacities,  and 
deciding  upon  a  peace  treaty  at  the  last  that 
would  have  doomed  the  world  to  resume  life 
under  the  old  menaces  of  catastrophe.  Instead 
of  a  League  of  Nations,  with  its  great  world 
court  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  interna- 
tional disputes,  only  a  return  to  the  evil  balance 
of  power;  instead  of  universal  disarmament, 
freeing  the  back  of  humanity  from  a  crushing 
burden,  more  millions  into  navies  and  even 
larger  standing  armies;  instead  of  permanent 
peace,  only  the  certainty  of  new  and  more  terrible 
wars.  There  was  but  one  decision  possible  to  be 
made  in  honor,  and  that  was  to  fight  it  out. 
This  decision  the  President  made,  and  he  brought 
to  its  support  a  courage  that  never  wavered,  a 
faith  that  beat  down  opportunism,  a  resourceful- 
ness that  bewildered  his  opponents,  and  a  char- 
acter that  compelled  their  reluctant  respect. 

Mr.  Keynes  finds  it  in  his  conscience  to  write 
that  the  President's  mind  was  "slow  and  un- 
adaptable," that  he  was  somewhat  "dull'*  and 
often    "bewildered";     that    his    hands,    "while 

i86 


"THE  BIG  FOUR" 

capable  and  fairly  strong,  were  wanting  in  sensi- 
tiveness and  finesse,"  that  he  lacked  "the 
dominating  intellectual  equipment  necessary  to 
cope  with  subtle  and  dangerous  spellbinders/* 
and,  crowning  fault  of  all,  "he  was  not  only 
insensitive  to  his  surroundings  in  the  external 
sense,  he  was  not  sensitive  to  his  environment 
at  all.  What  chance  could  such  a  man  have 
against  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  unerring,  almost 
medium-like  sensibility  to  every  one  immediately 
round  him?  To  see  the  British  Prime  Minister 
watching  the  company,  with  six  or  seven  senses 
not  available  to  ordinary  men,  judging  character, 
motive,  and  subconscious  impulse,  perceiving 
what  each  was  thinking  and  even  what  each  was 
going  to  say  next,  and  compounding  with  tele- 
pathic instinct  the  argument  or  appeal  best 
suited  to  the  vanity,  weakness,  or  self-interest 
of  his  immediate  auditor,  was  to  reahze  that  the 
poor  President  would  be  playing  blind  man's 
buff  in  that  party." 

This  expression  of  British  malice,  so  peculiarly 
revelational  of  the  intense  dislike  for  America 
and  Americans  that  dominates  the  average 
Englishman,  is  best  answered  by  the  record. 
The  President  m.et  Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George, 
and  Sonnino  on  their  own  ground,  fought  them 
with  their  own  weapons,  and  won.  Before  many 
days  had  passed  his  Tory  associates  were  hysteri- 
cal in  their  resentment  against  Lloyd  George 
for  his  weakness,  contemptuously  referring  to 
him  as  "Wilson's  puppy  dog,"  while  the  reaction- 
ary French  newspapers  and  the  jingoistic  group 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  were  equally  bitter 

187 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

against  Clemenceau  for  permitting  "the  auto- 
cratic Wilson"  to  bully  him  into  the  surrender 
of  French  rights.  The  same  hoarse  screaming 
came  from  Italy  and  Japan. 

The  League  of  Nations,  urged  only  by  the  | 
President  and  resisted  by  every  Premier,  was  ' 
not  only  adopted,  but  adopted  as  a  primary  and  ' 
integral  part  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  the  very  key-  j 
stone  of  the  arch.  i 

The  German  colonies,  confidently  looked  upon  l 
by  England  as  loot,  and  the  weak  nations  of  the  j 
world,  about  to  be  divided  as  part  of  the  spoils,  j 
were  all  withdrawn  from  conquest  and  annexa- 
tion and  placed  under  the  supervision  and  pro-  ' 
tection  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  French  claim  to  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Saar  Basin  and  the  Rhine  Valley  was  disputed 
successfully,   likewise  the   Italian   claim   to  the   \ 
Jugoslavic  seaport  of  Fiume,  and  Japan,  instead 
of  holding  Shantung  as  a  prize  of  war,  was  forced   ] 
to  accept  the  role  of  an  economic  concessionnaire.    ' 

The  German  indemnity,  instead  of  being  fixed  I 
at  $40,000,000,000,  was  set  at  about  $14,000,-  | 
000,000,  and  placed  under  the  direction  of  a  i 
Reparations  Commission  that  has  the  power  i 
to  accommodate  payments  to  the  needs  and  ' 
abilities  of  the  German  people. 

Mr.  Keynes  may  feel  that  the  "old  Presby-  \ 
terian"  was  "bamboozled,"  but  no  crow  of  self- 
congratulation  has  yet  escaped  Lloyd  George,  j 
Clemenceau,  or  Sonnino,  and  the  bitterness  of  i 
the  imperialistic  press  of  France,  England,  and  \ 
Italy  continues  unsoothed. 


XII 

THE    OPENING   BATTLE 

THE  sources  of  confusion  and  antagonism 
with  respect  to  the  treaty  narrow  down, 
under  analysis,  to  two  fundamental  miscon- 
ceptions: the  first  as  to  the  power  and  purpose 
of  the  Peace  Conference  itself,  and  the  second 
as  to  its  emphasis  and  procedure.  There  is  a 
somewhat  general  opinion,  carefully  cultivated, 
that  the  Paris  gathering  had  the  scope  and 
authorities  of  a  world  court,  and  that  it  blundered 
criminally  and  fatally  in  failing  to  realize  that 
its  problems  were  not  political  or  territorial,  but 
financial  and  economic. 

The  Peace  Conference,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
was  in  no  sense  a  concert  of  nations,  but  merely 
the  assemblage  of  a  group  of  victorious  belliger- 
ents for  the  sole  business  of  determining  matters 
that  concerned  themselves  and  themselves  alone. 
They  were  joined  only  to  re-estabhsh  their  own 
lives,  to  heal  their  own  wounds,  for  any  attempt 
to  order  the  affairs  of  the  whole  world,  in  the 
absence  of  every  neutral  nation,  would  have  been 
unwarranted  and  resentable.  The  single  con- 
cern of  the  Conference  was  the  settlement  of  the 
war  and  questions  arising  out  of  the  war.  All 
else  was  automatically  excluded. 

It  was  the  case,  to  be  sure,  that  definite  bases 
189 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

of  settlement  had  been  declared,  and  that  many 
solemn  pledges  bound  the  gathering  to  certain 
great  principles  in  connection  with  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  new  world  order  with  permanent 
peace  as  its  object.  The  application  of  these 
principles  to  concrete  injustices,  however,  was 
neither  the  right  nor  province  of  the  Conference. 
The  freedom  of  the  seas,  self-determination, 
disarmament,  arbitration — these  and  all  other 
related  hopes  were  not  in  the  authority  of  the 
Conference,  except  as  it  chose  to  approve  them, 
but  waited  necessarily  on  the  formation  of  an 
inclusive,  independent,  and  impartial  body  such 
as  was  forecast  by  the  proposed  League  of 
Nations.  Ireland,  Egypt,  and  Morocco  had  no 
more  reason  to  be  considered  than  Porto  Rico, 
Cuba,  or  the  Phihppines,  for  they  were  not  Ger- 
man possessions  nor  were  they  at  stake  in  the 
war.  Their  wrongs,  and  they  were  undoubted, 
were  for  the  adjudication  of  a  world  court, 
not  for  the  wrangle  of  a  group  of  belligerents. 
For  America  to  have  attempted  to  give  England 
orders  as  to  Ireland  would  have  been  as  futile 
and  absurd  as  for  England  to  have  issued  a 
mandate  to  America  with  respect  to  the  Philip- 
pines. The  one  result  of  such  impudences 
would  have  been  an  exaggeration  of  chaos,  the 
loss  of  the  one  hope  that  lighted  the  despairs  of 
oppressed  peoples. 

Refusing  to  recognize  the  obviousness  of  the 
situation,  Irish,  Egyptian,  and  Hindu  delega- 
tions hurled  themselves  upon  Paris  and  the 
President,  demanding  instant  adjustment  of 
their  wrongs   and   refusing  to  admit  that   any- 

190 


THE  OPENING  BATTLE 

thing  else  possessed  larger  importance.  But  for 
the  tragedy  of  it,  there  would  have  been  laughter 
in  the  confident  assumption  that  the  President 
had  only  to  "sign  on  the  dotted  line"  in  order  to 
give  freedom  to  Ireland,  India,  and  Egypt. 
Their  insistences  rejected,  the  various  revolu- 
tionary groups  joined  hands  with  the  reactionary 
groups,  and  soon  the  world  witnessed  the  amaz- 
ing spectacle  of  imperialist  and  rebel,  Tory  and 
Bolshevik,  all  joined  in  enthusiastic  unity  for  the 
defeat  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  second  contention — that  the  Conference 
should  have  refused  to  consider  political  and 
territorial  problems  until  a  program  of  financial 
and  economic  reconstruction  had  been  worked 
out — is  the  talk  of  ignorant  specialists  when  it  is 
not  the  malignance  of  partizans.  From  the  be- 
ginning of  tim^e,  the  strongest  force  in  human 
nature  has  been  the  passion  for  liberty.  Not 
cold  nor  hunger  nor  wretchedness  nor  death  has 
ever  had  power  to  subordinate  the  soul  of  man- 
kind to  the  material  considerations  of  life.  The 
words  of  Wilson  and  the  defeat  of  Germany 
joined  to  give  bright  promise  of  a  new  order. 
These  forces  released  the  aspirations  of  centuries, 
and  the  Old  World  seethed  in  a  spiritual  tumult 
that  had  no  parallel  save  in  the  exaltations  of  the 
Crusades.  It  is  true  enough  that  through  the 
President's  windows  came  the  cries  of  a  suffering 
world,  but  in  no  sense  was  it  the  wail  of  a  nursing 
child.  It  was  the  cry  of  men  and  women  sick 
of  tyranny,  and  it  came  from  their  hearts  and 
souls,  not  from  their  bellies.  Bread  was  not 
their    clamor,    but    freedom.     The    thing    that 

191 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

stirred  them  was  not  present  needs,  but  ancient 
wrongs. 

For  four  hundred  years  the  indomitable  peo- 
ples of  Czechoslovakia  had  held  to  their  national 
hopes  in  spite  of  every  cruelty  of  repression; 
through  bloody,  terrible  centuries  the  Poles 
had  dreamed  their  dream  of  nationality,  and  the 
Jugoslavic  peoples,  unbowed  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  yoke,  were  also  standing  erect  at 
last,  pressing  their  faces  against  the  stars.  It 
is  reasonable  to  assume  that  such  as  these  would 
have  put  their  passions  to  one  side  while  be- 
spectacled economists  worked  out  the  problems 
of  customs,  exchange,  fuel,  and  transport? 
For  close  to  half  a  century  France  had  suffered 
the  memories  of  1871,  and  the  self-respect  of  the 
nation  was  bound  up  in  the  restoration  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  Italy  looked  to  the  Irredenta  as  a 
mother  to  her  recovered  child,  and  this  spirit  of 
nationalism  also  compelled  an  early  considera- 
tion of  the  Adriatic  tangle.  Is  it  fair,  or  even 
intelligent,  to  imagine  that  France  and  Italy 
would  have  been  content  to  think  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  and  the  Irredenta  in  terms  of  coal  and 
iron  and  railroads? 

It  is  true  that  finance  and  economics  were 
fundamental  problems,  but  it  is  equally  true 
that  the  Peace  Conference  did  not  meet  in  an 
emotional  vacuum.  Nothing  is  more  unfair, 
more  mad,  than  the  present  smug  theory  that 
the  human  equation  could  have  been  cold- 
bloodedly put  to  one  side  while  economists  pawed 
over  charts  and  tables.  The  President  saw  the 
situation  in  all  of  its  pathetic  hopelessness,  and 

192 


THE  OPENING  BATTLE 

even  as  he  drove  forward  with  the  League  of 
Nations,  so  did  he  insist  upon  instant  considera- 
tion of  the  land  titles  of  Europe.  The  League 
was  his  safeguard  against  injustice,  a  guaranty 
for  the  future,  while  a  quick  settlement  of 
European  territorial  claims,  in  his  opinion,  would 
abate  passion  and  stabilize  mental  processes, 
permitting  economic  questions  to  be  answered 
sanely. 

This  order  of  business,  however,  was  not  in 
accordance  with  the  plans  of  the  various  Pre- 
miers. While  the  Allies  stood  as  a  unit  against 
the  League  of  Nations  and  the  Fourteen  Points, 
each  nation  had  its  own  secret  ideas  with  regard 
to  the  territorial  readjustment  of  Europe.  In 
addition  to  the  proposed  annexation  of  the 
Rhine  Valley  and  the  Saar  Basin,  France  was 
also  taking  a  very  feverish  interest  in  the  affairs 
of  the  new  Polish  state,  as  well  as  giving  much 
thought  and  time  to  the  cultivation  of  close 
arrangements  with  Czechoslovakia.  Italy  was 
rounding  out  her  claims  to  Fiume  and  Dalmatia, 
and  considering  new  measures  to  check  the 
aspirations  of  the  Jugoslavs.  England,  in  full 
control  of  the  seas,  could  afford  to  look  upon 
Germany  as  a  customer,  rather  than  as  a  rival, 
but  was  not  yet  willing  to  show  her  hand  fully. 
What  complicated  the  situation  still  further 
was  the  disclosure  of  secret  treaties,  made 
prior  to  the  American  entry  into  the  war,  to  be 
sure,  but  never  even  hinted  at  until  President 
Wilson  heard  of  them  in  Paris  and  demanded 
to  see  them.  Among  the  documents  that  he 
forced  to  be  laid  on  the  board  were  the  Treaty 

193 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON      I 

of  London,  by  which  Italy  was  induced  to  declare  i 
war;    the  agreement  with  Rumania  in  August, 
1916;     the    various    agreements    in    respect    to  , 

sia  Minor,  and  the  agreements  of  191 7  between  ! 
France  and   Russia  relative  to  the  Saar  Basin 
and  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  ! 

The    President,    as    a   matter   of  course,    an-  | 
nounced  that  he  would  refuse  to  be  bound  by 
these  secret  and  concealed  arrangements,  but  of 
all    those    assembled    in    Paris,    only    Venizelos  i 
supported    his    stand.     In    a   public   statement,  ; 
the  Greek  statesman  said  that   "A  League  of  ; 
Nations  will  do  away  with  these  treaties.     As  i 
a  matter  of  fact,  they  were  made  before  the  real  ! 
purpose  and  significance  of  this  was  developed 
and    before    America    came    into    the    conflict. 
They   no   longer    apply.     At   Versailles   we    all  ' 
agreed  to  the  fourteen  peace  terms  of  President  ; 
Wilson.     That    agreement    abrogates    previous 
secret  treaties  which  are  not  in  harmony  with 
it."  ^  i 

It  is  a  matter  of  intense  regret  that  Venizelos  \ 
could  not  have  played  a  larger  part  in  the  Peace  | 
Conference,  for  he  had  qualities  of  greatness  \ 
that  dwarfed  those  of  Lloyd  George,  Clemenceau,  j 
and  Sonnino.  With  his  broad  forehead,  deep-set  ] 
thinker's  eyes,  and  general  suggestion  of  the  ; 
university,  Venizelos  gave  little  hint  of  the  rev- 
olutionist, yet  it  was  his  courage  that  drove  i 
Prince  George  from  Crete  and  sent  a  traitor  j 
king  into  exile  and  disgrace.  Venizelos  sees  as  \ 
far  and  sees  as  clear  as  any  man  in  the  world  ; 
to-day.  As  intense  a  nationaUst  as  ever  lived,  j 
he  holds  his  land  and  his  people  to  ideals  of 

194 


THE  OPENING  BATTLE 

justice  and  refuses  to  let  them  be  stained  by  a 
single  selfishness. 

The  Allies  were  not  ready  to  face  the  issue, 
partly  out  of  a  fear  of  the  President's  strength, 
but  principally  because  their  own  plans  were 
still  in  disarray.  What  seemed  safe,  therefore, 
as  a  measure  for  gaining  further  time  was  the 
disposition  of  the  German  colonies,  and  this 
question  was  put  to  the  fore.  On  its  face,  it 
looked  simple,  for  the  peoples  involved  were 
weak  and  helpless,  and  the  transaction  seemed  no 
more  difficult  than  a  book  transfer  from  Germany 
to  the  nations  then  in  physical  possession.  All 
had  been  arranged  in  advance  and  only  signa- 
tures were  required.  Japan  was  to  hold  the 
province  of  Shantung  in  fee  simple  and  was  to 
take  over  the  Marshall  and  Caroline  Islands; 
AustraHa  and  New  Zealand  were  to  divide  the 
Southern  Pacific  possessions;  South  Africa  was 
to  annex  German  territory;  and  the  French  were 
to  receive  the  Cameroons  and  Togoland. 

The  President,  when  faced  with  these  pro- 
posals, pointed  to  the  fifth  of  the  Fourteen 
Points,  which  said  that  in  colonial  claims  "the 
interests  of  the  populations  concerned  must 
have  equal  weight  with  the  equitable  claims  of 
the  government  whose  title  is  to  be  determined." 
The  Allies  agreed  enthusiastically  to  this  prin- 
ciple, but  insisted  that  its  appHcation  be  delayed 
until  after  the  German  colonies  had  been  dis- 
tributed. President  Wilson  stood  like  iron  in 
support  of  Point  Five,  insisting  that  the  German 
colonies  should  not  be  handed  out  like  prize 
packages,  but  must  be  placed  under  the  pro-» 
14  195 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

tection  and  guidance  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Mr.  Hughes,  the  AustraUan  Premier,  was  put 
forward  by  England  to  make  the  open  fight 
against  the  President,  and  his  bitter  attack 
reached  the  point  of  insult  and  abuse.  The 
French  and  British  press,  directly  inspired, 
joined  in  a  hue  and  cry  that  continued  until  the 
President  informed  Lloyd  George  and  Clemen- 
ceau  that  he  would  reveal  the  entire  discussion 
unless  the  guerrilla  attack  came  to  an  end. 
Neither  of  the  Premiers  dared  to  stand  before  the 
world  as  cold-blooded  annexationists,  and  in  the 
end  the  President  scored  a  complete  victory. 
Article  22  of  the  Covenant  accepts  the  mandatory 
principle  in  its  entirety.  The  French  press  gave 
vent  to  its  indignation  in  rather  full  degree,  but 
it  was  the  English  newspapers  that  voiced  a 
frenzy  of  reproach.  Lloyd  George  was  accused 
of  having  cut  the  Empire  into  bits,  attacked  for 
betraying  the  British  tradition,  and  denounced 
as  a  weakling  who  dared  not  stand  out  against 
the  autocracies  of  Wilson. 

This  decision  was  reached  on  January  29th. 
On  the  25th  another  success  had  been  won  by 
the  President,  the  first  plenary  session  of  the 
Peace  Conference  adopting  the  project  to  estab- 
lish a  League  of  Nations  as  an  integral  part  of 
the  Peace  Treaty,  and  appointing  a  committee  to 
work  out  the  details.  The  President  was  named 
as  chairman,  and  his  associates  were  Lord  Robert 
Cecil,  General  Smuts,  Leon  Bourgeois,  and 
Orlando.  No  lie  was  more  assiduously  circulated 
at  the  time,  or  is  more  generally  beheved  to-day, 
than  that  the  President's  stubborn  support  of 

196 


THE  OPENING  BATTLE 

the  League  of  Nations  was  responsible  for  the 
delay  in  framing  the  full  Treaty  of  Peace.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  two  engagements  of  January 
1 8th  and  January  25th  were  as  brief  as  they  were 
decisive,  while  the  actual  formulation  of  the 
Covenant  itself  was  done  at  night  after  the 
President  had  given  his  day  to  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. This  incessant  strain,  forced  upon 
him  by  his  sense  of  urgency,  was  what  sapped 
his  strength,  for  he  was  compelled  to  depart 
from  the  White  House  regimen  that  kept  him 
\\n  health. 

I  Much  is  made  of  the  fact  that  when  the  Presi- 
dent reached  Paris  he  did  not  have  a  typewritten 
constitution  and  by-laws  in  his  pocket  for  im- 
mediate production  after  the  style  of  a  constable 
about  to  foreclose  a  chattel  mortgage.  Where 
the  President  had  the  plan  of  the  League  was 
in  his  mind,  his  heart,  and  his  soul.  The  matter 
was  not  one  for  thought,  but  one  for  agreement. 
Every  fundamental  of  the  League's  constitution 
had  been  set  down  in  his  addresses  time  and 
again.  Its  terms,  as  he  saw  them  and  as  he  had 
stated  them,  were  these:  an  end  to  the  secret 
treaties  of  secret  diplomacy,  disarmament,  a 
general  council  to  sit  continuously,  arbitration 
and  the  economic  boycott  as  a  substitute  for 
war,  an  end  to  private  traffic  in  the  munitions 
of  war,  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  court 
of  international  justice,  the  protection  of  demo- 
cratic nations  brought  into  existence  as  the  re- 
sult of  the  Great  War,  and  a  system  of  manda- 
tories for  the  upbuilding  of  weak  peoples  hitherto 
handed  about  from  power  to  power  like  so  many 

197 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

pawns.  It  was  not  phraseology  that  mattered — 
any  law  clerk  could  write  it  out  when  agreed 
upon — but  principles.  In  the  discussions  that 
took  place  in  the  Hotel  Murat,  night  after  night, 
Orlando  was  reserved,  Bourgeois  timid,  Cecil 
hesitant,  and  only  Smuts,  with  the  ardor  and 
vision  of  the  colonial,  had  the  courage  to  take 
his  stand  side  by  side  with  the  President,  aiding 
him  at  all  times  to  drive  forward. 

All  the  while  another  question  of  tremendous 
import  was  pressing  its  demand  for  immediate 
attention.  This  was  the  Russian  situation. 
Throughout  the  war  the  President,  unable  to 
come  to  any  positive  agreement  with  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  Japan,  and  faced  by  the 
utter  impossibility  of  taking  any  single-handed 
action,  had  more  or  less  permitted  the  Russian 
chaos  to  "take  care  of  itself."  This  policy 
could  be  persisted  in  no  longer  with  safety,  and 
none  realized  it  more  keenly  than  the  President. 
Japan  was  taking  advantage  of  every  opportunity 
to  increase  her  armed  force  in  Siberia,  and  French 
opinion,  concerned  entirely  with  France's  huge 
loans  to  Russia,  was  solidly  in  favor  of  over- 
throwing the  Bolshevik  dynasty,  although  some- 
what uncertain  as  to  the  means.  In  the  middle 
of  January  Lloyd  George  ventured  a  hint  that 
it  might  be  well  to  recognize  the  Lenin  govern- 
ment as  a  first  step  in  the  direction  of  stabiliza- 
tion, but  the  outcry  that  rose  instantly  from 
the  conservatives  of  England  and  France  sent 
him  scuttling  to  cover.  The  Republican  leaders 
in  the  Senate — the  selfsame  group  that  later 
listened  with  such  keen  sympathy  to  Mr.  Bul- 

198 


THE  OPENING  BATTLE 

litt*s  glowing  picture  of  Bolshevism — ^joined  in 
the  thunder  of  denunciation. 

The  next  move  in  the  confused  game  was  the 
proposal  to  hold  a  conference  on  Prince's  Island 
to  which  representatives  of  every  Russian  group 
would  be  invited,  the  hope  being  that  the  Rus- 
sians themselves  might  come  to  some  agreement, 
or,  at  least,  simplify  the  situation  so  that  the 
Peace  Conference  could  take  a  fair  and  definite 
position.  The  idea  was  that  of  the  President, 
but  it  had  the  approval  of  England  and  France. 
Lenin  accepted  the  invitation  with  alacrity, 
but  the  anti-Bolshevist  groups  declined  with 
fury  and  particularity.  How  far  the  French 
encouraged  this  refusal  will  always  be  a  matter 
of  conjecture,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to 
Clemenceau's  change  from  sullen  acquiescence  to 
aggressive  opposition.  The  Republican  party 
in  the  United  States,  and  the  conservative  forces 
of  France  and  England,  joined  in  bitter  protest 
against  any  "parley  with  assassins,"  and  Clemen- 
ceau  was  able  to  support  his  attitude  by  reference 
to  this  opposition.  Deserted  by  their  own  peo- 
ple, the  President  and  Lloyd  George  were  unable 
to  go  farther.  Even  as  they  debated,  however, 
the  situation  changed,  forcing  an  action  of  the 
very  appearance  that  both  men  hated  and 
desired  to  avoid.  Japan,  waiting  with  curled 
lip  while  the  talk  went  on,  announced  that  she 
was  sending  70,000  troops  into  Siberia  for  the 
purpose  of  "protecting  Japanese  rights."  It 
was  plain  to  be  seen  that  Japan  could  not  be 
permitted  to  go  into  Russia  alone.  As  quickly 
as  might  be,  England  sent  a  force  into  northern 

199 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Russia,  French  troops  went  to  southern  Russia, 
and  American  troops  traveled  to  guard  the 
Siberian  Railway.  It  looked  Hke  a  policy  of 
aggression,  but,  in  reality,  it  was  a  policy  of 
protection.  This,  however,  could  not  be  ex- 
plained, for  the  motives  of  Japan  could  not  be 
impugned,  the  honor  of  Japan  could  not  be 
questioned. 

The  Russian  chaos  exists  to-day  as  a  direct 
result  of  the  failure  of  the  Prinkipo  conference, 
and  it  will  continue  to  exist  until  democratic 
nations  are  sufficiently  in  love  with  their  practice 
to  make  the  admission  that  Russia  is  entitled 
to  have  the  kind  of  government  that  the  people 
want  or  seem  to  want.  Whether  one  likes  or 
dislikes  the  rule  of  the  proletariat  is  not  the 
question.  It  is  what  Russia  likes,  or,  at  least, 
what  Russia  endures,  that  counts. 


XIII 

THE    STAB    IN   THE    BACK 

THE  early  days  of  February,  1919,  were 
bright  with  promise.  The  European  press, 
seeming  to  accept  the  President's  leadership  as 
unshakable,  was  more  amiable  in  its  tone,  the 
bitterness  bred  by  the  decision  as  to  the  German 
colonies  had  abated,  Fiume  and  the  Saar  Basin 
had  taken  discreet  places  in  the  background 
with  other  deferred  questions,  and  the  voice  of 
French  and  Enghsh  and  Italian  hberaHsm  was 
heard  again.  On  February  14th  the  President 
reported  the  first  draft  of  the  League  con- 
stitution— a  draft  that  expressed  his  principles 
without  change — and  it  was  confirmed  amid 
acclaim.  It  was  at  this  moment,  unfortunately, 
that  the  President  was  compelled  to  return  to 
the  United  States  to  sign  certain  bills,  and  for  the 
information  of  the  Senate  he  carried  with  him 
the  Covenant  as  agreed  upon  by  the  Allies. 

We  come  now  to  a  singularly  shameful  chapter 
in  American  history.  At  the  time  of  the  Presi- 
dent's decision  to  go  to  Paris  the  chief  point 
of  attack  by  the  RepubHcan  Senators  was  that 
such  a  "desertion  of  duty"  would  delay  the 
work  of  government  and  hold  back  the  entire 
program  of  reconstruction.  Yet  when  the  Presi- 
dent returned  for  the  business  of  consideration 

201 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

and  signature,  the  same  Republican  Senators 
united  in  a  filibuster  that  permitted  Congress  to 
expire  without  the  passage  of  a  single  appropria- 
tion bill.  This  exhibition  of  sheer  malignance, 
entailing  an  ultimate  of  confusion  and  disaster, 
was  not  only  approved  by  the  Republican  press, 
but  actually  applauded. 

The  draft  of  the  League  constitution  was 
denounced  even  before  its  contents  were  known 
or  explained.  The  bare  fact  that  the  document 
had  proved  acceptable  to  the  British  Empire 
aroused  the  instant  antagonism  of  the  "pro- 
fessional" Irish-Americans,  the  "professional" 
German-Americans,  the  "professional"  Itahan- 
Americans,  and  all  those  others  whose  political 
fortunes  depended  upon  the  persistence  and 
accentuation  of  racial  prejudices.  Where  one 
hyphen  was  scourged  the  year  before  a  score 
of  hyphens  was  now  encouraged  anU  approved. 
In  Washington  the  President  arranged  a  con- 
ference with  the  Senators  and  Representatives 
in  charge  of  foreign  relations,  and  laid  the 
Covenant  frankly  before  them  for  purposes  of 
discussion  and  criticism.  The  attitude  of  the 
RepubHcan  Senators  was  one  of  sullenness  and 
suspicion,  Senator  Lodge  refusing  to  state  his 
objections  or  to  make  a  single  recommendation. 
Others,  however,  pointed  out  that  no  express 
recognition  was  given  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine; 
that  it  was  not  expressly  provided  that  the 
League  should  have  no  authority  to  act  or 
express  a  judgment  on  matters  of  domestic  policy; 
that  the  right  to  withdraw  from  the  League  was 
not  expressly  recognized;   and  that  the  constitu- 

202 


THE  STAB  IN  THE  BACK 

tional  right  of  the  Congress  to  determine  all 
questions  of  peace  and  war  was  not  sufficiently 
safeguarded. 

The  President,  in  answer,  gave  it  as  his  opinion 
that  these  points  were  already  covered  satis- 
factorily in  the  Covenant,  but  that  he  would  be 
glad  to  make  the  language  more  explicit,  and 
entered  a  promise  to  this  effect.  Mr.  Root  and 
Mr.  Taft  were  also  furnished  with  copies  of  the 
Covenant  and  asked  for  their  views  and  criticism, 
and  upon  receipt  of  them  the  President  again 
gave  assurance  that  every  proposed  change  and 
clarification  would  be  made  upon  his  return  to 
Paris.  On  March  4th,  immediately  following 
these  conferences,  and  the  day  before  the  sailing 
of  the  President,  Senator  Lodge  rose  in  his  place 
and  led  his  Republican  colleagues  in  a  bold  and 
open  attack  upon  the  League  of  Nations  and 
the  war  aims  of  America.  The  following  account 
of  the  proceedings  is  taken  from  the  Congressional 
Record: 

Mr.  Lodge:  Mr.  President,  I  desire  to  take  only  a  mo- 
ment of  the  time  of  the  Senate.  I  wish  to  offer  the  resolu- 
tion which  I  hold  in  my  hand,  a  very  brief  one: 

Whereas  under  the  Constitution  it  is  a  function  of  the 
Senate  to  advise  and  consent  to,  or  dissent  from,  the  ratifica- 
tion of  any  treaty  of  the  United  States,  and  no  such  treaty 
can  become  operative  without  the  consent  of  the  Senate 
expressed  by  the  affirmative  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the 
Senators  present;    and 

Wheveas  owing  to  the  victory  of  the  arms  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  nations  with  whom  it  is  associated,  a 
Peace  Conference  was  convened  and  is  now  in  session  at 
Paris  for  the  purpose  of  settling  the  terms  of  peace;   and 

Whereas  a  committee  of  the  Conference  has  proposed  a 
constitution  for  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  proposal 

203 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

is  now  before  the  Peace  Conference  for  its  consideration; 
Now,  therefore,  be  it 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  in  the  dis- 
charge of  its  constitutional  duty  of  advice  in  regard  to 
treaties,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Senate  that  while  it 
is  their  sincere  desire  that  the  nations  of  the  world  should 
unite  to  promote  peace  and  general  disarmament,  the 
constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  form  now 
proposed  to  the  Peace  Conference  should  not  be  accepted 
by  the  United  States;  and  be  it 

Resolved  further.  That  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Senate  that 
the  negotiations  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  should 
immediately  be  directed  to  the  utmost  expedition  of  the 
urgent  business  of  negotiating  peace  terms  with  Germany 
satisfactory  to  the  United  States  and  the  nations  with 
whom  the  United  States  is  associated  in  the  war  against 
the  German  government,  and  that  the  proposal  for  a 
League  of  Nations  to  insure  the  permanent  peace  of  the 
world  should  be  then  taken  up  for  careful  and  serious 
consideration. 

I  ask  unanimous  consent  for  the  present  consideration 
of  this  resolution. 

Mr.  Swanson:  I  object  to  the  introduction  of  the  reso- 
lution. 

Mr.  Lodge:  Objection  being  made,  of  course  I  recognize 
the  objection.  I  merely  wish  to  add,  by  way  of  explanation, 
the  following: 

The  undersigned  Senators  of  the  United  States,  Mem- 
bers and  Members-elect  of  the  Sixty-sixth  Congress,  hereby 
declare  that,  if  they  had  had  the  opportunity,  they  would 
have  voted  for  the  foregoing  resolution: 

Henry  Cabot  Lodge  James  E.  Watson 

Philander  C.  Knox  Thomas  Sterling 

Lawrence  Y.  Sherman  J.  S.  Frelinghuysen 

Harry  S.  New  W.  G.  Harding 

George  H.  Moses  Frederick  Hale 

J.  W.  Wadsworth,  Jr.  William  E.  Borah 

Bert  M.  Fernald  Walter  E.  Edge 

Albert  B.  Cummins  Reed  Smoot 

F.  E.  Warren  Asle  J.  Gronna 
204 


THE  STAB  IN  THE   BACK 

Frank  B.  Brandegee  Lawrence  C.  Phipps 

William  M.  Calder  Selden  P.  Spencer 

Henry  W.  Keyes  Hiram  W.  Johnson 

Boies  Penrose  Charles  E.  Townsend 

Carroll  S.  Page  William  P.  Dillingham 

George  P.  McLean  L  L.  Lenroot 

Joseph  Irwin  France  Miles  Poindexter 

Medill  McCormick  Howard  Sutherland 

Charles  Curtis  Truman  H.  Newberry 
L.  Heisler  Ball 

I  ought  to  say  in  justice  to  three  or  four  Senators  who 
are  absent  at  great  distances  from  the  city  that  we  were 
not  able  to  reach  them;  but  we  expect  to  hear  from  them 
to-morrow,  and  if,  as  we  expect,  their  answers  are  favorable 
their  names  will  be  added  to  the  list. 

A  full  report  of  this  action  was  cabled  to 
Europe,  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  when  the 
President  arrived  in  Paris  on  March  14th,  ten 
days  later,  he  was  quick  to  learn  of  the  disastrous 
consequences.  The  Allies,  eagerly  accepting  the 
orders  of  the  Republican  majority,  had  lost 
no  time  in  repudiating  the  President  and  the 
solemn  agreements  that  they  had  entered  into 
with  him.  The  League  of  Nations  was  now 
discarded  and  the  plan  adopted  for  a  prehminary 
peace  with  Germany  was  based  upon  a  frank 
division  of  the  spoils,  the  reduction  of  Germany 
to  a  slave  state,  and  the  formation  of  a  mihtary 
alHance  by  the  Allies  for  the  purpose  of  guarantee- 
ing the  gains.  Not  only  this,  but  an  Allied 
army  was  to  march  at  once  to  Russia  to  put  down 
the  Bolshevists  and  the  treaty  itself  was  to  be 
administered  by  the  Allied  high  command,  en- 
forcing its  orders  by  an  army  of  occupation. 
The  United  States,  as  a  rare  favor,  was  to  be  per- 

205 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

mitted  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  Russian  expedition 
and  such  other  incidental  expenses  as  might 
arise  in  connection  with  the  mihtary  dictatorship 
that  was  to  rule  Europe. 

While  primarily  the  plan  of  Foch  and  the  other 
generals,  it  had  the  approval  of  statesmen,  even 
those  who  were  assumed  to  represent  the  liberal 
thought  of  England  being  neck-deep  in  the  con- 
spiracy. Not  a  single  party  to  the  cabal  had 
any  doubt  as  to  its  success.  Was  it  not  the  case 
that  the  Republican  Senators,  now  in  the  ma- 
jority, spoke  for  America  rather  than  the  Presi- 
dent? Had  the  Senators  not  stated  formally 
that  they  did  not  want  the  League  of  Nations, 
and  was  the  Republican  party  itself  not  on 
record  with  the  belief  that  the  Allies  must  have 
the  right  to  impose  peace  terms  of  their  own 
choosing,  and  that  these  terms  should  show 
no  mercy  to  the  "accursed  Hun^.f*  I  was  in 
Paris  throughout  this  period,  and  while  regret 
at  the  "passing  of  the  President''  was  heard  in 
some  quarters,  the  general  feeling  was  one  of  great 
satisfaction.  There  would  now  be  an  end  to 
this  silly  gabble  about  "ideals"  and  "justice." 
The  President  allowed  himself  just  twenty-four 
hours  in  which  to  grasp  the  plot  in  all  of  its 
details,  and  then  he  acted,  ordering  the  issuance 
of  this  statement: 

The  President  said  to-day  that  the  decision  made  at  the 
Peace  Conference  in  its  Plenary  Session,  January  25,  1919, 
to  the  effect  that  the  establishment  of  a  League  of  Nations 
should  be  made  an  integral  part  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace, 
is  of  final  force  and  that  there  is  no  basis  whatever  for  the 
reports  that  a  change  in  this  decision  was  contemplated. 

206 


THE  STAB  IN  THE  BACK 

This  action  of  the  President  brought  upon  his 
head  the  fiercest  denunciation  that  had  yet  been 
launched,  and  when  he  met  with  Clemenceau 
and  Lloyd  George  on  March  i8th  their  attitude 
was  one  of  truculence.  In  this  crisis  the  Presi- 
dent used  no  threats  of  any  kind,  for,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  there  were  none  that  he  could  use. 
Deserted  by  the  peoples  of  the  world,  all  of  them 
now  committed  to  a  "hurry  up  the  peace" 
policy,  betrayed  by  the  Congress  of  his  own 
country,  and  faced  by  a  group  of  men  able  at 
last  to  voice  their  resentment  against  principles 
in  which  they  had  never  believed,  there  was  no 
threat  in  his  power  that  would  not  have  recoiled 
to  his  defeat  and  humiliation.  Nor  did  he  stoop 
to  appeals  or  persuasion.  He  simply  talked 
sense.  Clearly,  logically,  convincingly,  he  ripped 
the  plan  to  pieces,  showing  that  it  was  not  only 
unjust,  but  unworkable,  and  that  instead  of  lead- 
ing to  firm  ground  it  was  committing  the  Allies 
themselves  to  a  quicksand  from  which  there 
was  no  escape.  If  they  cast  the  Fourteen  Points 
to  one  side,  where  would  it  leave  them?  France 
would  straightway  seize  the  Saar  Basin  and  the 
Rhine  Valley.  Was  that  agreeable  to  England 
and  Italy?  No!  Italy  would  proceed  at  once 
to  make  the  Adriatic  an  **ItaHan  lake,"  cutting 
off  Czechoslovakia,  Austria,  Tugoslavia,  and 
Hungary  from  their  outlet  to  the  sea.  Putting 
aside  the  certainty  of  armed  resistance  by  the 
Slavs,  would  France  and  England  Hke  that? 
No!  Poland,  craftily  directed  by  France,  would 
lay  claim  to  East  Prussia  and  all  the  territory 
from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea?     Even  ignor- 

207 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

mg  the  wars  of  freedom  that  would  be  waged  by 
Russians,  Lithuanians,  Ruthenians,  and  Ukrain- 
ians, would  England  and  Italy  like  that?  No! 
England  would  take  over  Persia,  Mesopotamia, 
the  Hedjaz,  Egypt,  and  the  German  islands  in 
the  southern  Pacific?  Would  France  and  Italy 
Hke  that?    No! 

Did  they  not  have  sense  enough  to  see  that 
the  thing  they  planned  was  no  more  than  the 
manufacture  of  new  wars;  that  if  it  were  put 
into  effect  it  would  not  be  a  year  before  England, 
France,  and  Italy  would  not  only  be  facing 
armed  revolt  from  within,  but  that  each  nation 
would  be  in  arms  against  the  other,  searching 
eagerly  for  allies,  and  willing  to  make  any  agree- 
ment, even  with  their  former  foes,  that  would 
enable  them  to  defeat  their  former  friends? 
They  thought  themselves  intelligent,  yet  could 
not  discern  that  their  greedy  Imperialism  would 
restore  not  only  the  reputation  of  the  Central 
Powers,  but  also  their  military  strength?  It 
stood  plain  that  they  recognized  the  need  of  a 
machinery  to  administer  the  terms  of  the  Peace 
Treaty.  Were  they  fools  enough  to  dream  that 
this  administration  could  be  furnished  by  the 
Allied  high  command,  backed  by  armies  drawn 
from  the  youth  of  America,  England,  Italy, 
Japan,  and  the  other  associated  nations?  Did 
they  not  have  the  vision  to  perceive  that  the 
peoples  of  these  nations  were  sick  of  militarism, 
and  that  they  would  not  stand  for  a  military 
dictatorship  any  more  than  would  the  people 
of  Germany?  Were  they  so  blind  as  not  to  see 
that  the  League  of  Nations  provided  the  very 

208 


THE  STAB  IN  THE  BACK 

machinery — and  a  civil  machinery — that  was 
needed?  That  the  whole  Peace  Treaty  would 
fall  to  pieces  without  a  fair,  independent,  civil 
body  to  live  on  through  the  years  that  would 
be  necessary  to  carry  out  the  treaty's  provisions? 
What  madness  possessed  them  that  they  ima- 
gined for  one  moment  that  the  United  States 
would  furnish  the  money  for  a  Russian  invasion 
or  for  the  maintenance  of  a  military  dictatorship 
in  Germany? 

Under  this  merciless  rain  of  logic  Lloyd  George 
curled  up  and  Clemenceau  writhed.  There  was 
no  answer  to  it,  either  from  the  gay  insouciance 
of  the  one  or  the  insolence  of  the  other.  On 
March  26th  it  was  announced,  grudgingly 
enough,  that  there  would  be  a  League  of  Nations 
as  an  integral  part  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  It  was 
now  the  task  of  the  President  to  take  up  the 
changes  that  had  been  suggested  by  his  Re- 
publican enemies,  and  this  was  the  straw  that 
broke  his  back.  There  was  not  a  single  suggested 
change  that  had  honesty  back  of  it.  The  League 
was  an  association  of  sovereigns,  and  as  a  matter 
of  course  any  sovereign  possessed  the  right  of 
withdrawal.  The  League,  as  an  international 
advisory  body,  could  not  possibly  deal  with 
domestic  questions  under  any  construction  of 
the  Covenant.  No  power  of  Congress  was 
abridged,  and  necessarily  Congress  would  have 
to  act  before  war  could  be  declared  or  a  single 
soldier  sent  out  of  the  country.  Instead  of 
recognizing  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  American 
policy,  the  League  legitimized  it  as  a  world 
policy.     The  President,  however,  was  bound  to 

209 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

propose  that  these  plain  propositions  be  put  in 
kindergarten  language  for  the  satisfaction  of 
his  enemies,  and  it  was  this  proposal  that  gave 
Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  and  their  associates 
a  new  chance  for  resistance. 

All  of  the  suggested  changes  were  made  with- 
out great  demur  until  the  question  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  reached,  and  then  French  and 
English  bitterness  broke  all  restraints.  Why 
were  they  expected  to  make  every  concession 
to  American  prejudice  when  the  President  would 
make  none  to  European  traditions?  They  had 
gone  to  the  length  of  accepting  the  doctrine  of 
Monroe  for  the  whole  of  the  earth,  but  now, 
because  American  pride  demanded  it,  they  must 
make  public  confession  of  America's  right  to 
give  orders.  No!  A  thousand  times  no!  It 
was  high  time  for  the  President  to  give  a 
little  consideration  to  French  and  EngHsh  and 
ItaHan  prejudices  —  time  for  him  to  realize 
that  the  lives  of  these  governments  were  at 
stake  as  well  as  his  own,  and  that  Lloyd 
George,  Clemenceau,  and  Sonnino  had  parlia- 
ments to  deal  with  that  were  just  as  unrea- 
sonable as  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 
If  the  President  asked  he  must  be  wiUing  to 
give. 

As  if  at  a  given  signal,  France  renewed  her 
claim  for  the  Rhine  Valley  and  the  Saar  Basin, 
Italy  clamored  anew  for  Fiume  and  the  Dalma- 
tian coast,  and  Japan,  breaking  a  long  silence, 
rushed  to  the  fore  with  her  demand  for  Shantung 
in  fee  simple  and  the  right  of  her  nationals  to 
full  equahty  in  the  United  States.     Lloyd  George, 

2IO 


THE  STAB  IN  THE   BACK 

threatened  on  one  side  by  the  British  Labor 
party  and  menaced  on  the  other  by  his  Tory 
government,  shifted  painfully  from  one  foot  to 
the  other,  wondering  which  way  to  jump. 
Worn  out  in  body  by  the  terrific  strain,  the 
President  fell  ill  and  took  to  his  bed,  but  his 
indomitable  will  would  not  let  him  quit  the 
struggle,  and  the  Council  of  Four  continued  its 
meetings,  holding  them  in  a  room  adjoining  the 
President's  sick-room.  Instead  of  sympathy  for 
his  illness,  there  was  only  desperate  intent  to 
take  advantage  of  it.  On  April  7th  the  President 
struggled  to  his  feet  and  faced  the  Council  in 
what  every  one  recognized  as  a  final  test  of 
strength.  There  must  be  an  end  to  this  dreary, 
interminable  business  of  making  agreements  only 
to  break  them.  An  agreement  must  be  reached 
once  for  all.  If  a  peace  of  justice,  he  would 
remain;  if  a  peace  of  greed,  then  he  would  leave. 
He  had  been  second  to  none  in  recognizing  the 
wrongs  of  the  Allies,  the  state  of  mind  of  their 
peoples,  and  he  stood  as  firmly  as  any  for  a 
treaty  that  would  bring  guilt  home  to  the  Ger- 
mans, but  he  could  not,  and  would  not,  agree 
to  the  repudiation  of  every  war  aim  or  to  arrange- 
ments that  would  leave  the  world  worse  ofF 
than  before.  The  George  Washington  was  in 
Brooklyn.  By  wireless  the  President  ordered 
it  to  come  to  Brest  at  once. 

The  gesture  was  conclusive  as  far  as  England 
and  France  were  concerned.  Lloyd  George 
swung  over  instantly  to  the  President's  side,  and 
on  the  following  day  Le  Temps  carried  this 
significant  item: 
15  211 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Contrary  to  the  assertions  spread  by  the  German  press 
and  taken  up  by  other  foreign  newspapers,  we  beUeve  that 
the  government  has  no  annexationist  pretensions,  openly 
or  under  cover,  in  regard  to  any  territory  inhabited  by  a 
German  population.  This  remark  appHes  peculiarly  to 
the  regions  comprised  between  the  frontier  of  1871  and  the 
frontier  of  18 14. 

Again,  in  the  lock  of  wills,  the  President  was 
the  victor,  and  the  French  and  EngUsh  press, 
exhausted  by  now,  could  only  gasp  their  con- 
demnation of  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George. 


XIV 

THE   ZERO   HOUR 

THE  week  that  followed  was  one  of  such  prog- 
ress that  on  April  14th  the  Germans  were 
notified  that  they  should  present  themselves  at 
Versailles  on  the  25th.  Suddenly  a  new  storm 
broke.  Angered  beyond  measure  at  the  seeming 
inability  of  their  delegates  to  withstand  the 
force  of  the  President,  the  House  of  Commons 
and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  served  notice 
that  they  would  not  rest  satisfied  with  less  than 
a  "hard  peace."  The  French  radicals,  of  whom 
so  much  had  been  expected,  mustered  166  votes 
against  334.  From  Italy  came  an  imperative 
demand  for  Fiume  that  aroused  Orlando  to  a 
frenzy  of  action.  Day  after  day  the  President 
battled  along  against  the  onslaught,  for  while 
both  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau  were  op- 
posed to  the  Italian  claim,  neither  one  had  the 
courage  to  come  out  in  the  open.  The  President 
yielded  to  the  point  of  agreeing  to  place  Fiume 
under  genuine  international  control,  but  beyond 
this  he  would  not  go.  On  April  23d,  seeing  no 
end  to  the  interminable  discussion,  he  issued  the 
famous  statement  in  which  he  defined  and  de- 
fended the  rights  of  the  Jugoslavs  to  a  seaport. 
Straightway  Orlando  left  the  Conference  and 
set  out   for   Rome,   declaring  that  Italy  would 

213 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

neither  sign  the  treaty  nor  join  the  League  of 
Nations.  The  President's  statement  had  been 
read  and  approved  by  Lloyd  George  and  Cle- 
menceau,  but  when  the  storm  burst  both  hunted 
cover  and  permitted  newspaper  announcement 
to  be  made  that  neither  of  them  had  indorsed 
the  President's  position. 

It  was  at  this  moment  that  Belgium  chose  for 
an  expression  of  the  anger  that  had  been  slowly 
forming  through  the  weeks.  From  the  time  it 
became  apparent  that  it  was  not  in  the  power 
of  Germany  to  pay  in  full  measure  for  the  dam- 
age inflicted  the  Belgians  commenced  to  worry 
for  fear  that  France  and  England  would  appro- 
priate the  bulk  of  the  reparations  moneys,  forcing 
the  "little  fellows"  to  rest  content  with  what 
was  left.  Notice  was  now  served  on  the  Presi- 
dent that  unless  the  Belgian  idea  of  justice 
was  met  in  all  completeness,  Belgium  would 
follow  the  example  of  Italy,  withdrawing  from 
the  Conference  and  refusing  to  become  a  signa- 
tory to  the  treaty. 

Into  this  troubled  situation  the  Japanese  pro- 
jected themselves  with  instancy  and  vigor. 
Bluntly,  stubbornly,  they  insisted  upon  the 
validation  of  their  claim  to  German  rights  in 
Shantung.  As  far  as  legal  title  was  concerned, 
the  Japanese  contention  was  impregnable  against 
attack.  Shantung  had  been  wrested  from  the 
Germans  by  force  of  arms,  and  the  transfer  of 
German  rights  to  Japan  had  been  pledged  by 
France  and  England,  and  approved  by  China  as 
well.  The  President,  however,  looked  beyond 
the  law  and  treaties  to  the  justice  of  the  case, 

214 


THE  ZERO  HOUR 

and  stood  for  the  return  of  Shantung  to  the 
Chinese  as  a  first  step  in  restoring  the  territorial 
integrity  of  China.  The  Japanese  were  bitter 
in  their  rejection  of  this  theory.  On  April  nth 
the  Peace  Conference  had  denied  them  the  racial 
equality  that  should  have  been  given  to  them. 
Wounded  in  pride,  deeply  resentful  of  what 
seemed  to  be  a  bold  drawing  of  the  color  line, 
Japan  insisted  upon  her  rights  in  Shantung 
not  only  as  a  matter  of  honor,  but  as  a  demand 
of  national  self-respect.  They  pointed  to  the 
treaty  in  which  France  and  England  agreed  to 
support  the  Shantung  claim.  Was  this  now  to 
be  regarded  as  "a  scrap  of  paper"?  Lloyd 
George  and  Clemenceau  answered  that  they  still 
felt  themselves  bound  by  their  written  agreement, 
whereupon  both  Premiers  w^alked  out  of  the 
room,  leaving  the  President  to  make  the  fight 
alone.  Words  were  not  wasted.  If  the  Japanese 
claim  was  not  adjusted  in  fairness,  Japan  would 
withdraw  from  the  Conference  and  refuse  to 
sign  the  Peace  Treaty. 

The  fate  of  the  world  now  hung  upon  the 
decision  of  the  President,  a  man  deserted  by  his 
associates,  repudiated  by  the  parHamentary 
body  of  his  country,  and  unsupported  by  the 
peoples  from  whose  idealism  so  much  had  been 
expected.  Italy  had  already  withdrawn  from 
the  Conference,  Belgium  was  making  daily 
threats  of  withdrawal,  ana  now  came  the  Japan- 
ese with  a  similar  ultimatum.  It  was  not 
merely  the  disruption  of  the  Conference  that 
was  to  be  feared;  it  was  the  world  chaos  that 
impended.     In  Hungary  the   administration  of 

215 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Karolyi  had  been  overthrown  and  Bela  Kun 
and  his  Bolshevists  were  in  command;  Austria 
trembled  on  the  edge  of  anarchy;  Bavaria  had 
adopted  a  Bolshevist  form  of  government;  the 
Poles  and  the  Czechs  were  at  swords'  points; 
red-flag  parades  were  being  held  in  Paris,  and 
wherever  one  looked  there  was  hatred  and  fight- 
ing. To  delay  the  peace  meant  the  turning 
over  of  civilization  to  the  forces  of  disorder. 
To  permit  the  disruption  of  the  Conference 
might  give  courage  to  Germany  to  enter  the 
field  again.  Above  all,  it  would  lose  the  League 
of  Nations! 

Was  this  great  fundamental,  after  all,  not 
more  important  than  a  detail  or  two.?*  Was  it 
right  to  hazard  the  peace  and  security  of  the 
world  by  any  stubborn  demand  for  immediate 
perfection?  None  knew  better  than  the  Presi- 
dent that  if  the  Conference  dissolved  in  anger 
and  confusion  nothing  but  another  world  war 
would  restore  the  League  of  Nations  to  the 
realm  of  practical  politics.  None  knew  better 
than  the  President  that  the  constitution  of  the 
League  contained  every  power  of  remedy  for 
the  evils  of  the  treaty,  and  that  these  powers 
would  be  exercised  wisely  and  eflTectively  in 
the  day  when  the  rule  of  reason  should  prevail 
again.  These  were  the  considerations  that 
impelled  the  President  to  certain  measures  of 
compromise.  Facing  the  Japanese  anew,  he 
told  them  that  he  would  support  their  claim 
to  the  German  rights  in  Shantung  if  Japan,  in 
return,  would  agree  to  recognize  the  sovereignty 
of  China  and  rest  content  with  the  mere  role 

216 


THE  ZERO  HOUR 

of  an  economic  concessionnaire.  Upon  this  basis 
the  settlement  was  made  on  April  29th. 

The  Italians  had  no  such  case  in  the  matter  of 
Fiume,  for  even  the  Treaty  of  London  specifi- 
cally excluded  this  seaport.  As  a  consequence 
the  President  stood  firm  on  this  point.  He 
refused  to  change  his  position  with  respect  to 
the  Polish  demand  for  East  Prussia  and  Dantzig, 
insisting  that  the  needs  of  Poland  would  be  served 
by  the  internationalization  of  the  ancient  city. 
Neither  was  he  shaken  as  to  the  continuance  of 
German  sovereignty  in  the  Rhine  Valley  and 
over  the  Saar  Basin,  but  in  the  last  phase  of  this 
debate  he  did  make  an  important  concession  to 
Clemenceau.  This  was  the  tripartite  alliance 
that  pledged  England  and  the  United  States  to 
come  to  the  aid  of  France  in  event  of  any  new 
attack  by  Germany.  Even  had  conditions  been 
vastly  different,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any 
other  action  could  have  been  taken  in  fairness  or 
generosity. 

Clemenceau  had  been  forced  to  surrender  on 
virtually  every  point  in  the  French  demand. 
Punitive  indemnities,  the  annexation  of  the 
Rhine  Valley  and  the  Saar  Basin,  the  League  of 
Nations — all  of  these  were  losing  battles  for 
"The  Tiger."  What  he  asked  at  the  last  was 
nothing  more  than  reassurance,  a  gesture  to 
calm  the  hysteria  of  fear  that  shook  his  people. 
The  Americans  and  the  British  were  returning 
to  their  unravaged  lands,  leaving  a  desolated 
France  to  five  under  the  menace  of  an  uncrushed 
Germany.  What  stood  in  the  way  of  such  a 
pledge?     Had    Mr.    Roosevelt    and    the    entire 

217 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Republican  party  not  attacked  the  President 
savagely  for  his  neutrality,  urging  France's 
many  claims  upon  America's  generosity?  Was 
it  not  the  case  that  the  people  and  press  of  the 
United  States  were  a  unit  in  admitting  America's 
obhgations  to  the  land  of  Lafayette  and  Rocham- 
beau?  Why,  then,  the  hesitancy?  It  was  true, 
to  be  sure,  that  the  League  of  Nations  would 
furnish  the  desired  security,  but  the  Republican 
majority  in  the  Senate  had  served  notice  that 
it  would  not  ratify  the  Covenant.  What  was 
France  to  do  in  the  mean  time?  Also  was  it 
not  a  fact  that  the  President  had  insisted  upon 
reopening  a  closed  matter  for  the  sake  of  exempt- 
ing the  Monroe  Doctrine  from  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  League  of  Nations?  What  was  this  but 
an  obvious  submission  to  the  prejudices  of  his 
people?  Would  he  now  deny  Clemenceau's  ap- 
peal to  have  equal  respect  shown  for  the  fears 
of  France?  It  was  an  argument  that  could  not 
be  rejected  by  a  just  or  generous  man. 

With  the  various  disputes  adjusted,  com- 
promised, or  dismissed,  the  treaty  took  shape 
rapidly,  and  on  May  7th,  fourth  anniversary  of 
the  Lusitania  disaster,  the  German  delegation 
filed  into  the  historic  chamber  at  Versailles 
where  Bismarck  had  once  stood  in  power  and 
arrogance,  shouting  the  savage  terms  that  were 
assumed  to  work  the  annihilation  of  France. 
The  personnel  of  the  delegation  was  unfortunate, 
for  instead  of  men  expressive  of  a  new  and 
democratic  order,  the  head  w^as  Count  Brock- 
dorfF-Rantzau,  a  pillar  of  Hohenzollernism,  and 
at  his  side  grouped  prominent  figures  of  the  old 

218 


THE  ZERO  HOUR 

regime.  Their  attitude  was  truculent  to  the 
point  of  insolence,  and  from  the  first  it  was 
more  their  disposition  to  argue  dead  issues  than 
to  deal  inteUigently  with  the  presented  problems. 
Without  attempt  to  play  upon  the  passions  of  the 
past,  Clemenceau  gave  the  text  of  the  treaty  to 
BrockdorfF-Rantzau,  and  informed  him  that  an 
answer  would  be  required  by  May  2ist.  Oral 
discussion  was  barred,  and  this  decision  is  the 
sole  ground  for  one  of  the  most  popular  and 
widely  copied  attacks  upon  the  President: 

Thus  it  was  that  Clemenceau  brought  to  success  what  had 
seemed  to  be,  a  few  months  before,  the  extraordinary  and 
impossible  proposal  that  the  Germans  should  not  be  heard. 
If  only  the  President  had  not  been  so  conscientious,  if 
only  he  had  not  concealed  from  himself  what  he  had  been 
doing,  even  at  the  last  moment  he  was  in  a  position  to  have 
recovered  lost  ground  and  to  have  achieved  some  very 
considerable  successes.  But  the  President  was  set.  His 
arms  and  legs  had  been  spliced  by  the  surgeons  to  a  certain 
posture,  and  they  must  be  broken  again  before  they  could 
be  altered.  To  his  horror,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  desiring 
at  the  last  moment  all  the  moderation  he  dared,  discovered 
that  he  could  not  in  five  days  persuade  the  President  of 
error  in  what  it  had  taken  five  months  to  prove  to  him  to 
be  just  and  right.  After  all,  it  was  harder  to  de-bam- 
boozle this  old  Presbyterian  than  it  had  been  to  bamboozle 
him;  for  the  former  involved  his  belief  in  and  respect  for 
himself.  Thus  in  the  last  act  the  President  stood  for 
stubbornness  and  a  refusal  of  conciliations.^ 

To  charge  that  the  Germans  were  not  heard 
is  a  well-nigh  incredible  distortion  of  the  facts. 
Oral  discussion  was  barred  for  the  very  sound 
and  sensible  reason  that  meetings  would  have 
degenerated     into    unseemly    wrangles,     angers 

*  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,  p.  54. 
219 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

putting  argument  to  one  side,  not  to  mention 
the  obvious  effect  of  daily  recrimination  upon 
the  populations  of  the  various  countries.  On 
the  other  hand,  written  arguments  and  counter- 
proposals were  invited,  and  the  Germans  took 
jfuU  advantage  of  this  privilege.  All  in  all,  a 
full  score  of  objections  and  appeals  were  filed, 
and  these  notes,  with  the  AlHed  replies,  were 
given  instant  publication  so  that  the  world 
might  follow  the  negotiations.  On  May  loth 
the  Germans  discussed  at  length  the  clauses 
relating  to  the  repatriation  of  prisoners;  on 
May  1 2th,  the  question  of  reparations;  on  May 
13th,  the  proposed  territorial  changes;  on  May 
i6th,  the  Saar  Basin;  on  May  22d,  the  interna- 
tional labor  legislation;  and  on  May  23d  the 
report  of  the  German  Economic  Commission 
was  published,  together  with  the  Allied  reply. 
On  May  20th  an  extension  of  time  was  asked 
and  granted,  and  on  May  29th  the  complete 
German  counter-proposals  were  handed  in  and 
straightway  given  to  the  press  for  the  informa- 
tion of  all  peoples.  No  fairer  method  of  hearing 
could  have  been  devised.  Instead  of  the  hot 
give-and-take  of  oral  debate,  confined  neces- 
sarily to  a  few  principal  figures,  the  Germans 
were  allowed  time  and  opportunity  for  thought, 
study,  and  consultation  in  order  that  their  replies 
might  be  full  and  authoritative,  expressing  the 
deliberate  opinions  of  their  experts. 

At  no  time  did  Lloyd  George  attempt  to 
persuade  the  President  of  error  in  this  matter. 
It  is  true  that  he  called  the  whole  British  Cabinet 
to  Paris  on  June  ist  for  the  purpose  of  consider- 

220 


THE  ZERO  HOUR 

ing  the  advisability  of  modifying  the  peace 
terms  to  Germany,  but  this  is  what  every  other 
government  was  doing,  and  what  the  President 
himself  insisted  upon.  The  Peace  Treaty  and 
the  German  reply  were  before  the  world.  As  a 
matter  of  common  sense,  it  behooved  the  Peace 
conferees  to  see  that  every  Germ.an  point 
received  full  consideration,  for  the  peoples  of 
earth  were  watching  and  waiting.  From  May 
29th  to  June  i6th  the  Council  worked  on  the 
German  counter-proposals,  weighing  every  word, 
analyzing  every  claim,  for  it  was  the  moral 
judgment  of  mankind  that  would  pass  upon  the 
result  of  their  labors. 

It  is  to  be  wished  that  the  two  documents — 
the  German  of  May  29th  and  the  Allied  reply 
of  June  i6th — could  be  printed  in  every  language 
and  placed  in  every  school  and  library,  for  they 
furnish  in  themselves  a  complete  and  dramatic 
exposition  of  the  whole  Peace  Treaty,  permitting 
the  formation  of  an  intelligent  and  independent 
opinion  with  respect  to  the  confused  question 
of  justice  or  injustice.  The  German  note  was 
passionate  without  being  strong,  and  even  so 
ardent  an  admirer  as  Mr.  Keynes  admits  regret- 
fully that  it  "did  not  succeed  in  exposing  in 
burning  and  prophetic  words"  the  insincerity  of 
the  transaction.  The  Allied  note,  on  the  con- 
trary, had  strength  without  passion,  and  even  as 
it  made  many  and  important  concessions  and 
modifications,  so  was  it  at  pains  to  explain  every 
rejection. 

The  principal  German  contentions  were  these: 
that  the  peace  was  one  of  violence,  not  justice; 

221 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

that  Germany  did  not  commence  the  war;  and 
that  the  AlHes  had  stated  repeatedly  that  they 
were  not  making  war  on  the  German  people;  it 
should  be  taken  into  consideration  that  the 
people  were  now  in  power,  and  that  the  new 
government  should  not  be  held  responsible  for 
the  "  faults  "  of  the  former  government.  To  these 
assertions  this  crushing  rejoinder  was  made: 

The  protest  of  the  German  delegation  shows  that  they 
fail  to  understand  the  position  in  which  Germany  stands 
to-day.  They  seem  to  think  that  Germany  has  only  to 
**make  sacrifices  in  order  to  obtain  peace,"  as  if  this  were 
but  the  end  of  some  mere  struggle  for  territory  and  power. 
The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  therefore  feel  it  neces- 
sary to  begin  their  reply  by  a  clear  statement  of  the  judg- 
ment of  the  world,  which  has  been  forged  by  practically 
the  whole  of  civilized  mankind. 

In  the  view  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  the  war 
which  began  on  the  ist  of  August,  1914,  was  the  greatest 
crime  against  humanity  and  the  freedom  of  the  peoples 
that  any  nation  calling  itself  civilized  has  ever  consciously 
committed.  For  many  years  the  rulers  of  Germany,  true 
to  the  Prussian  tradition,  strove  for  a  position  of  dominance 
in  Europe.  They  were  not  satisfied  with  that  growing 
prosperity  and  influence  to  which  Germany  was  entitled, 
and  which  all  other  nations  were  willing  to  accord  her,  or 
the  society  of  free  and  equal  position. 

They  required  that  they  should  be  able  to  dictate  and 
tyrannize  over  a  subservient  Europe,  as  they  dictated  and 
tyrannized  over  a  subservient  Germany.  In  order  to 
attain  their  ends  they  used  every  channel  through  which 
to  educate  their  own  subjects  in  the  doctrine  that  might 
was  right  in  international  affairs.  They  never  ceased  to 
expand  German  armaments  by  land  and  sea,  and  to  propa- 
gate the  falsehood  that  it  was  necessary  because  Ger- 
many's neighbors  were  jealous  of  her  prosperity  and  power. 
She  sought  to  sow  hostilities  and  suspicion  instead  of 
friendship  between  nations. 

222 


THE  ZERO  HOUR 

They  developed  a  system  of  espionage  and  intrigue 
through  which  they  were  enabled  to  stir  up  international 
rebellion  and  unrest,  and  even  to  make  secret  offensive 
preparations  within  the  territory  of  their  neighbors,  where- 
by they  might,  when  the  moment  came,  strike  them  down 
with  greater  certainty  and  ease.  They  kept  Europe  in  a 
ferment  by  threats  of  violence,  and  when  they  found  that 
their  neighbors  were  resolved  to  resist  their  arrogant  will 
they  determined  to  assert  their  predominance  in  Europe 
by  force. 

As  soon  as  their  preparations  were  complete,  they  en- 
couraged a  subservient  ally  to  declare  war  on  Serbia  at 
forty-eight  hours'  notice,  a  war  involving  the  control  of  the 
Balkans,  which  they  knew  could  not  be  localized  and  which 
was  bound  to  unchain  a  general  war.  In  order  to  make 
doubly  sure,  they  refused  every  attempt  at  conciliation 
and  conference  until  it  was  too  late  and  the  World  War  was 
inevitable  for  which  they  had  plotted  and  for  which  alone 
among  the  nations  they  were  adequately  equipped  and 
prepared. 

Germany's  responsibility,  however,  is  not  confined  to 
having  planned  and  started  the  war.  She  is  no  less  respon- 
sible for  the  savage  and  inhuman  manner  in  which  it  was 
conducted.  Though  Germany  was  herself  a  guarantor  of 
Belgium,  the  rulers  of  Germany  violated  their  solemn 
promise  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  this  unoffending  people. 
Not  content  with  this,  they  deliberately  carried  out  a 
series  of  promiscuous  shootings  and  burnings  with  the  sole 
object  of  terrifying  the  inhabitants  into  submission  by  the 
very  frightfulness  of  their  action. 

They  were  the  first  to  use  poisonous  gas,  notwithstanding 
the  appalling  suffering  it  entailed.  They  began  the  bombing 
and  long-distance  shelling  of  towns  for  no  military  object, 
but  solely  for  the  purpose  of  reducing  the  morale  of  their 
opponents  by  striking  at  their  women  and  children.  They 
commenced  the  submarine  campaign,  with  its  piratical 
challenge  to  international  law  and  its  destruction  of  great 
numbers  of  innocent  passengers  and  sailors  in  midocean, 
far  from  succor,  at  the  mercy  of  the  winds  and  waves,  and 
the  yet  more  ruthless  submarine  crews. 

223 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

They  drove  thousands  of  men  ana  women  and  children 
with  brutal  savagery  into  slavery  in  foreign  lands.  They 
allowed  barbarities  to  be  practised  against  their  prisoners 
of  war  from  which  the  most  uncivilized  people  would  have 
recoiled. 

The  conduct  of  Germany  is  almost  unexampled  in  human 
history.  The  terrible  responsibility  which  lies  at  her  doors 
can  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  not  less  than  7,000,000  dead 
lie  buried  in  Europe,  while  more  than  20,000,000  others 
carry  upon  them  the  evidence  of  wounds  and  suffering, 
because  Germany  saw  fit  to  gratify  her  lust  for  tyranny 
by  a  resort  to  war. 


Justice,  therefore,  is  the  only  possible  basis  for  the  set- 
tlement of  the  accounts  of  this  terrible  war.  Justice  is 
what  the  German  delegation  asks  for,  and  says  that  Ger- 
many has  been  promised.  But  it  must  be  justice  for  all. 
There  must  be  justice  for  the  dead  and  wounded,  and  for 
those  who  have  been  orphaned  and  bereaved,  that  Europe 
might  be  free  from  Prussian  despotism.  There  must  be 
justice  for  the  peoples  who  now  stagger  under  war  debts 
which  exceed  $30,000,000,000  that  liberty  might  be  saved. 
There  must  be  justice  for  those  millions  whose  homes  and 
lands  and  property  German  savagery  has  spoliated  and 
destroyed. 

This  is  why  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  have 
insisted  as  a  cardinal  feature  of  the  treaty  that  Germany 
must  undertake  to  make  reparation  to  the  very  uttermost 
of  her  power,  for  reparation  for  wrongs  inflicted  is  of  the 
essence  of  justice.  That  is  why  they  insist  that  those 
individuals  who  are  most  clearly  responsible  for  German 
aggression  and  for  those  acts  of  barbarism  and  inhumanity 
which  have  disgraced  the  German  conduct  of  the  war 
must  be  handed  over  to  justice,  which  has  not  been  meted 
out  to  them  at  home.  That,  too,  is  why  Germany  must 
submit  for  a  few  years  to  certain  special  disabilities  and 
arrangements. 

Germany  has  ruined  the  industries,  the  mines,  and  the 
machinery  of  neighboring  countries,  not  during  battle,  but 
with  the  deliberate  and  calculated  purpose  of  enabling  her 

224 


THE  ZERO  HOUR 

own  industries  to  seize  their  markets  before  their  industries 
could  recover  from  the  devastation  thus  wantonly  inflicted 
upon  them.  Germany  has  despoiled  her  neighbors  of 
everything  she  could  make  use  of  or  carry  away.  Germany 
has  destroyed  the  shipping  of  all  nations  on  the  high  seas, 
where  there  was  no  chance  of  rescue  for  the  passengers 
and  crews. 

It  is  only  justice  that  restitution  should  be  made,  and 
that  these  wronged  peoples  should  be  safeguarded  for  a 
time  from  the  competition  of  a  nation  whose  industries 
are  intact  and  have  even  been  fortified  by  machinery 
stolen  from  occupied  territories. 

If  these  things  are  hardships  for  Germany,  they  are 
hardships  which  Germany  has  brought  upon  herself. 
Somebody  must  suffer  for  the  consequences  of  the  war. 
Is  it  to  be  Germany  or  the  peoples  she  has  wronged  ?  Not 
to  do  justice  to  all  concerned  would  only  leave  the  world 
open  to  fresh  calamities.  If  the  German  people  themselves, 
or  any  other  nation,  are  to  be  deterred  from  following  the 
footsteps  of  Prussia;  if  mankind  is  to  be  lifted  out  of  the 
belief  that  war  for  selfish  ends  is  legitimate  to  any  state; 
if  the  old  era  is  to  be  left  behind,  and  nations  as  well  as 
individuals  are  to  be  brought  beneath  the  reign  of  law,  even 
if  there  is  to  be  early  reconciliation  and  appeasement — it 
will  be  because  those  responsible  for  concluding  the  war 
have  had  the  courage  to  see  that  justice  is  not  deflected  for 
the  sake  of  a  convenient  peace. 

It  is  said  that  the  German  revolution  ought  to  make  a 
difference,  and  that  the  German  people  are  not  responsible 
for  the  policy  of  the  rulers  whom  they  have  thrown  from 
power.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  recognize  and 
welcome  the  change.  It  represents  great  hope  for  peace 
and  a  new  European  order  in  the  future,  but  it  cannot 
affect  the  settlement  of  the  war  itself. 

The  German  revolution  was  stayed  until  the  German 
armies  had  been  defeated  in  the  field  and  all  hope  of  profiting 
by  a  war  of  conquest  had  vanished.  Throughout  the  war, 
as  before  the  war,  the  German  people  and  their  representa- 
tives supported  the  war,  voted  the  credits,  subscribed  to 
the  war  loans,  obeyed  every  order,  however  savage,  of  their 

225 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

government.  They  shared  the  responsibility  for  the  poHcy 
of  their  government,  for  at  any  moment,  had  they  willed 
it,  they  could  have  reversed  it. 

Had  that  policy  succeeded  they  would  have  acclaimed 
it  with  the  same  enthusiasm  with  which  they  welcomed  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.  They  cannot  now  pretend,  having 
changed  their  rulers  after  the  war  was  lost,  that  it  is  justice 
that  they  should  escape  the  consequences  of  their  deeds. 

In  conclusion,  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  must 
make  it  clear  that  this  letter  and  the  memorandum  attached 
constitute  their  last  word.  They  have  examined  the 
German  observations  and  counter-proposals  with  earnest 
attention  and  care.  They  have,  in  consequence,  made 
important  modifications  in  the  draft  treaty,  but  in  its  prin- 
ciples they  stand  by  it. 

They  believe  that  it  is  not  only  a  just  settlement  of  the 
Great  War,  but  that  it  provides  the  basis  upon  which  the 
peoples  of  Europe  can  live  together  in  friendship  and 
equality.  At  the  same  time  it  creates  the  machinery  for 
the  peaceful  adjustment  of  all  international  problems  by 
discussion  and  consent,  and  whereby  the  settlement  of 
1919  itself  can  be  modified  from  time  to  time  to  suit  new 
facts  and  new  conditions  as  they  arise. 

Another  important  German  demand  was  for 
immediate  admission  to  the  League  of  Nations. 
In  answer,  the  AlHes  expressed  earnest  hope  of 
the  "early  entry  of  Germany  into  the  League," 
but  felt  that  it  would  be  wise  to  wait  until  the 
revolution  proved  itself  a  "permanent  change." 

Military  terms  were  modified,  the  revision 
permitting  Germany  to  maintain  temporarily 
an  army  of  200,000  instead  of  100,000,  certain 
demands  with  respect  to  Helgoland  were  granted, 
and  important  rectifications  were  made  as  to  the 
Polish  frontier.  While  explicit  refusal  met  the 
German  request  to  retain  Dantzig,  instead  of 

226 


THE  ZERO  HOUR 

turning  it  over  to  the  League  of  Nations,  the 
German  contention  for  a  plebiscite  in  Upper 
Silesia  was  allowed.  It  was  also  agreed  that  the 
historic  frontier  between  Pomerania  and  West 
Prussia  should  be  established. 

German  objections  to  the  Schleswig  settlement 
were  answered  by  the  statement  that  the  plebis- 
cite, as  planned,  was  no  more  than  what  Prussia 
had  promised  by  treaty  in  1864.  It  was  also 
explained  that  the  award  of  the  communal  woods 
of  Prussian  Moresnet  to  Belgium  was  not  puni- 
tive, but  merely  partial  compensation  for  the 
destruction  of  Belgian  forests. 

With  respect  to  her  colonies,  Germany  agreed 
that  they  should  be  turned  over  to  the  League 
of  Nations,  but  claimed  the  right  to  be  named  as 
mandatory.  This  was  rejected  by  reason  of  the 
abuses  that  invariably  attended  German  colonial 
administration,  and  the  theory  of  hampered 
economic  development  was  met  by  the  proof 
that  pre-war  figures  showed  that  only  one-half 
of  I  per  cent,  of  Germany's  exports  and  one-half 
of  I  per  cent,  of  her  imports  were  with  her  own 
colonies. 

While  accepting  obligation  to  pay  for  all 
damages  sustained  by  the  civil  populations  in 
the  occupied  parts  of  Belgium  and  France, 
Germany  opposed  reparation  to  other  occupied 
territories  in  Italy,  Montenegro,  Serbia,  Ru- 
mania, and  Poland,  as  no  attack  in  contradiction 
to  international  law  was  involved.  In  answer 
it  was  pointed  out  that  the  President's  Fourteen 
Points,  explicitly  accepted  by  Germany  as  a 
base  of  settlement,  made  plain  statement  that 

16  227 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  damage  to  these  countries  must  be  paid 
for.  While  it  was  denied  that  liberated  coun- 
tries should  be  expected  to  pay  any  part  of  the 
German  war  debt,  there  was  admission  that  they 
should  bear  their  proper  portion  of  pre-war 
debts. 

Questions  of  reparations,  coal,  shipping,  river 
control,  and  other  economic  phases  of  the  dis- 
cussion will  be  treated  in  succeeding  chapters, 
as  they  call  for  more  than  brief  comment. 


XV 

MR.    KEYNES's   JEREMIAD 

VARIOUS  references  have  already  been  made 
to  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace^ 
the  work  of  John  Maynard  Keynes,  an  English- 
man. In  considering  the  details  of  the  treaty, 
these  references  will  become  increasingly  numer- 
ous, for  more  exactly  and  comprehensively  than 
any  other  Mr.  Keynes  has  caught  up  and  ex- 
pressed every  attack,  misrepresentation,  dis- 
tortion, and  malignance.  His  book — jerked  into 
notoriety  by  those  who  hate  the  President, 
endowed  with  scriptural  values  by  every  German, 
Austrian,  and  Hungarian,  copied  extensively 
by  reactionary  and  radical  pubHcations,  and 
hailed  with  joy  by  the  semi-intelligent  as  a 
short  cut  to  statecraft — has  done  more  than 
any  other  thing  to  poison  the  wells  of  pubHc 
opinion. 

An  American  wit  once  said  that  an  accountant 
was  merely  a  "bookkeeper  out  of  a  job."  He 
might  have  commented  also  that  the  usual 
economist  is  a  clerk  risen  to  the  importance  of 
carrying  a  leather  portfolio.  Another  confusion 
is  in  the  matter  of  definition.  In  America 
** liberal"  implies  a  state  of  mind;  in  England 
Liberal    appKes   to    a   national   political   party. 

229 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

In  America  liberalism  is  based  upon  ideals;  In 
England  Liberalism  is  based  upon  partizan- 
ship.  These  distinctions  must  be  borne  in  mind 
in  any  consideration  of  Mr.  Keynes's  book. 
He  does  not  write  as  a  liberal,  but  as  a  Liberal, 
and  his  book  is  in  no  sense  the  protest  of  an  out- 
raged conscience,  but  the  explicit  announcement 
of  a  party  program  in  support  of  a  definite  party 
objective.  The  Liberals  of  England  have  never 
forgiven  Lloyd  George  for  his  desertion  and 
betrayals,  and  his  vagrant  course  at  the  Peace 
Conference  provided  the  opportunity  for  assault 
that  was  denied  them  during  the  war.  The 
Welsh  chameleon  and  his  Tory  associates  are 
now  to  be  thrown  out  of  office,  and  Liberals  and 
Labor  are  to  be  put  in  their  places.  This  is  Mr. 
Keynes's  primary  offensive,  and  at  the  end  he 
states  it  frankly,  explaining  that  "the  replace- 
ment of  the  existing  governments"  is  a  necessary 
preliminar}^  to  any  honest  readjustment. 

The  Premier  is  held  up  to  scorn  as  an  oppor- 
tunist when  he  is  not  scourged  as  a  charlatan,  and 
the  consequences  of  his  opportunism  and  char- 
latanry are  painted  in  terms  of  anarchy,  disaster, 
and  ruin.  The  flings  at  President  Wilson  are 
largely  incidental,  included,  perhaps,  for  the 
sake  of  the  American  sale,  but  chiefly  for  the 
purpose  of  catering  to  that  large  segment  of  the 
British  population  that  is  never  so  happy  as  in 
hearing  America  and  Americans  shamed  and 
derided. 

Having  launched  the  drive  to  "kick  the  ras- 
cals out,"  the  next  step,  naturally,  is  a  platform 
based    upon    national    and    material    interests. 

230 


MR.  KEYNES'S  JEREMIAD 

Lloyd  George  and  the  Tories  have  done  fairly 
well  by  England  in  the  matter  of  profits.  It  must 
be  shown  to  the  electorate  that  Mr.  Keynes  and 
the  Liberals  can  do  better.  The  result  is  a  cold- 
blooded program  based  upon  the  betrayal  of 
every  obligation  of  honor  and  friendship.  In  the 
first  place,  America  is  urged  to  cancel  England's 
indebtedness,  and  in  event  that  we  are  not 
generous  enough  to  adopt  the  suggestion,  there 
is  the  frank  threat  of  repudiation.  This  done, 
America  is  to  make  a  new  loan. 

In  the  second  place,  the  program  calls  explicitly 
for  the  complete  rehabilitation  of  Germany  and 
the  equally  complete  demoralization  of  France. 
In  plain  words,  France  is  to  be  destroyed  as  a 
rival  and  Germany  is  to  be  built  up  as  a  customer. 
There  is  no  longer  any  German  merchant  marine, 
there  are  no  longer  any  German  colonies  and  the 
German  hold  on  world  trade  has  been  broken 
in  the  Levant,  the  Orient,  Africa,  and  South 
America.  England's  control  of  the  seas  is  abso- 
lute, and  therefore  England  has  nothing  to  fear 
from  German  rehabilitation,  but  everything  to 
hope.  A  rich,  powerful  Germany — cut  ojff  from 
the  sea — may  become  a  menace  to  the  Continent, 
but  not  to  England.  It  is  from  England  that 
the  Germans  will  be  forced  to  buy — it  is  through 
England  that  Germany  will  be  forced  to  sell. 
The  weak  point  in  the  plan  is  German  poverty; 
and  the  remedy  for  this  is  the  restoration  of 
Germany  to  her  pre-war  status,  minus  colonies, 
navy,  and  merchant  marine.  Mr.  Keynes  works 
boldly  to  his  object,  not  fearing  to  paint  this 
picture  of  the  idyllic  conditions  of  1914: 

231 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

The  interference  of  frontiers  and  of  tariffs  was  reduced 
to  a  minimum,  and  not  far  short  of  three  hundred  milHons 
of  people  lived  within  the  three  Empires  of  Russia,  Ger- 
many, and  Austria-Hungary.  The  various  currencies, 
which  were  all  maintained  on  a  stable  basis  in  relation  to 
gold  and  to  one  another,  facilitated  the  easy  flow  of  capital 
and  of  trade  to  an  extent  the  full  value  of  which  we  only 
realize  now,  when  we  are  deprived  of  its  advantages.  Over 
this  great  area  there  was  an  almost  absolute  security  of 
property  and  of  person. ^ 

At  whatever  cost — to  the  Continent — this 
happy  family  must  be  brought  together  again. 
It  is  "abhorrent  and  detestable"  that  France 
should  be  permitted  to  recapture  Alsace-Lor- 
raine and  exercise  suzerainty  over  the  Saar 
Basin,  although  Mr.  Keynes  is  able  to  view  with 
equanimity  the  English  seizure  of  Germany's 
African  possessions.  The  Dantzig  corridor  for 
Poland  is  part  of  a  policy  "not  authorized  by 
religion  or  natural  morals,"  but  Mr.  Keynes's 
religion  and  morals  approve  the  taking  and 
keeping  of  the  German  ships  by  England.  An 
"unworkable"  condition  is  created  by  the  action 
of  the  Poles  and  Czechs  in  assuming  control  of 
the  Silesian  coal-fields,  but  every  interest  of 
efficiency  is  served  by  the  action  of  England  in 
absorbing  Persia,  annexing  Egypt,  and  filching 
Mesopotamia  and  the  Hedjaz.  Through  all  the 
centuries  "perfide  Albion"  has  been  a  cry  of  hate 
and  reproach,  but  it  has  remained  for  this  Eng- 
lish government  clerk,  writing  in  the  name  of 
humanity,  to  give  new  and  greater  force  to  the 
ancient  indictment  of  British  faith. 

At  every  point,  in  every  word,  The  Economic 

1  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  tJie  Peaces  p.  15. 
232 


MR.  KEYNES^S  JEREMIAD 

Consequences  of  the  Peace  is  a  brutal  attack  upon 
England's  allies — that  they  may  not  be  permitted 
to  dispute  England's  program  of  trade  imperi- 
alism— and  an  equally  indecent  attempt  to 
restore  Germany  as  an  European  autocracy, 
robbed  of  sea-power  and  barred  from  world 
trade,  and  therefore  forced  to  buy  and  sell 
through  England.  France  is  derided  and  re- 
buked, her  wrongs  ignored,  her  sufferings  min- 
imized. Belgium  is  an  object  of  contempt,  for, 
while  Mr.  Keynes  admits  a  certain  amount  of 
sacrifice  in  1914,  "she  played  a  minor  role" 
thereafter  and  sacrificed  as  little  as  possible, 
thinking  it  sufficient  to  pride  herself  on  not 
having  made  long  ago  a  separate  peace  with 
Germany. 

Poland,  no  less  than  Belgium  and  France, 
excites  anger  by  the  bare  presumption  of  na- 
tional existence.  "She  is  to  be  strong.  Catholic, 
militarist  and  faithful,  the  consort,  or  at  least 
the  favorite  of  victorious  France,  prosperous 
and  magnificent  between  the  ashes  of  Russia  and 
the  ruin  of  Germany.  Rumania,  if  only  she 
could  be  persuaded  to  keep  up  appearances  a 
little  more,  is  a  part  of  the  same  scatter-brained 
conception."^ 

Prof.  Charles  D.  Hazen  of  Columbia  has 
characterized  this  as  a  "gift  of  quite  gratuitous 
insult"  and  points  it  out  as  an  "excellent  example 
of  Mr.  Keynes's  highly  perfected  art  of  slurring 
those  who  helped  win  this  war,  without  under- 
going the  labor  of  presenting  the  situation  with 
any  fairness." 

^  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of' the  Peace^  p.  291. 
233 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Another  authority,  Prof.  Charles  H.  Haskins 
of  Harvard,  has  also  passed  judgment  in  these 
words: 

Throughout  the  book  the  author's  economic  conceptions 
are  curiously  static.  He  pleads  for  the  restoration  of  pre- 
war conditions  as  far  as  possible,  irrespective  of  the  fact 
that  they  gave  Germany  a  position  of  peculiar  advantage 
in  Europe,  and  he  opposes  any  correction  of  this  balance  in 
favor  either  of  France  or  of  the  new  states  of  the  East. 
Having  adopted  a  Germanocentric  theory  of  European 
economic  life,  he  follows  it  through.  A  little  more  imagina- 
tion would  show  him  that  many  readjustments  are  possible 
with  the  opening  up  of  new  natural  resources  and  lines  of 
trade  and  with  the  extension  of  the  industrial  revolution  to 
eastern  Europe;  and  a  little  more  sympathy  with  non- 
German  peoples  would  show  him  the  injustice  of  re-estab- 
lishing a  state  of  affairs  which  Germany  exploited  to  her 
own  selfish  advantage.  Readjustment  inevitably  causes 
hardship  in  Germany,  but  it  is  necessary  to  prevent  Ger- 
man dominance  over  peoples  whom  the  war  has  at  last 
set  free. 

Professor  Haskins  is  mistaken,  however,  in 
assuming  that  Mr.  Keynes  is  content  with  any 
mere  "restoration  of  pre-war  conditions."  With 
the  Imperial  German  Empire  restored — ex- 
cepting colonies  and  ships,  which  England  will 
retain — the  claims  of  Belgium,  France,  Serbia, 
and  Italy  eliminated,  and  the  absurd  pretensions 
of  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia  wiped  out,  the 
next  step  in  the  program  is  to  turn  Russia  over 
to  "German  enterprise  and  organization"  for 
the  restoration  of  Russian  productivity.  To 
quote  Mr.  Keynes: 

It  is  impossible  geographically  and  for  many  other 
reasons  for  Englishmen,  Frenchmen,  or  Americans  to  un- 
dertake it;  we  have  neither  the  incentive  nor  the  means  for 

234 


MR.  KEYNES'S  JEREMIAD 

doing  the  work  on  a  sufficient  scale.  Germany,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  the  experience,  the  incentive,  and  to  a  large 
extent  the  materials  for  furnishing  the  Russian  peasant 
with  the  goods  of  which  he  has  been  starved  for  the  past 
five  years,  for  reorganizing  the  business  of  transport  and 
collection,  and  so  for  bringing  into  the  world's  pool,  for  the 
common  advantage,  the  supplies  from  which  we  are  now 
so  disastrously  cut  off.  It  is  in  our  interest  to  hasten  the 
day  when  German  agents  and  organizers  will  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  set  in  train  in  every  Russian  village  the  impulses  of 
ordinary  economic  motive.* 

Nor  is  this  all.  One  of  Mr.  Keynes's  important 
"remedies''  is  the  establishment  of  a  free  union 
of  countries  ^^undertaking  to  impose  no  protec- 
tionist tariffs  whatever  against  the  produce  of  other 
members  of  the  union.  Germany,  Poland,  the 
new  states  which  formerly  composed  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  and  Turkish  Empires,  and  the  man- 
dated states  should  he  compelled  to  adhere  to  this 
union  for  ten  years,  after  which  time  adherence 
would  he  voluntary.  The  adherence  of  other  states 
would  he  voluntary  from  the  outset.  But  it  is  to 
he  hoped  that  the  United  Kingdom,  at  any  rate, 
would  hecome  an  original  member.  .  .  .  By  the  pro- 
posed Free  Trade  Union  some  part  of  the  loss  of 
organization  and  economic  efficiency  may  be  re- 
trieved, which  must  otherwise  result  from  the  in- 
numerable new  political  frontiers  now  created 
between  greedy,  jealous,  immature,  and  economically 
incomplete  nationalist  states.  Economic  frontiers 
were  tolerable  so  long  as  an  immense  territory  was 
included  in  a  few  great  empires,  but  they  will  not 
he  tolerable  when  the  empires  of  Germany,  Austria- 

^J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  oj  the  Peace y  pp. 
293-294. 

^7>^ 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Hungary,  Russiuy  and  Turkey  have  been  parti-- 
tioned  between  some  twenty  independent  author- 
ities"^ 

In  plain  words,  Mr.  Keynes  proposes  to  have 
the  treaty  give  to  Germany  what  Germany  failed 
to  win  by  war.  The  "greedy,  jealous,  and  im- 
mature" small  states,  having  won  their  freedom 
from  Germany  by  blood  and  sacrifice,  are  to  be 
restored  to  the  commercial  ownership  of  Ger- 
many in  the  sacred  name  of  economics.  It  is 
the  German  dream  of  Mittel-Europa  that  Mr. 
Keynes  wants  to  see  come  true.  The  Hst  of 
countries  that  he  sets  down  is  precisely  the  list 
that  Doctor  Naumann  enumerated  in  his  grandi- 
ose plan  for  gaining  for  Germany  the  economic 
mastery  of  central  and  southeastern  Europe. 
Compelled  to  enter  the  union  and  denied  the 
right  to  erect  a  single  tariff  barrier  against  Ger- 
many, the  new  states  would  indeed  be  given  a 
splendid  chance  to  build  up  their  industries! 
The  one  change  in  the  Mittel-Europa  program, 
as  declared  by  Naumann,  is  that  the  United 
Kingdom  will  also  enter,  cannily  directing  and 
sharing  in  the  profits  of  this  economic  conquest. 

These  brutalities  might  be  forgiven  to  Mr. 
Keynes,  for  he  is  the  inheritor  of  commercial 
traditions.  For  centuries  the  British  govern- 
ment has  made  trade  its  god,  annexation  its 
religion,  and  while  there  is  reason  to  believe  that 
a  new  generation  is  commencing  to  view  hypoc- 
risy and  rapacity  with  disgust,  the  official  class 
is  still  the  creature  of  old  habit.     It  is  impossible, 

^  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Conseqiiences  of  the  Peace ^  pp. 
265-266. 

236 


MR.  KEYNES'S  JEREMIAD 

however,  to  forgive  him  for  his  inhumanity. 
That  is  a  personal  quaUty.  Nothing  stands 
more  clear  than  that  the  military  masters  of 
Germany  precipitated  the  World  War  in  cold 
blood,  working  a  horror  of  desolation  that  is  ex- 
pressed in  millions  of  graves,  in  sad  hosts  of 
maimed  and  blind,  in  the  destruction  of  cities, 
the  devastation  of  great  areas,  the  ruined  lives 
of  whole  populations,  and  the  blight  of  a  future 
that  had  every  promise  of  fairness.  One  searches 
in  vain  through  the  pages  of  Mr.  Keynes  for  a 
single  word  of  condemnation  addressed  to  Ger- 
many— for  a  single  word  of  sympathy  addressed 
to  Belgium,  France,  Italy,  or  Serbia.  Almost 
tearfully  he  quotes  paragraph  after  paragraph 
from  German  writers  telling  of  the  sufferings  of 
German  children,  and  in  one  foot-note  he  prints 
this  pathetic  story: 

You  see  this  child  here,  the  physician  in  charge  explained; 
it  consumed  an  incredible  amount  of  bread,  and  yet  did  not 
get  any  stronger.  I  found  out  that  it  hid  all  the  bread  it 
received  underneath  its  straw  mattress.  The  fear  of  hunger 
was  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  child  that  it  collected  stores 
instead  of  eating  the  food:  a  misguided  animal  instinct 
made  the  dread  of  hunger  worse  than  the  actual  pangs. 

No  one  would  wish  to  take  away  a  throb  of 
pity  from  the  little  ones  of  the  Central  Powers 
and  each  day  sees  America  raising  vast  amounts 
for  child  relief  in  Germany,  Austria,  and  Hun- 
gary. But  is  no  word  to  be  said  in  behalf  of 
the  children  of  France,  of  Belgium,  of  Poland, 
of  Serbia,  and  of  Italy  .f^  What  of  the  desolated 
homes  in  Allied  countries,  the  tragic  flights  of 
families,  of  whole  communities;    the  tragic  toll 

237 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

in  human  life  that  was  taken  by  hunger,  cold, 
and  hardship?  Of  all  this  there  is  no  word  from 
Mr.  Keynes.  Human  wretchedness  must  cry 
its  despair  in  German  to  reach  his  ears.  At 
one  point  he  says : 

The  German  commentators  had  little  difficulty  in  showing 
that  the  draft  treaty  constituted  a  breach  of  engagements 
and  of  international  morality  comparable  with  their  own 
offense  in  the  invasion  of  Belgium. 

Professor  Hazen  has  made  the  best  comment, 
saying: 

This  amazing  statement  accurately  presents  the  tone  that 
pervades  the  book  from  cover  to  cover.  From  this  passage, 
as  from  many  others,  the  reader  can  form  his  own  idea  of 
the  sobriety  of  judgment,  the  restraint  of  language,  the 
intellectual  discrimination  of  the  author.  The  world  out- 
side central  Europe  long  ago  formed  a  very  definite  idea  of 
the  morality  involved  in  the  invasion  of  Belgium.  Mr. 
Keynes  places  the  treaty  alongside  as  a  fit  and  adequate 
companion-piece.  He  is  entitled  to  all  the  repute  he  may 
get  as  a  fair  thinker  from  that  phrase.  At  any  rate,  he  gives 
us  a  clear  revelation  of  his  critical  standards. 

As  bearing  upon  the  fairness  of  Mr.  Keynes, 
it  is  noteworthy  that  there  is  neither  record  nor 
remembrance  of  any  advancement  of  his  "liberal" 
views  while  acting  as  a  representative  of  the 
British  Treasury  at  the  Peace  Conference.  The 
members  of  the  American  delegation,  such  as 
were  concerned  with  reparations,  have  the  very 
distinct  recollection  that  his  one  effort  was  to 
get  everything  possible  for  the  British  Empire, 
regardless  of  justice,  and  that  his  only  other  bias 
was  a  certain  definite  antagonism  to  France  and 
the   French.     Also,  in   a  recent  letter  to   Prof. 

238 


MR.   KEYNES'S  JEREMIAD 

AUyn  Young  this  amazing  economist  expressed 
regret  that  his  book  should  have  been  construed 
as  an  attack  upon  the  President,  concluding, 
naively,  **0f  course  I  recognize  that  President 
Wilson  was  the  noblest  figure  in  Paris." 

In  the  matter  of  honor  Mr.  Keynes  is  no  less 
pecuHar  and  individual,  as  stands  proved  by  the 
slightest  consideration  of  what  he  is  pleased  to 
call  his  "remedies."  That  he  is  valued  chiefly 
as  a  rhetorician,  by  the  way,  rather  than  as  an 
economist,  is  made  obvious  by  the  fact  that  not 
one  of  these  "remedies"  has  ever  been  given 
serious  attention  by  any  of  the  papers  or  the 
people  who  have  been  most  vigorous  in  applaud- 
ing his  phrases.  The  principal  "remedy"  pro- 
posed by  Mr.  Keynes  is  the  entire  cancelation 
of  inter-Ally  indebtedness,  which,  reduced  to 
terms,  is  a  frank  demand  that  the  United  States 
shall  wipe  off  the  ten  billions  owed  by  the  AlKes. 
Mr.  Keynes  assumes  that  when  America  gave 
the  money  that  "it  was  not  in  the  nature  of  an 
investment,"  and  he  also  mentions  casually  that 
"the  financial  sacrifices  of  the  United  States 
have  been,  in  proportion  to  her  wealth,  immensely 
less  than  those  of  European  states."  ^ 

In  event  that  these  great  debts  are  not  can- 
celed, thereby  giving  a  "stimulus  to  the  soKdar- 
ity  and  true  friendliness  of  the  nations  lately 
associated,"  Mr.  Keynes  blithely  advances  a 
policy  of  repudiation:  "On  the  one  hand, 
Europe  must  depend  in  the  long  run  on  her 
own  daily  labor  and  not  on  the  largesse  of 
America;    but,  on  the  other  hand,  she  will  not 

^  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,  p.  273. 
239 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

pinch  herself  in  order  that  the  fruit  of  her  daily 
labor  may  go  elsewhere.  In  short,  I  do  not 
believe  that  any  of  these  tributes  will  continue 
to  be  paid,  at  the  best,  for  more  than  a  very 
few  years.  They  do  not  square  with  human 
nature  or  agree  with  the  spirit  of  the  age.^  .  .  . 
It  might  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  it  is 
impossible  for  the  European  Allies  to  pay  the 
capital  and  interest  due  from  them  on  these 
debts,  but  to  make  them  do  so  would  certainly 
be  to  impose  a  crushing  burden.  They  may  be 
expected,  therefore,  to  make  constant  attempts 
to  evade  or  escape  payment,  and  these  attempts 
will  be  a  constant  source  of  international  friction 
and  ill  will  for  many  years  to  come.  A  debtor 
nation  does  not  love  its  creditor.  .  .  .  There 
will  be  a  great  incentive  to  them  to  seek  their 
friends  in  other  directions,  and  any  future  rupture 
of  peaceable  relations  will  always  carry  with  it 
the  enormous  advantage  of  escaping  the  payment 
of  external  debts.  "^ 

This  must  be  regarded  as  the  voice  of  England 
alone,  for  no  other  country  has  suggested  can- 
celation except  England.  And  what  is  that  but 
a  direct  threat,  the  blackmail  of  force?  By  no 
means  will  "Europe  pinch  herself  in  order  to 
pay  her  debts.  America  pinched  herself  to 
lendy  and  to-day  is  paying  burdensome  taxes 
to  carry  the  loans,  but  England  is  of  greater 
sensitiveness,  and  these  sordid  money  transac- 
tions irk  her  proud  spirit.  Either  America  must 
cancel  the  debt  or  else  we  may  expect  repudia- 

1  J,  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peacey  p.  282. 

2  Ihid,  p.  278. 

240 


MR.  KEYNES'S  JEREMIAD 

tion  and  enmity.  "A  debtor  nation  does  not 
love  its  creditor"  and  "rupture  of  peaceable 
relations"  are  ugly  phrases  pregnant  with 
warning. 

Passing  on,  Mr.  Keynes  next  proposes  an 
international  loan,  "a  fund  of  one  billion  in  the 
first  instance,"  and  to  be  made  by  the  United 
States  as  a  matter  of  course.  Having  repudiated 
ten  billions  as  ''not  squaring  with  the  spirit  of 
the  age,"  even  the  naive  mind  of  Mr.  Keynes 
is  impressed  by  the  necessity  of  reassuring  the 
lender  with  regard  to  the  second  loan,  and  he  is 
entirely  wilHng  that  the  additional  billion  "should 
be  borrowed  with  the  unequivocal  intention 
of  its  being  repaid  in  full."  Of  course,  if  America 
does  not  care  to  enter  into  this  easy  arrange- 
ment, there  is  the  possibility  that  the  indicated 
"rupture  of  peaceable  relations"  may  provide 
a  way  to  make  us. 

Detailed  answer  to  Mr.  Keynes,  however, 
requires  a  volume  all  its  own.  Any  full  exposure 
of  the  contradictions  that  crowd  his  pages  would 
necessitate  lengthy  and  painstaking  analysis, 
particularly  with  respect  to  foot-notes,  for  it  is 
in  their  small  type  that  the  author  huddles  the 
facts  that  he  misrepresents  in  the  bolder  type 
of  his  text.  In  the  chapters  that  follow  only  the 
fundamental  misstatements  of  the  book  will  be 
checked. 

Nor  is  it  the  intent  of  the  writer  to  paint 
either  the  treaty  or  the  Covenant  as  documents 
of  perfection.  Whatever  their  faults,  however, 
their  justice  cannot  be  questioned.  Had  the 
Germans  been  stripped  of  every  asset  and  snb- 

241 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

jected  to  vassalage  for  generations  to  come,  still 
would  the  punishment  have  fallen  far  short  of 
their  monstrous  crime.  As  a  matter  of  truth, 
the  actual  terms  are  in  no  wise  akin  to  enslave- 
ment. If  the  Germans  will  work  in  peace  as 
they  worked  in  war,  bringing  to  reparation  the 
same  passionate  energy  that  they  devoted  to 
destruction,  the  treaty  will  work.  Life  will 
be  hard  for  them,  to  be  sure,  but  is  it  argued 
that  life  is  going  to  be  easy  in  France,  Belgium, 
Italy,  or  Serbia? 

Framed  in  an  hour  of  passion,  with  emphasis 
placed  entirely  on  territorial  and  political  issues, 
and  one  man  only  standing  in  championship  of 
ideals,  there  are  many  changes  that  will  have 
to  be  made  in  a  spirit  of  mercy,  for  justice, 
especially  when  applied  with  literalness,  has 
a  way  of  being  harsh.  What  escapes  Mr. 
Keynes's  notice,  for  the  most  part,  and  the 
notice  of  the  majority  of  people  entirely,  is  that 
ample  provision  is  made  for  this  machinery  of 
accommodation.  When  the  heat  of  nationalism 
has  died  down  and  passions  have  abated,  and 
when  the  necessities  of  the  workaday  world 
have  developed  mutuality  of  interest,  the  Rep- 
arations Commission  may  be  expected  to  dis- 
charge its  high  duties  in  such  manner  as  to 
restore  the  normalities  of  commerce,  industry, 
and  intercourse. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  Treaty  and  the  Cove- 
nant, for  all  their  faults,  stand  as  a  great  and  note- 
worthy attempt  to  rebuild  the  world  on  founda- 
tions of  liberty,  peace,  and  fraternity. 


XVI 

WHAT  MUST  GERMANY   PAY? 

THE  principal  confusion  with  respect  to  the 
treaty  centers  naturally  around  the  matter 
of  reparations.  Huge  calculations  are  intricate 
at  best,  and  for  reasons  that  will  be  explained 
the  Allies  were  at  pains  to  avoid  explicitness  in 
the  indemnity  clauses.  This  premeditated  vague 
ness,  while  essentially  in  the  interest  of  the 
Germans,  nevertheless  lends  itself  admirably 
to  their  campaign  of  distortion.  Mr.  Keynes,, 
for  instance,  declares  that  Germany  must  pay  a 
total  of  $40,000,000,000  and  insists  that  this 
crushing  burden  will  have  the  effect  of  reducing 
a  people  "to  servitude  for  a  generation,  of 
degrading  the  lives  of  millions  of  human  beings, 
and  of  depriving  a  whole  nation  of  happiness." 
Mr.  David  Hunter  Miller,  legal  adviser  to  the 
American  Peace  Commission,  has  answered  this 
bold  misrepresentation  in  detail,  showing  plainly 
*^that  instead  of  an  indemnity  of  $40,000,000,000 
laid  upon  Germany,  as  claimed  hy  Mr,  Keynes, 
with  annual  payments  of  nearly  $4,000,000,000, 
the  indemnity  of  the  treaty  amounts  to  approxi- 
mately $14,000,000,000;  that  this  sum  cannot  he- 
added  to  except  hy  a  unanimous  determination  of 
the  Reparations  Commission  {composed  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,. 
17  243 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

France,  Italy,  and  Belgium),  that  Germany  is  in 
equity  able  to  pay  more,  and  that  before  any  such 
determination,  evidence  and  argument  on  behalf 
of  Germany  must  be  heard.'' 

Subjected  to  analysis,  the  indemnity  clauses 
of  the  treaty  are  as  clear  and  simple  as  a  sum 
in  primary  arithmetic,  and  stand  at  every  point 
in  flat  contradiction  to  the  figures  of  Mr.  Keynes 
and  the  German  economists.     Germany's  first 
payment  is  set  for  May  i,  1921,  in  the  sum  of 
20,000,000,000    marks,    or,    accepting   the    gold 
mark  as  equal  to  a  quarter  of  a  dollar,  $5,000,- 
000,000.     As  credit  items  against  this  payment, 
the  Germans  are  permitted  to  list  the  expenses 
of  the  Army  of  Occupation,  ships,  coal,  securities, 
machinery,  cattle,  and  such  other  assets  as  she 
may  turn  over  to  the  Allies  prior  to  May  i,  1921. 
There  is  also  the  provision  that  "such  supplies 
of  food  and  raw  material  as  may  be  judged  by 
the    governments    of  the    principal   AlHed    and 
Associated    Powers    to    be    essential    to    enable 
Germany  to  meet  the  obligations  for  reparation 
may  also,  with  the  approval  of  the  said  govern- 
ments, be  paid  for  out  of  the  above  sum." 

In  plain  words,  a  part  or  the  whole  of  this  sum 
may  be  reloaned  to  Germany  for  the  recon- 
struction of  her  economic  Hfe.  As  Mr.  Keynes 
is  compelled  to  admit,  even  if  sneeringly:  "This 
is  a  quahfication  of  high  importance.  The 
clause,  as  it  is  drafted,  allows  the  Finance  Minis- 
ters of  the  Allied  countries  to  hold  out  to  their 
electorates  the  hope  of  substantial  payments  at 
an  early  date,  while  at  the  same  time  it  gives  to 
the  Reparations  Commission  a  discretion,  which 

244 


WHAT  MUST  GERMANY  PAY? 

the  force  of  facts  will  compel  them  to  exercise, 
to  give  back  to  Germany  what  is  required  for  the 
maintenance  of  her  economic  existence." 

The  second  monetary  demand  upon  Germany 
is  for  $io,ooo,cxx),ooo  in  bonds,  carrying  interest 
at  zyi.  per  cent,  from  May  2,  192 1,  to  1926,  and 
at  5  per  cent,  plus  i  per  cent,  for  amortization 
thereafter.  In  event,  however,  of  Germany's 
failure  to  meet  completely  the  first  payment  of 
$5,000,000,000,  any  unpaid  balance  is  to  be  con- 
verted into  interest-bearing  bonds  of  the  same 
character  as  the  $10,000,000,000  issue  and  added 
to  that  issue.  As  an  example  of  Mr.  Keynes's 
honest  purpose,  he  makes  this  declaration  in  his 
text,  *' Assuming,  therefore,  that  Germany  is 
not  able  to  provide  any  appreciable  surplus 
toward  reparation  before  1921,  she  will  have  to 
find  a  sum  of  $375,000,000  annually  from  1921 
to  1925,  and  $900,000,000  annually  thereafter."  ^ 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  he  wipes  out  en- 
tirely any  possibility  of  offsets,  allowing  noth- 
ing at  all  for  the  German  ships,  coal,  securities, 
etc.  In  one  of  his  coy  foot-notes,  however,  he 
says,  "If,  per  impossible^  Germany  discharged 
$2,500,000,000  in  cash  or  kind  by  1921,  her 
annual  payments  would  be  at  the  rate  of  $312,- 
500,000  from  1 92 1  to  1925  and  of  $750,000,000 
thereafter."  ^ 

As  a  matter  of  truth,  many  conservative 
economists  figure  that  these  credit  items  will 
reach  a  total  that  may  discharge  the  entire  obli- 
gation, but  none  places  them  at  less  than  $2,500,- 

^  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  oj  the  Peace^  p.  164. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  164, 

24s 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

000,000.^  Assuming,  then,  that  Germany  is 
able  to  make  no  cash  payment  on  May  21,  1912, 
and  has  nothing  to  offer  but  her  offsets,  there 
will  remain  a  balance  of  $2,500,000,00x5  to  add 
to  the  bond  issue  of  $10,000,000,000,  making  a 
total  of  $12,500,000,000.  This  is  the  only  sum 
that  Germany  is  asked  to  pay.  It  is,  in  fact,  the 
whole  German  indemnity.  The  interest  charge 
on  this  amount  would  be  $312,500,000  a  year 
until  1926,  and  thereafter  an  annual  payment 
of  $750,000,000  to  take  care  of  interest  and 
amortization.  This  amount  does  not  include,  or 
even  touch  upon,  the  general  war  costs  of  the 
Allies,  representing  only  a  reasonable  estimate  of 
the  damage  done  to  non-combatants  and  their 
property.     As  Mr.  Keynes  is  compelled  to  admit : 

A  great  part  of  Annex  I  is  in  strict  conformity  with  the 
pre-armistice  conditions,  or,  at  any  rate,  does  not  strain 
them  beyond  what  is  fairly  arguable.  Paragraph  i  claims 
damage  done  for  injury  to  the  persons  of  civilians,  or,  in  the 
case  of  death,  to  their  dependents,  as  a  direct  consequence  of 
acts  of  war;  Paragraph  2,  for  acts  of  cruelty,  violence,  or 
maltreatment  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  toward  civilian 
victims;  Paragraph  3,  for  enemy  acts  injurious  to  health 
or  capacity  to  work  or  to  honor  toward  civilians  in  occupied 
or  invaded  territory;  Paragraph  8,  for  forced  labor  exacted 
by  the  enemy  from  civilians;  Paragraph  9,  for  damage  done 
to  property  with  the  exception  of  naval  and  military  works 
or  materials  as  a  direct  consequence  of  hostilities;  and 
Paragraph  10,  for  fines  and  levies  imposed  by  the  enemy 
upon  the  civilian  population.  All  these  demands  are  just 
and  in  conformity  with  the  Allies'  rights. 

Nor  is  the  amount  of  $15,000,000,000,  minus 


^A  recent  press  despatch   gives  the  information   that  Germany 
is  estimating  these  credit  items  in  excess  of  fire  billions. 

246 


WHAT  MUST  GERMANY  PAY? 

credit  items,  less  than  just.     Mr.  Keynes  him^ 
self  presents  this  estimate  of  damage:^ 

Belgium ^2,500,000,000 

France 4,000,000,000 

Great  Britain 2,850,000,000 

Other  Allies 1,250,000,000 

Total $10,600,000,000 

Mr.  Keynes  admits  that  "no  figures  exist  on 
which  to  base  any  scientific  or  exact  estimate," 
and  so  he  frankly  gives  his  own  "guess  for  what 
it  is  worth."  It  is  a  guess  that  should  have 
destroyed  his  book  in  the  hour  of  its  publication. 
His  Belgian  figure  is  based  upon  the  sneer  that 
hostilities  were  "confined  to  a  small  corner  of 
the  country,  much  of  which  in  recent  times  was 
backward,  poor,  sleepy,  and  did  not  include  the 
active  industry  of  the  country."  The  French 
claim  of  damage  in  the  sum  of  $13,000,000,000, 
without  counting  war  levies,  losses  at  sea,  the 
roads,  etc.,  is  arbitrarily  cut  down  to  $4,000,000,- 
000.  Serbia  is  dismissed  with  a  reference  to  her 
**low  economic  development,"  and  Italy,  Ru- 
mania, and  Greece  are  not  even  considered  in 
detail,  all  being  lumped  together  as  "other 
Allies,"  and  allowed  $1,250,000,000  as  con- 
trasted to  England's  $2,850,000,000.  To  be 
sure,  he  has  the  grace  to  remark:  "It  is  sur- 
prising, perhaps,  that  the  money  value  of  Great 
Britain's  claim  should  be  so  little  short  of  that  of 
France,  and  actually  in  excess  of  that  of  Belgium. 
But  measured  either  by  pecuniary  loss  or  real 

^  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peacey  p.  134. 
247 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

loss  to  the  economic  power  of  the  country,  the 
injury  to  her  mercantile  marine  was  enormous." 
Amazing! 

Between  the  Keynes-German  estimate  of 
$10,000,000,000  and  the  Alhed  estimate  of 
$40,000,000,000  honest  opinion  will  decide  that 
the  sum  of  $15,000,000,000  strikes  a  balance  that 
is  indeed  merciful  to  a  nation  that  plunged  a 
world  into  bloodshed  and  chaos.  This  amount, 
less  an  anticipated  offset  of  $2,500,000,000,  is 
all  that  Germany  is  committed  to  pay.  It  were 
well  indeed  if  the  treaty  had  decreed  that  the 
amount  was  all  that  Germany  was  under  any 
obligation  to  pay.  Throughout  his  book  Mr. 
Keynes  bemoans  the  fact  that  a  lump  indemnity 
was  not  fixed — a  sum  within  Germany's  power  to 
pay — but  he  does  not  state  the  fact,  as  he  knew 
it  to  be  a  fact  at  the  time,  that  this  was  the  con- 
tention of  the  President  from  the  first.  Mr. 
Bernard  M.  Baruch,  economic  adviser  to  the 
American  Peace  Commission,  has  stated  openly 
and  repeatedly  that  the  President  and  his  eco- 
nomic advisers  insisted  at  all  times  upon  the 
imposition  of  a  **  fixed  and  reasonable  sum,"  and 
that  this  sound  proposition  went  down  to  defeat 
before  the  bitter,  unyielding  opposition  of  Lloyd 
George  and  Clemenceau.  At  this  point  it  is 
necessary  to  quote  Mr.  Miller  again,  for  not  only 
is  his  an  authoritative  voice,  but  his  statement 
of  conditions  is  singularly  clear  and  convincing: 

It  is  essential  to  look  at  the  circumstances  surrounding 
the  Conference  in  the  early  months  of  1919.  No  one  then 
seriously  thought  that  Germany  could  pay  an  indemnity 
equivalent   to   the   capital   sum   of  forty   billions.     Some 

248 


WHAT  MUST  GERMANY  PAY? 

economists  did  make  estimates  of  a  possible  total  of  twenty- 
five  billions,  but  such  a  figure  represented  the  blue  sky  of 
optimism. 

There  were,  however,  some  known  factors  in  the  situa- 
tion. One  of  these  was  that  the  amount  which  Germany 
could  in  reason  pay  was  unknown.  Whether  that  sum  was 
ten  billions,  as  Mr.  Keynes  thinks,  or  fifteen  billions,  or 
perhaps  even  twenty,  as  others  thought,  could  not  be  pre- 
dicted then,  and  I  venture  to  say  cannot  be  predicted  now. 
A  second  factor,  moreover,  was  that  any  amount  which 
Germany  could  fairly  pay  was  less  than  the  German  debt. 
A  third  factor  was  public  sentiment  in  Europe,  particularly 
in  Great  Britain  and  France.  Public  sentiment  is  a  fact. 
To  yield  to  a  wrong  public  sentiment  may  be  a  crime,  but 
to  adopt  a  course  which  without  yielding  permits  sentiment 
to  change  and  passions  to  cool  is  the  part  of  wisdom. 

The  conduct  of  the  British  election  campaign  of  Decem- 
ber, 191 8,  and  the  utterances  of  politicians  and  economists 
on  the  Continent,  had  created  a  very  wide-spread  feeling 
among  the  peoples  who  had  suffered  by  the  war  and  who 
could  not  understand  the  mysteries  of  international  trade, 
that  their  financial  burdens  would  be  greatly  lessened  and 
perhaps  even  removed  by  payments  from  Germany.  This 
was  a  delusion  which  existed,  however  unfortunate  or 
deplorable  its  origin. 

The  question  presented  to  the  framers  of  the  treaty  was 
whether  the  existence  of  this  delusion  should  be  recognized 
by  a  form  of  the  treaty  which  did  not  increase  Germany's 
obligation  to  pay,  but  which  left  time  for  appreciation  of 
realities  by  the  Allied  peoples,  or  whether  they  should  adopt 
another  form  of  the  treaty  and  shock  and  enrage  the  senti- 
ment of  a  public  suffering,  depressed,  and  almost  hyster- 
ical. The  framers  of  the  treaty  chose  the  former  course. 
I  believe  that  their  decision  was  wise  and  that  history 
will  sustain  this  view. 

Mr.  Keynes,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  agrees  with 
this  view,  for  while  he  declares  on  page  147  that 
the  sum  to  be  paid  by  Germany  should  have 
been  fixed  at  ^10,000,000,000  at  the  very  out- 

249 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

set,  on  page  158  he  admits  that  "this  was  im- 
possible for  two  reasons.  Two  different  kinds  of 
false  statements  had  been  promulgated,  one  as 
to  Germany's  capacity  to  pay,  the  other  as  to 
the  amount  of  the  Allies'  just  claims  in  respect 
of  the  devastated  areas.  The  fixing  of  either 
of  these  figures  presented  a  dilemma." 

In  reaching  his  decision  the  President  found 
himself  face  to  face  with  this  dilemma.  In  the 
first  place,  Germany  was  bound  by  the  armistice 
terms  to  pay  in  full  for  her  cruel  devastations. 
The  Fourteen  Points  provided  for  damage  done 
in  invaded  territory — Belgium,  France,  Ru- 
mania, Serbia,  and  Montenegro  being  specifically 
mentioned — but  they  did  not  include  the  loss 
caused  by  submarine  sinkings,  bombardments, 
or  air  raids.  It  was  to  cover  these  omissions, 
and  any  others,  that  the  Allies  suggested  an 
addition  to  the  effect  that  Germany  must  make 
compensation  **for  all  damage  done  to  the  civilian 
population  of  the  Allies  and  to  their  property  by 
the  aggression  of  Germany  by  land,  sea,  and  the 
air.''  There  was  also  a  provision  that  "any 
future  claims  of  the  Allies  and  the  United  States 
of  America  remain  unaffected." 

The  President  had  agreed  to  these  additions. 
They  had  been  included  in  the  armistice.  Ger- 
many, after  careful  examination,  had  signed  the 
armistice.  There  was,  therefore,  no  question  as 
to  German  liability.  It  was  even  the  case  that 
under  the  armistice  terms  the  AUies  could  have 
held  Germany  responsible  for  the  devastations 
of  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey,  "imposing  con- 
tingent   liabilities,"     as    Mr.     Keynes     admits, 

250 


WHAT  MUST  GERMANY  PAY? 

"without  running  seriously  contrary  to  the 
general  intention  of  their  engagements." 

The  President  knew  well,  however,  that  it 
was  not  within  the  power  of  Germany  to  pay  the 
full  sum  or  even  a  half  of  the  sum  that  stern 
justice  could  have  demanded.  He  knew  equally 
well  that  the  governments  of  France,  England, 
and  Italy  would  fall  if  this  fact  should  be  ad- 
mitted openly  in  the  treaty.  It  was  not  only 
the  case  that  their  statesmen,  Lloyd  George  par- 
ticularly, had  dealt  in  glowing  promises,  but  also 
that  the  hopes  of  the  peoples  themselves  ran 
naturally  and  inevitably  along  the  line  that  it 
was  right  and  necessary  for  Germany  to  restore 
pre-war  conditions.  As  the  one  escape  from 
national  despair  and  international  collapse,  he 
assented  to  an  agreement  that  did  not  increase 
Germany's  obligation  to  pay,  but  which  con- 
tinued the  hope  of  the  AlHed  peoples  until  the 
recovery  of  normality  enabled  them  to  look 
facts  in  the  face. 

A  Reparations  Commission  was  created  and 
in  this  civil  body  was  vested  full  power  in  con- 
nection with  the  settlement.  The  sum  of  $15,- 
000,000,000  was  fixed  as  the  amount  that  Ger- 
many should  pay,  and  an  additional  bond  issue 
of  ^10,000,000,000  was  recognized  as  permissible. 
This  obligation  was  the  last  word  in  indetermi- 
nateness,  for  it  was  to  be  issued  "when  and  not 
until  the  Reparations  Commission  is  satisfied 
that  Germany  can  meet  the  interest  and  the 
sinking-fund  obligations."  As  a  matter  of  course, 
this  additional  $10,000,000,000  bond  issue  will 
never  be   authorized.     Mr.   Miller,   in   an   able 

251 


ITHE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON       ' 

consideration   of  the   Reparations  Commission, 
makes  this  explanation  of  procedure:  I 

How  is  the  Commission  to  be  convinced?  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  to  be  "guided  by  justice,  equity,  and  good  faith," 
although  *'not  bound  by  any  particular  code  or  rules  of  law 
or  by  any  particular  rule  of  evidence  or  of  procedure.'*  In 
the  second  place,  the  Commission,  to  be  convinced,  must 
be  unanimously  convinced.  This  is  specifically  provided  by 
Annex  II,  clause  13b. 

In  other  words,  the  representatives  of  the  United  States,      i 
of  Great  Britain,  of  France,  of  Italy,  and  of  Belgium  must 
all  be  convinced,  according  to  justice,  equity,  and  good 
faith,  that  a  further  sum  is  payable  or  it  will  never  be  paid.      I 
But  there  is  still  another  safeguard.     The  question  cannot      ! 
be  decided  without  a  hearing.     The  Commission  in  this      j 
matter  is  to  act  judicially;   it  must  receive  evidence  and  it 
must  hear  argument  on  behalf  of  Germany,  and  not  until 
then  can  it  decide.     (Annex  II,  9) 

Mr.  Keynes  strangely  enough  criticizes  the  requirement  i 
of  unanimity,  because  the  Commission  must  be  unanimous  i 
in  order  to  cancel  or  reduce  the  debt;  but  the  debty  so  far  as 
it  is  not  to  be  paid,  either  principal  or  interest,  is  a  figment  j 
of  the  imagination.  It  is  the  payment  that  matters,  and  | 
nothing  else. 

In  short,  Mr.  Keynes's  conclusions  (pages  167-168)  are 
wholly  unwarranted  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty.     He  says 
that  the  treaty  fixes  a  sum  far  beyond  Germany's  capacity,      | 
which  is  then  to  be  reduced  at  the  discretion  of  a  foreign      J 
commission  acting  with  the  object  of  obtaining  each  year      ] 
the  maximum.     The  contrary  is  the  case.     The  treaty  pro- 
vides for  a  payment  reasonably  within  Germany's  ability      I 
and    permits   its   increase  only   upon   evidence   and    proof 
which   will    convince   all   the   representatives   of  the   five      ; 
powers  that  in  justice  and  equity  it  should  be  increased.  1 

With  respect  to  the  Commission,  Mr.  Keynes 
admits  that  "it  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  set 
up  a  body  to  estabUsh  the  bill  of  claim,  to  fix  the 
mode   of  payment,  and   to    approve   necessary 

252  i 


WHAT  MUST  GERMANY  PAY? 

abatements  and  delays."  Having  granted  this, 
however,  he  proceeds  to  distort  and  misrepresent 
its  powers  and  purposes.  He  is  not  original  in 
this.  Almost  word  for  word  he  follows  the 
German  attack  made  by  BrockdorfF-Rantzau  in 
the  reply  of  May  29th,  and  to  which  the  AUies 
repHed : 

The  observations  of  the  German  delegation  present  a 
view  of  this  Commission  so  distorted  and  so  inexact  that  it 
is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  clauses  of  the  treaty  have 
been  calmly  or  carefully  examined.  It  is  not  an  engine  of 
oppression  or  a  device  for  interfering  with  German  sov- 
ereignty. It  has  no  forces  at  its  command;  it  has  no  ex- 
ecutive powers  within  the  territory  of  Germany;  it  cannot, 
as  is  suggested,  direct  or  control  the  educational  or  other 
systems  of  the  country.  Its  business  is  to  ask  what  is  to 
be  paid;  to  satisfy  itself  that  Germany  can  pay;  and  to 
report  to  the  powers,  whose  delegation  it  is,  in  case  Ger- 
many makes  default.  If  Germany  raises  the  money  re- 
quired in  her  own  way,  the  Commission  cannot  order  that 
it  shall  be  raised  in  some  other  way;  if  Germany  offers 
payment  in  kind,  the  Commission  may  accept  such  pay- 
ment, but  except  as  specified  in  the  treaty  itself,  the  Com- 
mission cannot  require  such  a  payment. 

The  Reparations  Commission,  in  plain,  is  the 
President's  provision  for  tempering  justice  with 
mercy.  If  accepted  by  the  Germans  in  faith 
and  honesty,  it  will  prove  a  speedy  and  effective 
agency  for  the  restoration  of  their  economic  Hfe. 
The  purposes  of  the  body  go  far  beyond  the  mere 
collection  of  an  indemnity,  and  are  primarily 
concerned  with  the  rehabilitation  of  Europe  as 
a  whole.  It  has  the  power  to  receive  proposals 
from  Germany  for  a  lump-sum  settlement, 
and   it   has  the   authority   also  to   handle   the 

253 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

fifteen-billion-dollar  imposition  in  such  manner 
as  to  guard  absolutely  the  interests  of  Germany. 
Mr.  Keynes,  in  one  of  his  bursts  of  contradiction, 
says:  "Transferred  to  the  League  of  Nations, 
an  appanage  of  justice  and  no  longer  of  interest, 
who  knows  that  by  a  change  of  heart  and  object 
the  Reparations  Commission  may  not  yet  be 
transformed  from  an  instrument  of  oppression 
and  rapine  into  an  economic  council  of  Europe, 
whose  object  is  the  restoration  of  Hfe  and  of 
happiness,  even  in  the  enemy  countries?'* 
This  was  its  object  at  the  time  and  it  is  more 
than  ever  its  object  to-day. 

These  assertions  are  not  based  upon  conject- 
ure. Long  before  the  rise  of  Mr.  Keynes 
there  was  open  and  official  recognition  of  the 
facts  that  he  presents  in  his  book  as  "revela- 
tions." Mr.  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  economic 
adviser  to  the  American  delegation,  appeared 
as  a  witness  before  the  Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee of  the  Senate  on  August  i,  1919,  and 
testified  that  the  President  had  fought  always 
for  the  naming  of  a  "fixed  and  reasonable  sum,*' 
and  that  while  this  was  not  done,  he  did  succeed 
in  vesting  power  in  the  Reparations  Commission 
to  adjust  the  German  indemnity  in  such  manner 
as  to  make  it  meet  Germany's  abihties.  The 
following  excerpts  from  his  testimony  well  dis- 
close the  spirit  and  intent  of  the  President  and 
his  advisers: 

Senator  Johnson  (of  California):  So  that,  on  the 
figures  as  obtainable  and  presentable  now,  the  bill  is  one 
that  you  say  you  do  not  think  Germany  can  pay,  but  you 
rely  upon  the  fact  that  the  good  sense  of  the  Reparations 

254 


WHAT  MUST  GERMANY  PAY? 

Commission  will  scale  the  amount  down  to  a  point  com- 
mensurate with  the  ability  of  Germany? 

Mr.  Baruch:  Yes;  and  within  that  power  it  has  been 
left  so  that  it  would  work.  It  is  workable;  there  is  no 
question  about  that. 

Senator  Johnson  (of  California):  They  have  the  power 
and  the  contrary  power  as  well? 

Mr.  Baruch:   Contrary  power?     What  do  you  mean? 

Senator  Johnson  (of  California):  That  is,  the  power  to 
scale  down  and  the  discretion  to  fix  as  well  the  amount 
that  might  not  be  scaled  down. 

Mr.  Baruch:  To  fix  the  amount.  But,  of  course,  if  the 
amount  is  fixed,  personally,  I  think  that  will  be  the  most 
workable  treatment — to  fix  with  Germany  the  amount 
which  they  themselves  think  they  could  pay.  Of  course, 
no  one  would  fix  an  amount  against  a  debtor  that  he  did 
not  think  the  debtor  could  pay. 

Senator  Harding:  Why  do  you  say  that  it  (Germany's 
solvency)  is  to  the  interest  of  America,  when  the  Central 
Powers  are  the  most  formidable  commercial  rival? 

Mr.  Baruch:  Can  you  imagine  the  world  being  prosper- 
ous while  130,000,000  people  right  in  the  center  of  the  in- 
dustrial population  are  not  prosperous?  Can  you  imagine 
prosperity  without  the  financial  prosperity  of  the  Central 
Powers,  with  the  finances  of  Italy,  France,  and  of  Belgium 
and  their  industrial  life,  and  to  a  large  extent  England's, 
depending  on  what  they  are  going  to  receive  from  these 
people?  In  that  way  this  reflects  upon  us.  It  is  a  great 
big  partnership.  We  cannot  separate  ourselves  from  it. 
It  is  of  vast  consequence  to  America.  .  .  . 

Senator  Johnson:  I  want  to  get  your  viewpoint.  Our 
activities  will  be  wholly  altruistic? 

Mr.  Baruch:  I  would  say  no  to  that,  for  this  reason: 
the  spirit  and  the  wisdom  of  the  carrying  out  of  this  Repara- 
tions Commission  is  a  matter  of  dollars  and  cents  in  the 
United  States  of  America,  because  upon  the  wisdom  of 
those  decisions  depend  the  financial  and  the  industrial 
conditions  of  the  world  for  years  to  come,  perhaps  for  many 
generations. 

255 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Senator  Johnson:  Then  it  is  from  the  world  standpoint 
and  for  the  stabilizing  of  the  world  ? 

Mr.  Baruch:  And  from  our  own  personal  interests. 
Germany  was  a  very  large  customer  of  ours.  And  this 
Reparations  Commission  does  not  deal  alone  with  Germany, 
but  with  all  the  great  Central  Empires,  and  there  are  some 
130,000,000  to  150,000,000  people  involved  in  this.  And  it 
is  a  matter  about  which  we  are  moved  by  great  altruistic 
ideas  primarily,  but  it  is  also  a  matter  of  deep  self-interest. 

How,  then,  does  Mr.  Keynes  reach  his  con- 
clusion that  the  total  amount  demanded  of 
Germany  is  $40,000,000,000?  His  process  is 
simple.  He  takes  the  first  payment  of  $5,000,- 
000,000,  and  by  disregarding  the  probable  credit 
items  of  $2,500,000,000,  puts  down  the  full 
amount.  To  this  he  adds  the  second  com- 
mitment of  $10,000,000,000.  Then,  thrusting 
aside  the  fact  that  the  third  obligation  of  $10,- 
000,000,000  is  permissive  only  and  cannot  be 
authorized  until  public  hearings  ha>^e  convinced 
the  Reparations  Commission  unanimously  that 
Germany  can  pay  this  additional  amount,  he 
assumes  it  as  an  already  collectible  debt,  thereby 
bringing  his  total  up  to  $25,000,000,000.  The 
inclusion  of  the  third  item  is  imaginative  enough, 
in  all  truth,  but  in  his  next  performance  Mr. 
Keynes  severs  all  connection  with  reality. 
Because  the  Allies  possess  the  right  to  make  claim 
for  all  damages,  Mr.  Keynes  asserts  that  Ger- 
many will  be  expected  to  pay  the  amounts  dis- 
bursed for  pensions,  allowances,  and  like  com- 
pensations. This  total,  by  one  of  his  "guesses," 
is  placed  at  $15,000,000,000  and  added  to  the 
accounts  due  and  payable,  thereby  gaining  the 
figure  of  $40,000,000,000  that  he  holds  up  to  a 

256 


WHAT  MUST  GERMANY  PAY? 

pitying  world  as  the  sum  that  Germany  must 
pay. 

For  the  confusion  of  such  German-Americans 
as  have  resurrected  the  hyphen,  and  for  the 
information  of  the  honest,  let  it  be  stated  again 
that  the  sum  total  of  Germany's  specified  obliga- 
tion under  the  treaty  is  $15,000,000,000,  and 
that  against  this  is  a  credit  item  conservatively 
estimated  at  $2,500,000,000.  The  President 
agreed  to  the  inclusion  of  a  further  impHed 
obligation,  not  because  it  stood  as  an  expressed 
armistice  right  of  the  Allies,  but  because  he 
saw  it  as  the  one  bridge  to  the  future.  No  man 
at  the  Peace  Conference  had  any  idea  that  the 
indemnity  would  ever  be  increased  beyond 
the  $15,000,000,000,  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
many  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  tentative 
amount  would  have  to  be  scaled  down — not 
from  any  sympathy  with  Germany,  but  out  of 
the  conviction  that  the  rehabilitation  of  Ger- 
many's economic  life  was  necessary  to  the  health 
of  the  world.^  The  President's  course  is  already 
justified.  At  this  time  of  writing  (April  25th) 
a  saner  Europe  is  already  suggesting  the  "fixed 
and  reasonable  sum"  that  will  give  Germany  a 
chance  not  only  to  restore  prosperity,  but  a 
chance  to  cleanse  the  honor  that  she  has  dragged 
through  blood  and  mire. 

^  At  the  time  of  the  armistice  Germany's  immediately  trans- 
ferable wealth  was  about  $625,000,000.  This,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  was  an  available  source  of  reparation,  and  could  have 
been  demanded  by  the  Allies.  Instead  of  this  ruthless  method, 
Germany  was  permitted  to  use  $250,000,000  in  gold  for  the 
purchase  of  food,  also  to  export  another  $50,000,000  from  the 
Reichsbank  to  meet  her  obligations  in  neutral  countries. 


XVII 

THE     QUESTION     OF    COAL 

MR.  KEYNES,  in  considering  the  coal  clauses 
of  the  treaty,  is  even  more  untrustworthy 
and  contradictory  than  in  his  analysis  of  the 
cash  indemnity.  Commencing  with  the  flat 
assertion  that  "the  judgment  of  the  world  has 
already  recognized  the  transaction  of  the  Saar 
as  an  act  of  spoliation  and  insincerity,*'  he  paints 
a  picture  of  industrial  ruin  that  gives  the  manu- 
facturing districts  of  Germany  tragic  resemblance 
to  the  devastated  areas  of  France,  Belgium,  and 
Italy.  His  method,  as  per  habit,  is  to  make  the 
blackest  possible  statement  of  the  case  at  the 
outset,  and  then,  in  later  pages  or  in  unobtrusive 
foot-notes,  admit  qualifying  facts  which,  while 
not  altering  the  force  of  his  original  attack,  saves 
him  from  the  direct  charge  of  dishonesty.  In  the 
matter  of  coal,  he  juggles  figures  until  he  has 
them  to  his  liking,  and  then  sums  up  his  arraign- 
ment of  the  treaty  provisions  in  this  confident 
sentence: 

"Our  hypothetical  calculations,  therefore,  leave 
us  with  post-war  German  domestic  requirements 
on  the  basis  of  a  pre-war  efficiency  of  railways 
and  industry  of  110,000,000  tons  against  an  out- 
put not  exceeding  100,000,000  tons,  of  which  40,- 

258 


THE  QUESTION  OF  COAL 

000,000  tons  are  mortgaged  to  the  Allies."  And 
on  this  flat  statement  he  bases  a  somewhat  pas- 
sionate assertion  of  Allied  depravity,  and  a 
pathetic  appeal  in  behalf  of  German  industry. 

What  are  the  facts  .^  In  the  first  place,  Mr. 
Keynes  ignores  at  every  point  this  precise  pledge 
of  the  treaty:  "If  the  commission  shall  de- 
termine that  the  full  exercise  of  the  foregoing 
options  would  interfere  unduly  with  the  indus- 
trial requirements  of  Germany,  the  commission 
is  authorized  to  postpone  or  to  cancel  deliveries, 
and  in  so  doing  to  settle  all  questions  of  priority: 
but  the  coal  to  replace  coal  from  destroyed  mines 
shall  receive  priority  over  other  deliveries." 

In  page  after  page  he  insists  upon  40,000,000 
tons  as  the  coal  that  Germany  "must"  supply 
annually,  and  it  is  only  in  the  fine  type  of  a  foot- 
note, tucked  away  at  the  bottom  of  page  97, 
that  he  makes  the  admission  that  as  early  as 
September,  191 9,  the  coal  demands  upon  Germany 
were  TYiodifled  from  a  delivery  of  4JyOOO,ooo  tons 
per  annum  to  20,000,000  tons. 

On  pages  90  and  91  he  states  that  the  coal 
production  of  Germany,  without  the  Saar, 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and  Upper  Silesia,  cannot  pos- 
sibly exceed  100,000,000  tons,  yet  on  page  97, 
in  the  usual  foot-note,  he  admits  that  in  Septem- 
ber, 1919,  the  level  of  production  was  108,000,000 
tons.  Also,  through  the  usual  medium  of  the 
inconspicuous  foot-note  on  page  92,  he  confesses 
a  German  production  in  191 3  of  13,000,000  tons 
of  rough  lignite  in  addition  to  an  amount  con- 
verted into  21,000,000  tons  of  briquette,  modestly 
adding,  "I  am  not  competent  to  speak  on  the 

18  259 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

extent  to  which  the  loss  of  coal  can  be  made 
good  by  the  extended  use  of  lignite  or  by  econ- 
omies in  its  present  employment;  but  some 
authorities  believe  that  Germany  may  obtain 
substantial  compensation  for  her  loss  of  coal  by 
paying  more  attention  to  her  deposits  of  lignite." 

He  does  not  spare  space  in  reciting  the  de- 
liveries of  coal  that  Germany  must  make — 
always  40,000,000  tons  instead  of  20,000,000 — 
but  he  is  careful  not  to  call  them  "options," 
which  is  what  they  are,  nor  does  he  point  out 
that  every  single  ton  is  to  be  paid  for  at  the 
German  pithead  price  plus  freight  to  the  frontier. 

On  page  83  Mr.  Keynes  attacks  the  Saar 
settlement  as  "an  act  of  spoliation  and  insin- 
cerity," and  on  page  84  he  denounces  the  Upper 
Silesia  arrangement,  but  on  pages  263  and  264, 
far  removed  from  the  original  accusations,  he 
admits  that  both  settlements,  with  some  modi- 
fications, "should  hold  good." 

His  whole  attempt  is  to  give  the  impression 
that  the  Saar  Basin  has  been  annexed  by  France 
as  spoils  of  war.  To  quote  his  exact  words  in  one 
instance,  "The  French  wanted  the  coal  for  the 
purpose  of  working  the  iron-fields  of  Lorraine, 
and  in  the  spirit  of  Bismarck  they  have  taken  it." 
As  a  matter  of  truth,  the  district  has  been  trans- 
ferred, not  to  French  sovereignty,  but  to  the  con- 
trol of  the  League  of  Nations.  This  method  has 
the  double  advantage  that  it  involves  no  annexa- 
tion, while  it  maintains  the  economic  unity  of 
the  district,  important  to  the  interest  of  the  in- 
habitants, and  relieves  France  from  entire  de- 
pendence  on    German    faith.    At   the   end    of 

260 


THE  QUESTION  OF  COAL 

fifteen  years  the  mixed  population,  which  in  the 
mean  while  will  have  had  control  of  its  own  local 
affairs  under  the  governing  supervision  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  will  have  complete  freedom 
to  decide  whether  it  wishes  union  with  Germany, 
union  with  France,  or  the  continuance  of  the 
regime  provided  for  in  the  treaty.  In  event 
that  the  people  vote  to  reunite  with  Germany, 
the  Germans  are  required  to  repurchase  the  mines 
at  a  figure  to  be  determined  by  fair  appraisal.  In 
the  mean  time,  as  an  answer  to  Mr.  Keynes's 
charge  of  spoliation,  the  mines  are  to  be  duly 
credited  to  Germany  on  the  reparation  account 
as  compensation  for  the  destruction  of  French 
mines,  and  as  part  payment  toward  the  indem- 
nity as  a  whole. 

These  paragraphs  were  rewritten  from  the 
first  draft,  as  the  Germans  made  a  point  of 
the  right  to  repurchase.  As  a  further  con- 
cession, Germany  is  given  the  right  to  declare 
the  purchase  price  as  a  prior  charge  upon  her 
assets. 

Mr.  Keynes's  estimate  of  Germany's  post-war 
domestic  requirements  at  110,000,000  tons  is 
based,  as  he  frankly  admits,  "on  the  basis  of  a 
pre-war  efficiency  of  railways  and  industry,'^  As 
a  consequence  of  German  destruction,  the  Euro- 
pean coal  situation  is  the  great  problem  of  recon- 
struction. Germany,  however,  instead  of  sharing 
in  the  general  privations  of  which  she  is  the  sole 
cause,  must  be  permitted  to  have  a  supply  of 
coal  equal  to  every  pre-war  requirement.  The 
industries  of  France,  Belgium,  Italy,  and  the 
new  states  may  stand  with  cold  chimneys,  but 

261 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

under  no  circumstances  must  a  German  factory 
be  allowed  to  shut  down. 

Brushing    hypocrisy    and    misrepresentation 
aside,  the  facts  in  the  case  do  not  admit  of  dis- 
tortion.    At  present  the  coal  production  of  Ger-  | 
many,    minus   the    output   of  the    Saar    Basin,  ; 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and  Upper  Silesia,  is  108,000,000  i 
tons  per  year.     Of  this  she  is  to  deliver  20,000,000 
tons  to  other  countries,  if  the  Reparations  Com-  , 
mission   decides  that  she  is  able  to   meet  this  ; 
requirement.      Assuming   that   the    commission  l 
so  decides,  this  will  leave  88,000,000  tons  for 
German  domestic  consumption.     It  can  be  seen, 
therefore,  that  the  Germans  are  left  with  exactly  : 
80  per  cent,  of  their  pre-war  requirements,  a  far  \ 
larger  percentage  than  is  enjoyed  by  France  or 
Italy  or  Belgium,  even  if  Germany  makes  de- 
liveries to  them  in  accordance  with  the  treaty 
provisions.     Mr.  Baruch,  answering  the  question  | 
as  to  whether  the  coal  clauses  of  the    treaty  ; 
would  work  serious  injury  to  Germany,  said: 

"No.  There  seems  to  be  a  great  misunder-  | 
standing  regarding  those  clauses.  In  addition  ' 
to  the  coal  to  make  up  for  the  loss  from  France's  ' 
destroyed  mines,  the  only  coal  Germany  is  ' 
required  to  export  to  the  Allied  countries  is  the  i 
same  amount  she  exported  to  them  before  the  ; 
war,  and  even  this  is  required  only  for  a  limited 
period,  and  only  if  it  does  not  interfere  with  Ger-  \ 
many's  industrial  life.  As  a  matter  of  fact  there  \ 
are  large  amounts  of  coal  Germany  can  mine  ! 
when  she  gets  ready.  The  trouble  with  her  at  ; 
present  is  that  she  won't  work.  She  won't  dig  i 
the  coal  out  of  the  mines.     If  the  German  and  j 

262  i 


THE  QUESTION  OF  COAL 

other  coal-fields  in  Europe  were  being  properly 
developed  now,  Europe  would  not  need  coal." 

By  way  of  clearing  up  the  whole  matter,  it 
may  be  wise  to  deal  in  detail  with  the  Saar  and 
Upper  Silesia  settlements.  In  neither  case  is 
there  even  the  hint  of  annexation.  As  for  Upper 
Silesia,  the  whole  question  of  sovereignty  is  left 
to  a  vote  of  the  people  themselves.  In  the  mean 
time  the  province  is  not  in  the  hands  of  Poland, 
but  remains  under  the  government  of  an  AlHed 
commission  until  the  plebiscite.  Although  Ger- 
many gained  title  by  force  of  arms,  the  decision 
of  the  future  is  left  to  the  people.  If  they  want 
German  rule  they  can  have  it.  Self-determina- 
tion, however,  does  not  suit  Mr.  Keynes  in  the 
case  of  Upper  Silesia,  or  in  any  other  case  where 
there  is  a  chance  that  Germany  will  lose.  Be- 
cause he  knows  that  the  population  of  Upper 
Silesia  is  Polish  indisputably,  he  enters  the  plea 
that  "economically  it  is  intensely  German;  the 
industries  of  eastern  Germany  depend  upon  it 
for  their  coal,  and  its  loss  would  be  a  destructive 
blow  at  the  economic  structure  of  the  German 
state."  And  in  his  "Remedies"  he  actually 
advances  the  suggestion  that  the  Allies  should 
attempt  to  influence  the  vote  by  (ieclaring  that 
"in  their  judgment,  economic  conditions  require 
the  inclusion  of  the  coal  districts  in  Germany." 

Germany's  needs  and  desires  are  conclusive. 
Poland's  rights  and  Poland's  needs  are  not  to  be 
considered.  After  taking  a  further  fling  at  the 
"bankruptcy  and  incompetency  of  the  new  PoHsh 
state,"  Mr.  Keynes  appeals  to  prejudice  still 
further  by  stating  that  **the  conditions  of  life  in 

263 


^THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON       ^ 

such  matters  as  sanitation  and  social  legislation 
are  incomparably  better  in  Upper  Silesia  than  in    ] 
the  adjacent  districts  of  Poland,  where  similar 
legislation  is  in  its  infancy."     He  forgets  to  men- 
tion that  these  were  the  German  assertions  and 
that  they  are  disputed  at  every  point  by  the    ■ 
Poles.     Nor  does  he  put  proper  emphasis  upon    i 
the  treaty  clause  that  provides  in  event  of  the 
vote  favoring   Poland  that  Germany  shall  have    : 
**the  right  to  purchase  mineral  products,  includ-    \ 
ing  coal,   free  from   all  export   duties  or  other    \ 
charges  or  restrictions  on   exportation,  and  on    j 
terms    as    favorable    as    are    applicable    to    like    ^ 
products  sold  under  similar  conditions  to  pur- 
chasers in  Poland  or  in  any  other  country."  i 

Coming  to  the  Saar  Basin,  it  is  possible  to 
quote  the   printed   opinion  of  Mr.  Miller,  legal    ; 
adviser  to  the  American  Peace  delegation.     He 
has  said: 

The  truth  Is  that  no  arrangement  of  the  treaty  is  fairer     ' 
or  more   defensible  than   the   arrangement  regarding  the     i 
Saar.     The   coal   situation   in   Europe   is   set  out   in   Mr. 
Keynes's  book  at  page  93,  particularly  In  the  foot-note. 
The  diminished  supply  in  France  is  due  not  only  to  the  war,     ' 
to  loss  of  man-power,  to  the  difficulties  of  transport,  but  to     i 
the  deliberate  destruction  by  Germany,  so  far  as  destruc-     ! 
tion  was  physically  possible,  of  the  French  coal-mines  at     | 
Lens  and  elsewhere.     The  Saar  Basin  Is  on  the  border  of 
France,  on  Its  very  frontier;  the  delivery  of  the  coal-mines 
to  French  ownership  for  fifteen  years  is  not  only  an  equitable     i 
way  of  assuring  to  France  some  repletion  of  her  coal-supply, 
but  the  only  physical  way  of  giving  her  any  effective  assur-     j 
ance   whatever.     Deliveries   of  coal   from   Germany   may 
prove,  as  to  some  extent  they  have  already  proved,  illusory. 
That  France  should  receive  nothing  but  a  hope  of  coal 
deliveries  by  Germany,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  coal-     ! 

264  i 


THE  QUESTION  OF  COAL 

supply  of  Europe,  of  her  own  needs,  and  of  her  coal  losses 
during  the  war,  would  have  been  so  unjust  as  to  be  wholly 
indefensible. 

As  for  the  Keynes  charge  that  "the  judgment 
of  the  world  has  already  recognized  the  transac- 
tion as  an  act  of  spoliation  and  insincerity," 
previous  disproofs  may  well  be  capsheafed  by 
this  historical  comment  from  Professor  Hazen 
of  Columbia: 

In  other  words,  the  world  recognized  that  the  Allies  in 
Paris  were  robbers  and  hypocrites,  for  these  are  the  vulgar 
synonyms  for  those  who  engage  in  spoliation  and  insincerity. 
When  one  makes  a  charge  like  that  there  is  perhaps  some 
obligation  to  try  to  prove  it.  It  is  significant  and  it  is  en- 
tirely characteristic  that  the  only  evidence  Mr.  Keynes 
offers  is  the  argument  submitted  by  the  German  delegates 
in  their  reply  to  the  Allies.  This  argument  he  accepts 
with  approval  and  without  the  slightest  critical  analysis. 
One  of  the  assertions  in  the  German  statement  is  that  the 
Saar  district  has  been  German  for  more  than  a  thousand 
years;  that  for  only  sixty-eight  of  those  years  has  it  been 
French.  This  is  the  classic  Pan-German  argument,  long 
urged  with  great  vigor  and  iteration,  that  what  belonged 
to  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  lawfully  belonged  to  the  Hohen- 
zollem  Empire  of  1871  and  must  not  be  touched.  It  has 
been  constantly  urged  in  the  case  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and 
the  Pan-Germanists  of  1914  were  ready  to  apply  it  to  other 
areas  that  had  belonged  to  the  medieval  empire.  This 
German  reply  of  last  May,  which  Mr.  Keynes  accepts  as 
adequate  authority,  also  says  what  when  in  the  treaty  of 
18 14  a  small  portion  of  the  Saar  was  retained  for  France 
the  population  raised  the  most  energetic  opposition  and 
demanded  "reunion  with  their  German  fatherland";  to 
which  they  were  "related  by  language,  customs,  and  re- 
ligion," and  that  this  desire  was  taken  into  account  in  the 
following  year.  No  mention  is  made  either  in  the  German 
reply  or  in  Mr.  Keynes's  text  that  there  is  a  literature  worthy 
of  study  which  shows  that  the  separation  of  the  Saar  from 

265 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 


France  in  1815  was  a  typical  illustration  of  the  Prussian  . 
art  of  land-grabbing  and  that  the  alleged  great  popular  ! 
clamor  was  the  intrigue  of  a  small  clique  of  Germans  in- 
terested in  feathering  their  own  nests  in  a  mining  venture,  j 

Despite  this  basis  for  a  just  claim  to  the  right 

to  annex,  the  Saar  goes  to  the  League  of  Nations  \ 

for  administration,  and  in  fifteen  years  the  peo-  | 

pie    will    decide    their    future    by    independent  1 

ballot.     A  fitting  conclusion  to  the  whole  coal  ' 

consideration  is  the  following  survey  by  David  I 

Hunter  Miller:  ' 

Let  us  look  at  the  matter  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  , 

statesmen  who  framed  the  treaty.     The  coal  situation  in  1 

Europe  was  one  of  great  complexity,  of  great  difficulty,  and  i 

of  great   uncertainty.     Nobody   could   determine   exactly  i 

what  would  in  the  years  immediately  succeeding  the  treaty  ; 

be  an  equitable  distribution  of  coal  in  Europe;  Germany  I 

might  have  a  large  surplus  of  coal  for  export.     Whether  i 
this  would  prove  to  be  the  case  was,  of  course,  unknown,  but 

taking  into  account  the  transport  situation  and  the  coal  1 

situation  generally,  nothing  could  be  more  just  than  that  I 

Germany  should  contribute  this  exportable  surplus,  if  sh<r  \ 

had  ity  both  as  a  payment  on  the  indemnity  and  at  the  same  j 

time  as  a  relief  to  the  economic  and  physical  conditions  of  : 

other  peoples.  ! 

The  scheme  of  the  treaty  followed  logically  and  justly.  ' 

Germany  agrees  to  deliver  her  exportable  surplus  up  to  the  i 

maximum  amount  which  it  could  probably  reach,  approx-  j 

imately  40,000,000  tons.    The  treaty  itself  shows  the  doubt  i 

that  existed  as  to  the  figure  being  reached  or  as  to  any  i 

figure  of  exportable  surplus  being  reached.     The  40,000,000  j 

tons  of  deliveries  mentioned  in  the  treaty  are  "options."  , 

All  of  them  are  stated  to  be  options,  and  as  to  the  whole  of  \ 

the  40,000,000  tons,  and  as  to  any  part  of  them,  the  Repara-  j 
tions  Commission  hy  majority  vote  may  postpone  or  cancel 

deliveries  if  the  exercise  of  the  options  would  interfere  "  with  ' 
the  industrial  requirements  of  Germany."     So,  as  framed, 

266  ' 


THE  QUESTION  OF  COAL 

the  treaty  provides,  and  justly  provides,  a  maximum 
amount  of  coal  which  Germany  can  be  required  to  furnish 
and  leaves  the  actual  amount  to  be  determined  from  time 
to  time  by  a  commission  charged  with  the  duty  of  considering 
German  needs. 

If  it  is  objected  that  the  treaty  might  operate  unjustly  to 
Germany,  that  the  Reparations  Commission  might  be 
arbitrary,  the  answer  Is  that  a  deplorable  coal  situation 
existed  in  Europe,  due  to  the  war,  and  that  no  detailed  dis- 
tribution for  the  years  to  come  could  justly  be  fixed  in  the 
treaty,  but  had  to  be  left  to  decision  on  equitable  principles 
In  the  future. 

But  the  conclusive  answer  Is  the  action  already  taken  by 
the  Coal  Commission,  which  Is  for  this  purpose  practically 
the  Reparations  Commission,  In  reducing  by  more  than 
50  per  cent,  the  amount  of  coal  to  be  furnished  by  Ger- 
many, In  promising  to  give  consideration  to  further  reduc- 
tion If  German  production  should  decrease,  and  in  limiting 
to  50  or  60  per  cent,  the  amount  to  be  supplied  from  any 
such  future  Increase. 


The  treaty,  according  to  Mr.  Keynes,  sweeps 
the  German  mercantile  marine  from  the  seas 
for  many  years  to  come.  It  must  be  admitted 
that  this  is  hardly  a  fair  description  of  the 
arrangement  that  compels  Germany  to  turn 
over  her  own  ships  to  take  the  place  of  the 
tonnage  ruthlessly  destroyed  by  her  submarines 
during  the  war.  The  Germans  did  not  seek 
to  escape  responsibility  in  this  regard  and  the 
one  appeal  was  for  modifications  that  would 
permit  Germany  to  retain  and  use  her  mercan- 
tile marine  while  she  built  other  ships  for  the 
Allies.  While  Mr.  Keynes  denounces  the  ship- 
ping provisions  of  the  treaty  on  page  Gj,  his 
indignation  has  spent  itself  by  the  time  he  reaches 
page  261,  for  under  the  head  of  "Remedies" 

267 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

he  suggests  quite  calmly  that  "the  surrender  of 
merchant-ships  and  submarine  cables  required 
under  the  treaty,  etc.,  should  be  reckoned  as 
worth  the  lump  sum  of  ^2,500,000,000,  and 
should  be  deducted"  from  a  lump  indemnity  of 
$10,000,000,000. 

As  showing  the  erratic  quahty  of  his  mind, 
on  page  174  he  says:  "Estimating  the  tonnage 
of  German  shipping  to  be  taken  over  under  the 
treaty  at  4,000,000  gross  tons  and  the  average 
value  per  ton  at  $150  per  ton,  the  total  money 
value  involved  is  $600,000,000." 

Mr.  Baruch,  asked  whether  it  would  be  pos- 
sible for  Germany  to  re-establish  a  mercantile 
marine,  made  this  answer:  "Certainly  it  is 
possible.  It  depends  partly,  however,  upon  the 
wisdom  and  generosity  of  the  Allies.  The 
ownership  of  a  merchant  marine  in  time  of  peace 
is  not  very  different  from  the  ownership  of  raw 
materials.  In  time  of  war  or  blockade  we  over- 
emphasize their  importance  because  the  channels 
through  which  they  move  are  disrupted.  Under 
peaceful  conditions  both  ships  and  raw  mate- 
rials will  move  naturally  to  the  highest-paying 
market." 

Mr.  Keynes,  however,  insists  that,  "The 
prosperity  of  German  ports  and  commerce 
can  only  revive,  it  would  seem,  in  proportion 
as  she  succeeds  in  bringing  under  her  effective 
influence  the  merchant  marines  of  Scandinavia 
and  of  Holland."  As  Mr.  Miller  caustically 
comments,  "If  ports  and  commerce  require 
for  their  prosperity  ships  of  a  particular  flag, 
then  the  United  States  was  without  prosperous 

268 


THE  QUESTION  OF  COAL 
ports  or  important  foreign  commerce  before  the 


war. 


In  discussing  the  clauses  relating  to  the  river 
system  of  Germany,  Mr.  Keynes  declares: 
**These  are  largely  unnecessary  and  are  so  little 
related  to  the  supposed  aims  of  the  Allies  that 
their  purport  is  generally  unknown.  Yet  they 
constitute  an  unprecedented  interference  with  a 
country's  domestic  arrangements,  and  are  capa- 
ble of  being  so  operated  as  to  take  from  Germany 
all  effective  control  over  her  own  transport 
system."  Whereupon  he  attacks  the  plan  as 
part  of  the  general  policy  to  "impoverish 
Germany"  and  to  "obstruct  her  development 
in  future."  One  hesitates  to  characterize  the 
type  of  mind  that  can  permit  itself  such  state- 
ments. Instead  of  their  purport  being  "un- 
known," the  theory  of  international  river  control 
was  established  in  the  Allied  answer  as  one  of 
the  fundamentals  of  peace,  and  these  great 
principles  were  asserted:  that  it  was  vital  to 
the  free  life  of  young,  landlocked  states  to  have 
secure  access  to  the  sea  along  rivers  which  are 
navigable  through  their  territory;  that  if  viewed 
according  to  the  discredited  doctrine  that  every 
state  is  engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle  for 
ascendancy  over  its  neighbors,  no  doubt  such 
arrangement  may  be  an  impediment  to  the 
artificial  strangling  of  a  rival;  but  if  it  be  the 
idea  that  nations  are  to  co-operate  in  the  ways 
of  commerce  and  peace,  they  are  natural  and 
right. 

Instead  of  being  "unprecedented,"  even  be- 
fore the  war  an  international  commission  regu- 

269 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

lated  the  Rhine  and  the  Danube.  What  the 
Peace  Conference  did  was  merely  to  extend  the 
principle  not  only  to  other  German  rivers,  but 
to  all  the  rivers  of  Europe.  It  is  a  plan  as  vast 
as  it  is  commendable  to  end  the  autocracies 
of  national  privilege  by  internationalizing  all  the 
great  waterways  of  the  Continent  so  that  the 
stream  that  passes  through  one  nation  shall  be 
just  as  free  in  all  its  length  to  the  sea  as  if  that 
nation  owned  the  whole  of  it. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  German  counter- 
proposals admitted  the  wisdom  and  justice  of 
the  plan,  and  objected  only  on  the  ground  that 
reciprocity  was  not  provided  for,  although  sug- 
gesting various  changes  and  making  certain 
demands.  The  Allied  answer  stated  that  re- 
ciprocal rules  would  be  arranged  as  soon  as  the 
League  of  Nations  laid  down  general  conventions. 
Concessions  were  made,  however,  in  a  strength- 
ening of  the  clauses  assuring  freedom  of  transit 
across  West  Prussia  to  Germany,  the  increase 
of  Germany's  representation  on  the  Oder  from 
one  to  three,  the  representation  of  Germany 
on  the  commission  to  estabhsh  a  permanent 
status  for  the  Danube,  the  submission  of  the 
future  Rhine-Danube  Canal  to  the  general 
regime  of  international  waterways,  and  the  sup- 
pression of  the  clauses  as  to  the  constructing  of 
railroads  through  Germany  and  of  the  Kiel 
Canal  Commission. 


XVIII 

SHANTUNG   AND   HYPOCRISY 

NOT  the  President  nor  supporters  of  the  Peace 
Treaty  have  ever  advanced  an  opinion  that 
the  Shantung  settlement  was  ideal,  but  there  has 
been  frank  admission  at  all  times  that  a  widely 
different  arrangement  was  hoped  for  and  worked 
for.  As  it  stands,  however,  the  agreement  with 
relation  to  Shantung  holds  out  a  brighter  promise 
to  China  than  has  ever  before  illumined  her 
helplessness,  for  in  it  is  the  certainty  of  protec- 
tion against  further  despoliation  and  explicit 
guaranties  that  will  lead  to  the  restoration  of 
lost  sovereignties.  On  the  other  hand,  those 
who  preach  the  treaty's  defeat  on  account  of 
the  Shantung  provision  have  nothing  to  offer 
except  their  false  sympathy,  and  even  as  they 
cry  out  their  pretended  indignation  they  know 
that  their  course,  if  successful,  can  have  no 
other  end  than  the  dooming  of  China  to  a  greater 
hopelessness,  a  more  profound  despair. 

Americans,  as  a  whole,  are  invincibly  antago- 
nistic to  the  Japanese.  This  dislike,  originating 
in  California,  has  been  spread  by  the  malign 
activities  of  demagogic  politicians  and  papers, 
and  the  general  policies  of  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment have  not  helped  to  bring  about  a  better 
understanding.     Militaristic    and    imperialistic, 

271 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON      I 

.  ! 

the  spirit  of  Japan  has  rasped  the  United  States 

at  every  point,  and  this  irritation  has  closed  the  i 

average    mind    to    any    fair    consideration    of 

issues  in  which  Nippon  has  a  stake.     Not  one  | 

citizen  in  10,000  knows  the  details  of  the  Shan-   I 

tung  settlement,  or  has   any  exact   knowledge  ; 

of  the   Chinese   conditions   that   led    up   to   it.   \ 

These    prejudices    and    ignorances    have    fitted   i 

perfectly  into  the  plans  of  partizans  who  have 

banded  to  defeat    the    treaty  and  to  discredit 

the  President.     Their  hypocrisy  is  a  matter  of  ; 

proof,   not    assumption,   for  while   the   citizens  ' 

may  be  excused  on  the  score  of  non-understand-   , 

ing,  the  members  of  the  Senate  of  the  United 

States  can  enter  no  such  plea,  for  they  know,  or   ■ 

should   know,  the  record   of  rapacity  that  has   | 

been  written  at  China's  expense  during  the  last   : 

quarter  of  a  century.     Shantung  was  the  begin-   ! 

ning  of  spoliation  even  as  it  promises  to  be  the  \ 

end.  i 

The  first  act  in  the  sordid  tragedy  of  China    i 

was  staged  in   1894,  when  Japan  declared  war  j 

under  pretense  of  saving  Manchuria  from  Russian 

domination.     The  fruit  of  Japanese  victory  was   '. 

Port  Arthur  and  the  Liao-tung  Peninsula,  but   \ 

Russia  stepped  in,  backed  by  France  and  Ger-   ; 

many,  and  forced  Japan  to  surrender  the  terri-   ; 

tory.     Tokio  exhausted  effort  to  obtain  a  pledge   \ 

that   Russia   had   no   designs   upon   Manchuria,   i 

but  a  treaty  to  this  end  was  refused,  and  in  1897 

the    Russians    effected     a    virtual    occupation. 

The  war-ships  of  the  Czar  entered  the  harbor  of 

Port  Arthur  and  in  April,  1898,  it  was  announced 

that  China  had  granted  Russia  a  lease  that  was, 

272 


SHANTUNG  AND  HYPOCRISY 

to  all  intents,  a  surrender  of  Manchurian  sover- 
eignty. Port  Arthur  was  fortified,  garrisons 
were  established,  railroads  were  built,  and  the 
whole  country  was  treated  as  a  Russian  province. 

In  1898  two  German  missionaries  were  killed 
by  Chinese  mobs.  Despite  the  disavowals  of 
the  Chinese  government,  and  its  plain  proof 
that  the  murders  were  due  entirely  to  an  outburst 
of  local  passion,  the  Germans  invaded  China 
with  drawn  swords  under  pretense  of  restoring 
order.  By  way  of  gratitude  for  the  Kaiser's 
aid,  China  was  compelled  to  grant  certain  con- 
cessions to  Germany  in  Shantung,  the  lease 
including  the  seaport  of  Tsing-Tau  and  embrac- 
ing the  privilege  of  building  a  railroad  and 
exploiting  ore  deposits.  Senator  Hiram  John- 
son, more  particularly  than  any  other,  has 
spared  no  pains  to  create  the  impression  that  the 
"Shantung  question"  involves  the  entire  prov- 
ince with  its  area  of  56,000  square  miles  and  its 
population  of  38,000,000.  The  grimy  history 
of  political  debate  is  without  record  of  any 
greater  falsehood.  The  ceded  area  covers  117 
square  miles  and  a  zone  of  suzerainty  76  miles — 
a  total  of  193  square  miles — and  the  population 
of  the  grant  to-day  is  about  60,000. 

Emboldened  by  the  success  of  Russia  and 
Germany,  England  seized  the  port  of  Wei-Hai- 
Wei  and  France  then  took  Tonking,  with  its 
80,000  people.  Nothing  was  left  to  China  but 
Peking,  and  even  there  a  joint  army  of  occupa- 
tion masqueraded  under  the  name  of  "legation 
guards." 

William  McKinley  was  President  at  the  time, 
273 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

and  John  Hay  was  his  Secretary  of  State,  yet 
from  America  no  word  of  protest  went  forth 
against  the  aggressions  of  Germany,  France, 
England,  and  Russia,  but  only  a  warning  that 
there  must  be  no  interference  with  America's 
trading  rights  in  China — that  the  invaders  must 
keep  an  "open  door"  for  American  merchandise. 
As  long  as  we  were  permitted  to  do  business 
in  the  stolen  territories  we  were  willing  to  let 
them  be  stolen.  And  not  Senator  Lodge,  nor 
any  other  RepubHcan  leader  now  prominent 
in  the  Shantung  agitation,  lifted  his  voice  to 
cry  out  against  the  rape  of  unhappy  China. 

In  1904  came  the  war  betweeen  Russia  and 
Japan.  The  peace,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  concluded  at  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire, 
under  the  benevolent  auspices  of  President 
Roosevelt,  and  as  a  result  of  the  treaty  framed 
on  American  soil  Japan  took  over  the  Russian 
"leases"  in  Manchuria,  Port  Arthur  and  its 
fortifications,  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railroad,  and 
Korea.  Again  no  protest  was  raised,  but  on  the 
contrary  press  and  people  commended  President 
Roosevelt  for  his  "great  achievement"  in  secur- 
ing a  "just  peace,"  and  Japan  was  praised  as  a 
"noble  victor." 

The  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  found  Japan 
the  ally  of  England,  and  without  delay  she  en- 
tered into  the  fulfilment  of  her  treaty  obliga- 
tions, declaring  war  on  Germany  on  August  23, 
1914.  The  consideration  of  tremendous  interest 
to  the  Allies,  as  a  matter  of  course,  was  that 
Germany's  bases  of  operations  in  the  Pacific 
should  be  destroyed,  for  not  only  did  the  German 

274 


SHANTUNG  AND  HYPOCRISY 

occupation  of  Shantung  forbid  the  transport  of 
troops  from  AustraHa,  but  it  gave  a  position  of 
advantage  for  continual  knife-thrusts  into  Eng- 
land's back.  Without  delay  Japan  attacked 
the  strong  forts  of  Tsing-Tau,  captured  them, 
and  swept  German  power  from  the  Pacific. 

In  May,  191 5,  China  signed  a  solemn  agree- 
ment to  the  effect  that  she  recognized  Japan's 
rights  to  the  Shantung  leasehold,  and  would 
assent  to  any  future  arrangement  effected  be- 
tween Japan  and  Germany.  In  the  spring  of 
1917,  when  Japan's  larger  participation  in  the 
war  was  necessary,  England  and  France  signed 
a  treaty  agreeing  to  recognize  the  Japanese  claim 
to  Shantung,  and  in  191 8  China  yielded  a  similar 
guaranty. 

This,  then,  was  the  situation  that  faced  the 
President  on  April  29th.  The  ideal  arrange- 
ment, as  he  saw  it,  was  an  outright  cancelation 
of  the  Shantung  lease  in  order  that  the  League 
of  Nations  might  build  from  the  beginning  on  a 
foundation  of  honor  and  territorial  integrity.  A 
variety  of  things  joined  to  make  any  such  settle- 
ment impossible.  In  the  first  place,  Japanese 
feeling  was  already  very  bitter  on  account  of  the 
refusal  of  the  Peace  Conference  to  recognize  the 
"equality  of  the  nations  and  the  just  treatment 
of  their  nationals,"  and  this  bitterness  had  ample 
justification.  The  only  excuse  for  this  discrimi- 
nation, as  the  President  frankly  explained,  was  an 
American  prejudice,  and,  while  the  future  might 
remove  it,  it  had  to  be  dealt  with  as  a  factor  at 
the  time.  Wounded  in  their  pride,  and  deeply 
angered  by  what  seemed  a  breach  of  faith,  the 

19  275 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Japanese  insisted  that  if  their  claim  to  the  Shan- 
tung concession  was  to  be  ignored,  they  would 
quit  the  Conference  and  refuse  to  sign  the  Peace 
Treaty.  No  one  was  suggesting  that  either 
England  or  France  should  surrender  Chinese 
leases.  Why,  then,  should  the  entire  burden  of 
sacrifice  be  placed  upon  Japan?  To  consent  to 
any  such  arrangement  was  tantamount  to  a 
confession  that  England  and  France  were  to  be 
trusted  in  China,  but  that  Japan  was  to  be 
excluded  as  an  untrustworthy  nation. 

As  the  Japanese  delegates  pointed  out,  it  was 
not  that  they  were  asking  anything  from  China, 
but  merely  taking  over  the  German  lease  granted 
by  China  in  1898,  and  which  still  had  seventy- 
eight  years  to  run.  By  an  expenditure  of  blood 
and  money  they  had  dispossessed  the  Germans 
and  were  now  the  legal  possessors  of  the  lease. 
England,  France,  and  China  had  affirmed  the 
transfer.  Under  no  circumstances  would  Japan 
allow  these  treaties  to  be  turned  into  scraps  of 
paper.  As  has  been  remarked,  Lloyd  George 
and  Clemenceau  informed  the  President  that 
they  could  not,  in  common  honor,  repudiate  the 
pledges   that  they  had  given  to  Japan. 

At  the  very  outset  the  President  indulged  in 
some  very  plain  speech.  Speaking  for  the 
United  States,  he  refused  absolutely  to  recognize 
ehe  treaties  of  191 5  and  191 8  by  which  China 
agreed  to  transfer  the  German  rights  in  Shantung 
to  the  Japanese.  He  proved  conclusively  that 
the  signature  of  China  in  both  instances  was 
obtained  under  threat  of  war,  and  he  proved 
also  that   China  would   have  entered  the  war 

276 


SHANTUNG  AND  HYPOCRISY 

against  Germany  in  1914  but  for  Japan's  veto. 
Tokio  did  not  want  to  see  a  Chinese  army  in 
the  field,  and  it  was  only  after  America's  entrance 
into  the  world  struggle  that  Japan  grudgingly 
consented  to  let  China  become  a  belligerent. 
Japan,  in  answer,  merely  pointed  to  the  fact 
that  Spain  had  ceded  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philip- 
pines to  the  United  States  under  duress.  She 
held  up  the  solemn  promise  of  England  and 
France  and  stated  flatly  that  her  delegates 
would  leave  Paris  at  once  unless  her  claim  to 
Shantung  was  granted. 

What  was  the  President  to  do?  It  was  not 
only  the  case  that  Japan  was  supported  at  every 
point  by  the  strict  letter  of  international  law, 
but  it  was  equally  true  that  there  was  not  one 
single  compulsion  that  could  be  applied  to  make 
her  consent  to  a  course  of  which  her  statesmen 
did  not  approve.  By  no  means  was  it  a  study  in 
the  abstract.  Japan  was  in  actual  and  absolute 
possession  of  Shantung,  able  to  enforce  her  rights 
regardless  of  any  decision  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence. It  was  not  only  the  case  that  the  departure 
of  the  Japanese  delegates  would  defeat  the  Peace 
Treaty  and  continue  world  chaos,  but  it  stood 
plain  that  China  would  not  be  helped  in  any 
degree.  The  President,  however,  met  firmness 
with  firmness  and  out  of  the  clash  of  wills  there 
came  a  decision  which,  while  not  ideal,  may  yet 
stand  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable  victories  of 
the  whole  Conference.  The  President  agreed 
that  the  German  lease  should  be  transferred 
without  reservation  to  Japan,  while  the  Japanese 
delegates  agreed  "to  hand  back  the  Shantung 

277 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

peninsula  in  full  sovereignty  to  China,  retaining 
only  the  economic  privileges  granted  to  Germany 
and  the  right  to  establish  a  settlement  under  the 
usual  conditions  at  Tsing-Tau."  All  fortifica- 
tions were  to  be  razed,  all  Japanese  troops  were 
to  be  withdrawn,  and  any  police  force  that  might 
be  needed  for  the  protection  of  Japanese  proper- 
ties was  to  be  recruited  from  the  Chinese  popula- 
tion. Where  Germany  ruled  as  a  sovereign  in 
Shantung  Japan  will  operate  only  as  an  economic 
concessionnaire,  enjoying  no  rights  but  the  eco- 
nomic and  commercial  rights  that  go  with  its 
lease  to  operate  a  railroad  and  to  develop 
mines. 

The  President  did  not  stop  with  this  arrange- 
ment. Calling  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau 
into  the  council-chamber  again,  he  explained  the 
nature  of  the  agreement,  and  asked  flatly 
whether  he  might  expect  that  England  and 
France  would  follow  the  laudable  example  of 
Japan.  The  two  Premiers  stated  that  they  were 
willing  that  the  French  and  English  concessions 
should  be  passed  upon  by  the  League  of  Nations 
and  that  the  President  might  count  upon  their 
influence  in  securing  the  surrenders  necessary  to 
restore  the  territorial  integrity  of  China. 

Those  who  strike  at  the  Peace  Treaty,  under 
pretense  of  friendship  and  pity  for  China,  are  in 
reality  the  enemies  of  China.  The  defeat  of  the 
treaty  will  not  cancel  the  Shantung  lease  or  put 
an  end  to  Japanese  control  of  the  former  German 
holdings.  These  are  things  that  can  be  done 
only  by  force.  America  would  have  to  take 
arms  against  Japan,  and  inasmuch  as  France  and 

278 


SHANTUNG  AND  HYPOCRISY 

England  are  in  China,  these  two  nations  would 
also  have  to  be  fought  and  expelled.  It  is  sig- 
nificant, however,  that  not  a  RepubHcan  Senator 
has  had  the  courage  or  honesty  to  suggest  this 
course,  for  it  is  not  China  that  they  want  to  help, 
but  the  President  that  they  want  to  discredit. 
If  the  League  of  Nations  does  not  become  a  fact, 
with  America  in  it  as  a  champion  of  fair  dealing, 
China  has  been  robbed  of  her  one  great  chance 
to  regain  her  ravished  sovereignty.  Japan,  re- 
leased from  her  obKgation,  will  undoubtedly 
treat  Shantung  as  the  Germans  treated  it — 
fortifying,  colonizing,  expanding — striking  always 
deeper  into  the  heart  of  China.  France  and 
England,  no  longer  bound  by  their  promises  to 
the  President,  will  strengthen  their  holds  in 
China,  and  the  unhappy  country  will  more  than 
ever  become  the  prey  of  strength. 

Only  in  the  ratification  of  the  treaty — only  in 
the  operation  of  the  League  of  Nations — is  there 
any  hope  for  China.  This  great  tribunal,  when 
it  is  set  up,  will  see  to  it  that  Japan  stands  by  her 
bargain,  receiving  no  rights  other  than  as  an 
economic  concessionnaire,  and  at  the  end  of  her 
lease  quitting  China  entirely.  France  and  Eng- 
land will  also  be  held  to  their  words,  and  quick 
action  may  be  expected  that  will  either  put  them 
outside  of  China  or  else  continue  them  as  mere 
tenants  and  not  as  sovereigns.  The  whole  in- 
tent of  Article  X  is  to  respect  and  preserve 
the  territorial  integrity  and  political  indepen- 
dence of  nations,  and  not  only  is  China  to  be  a 
member  of  the  League,  with  full  power  of  pro- 
test, but  the  other  nations  of  the  world  are  at 

279 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

last  in  a  position  to  voice  their  own  protests 
against  the  intolerable  grievances  to  which  the 
Chinese  have  been  subjected. 

There  is  no  question  that  Japan  will  Uve  up  to 
her  agreement  in  event  of  the  constitution  of  a 
League  of  Nations.  Contrary  to  general  opinion, 
Japan,  as  a  nation,  has  been  more  scrupulous 
than  any  other  in  the  observance  of  treaty 
obligations.  Another  factor,  overlooked  by  the 
average  American,  is  the  existence  and  increas- 
ing strength  of  the  liberal  movement  in  Japan. 
In  the  last  few  years,  particularly,  democratic 
sentiment  has  had  an  amazing  growth  in  the 
Flowery  Kingdom,  and  there  is  every  certainty 
that  the  mihtary  tradition  will  soon  be  over- 
thrown. Arbitrary  and  discriminatory  treat- 
ment in  the  matter  of  Shantung  would  have 
caused  a  revulsion  in  Japanese  feeling,  restoring 
the  imperialistic  party  to  all  of  its  old  power,  but 
the  League  of  Nations,  with  its  accent  upon 
peace  and  justice,  is  virtually  a  guaranty  of 
victory  for  the  forces  of  liberalism. 

Japan  wants  the  friendship  of  the  world,  but 
more  than  anything  else  she  needs  the  friendship 
of  China.  In  the  opinion  of  the  best  informed, 
there  is  little  doubt  that  Japan  will  not  only 
hold  to  her  agreement,  but  that  she  will  go  even 
farther,  perhaps  to  the  length  of  cancehng  the 
entire  Shantung  concession  as  the  first  step  in 
winning  the  confidence  of  the  Chinese. 

Whether  this  is  done  or  whether  this  is  not 
done,  the  arrangement  forced  by  the  President, 
and  depending  upon  the  formation  of  a  League 
of  Nations,    is    China's    one    hope.     The    only 

280 


SHANTUNG  AND  HYPOCRISY 

other  way  is  for  America  to  demand  the  return 
of  Shantung  under  threat  of  war,  and  every 
person  of  intelHgence  knows  that  this  is  not 
going  to  be  done. 

It  is  also  the  case  that  the  President  did  not 
rest  satisfied  with  the  settlement,  but  proceeded 
at  once  to  put  the  future  of  China  upon  firm 
ground.  The  representatives  of  the  United 
States,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Japan  met 
in  conference  and  associated  in  a  consortium 
based  upon  these  principles: 

(a)  That  no  country  should  attempt  to  culti- 
vate special  spheres  of  influence; 

(b)  That  all  existing  options  held  by  a  mem- 
ber of  any  of  the  national  groups  should,  so  far 
as  practicable,  be  turned  into  the  consortium 
as  a  whole; 

(c)  That  the  four  banking  groups  of  the  coun- 
tries in  question  should  act  in  concert  and  in  an 
effective  partnership  for  the  interests  of  China; 
and 

(d)  That  the  consortium's  operations  should 
deal  primarily  with  loans  to  the  Chinese  Republic 
or  to  provinces  of  the  Republic,  or  with  loans 
guaranteed  or  officially  having  to  do  with  the 
Republic  or  its  provinces,  and  in  each  instance 
of  a  character  sufficient  to  warrant  a  pubHc  issue. 

Here  was  plain  agreement  that  not  only  would 
China  be  protected  from  spoliation  in  the  future, 
but  that  the  partitions  of  the  past  would  be 
remedied.  Here  was  an  open,  honest  offer  of 
financial  help — an  unselfish  concert  of  nations 
for  the  purpose  of  lifting  China  out  of  debt 
and  putting  her  on  the  road  to  solvency. 

281 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Emboldened  by  the  position  of  the  Republican 
majority  in  the  Senate,  Japan  is  showing  signs 
of  a  desire  to  repudiate  the  consortium,  a  course 
she  would  not  dare  to  pursue  were  the  United 
States  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations.  It 
is  a  course  that  every  other  nation  will  com- 
mence to  adopt  if  America  persists  in  with- 
holding her  voice  and  influence.  It  is  not  only 
the  welfare  of  China  that  is  being  imperiled  by 
Senator  Lodge  and  his  Republican  majority, 
but  the  hopes  of  every  weak  nation  in  the  world. 


XIX 

THE   ADRIATIC   TANGLE 

THE  impregnability  of  the  President's  position 
with  respect  to  Fiume  is  proved  absolutely 
by  the  written  record.  It  may  not  be  seriously 
questioned  that  the  Treaty  of  London  is  to  be 
considered  as  a  complete  statement  of  Italy's 
war  objectives.  England  and  France,  facing 
what  seemed  to  be  certain  defeat,  were  little 
disposed  to  quibble  over  the  terms  that  would 
bring  a  new  ally  into  the  war,  especially  as  the 
rewards  that  Italy  was  to  receive  were  entirely 
at  the  expense  of  the  enemy.  What  Italy  asked 
was  the  Trentino,  as  a  matter  of  course,  the 
province  of  Triest,  the  peninsula  of  Istria, 
most  of  Dalmatia,  the  chief  Dalmatian  islands, 
and  the  Dodecannesus.  This  parceUng  rectified 
the  northern  frontier,  reclaiming  Italian  territory 
long  held  by  the  Austrians,  and  also  gave  Italy 
virtual  control  of  the  Adriatic.  France  and 
England  agreed  to  these  demands,  and  incor- 
porated them  into  the  Treaty  of  London.  No 
one  can  doubt  that  the  two  nations,  in  their 
extremity,  would  have  granted  anything  that 
Italy  chose  to  request,  and  Fiume  would  have 
been  signed  over  without  demur  had  the  city 
been   asked   for.     Instead   of  that,   the   Italian 

283 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

representatives    specifically    insisted    upon    the 
exclusion  of  Fiume  and  Spalato. 

Fiume,  therefore,  was  not  an  Italian  objective 
when  Italy  set  down  the  terms  upon  which  she 
stood  ready  to  enter  the  war.  Nor  was  Fiume 
in  the  mind  of  Italy  even  at  the  time  of  the 
armistice,  for  on  December  2,  191 8,  the  ItaHan 
Bureau  of  Information  in  Washington  issued  a 
statement  in  denial  of  imperiaHstic  pretensions, 
making  this  formal  reference  to  Fiume: 

The  Treaty  of  London  is  the  only  document  supported 
by  the  Allies  in  which  there  are  precise  promises  in  favor 
of  the  Jugoslavic  peoples,  and  these  promises  were  asked 
by  Italy  before  the  Allies.  Italy,  which  might  have 
egotistically  treated  only  with  regard  to  her  own  rights, 
has  wished,  in  entering  the  war,  to  assure  also  to  the  Jugo- 
slavs their  rights  for  a  just  balance  of  power  in  the  Adriatic. 

Note  2  attached  to  Article  V  of  the  treaty  (of  London) 
establishes: 

The  following  districts  upon  the  Adriatic  shall  be  by 
virtue  of  the  powers  of  the  Entente  included  in  the  territory 
of  Croatia,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro:  .  ,  .  the  entire  coast 
of  Croatia,  the  port  of  Fiume,  and  the  little  ports  of  Nevi 
and  of  Carlopago. 

This  stipulation,  as  it  gives  proof  of  the  generous  loyalty 
of  the  Italian  people,  so  it  gives  the  first  measure  of  what 
should  be  and  is  a  just  accord  of  all  rights;  of  the  rights 
of  a  people  such  as  the  Italians,  which  cannot  be  renounced. 

If  this  is  not  proof  enough  that  Fiume  was 
merely  an  afterthought  of  certain  Italian  poli- 
ticians, the  record  contains  other  confirmatory 
evidence.  Signor  Orlando  not  only  held  friendly 
conversations  in  London  with  Trumbic,  the 
Croatian  leader,  but  arranged  for  a  meeting  '"n 
Rome  for  the  purpose  of  cementing  an  alliance 

284 


THE  ADRIATIC  TANGLE 

between  Italy  and  the  Jugoslavic  peoples.  At 
the  time  Czechoslovaks,  Croats,  Serbs,  and 
Slovenes  were  fighting  under  the  ItaHan  colors 
in  the  front-line  trenches,  and  the  congress  gave 
promise  of  burying  forever  the  ancient  feud 
between  ItaHan  and  Jugoslav.  The  action  of 
the  Jugoslav  committee  in  congratulating  Or- 
lando upon  the  great  Piave  victory  was  a  fitting 
cHmax  to  the  projection  of  the  accord.  There 
was  much  talk  of  the  new  state  that  should  rise 
from  the  ruins  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  Signor 
Orlando  led  the  dominant  group  that  preached 
the  wisdom  of  a  close  and  co-operative  alliance. 
It  was  this  poHcy,  no  doubt,  that  dictated  the 
exclusion  of  Fiume  and  Spalato  from  the  Treaty 
of  London.  Orlando  saw  that  the  friendship 
of  the  Balkans  would  prove  of  incalculable 
benefit  to  Italian  commerce,  while  the  voluntary 
cession  of  Italy's  rights  in  Fiume  would  win 
world  approval. 

This  statesman-like  conception  was  brought 
to  naught  by  the  antagonism  of  Baron  Sonnino, 
Italy's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  a  diplomat 
brought  up  in  the  tradition  of  Metternich  and 
unable  to  grasp  any  other  political  method  than 
that  of  appeahng  to  the  basest  passions  of  the 
masses.  As  though  it  were  his  object  to  isolate 
Italy  entirely,  this  old  man  shattered  the  under- 
standing with  the  new  Jugoslavic  state,  con- 
temptuously rejected  the  overtures  of  Greece, 
and  set  about  the  disruption  of  friendly  relations 
with  France.  Fiume  was  the  idea  of  Sonnino 
and  Sonnino  alone.  The  Italian  people  knew 
nothing  about  the  demand  for  weeks,  and  when 

285 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

it  was  tentatively  suggested  to  President  Wilson 
soon  after  his  arrival  in  Paris  he  called  Sonnino's 
attention  to  the  fact  that  Fiume  did  not  figure 
in  the  Treaty  of  London  and  that  Italy  had 
accepted  the  Fourteen  Points  without  a  single 
reservation.  Stubbornly,  cleverly,  Sonnino  swept 
both  the  President  and  Orlando  to  one  side,  and 
commenced  the  promotion  of  the  agitation  that 
resulted  in  the  resurrection  of  Italian  jingoism 
and  D^Annunzio's  seizure  of  Fiume. 

As  has  been  pointed  out  in  a  previous  chapter, 
never  at  any  time  did  the  President  change  his 
mind  with  regard  to  Fiume.  He  made  his  posi- 
tion clear  when  the  matter  was  first  broached  in 
Paris,  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that  he  was 
dissuaded  from  stating  his  views  to  the  Italian 
people  during  his  visit  in  Rome.  Italy  was  to 
receive  the  Trentino,  the  province  of  Triest, 
principal  parts  of  Istria  and  Dalmatia,  the  naval 
base  at  Pola,  and  other  important  accessions. 
These  were  ItaUan  rights  and  the  President 
supported  them  wholeheartedly.  Fiume,  how- 
ever, had  been  promised  to  the  Serbs  and  the 
Czechoslovaks  as  their  one  outlet  to  the  sea, 
and  it  was  a  promise  that  must  be  kept.  His 
statement  of  April  23d — the  so-called  appeal 
to  the  ItaHan  people  over  the  heads  of  Orlando 
and  Sonnino — ^was  no  more  than  a  public  declara- 
tion of  the  stand  that  he  had  held  from  the  very 
beginning.  The  Italian  delegation  left  Paris  on 
April  24th  in  ostentatious  fury,  but  it  was  notable 
that  the  economic  representatives  remained,  con- 
tinuing the  daily  business  of  getting  money,  fuel, 
and  raw  materials  from  the  United  States. 

286 


THE  ADRIATIC  TANGLE 

The  vote  of  confidence  received  by  Orlando 
on  his  return  to  Rome  must  be  regarded  as  more 
political  than  popular,  for  it  was  not  long  before 
the  Premier  and  his  Cabinet  were  forced  to 
resign.  The  sane  papers  of  Italy  commenced  to 
point  out  that  the  lunatic  insistence  upon  the 
comparatively  insignificant  question  of  Fiume 
had  not  only  lost  Italy  valuable  and  necessary 
friendships,  but  that  it  had  blinded  the  delega- 
tion to  Italy's  real  necessities.  While  the  battle 
over  Fiume  was  being  waged  with  rage  and 
bitterness,  not  one  single  inteUigent  effort  had 
been  made  to  forward  Italy's  economic  interests 
by  arrangements  with  regard  to  finance,  coal, 
food,  iron,  and  steel. 

Until  the  day  of  his  departure,  the  President 
hoped  for  an  amicable  settlement  of  the  Adriatic 
tangle,  and  persisted  in  these  efforts  even  after 
his  return.  Principally  as  a  result  of  his  interest, 
an  agreement  was  reached  on  December  9,  1919, 
the  proposals  being  signed  by  Lloyd  George  and 
Clemenceau,  with  Frank  Polk  representing  the 
President  as  a  member  of  the  American  com- 
mission. There  was  no  question  as  to  the  joint 
nature  of  the  note,  and  even  as  late  as  December 
23d  Clemenceau  made  this  frank  statement 
to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies:  "The  Fiume 
question  has  been  agonizing.  Italy  promised 
Fiume  to  the  Jugoslavs,  but  went  back  on  her 
promise.  France,  England,  and  the  United 
States  have  sought  a  solution,  and  the  latest 
indications  are  that  it  will  finally  be  reached. 
Only  when  this  is  solved  can  we  commence  to 
breathe  freely."    The  feature  of  the  settlement 

287 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

was  the  creation  of  the  free  state  of  Fiume,  a 
compromise  that  safeguarded  the  Jugoslavic 
interests  even  as  it  held  a  salve  for  Italian  pride. 
In  all  else  the  Italian  claims  were  granted  even 
beyond  the  first  expectations. 

Shortly  afterward  the  American  delegation  re- 
turned to  the  United  States,  the  attitude  of  the 
Senate  making  impossible  any  further  stay  in 
Paris.  On  January  6,  1919,  Signor  Nitti,  the 
new  Italian  Premier,  answered  the  joint  note 
of  December  9th,  making  counter-proposals  that 
were  no  more  than  a  restatement  of  the  original 
Sonnino  demands.  Whereupon  Clemenceau  and 
Lloyd  George,  acting  in  entire  independence  and 
without  even  informing  the  President  of  the  new 
Italian  note,  met  hurriedly  on  January  9th 
and  came  to  a  fresh  understanding  that  repudi- 
ated in  every  particular  their  signed  agreement 
of  December  9th. 

Under  this  new  arrangement,  the  free  state  of 
Fiume  was  cut  down  to  include  the  city  only, 
and  a  further  strip  of  territory  was  given  to 
Italy  in  order  to  connect  Fiume  with  Italian 
Istria;  additional  islands  were  ceded  to  Italy, 
the  Jugoslavic  city  of  Zara  was  recognized  as  a 
free  city,  and  various  other  concessions  were 
made.  By  way  of  appeasing  the  Jugoslavs, 
they  were  given  permission  to  step  in  and  take 
a  considerable  sUce  of  northern  Albania,  a  pro- 
posal that  New  Europe  denounced  in  these 
terms : 

The  Jugoslavs  are  asked  to  sacrifice  half  a  million  of  their 
kinsmen,  and  to  accept  as  "compensation" — in  other  words, 
as  a  shameless  bribe — those  northern  districts  of  Albania 

288 


THE  ADRIATIC  TANGLE 

which  the  secret  Treaty  of  London  had  assigned  to  them. 
This  means  that  France  and  Britain  have  robbed  a  weak 
ally  of  its  rights  in  order  to  meet  obligations  which  they 
had  wrongly  contracted,  and  which  they  are  not  prepared 
to  redeem  with  their  own  property;  and  that  they  now 
invite  their  victim  to  indemnify  himself  and  descend  to 
their  own  level  by  plundering  a  still  weaker  neighbor. 

Premier  Nitti,  as  a  matter  of  course,  "con- 
sented,'' and  without  more  ado  Lloyd  George 
and  Clemenceau  sent  for  the  representatives  of 
the  Jugoslavs  and  told  them  that  unless  they 
accepted  the  new  proposition  within  four  days 
the  Treaty  of  London  would  be  put  in  force. 
The  London  Times,  describing  the  scene,  states 
that  **Pasitch  and  Trumbic  were  rated  in  a 
fashion  not  usual  in  diplomacy.  They  were  told 
that  discussion  could  not  continue,  that  if  they 
did  not  give  way  England  and  France  were  going 
not  only  to  apply  the  Treaty  of  London,  but 
to  allow  Italy  to  apply  it  and  apply  it  in  its 
integrity.  'That,'  said  Clemenceau,  *is  the  al- 
ternative. There  is  no  third  course  to  which  it 
is  possible  to  accede.'  Lloyd  George  was  *in 
full  agreement  with  Clemenceau." 

These  actions,  communicated  to  Washington, 
resulted  in  a  telegram  to  Ambassador  Wallace 
on  January  19th,  in  which  it  was  stated  that 
"the  United  States  is  being  put  in  the  position 
of  having  the  matter  disposed  of  before  the 
American  point  of  view  can  be  expressed,  as 
apparently  M.  Clemenceau  and  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  have  sought  only  the  views  of  the 
Italian  and  Jugoslav  governments  before  ascer- 
taining the  views  of  the  United  States  govern- 

289 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

ment.  Is  it  the  intention  of  the  British  and 
French  governments  in  the  future  to  dispose  of 
the  various  questions  pending  in  Europe  and  to 
communicate  the  results  to  the  government  of 
the  United  States?  There  are  features  in 
connection  with  the  proposed  Fiume  settlement 
which  both  M.  Clemenceau  and  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  must  realize  would  not  be  acceptable 
to  the  President.  As  was  pointed  out  by  Mr. 
Polk  before  his  departure,  the  Dalmatian  and 
other  questions  should  be  taken  up  through 
regular  diplomatic  channels,  and  the  fact  that 
you  are  not  charged  with  full  powers  could  have 
no  bearing  on  the  question." 

This  communication  was  answered  under  date 
of  January  23d  by  a  joint  cable  from  Lloyd 
George  and  Clemenceau  in  which  the  two 
Premiers  denied  any  intent  to  make  "a  definite 
settlement  of  the  question  without  obtaining 
the  views  of  the  American  government."  There 
were  glib  explanations  that  they  had  merely  pro- 
ceeded upon  the  theory  that  it  was  best,  in  view 
of  conditions,  "to  proceed  with  the  negotiations 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  to  submit  the  results 
to  the  United  States  government  as  soon  as 
definite  conclusions  had  been  reached."  The 
answer  also  protested  that  "practically  every 
important  point  of  the  joint  memorandum  of 
December  19,  1919,  remains  untouched  and  has 
now  been  indorsed  by  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Italy."  In  reply  the  President  despatched  his 
famous  note  of  February  loth,  dealing  not  only 
with  Fiume,  but  setting  forth  the  American 
position  with  reference  to  the  whole  question  of 

290 


THE  ADRIATIC  TANGLE 

European  territorial  readjustment.     Its  impor- 
tant passages  may  well  be  quoted: 

The  President  fully  shares  the  view  of  the  French  and 
British  governments  that  the  future  of  the  world  largely 
depends  upon  the  right  solution  of  this  question,  but  he 
cannot  believe  that  a  solution  containing  provisions  which 
have  already  received  the  well-merited  condemnation  of 
the  French  and  British  governments  can  in  any  sense  be 
regarded  as  right.  Neither  can  he  share  the  opiiaion  of 
the  French  and  British  governments  that  the  proposals 
contained  in  their  memorandum  delivered  to  the  Jugoslav 
representative  on  January  14th  leave  untouched  practically 
every  important  point  of  the  joint  memorandum  of  the 
French,  British,  and  American  governments  of  December 
9,  1919,  and  that  only  two  features  undergo  alterations, 
and  both  these  alterations  are  to  the  positive  advantage 
of  Jugoslavia.  On  the  contrary,  the  President  is  of  the 
opinion  that  the  proposal  of  December  9th  has  been  pro- 
foundly altered  to  the  advantage  of  improper  Italian  ob- 
jectives, to  the  serious  injury  of  the  Jugoslav  people  and 
to  the  peril  of  world  peace. 

•  •••••• 

The  memorandum  of  December  9th  rejected  the  device 
of  connecting  Fiume  with  Italy  by  a  narrow  strip  of  coast 
territory,  as  quite  unworkable  in  practice  and  as  involving 
extraordinary  complexities  as  regards  customs  control, 
coast-guard  services,  and  cognate  matters  in  a  territory  of 
such  unusual  configuration.  The  French  and  British 
governments,  in  association  with  the  American  government, 
expressed  the  opinion  that  "  the  plan  appears  to  run  counter 
to  every  consideration  of  geography,  economics,  and  ter- 
ritorial convenience."  The  American  government  notes 
that  this  annexation  of  Jugoslav  territory  by  Italy  is 
nevertheless  agreed  to  by  the  memorandum  of  January  14th. 

The  memorandum  of  December  9th  rejected  Italy's 
demand  for  the  annexation  of  all  of  Istria,  on  the  solid 
ground  that  neither  strategic  nor  economic  considerations 
could  justify  such  annexation,  and  that  there  remained 
nothing  in  defense  of  the  proposition  save  Italy's  desire 
20  291 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

for  more  territory  admittedly  inhabited  by  Jugoslavs. 
The  French  and  British  governments  then  expressed  their 
cordial  approval  of  the  way  in  which  the  President  had  met 
every  successive  Italian  demand  for  the  absorption  in  Italy 
of  territories  inhabited  by  peoples  not  Italian  and  not  in 
favor  of  being  absorbed,  and  joined  in  the  opinion  that 
*'it  is  neither  just  nor  expedient  to  annex  as  the  spoils  of 
war  territories  inhabited  by  an  alien  race."  Yet  this  un- 
just and  inexpedient  annexation  of  all  of  Istria  is  provided 
for  in  the  memorandum  of  January  14th. 

The  memorandum  of  December  9th  carefully  excluded 
Every  form  of  Italian  sovereignty  over  Fiume.  The  Amer- 
ican government  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the 
memorandum  of  January  14th  opens  the  way  for  Italian 
control  of  Flume's  foreign  affairs,  thus  introducing  a 
measure  of  Italian  sovereignty  over,  and  Italian  inter- 
vention in,  the  only  practicable  port  of  a  neighboring 
people;  and  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  extension  of 
Italian  territory  to  the  gates  of  Fiume,  paves  the  way  for 
possible  future  annexation  of  the  port  by  Italy,  in  con- 
tradiction of  compelling  considerations  of  equity  and  right. 

The  memorandum  of  December  9th  afforded  proper  pro- 
tection to  the  vital  railway  connecting  Fiume  northward 
with  the  interior.  The  memorandum  of  January  14th 
establishes  Italy  in  dominating  military  positions  close  to 
the  railway  at  a  number  of  critical  points. 

The  memorandum  of  December  9th  maintained  in  large 
measure  the  unity  of  the  Albanian  state.  That  of  January 
14th  partitions  the  Albanian  people,  against  their  vehement 
protests,  among  three  different  alien  powers. 


The  American  government,  while  no  less  generous  in  its 
desire  to  accord  to  Italy  every  advantage  to  which  she 
could  offer  any  proper  claims,  feels  that  it  cannot  sacrifice 
the  principles  for  which  it  entered  the  war  to  gratify  the 
improper  ambitions  of  one  of  its  associates,  or  to  purchase  a 
temporary  appearance  of  calm  in  the  Adriatic  at  the  price 
of  a  future  world  conflagration.  It  is  unwilling  to  recognize 
either  an  unjust  settlement  based  on  a  secret  treaty  the 
terms  of  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  new  world  condi- 

292 


THE  ADRIATIC  TANGLE 

tions  or  an  unjust  settlement  arrived  at  by  employing  that 
secret  treaty  as  an  instrument  of  coercion.  It  would  wel- 
come any  solution  of  the  problem  based  on  a  free  and  un- 
prejudiced consideration  of  the  merits  of  the  controversy, 
or  on  terms  of  which  the  disinterested  great  powers  agreed 
to  be  just  and  equitable.  Italy,  however,  has  repeatedly 
rejected  such  resolutions.  This  government  cannot  accept 
a  settlement  the  terms  of  which  have  been  admitted  to  be 
unwise  and  unjust,  but  which  it  is  proposed  to  grant  to 
Italy  in  view  of  her  persistent  refusal  to  accept  any  wise 
and  just  solution. 

It  is  a  time  to  speak  with  the  utmost  frankness.  The 
Adriatic  issue  as  it  now  presents  itself  raises  the  fundamental 
question  as  to  whether  the  American  government  can  on 
any  terms  co-operate  with  its  European  associates  in  the 
great  work  of  maintaining  the  peace  of  the  world  by  remov- 
ing the  primary  causes  of  war.  This  government  does  not 
doubt  its  ability  to  reach  amicable  understandings  with  the 
associated  governments  as  to  what  constitutes  equity  and 
justice  in  international  dealings,  for  differences  of  opinion 
as  to  the  best  methods  of  applying  just  principles  have 
never  obscured  the  vital  fact  that  in  the  main  the  several 
governments  have  entertained  the  same  fundamental  con- 
ception of  what  those  principles  are.  But  if  substantial 
agreement  on  what  is  just  and  reasonable  is  not  to  deter- 
mine international  issues,  if  the  country  possessing  the 
most  endurance  in  pressing  its  demands  rather  than  the 
country  armed  with  a  just  cause  is  to  gain  the  support  of 
the  powers;  if  forcible  seizure  of  coveted  areas  is  to  be 
permitted  and  condoned,  and  is  able  to  receive  ultimate 
justification  by  creating  a  situation  so  difficult  that  decision 
favorable  to  the  aggressor  is  deemed  a  practical  necessity; 
if  deliberately  incited  ambition  is,  under  the  name  of 
national  sentiment,  to  be  rewarded  at  the  expense  of  the 
small  and  the  weak;  if,  in  a  word,  the  old  order  of  things 
which  brought  so  many  evils  on  the  world  is  still  to  prevail — 
then  the  time  is  not  yet  come  when  this  government  can 
enter  a  concert  of  powers  the  very  existence  of  which  must 
depend  upon  a  new  spirit  and  a  new  order.  The  Americaa 
people  are  willing  to  share  in  such  high  enterprise,   but 

293 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

many  among  them  are  fearful  lest  they  be  entangled  in 
international  policies  and  committed  to  international  ob- 
ligations foreign  alike  to  their  ideals  and  their  tra<litions. 
To  commit  them  to  such  a  policy  as  that  embodied  in  the 
latest  Adriatic  proposals,  and  to  obligate  them  to  maintain 
injustice  as  against  the  claims  of  justice,  would  be  to  pro- 
vide the  most  solid  ground  for  such  fears.  This  government 
can  undertake  no  such  grave  responsibility. 

The  President  desires  to  say  that  if  it  does  not  appear 
feasible  to  secure  acceptance  of  the  just  and  generous 
concessions  offered  by  the  British,  French,  and  American 
governments  to  Italy  in  the  joint  memorandum  of  those 
powers  of  December  9,  1919,  which  the  President  has 
already  clearly  stated  to  be  the  maximum  concession  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States  can  offer,  the  President 
desires  to  say  that  he  must  take  under  serious  considera- 
tion the  withdrawal  of  the  treaty  with  Germany  and  the 
agreement  between  the  United  States  and  France  of  June 
28,  1919,  which  are  now  before  the  Senate  and  permitting 
the  terms  of  the  European  settlement  to  be  independently 
established  and  enforced  by  the  associated  governments. 

The  devious  nature  of  French  diplomacy  was 
evidenced  again  in  connection  with  this  cor- 
respondence. Appreciating  the  fact  that  secrecy 
could  be  maintained  no  longer,  and  fully  realiz- 
ing the  moral  strength  of  Wilson's  position,  the 
French  government  followed  its  usual  practice  of 
presenting  the  case  to  the  world  in  the  colored 
and  distorted  form  best  suited  to  French  pur- 
poses. Instead  of  giving  the  notes  to  the  press, 
inspired  articles  commenced  to  appear,  the  ob- 
ject being  to  gain  currency  for  the  impression 
that  France  and  Great  Britain  and  Italy  had 
agreed  upon  a  sensible  settlement,  eminently 
fair  to  the  Jugoslavs,  and  that  this  settlement 
had  been  rudely  cast  aside  by  President  Wilson 

294 


THE  ADRIATIC  TANGLE 

under  threat  of  withdrawing  entirely  from  con- 
cern with  European  affairs.  The  Echo  de  Parisy 
mouthpiece  of  the  French  Foreign  Office,  was 
guilty  of  one  great  indiscretion,  however,  when 
it  declared,  "It  is  inadmissible  that  Wilson — 
an  autocrat,  truly,  but  an  autocrat  who  is  about 
to  fall — should  be  allowed  to  impose  his  political 
conceptions  upon  us  when  within  a  year  Re- 
publicans will  rule  in  the  White  House  and  in  all 
probability  will  immediately  denounce  all  his 
conceptions." 

What  else  was  this  but  a  confession  that 
European  imperialism  looked  upon  the  Repub- 
lican Senate  as  its  ally,  and  that  under  the  terms 
of  this  new  alliance  authority  was  given  to  break 
every  agreement  entered  into  with  President 
Wilson  ? 

Certainly  the  action  of  Senator  Lodge  gave 
them  the  right  to  take  this  position.  At  one  of 
the  most  critical  stages  of  the  controversy  he 
sent  an  open  telegram  to  various  ItaHan  societies 
in  Boston,  declaring  that  Fiume  should  be  handed 
over  to  Italy,  "not  only  for  her  own  protection, 
but  as  an  essential  barrier  against  any  future 
attempt  of  Germany  to  attack  the  rest  of  the 
world  as  she  did  in  the  recent  war.'*  Having 
addressed  this  appeal  to  the  Italian  vote,  he 
then  turned  about  and  cajoled  the  German  vote 
by  insisting  that  the  United  States  should  make 
a  separate  peace  with  Germany  without  con- 
ditions of  any  kind.  It  was  this  sort  of  political 
claptrap,  in  the  United  States  as  well  as  in 
Rome,  that  aroused  passions  that  clouded  Italian 
intelligence. 

295 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

The  publication  of  the  President's  note  put 
an  end  to  intrigue.  Its  stirring  sentences  and 
unanswerable  logic  forced  a  quick  reconsidera- 
tion of  the  whole  Fiume  matter,  and  the  Anglo- 
French  reply  was  a  complete  backdown.  Every 
word  was  a  virtual  admission  that  the  settlement 
was  nothing  more  than  a  hasty,  ill-considered 
attempt  to  adjust  a  difficulty,  and  in  addition 
there  was  specific  admission  that  the  Albanian 
partition  was  unfair.  The  European  press  re- 
acted favorably  to  the  new  attitude  as  leading 
**to  the  only  sensible  settlement  of  the  dangerous 
and  embarrassing  position." 

President  Wilson,  in  a  note  of  February  24th, 
explained  that  he  "would,  of  course,  make  no 
objection  to  a  settlement  mutually  agreeable  to 
Italy  and  Jugoslavia  regarding  their  common 
frontier  in  the  Fiume  region,  provided  that  such 
an  agreement  is  not  made  on  the  basis  of  com- 
pensations elsewhere  at  the  expense  of  nationals 
of  a  third  power."  And  he  restated  the  principle 
on  which  he  stood: 


The  President  believes  it  to  be  the  central  principle 
fought  for  in  the  war  that  no  government  or  group  of 
governments  has  the  right  to  dispose  of  the  territory  or  to 
determine  the  political  allegiance  of  any  free  people.  The 
five  great  powers,  though  the  government  of  the  United 
States  constitutes  one  of  them,  have  in  his  conviction  no 
more  right  than  had  the  Austrian  government  to  dispose 
of  the  free  Jugoslavic  peoples  without  the  free  consent  and 
co-operation  of  those  peoples.  The  President's  position  is 
that  the  powers  associated  against  Germany  gave  final  and 
irrefutable  proof  of  their  sincerity  in  the  war  by  writing 
into  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  Article  X  of  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  which  constitutes  an  assurance 

296 


THE  ADRIATIC  TANGLE 

that  all  the  great  powers  have  done  what  they  have  com- 
pelled Germany  to  do — have  foregone  all  territorial  aggres- 
sion and  all  interference  with  the  free  political  self-deter- 
mination of  the  peoples  of  the  world.  With  this  principle 
lived  up  to,  permanent  peace  is  secured  and  the  supreme 
object  of  the  recent  conflict  has  been  achieved.  Justice 
and  self-determination  have  been  substituted  for  aggres- 
sion and  political  dictation.  Without  it,  there  is  no  security 
for  any  nation  that  conscientiously  adheres  to  a  non-* 
militaristic  policy. 

The  only  possible  solution  of  the  Fiume  ques- 
tion lies  in  the  friendly  and  sincere  agreement  of 
Italy  and  Jugoslavia,  and  such  an  agreement 
will  not  be  reached  until  the  Italian  people 
realize  that  their  politicians  have  led  them  into 
a  quicksand.  The  Fiume  claim  was  manu- 
factured after  the  armistice  in  open  defiance  of 
solemn  pledges,  and  there  is  small  doubt  that 
D'Annunzio's  coup  had  Sonnino's  approval,  if 
not  his  complete  support.  This  challenge  to 
the  Peace  Conference,  instead  of  forcing  a  sur- 
render to  the  Itahan  demands,  has  had  only 
the  opposite  effect,  and  as  a  result  Italy  is 
standing  outside  the  good  opinion  of  the  world. 
She  has  Fiume,  by  right  of  force,  but  against 
this  barren  victory  there  are  to  be  placed  her 
losses  in  friendship  and  material  support.  No 
nation  is  more  in  need  of  economic  reinforce- 
ment, yet  the  certainty  of  this  aid  has  been 
thrown  away  for  the  sake  of  a  port  that  Italy 
does  not  need. 

Under  the  quick  impulsiveness  of  the  Italian 
there  is  a  rare  fineness  of  spirit  and  a  very  shrewd 
common  sense.  When  passion  has  cooled  it  is 
safe  to  assume  that  the  people  of  Italy  will  return 

297 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

to  the  original  policy  of  Orlando,  working  out 
an  amicable  settlement  with  the  Jugoslavs  that 
will  safeguard  every  ItaHan  interest  even  as  it 
will  build  solid  foundations  for  an  accord  with 
the  Jugoslavic  state.  This  was  and  is  the  hope 
of  the  President. 


XX 

WERE   THE    FOURTEEN    POINTS    IGNORED? 

NOTHING  is  more  certain  than  that  the  calm 
judgment  of  the  future  will  bear  witness 
to  the  amazing  justice  of  the  Peace  Treaty. 
Deliberated  at  a  time  when  the  passions  of  the 
world  ran  high,  and  framed  against  a  back- 
ground of  ruin  worked  by  the  premeditated 
cruelties  of  Prussianism,  the  document  is  re- 
markable for  its  exclusion  of  the  spirit  of  revenge. 
There  is  severity  in  it,  to  be  sure,  for  the  thing 
that  Germany  did  called  for  punishment  that 
should  stand  forever  as  a  lesson  and  a  warning, 
but  at  every  point  there  are  redemptive  possi- 
bilities and  in  every  provision  there  is  opportunity 
for  the  exercise  of  a  wise  clemency.  The  whole 
emphasis  of  the  treaty  is  upon  the  future,  not 
the  past,  and  in  its  dream  of  a  new  world  there 
is  a  proud  place  for  Germany  if  her  people  have 
the  vision  and  the  courage  to  claim  it. 

Both  courage  and  vision  are  lacking  as  yet. 
Instead  of  comparing  the  terms  of  the  Peace 
Conference  with  the  conditions  that  Prussianism 
would  have  imposed  in  the  event  of  victory,  the 
German  people  are  still  indulging  in  an  orgy 
of  self-pity,  and  not  even  the  propaganda  of 
poison  with  which  they  deluged  the  world 
throughout   the   war  was   more   vigorous   than 

299 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  present  propaganda  of  appeaL  It  may  not 
be  denied  that  the  effects  are  being  felt  in  the 
United  States.  Naturally  enough,  the  great 
mass  of  Americans  of  German  blood  and  descent 
are  still  possessed  of  their  former  sympathies, 
and  the  cry  that  comes  to  them  from  their  kindred 
strikes  down  to  the  old  affections.  This  fact, 
unfortunately,  has  been  seized  upon  by  politi- 
cians with  keen  appreciation  of  the  strength  of 
the  German  vote,  and  no  attempt  has  been 
spared  to  convince  every  citizen  of  Teutonic 
extraction  that  a  savage  revenge  has  been 
inflicted  upon  the  Fatherland.  Mr.  Hays,  chair- 
man of  the  Republican  National  Committee, 
once  passionate  in  his  fear  that  President  Wilson 
meant  to  let  "the  accursed  Hun"  escape,  is  now 
leading  his  party  in  a  chorus  of  pained  expostula- 
tion, and  Senator  Knox,  most  clamant  in  his 
demand  for  a  "hard  peace,"  raises  his  voice 
to-day  only  to  attack  the  harshness  of  the  terms 
inflicted  upon  unhappy  Germany. 

To  justify  their  position  they  now  assert  that 
the  Germans  did  not  surrender  unconditionally, 
but  laid  down  their  arms  under  an  agreement  that 
peace  terms  should  be  based  upon  the  Fourteen 
Points  of  President  Wilson,  and  that  this  agree- 
ment was  "repudiated."  It  is  a  comparatively 
safe  position,  for  not  one  in  a  thousand  remembers 
the  Fourteen  Points  and  not  one  in  a  hundred 
thousand  knows  the  exact  provisions  of  the  Peace 
Treaty.  As  a  consequence  of  its  repetition,  the 
great  majority  of  the  men  and  women  of  the 
United  States  have  come  to  complete  and  un- 
questioning acceptance  of  the  falsehood,  and  even 

300 


WERE  THE  FOURTEEN  POINTS  IGNORED? 

among  those  who  approve  the  peace  there  is  a 
general  opinion  that  the  Fourteen  Points  were 
cast  aside. 

This  position  has  the  advantage  of  simplicity, 
calling  for  nothing  more  than  bare  assertion. 
Truth,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  thing  of  detail, 
particularly  so  in  the  present  instance.  The 
Fourteen  Points,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  were  in 
no  sense  a  definitive  practical  formula,  but  a 
broad  announcement  of  principles.  As  Mr. 
Keynes  himself  admits,  "a  large  part  of  the 
addresses  is  concerned  with  spirit,  purpose,  and 
intention,  and  not  with  concrete  solutions,** 
and  "it  is  difficult  to  apply  on  a  practical  basis 
those  passages  which  deal  with  spirit,  purpose, 
and  intention.''  If  it  were  necessary,  the  gen- 
eralizing nature  of  the  Fourteen  Points  could  be 
used  as  a  shield  against  attack,  but  there  is  no 
such  necessity.  Taken  up  one  by  one,  and  com- 
pared with  the  terms  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  it  is 
seen  that  the  Fourteen  Points  were  not  only  not 
repudiated,  but  were  put  into  effect  as  solemnly 
and  effectively  as  though  each  had  been  worded 
with  the  legal  precision  of  a  contract.  It  is  a 
comparison  that  should  have  been  made  months 
ago  in  the  interests  of  information  and  fairness. 
Considering  the  famous  Points  in  their  order, 
this  is  the  result: 

I.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after  which 
there  should  be  no  private  international  understandings 
of  any  kind,  but  diplomacy  shall  proceed  always  frankly 
and  in  the  public  view. 

The  fulfilment  of  this  is  found  in  Article 
XXVIII  of  the  Covenant  which  reads  as   fol- 

301 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

lows:  "Every  treaty  or  international  engage- 
ment entered  into  hereafter  by  any  Member 
of  the  League  shall  be  forthwith  registered 
with  the  Secretariat  and  shall  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble be  published  by  it.  No  such  treaty  or  in- 
ternational engagement  shall  be  binding  until 
so  registered."  This  marks  the  end  of  "secret 
diplomacy."  As  the  President  said  in  one  of 
his  speeches:  "From  this  time  forth  all  the 
world  is  going  to  know  what  all  the  agree- 
ments between  nations  are.  It  is  going  to 
know,  not  their  general  character  merely,  but 
their  exact  language  and  contents,  because  the 
provision  of  the  League  is  that  no  treaty  shall 
be  vahd  which  is  not  registered  with  the  general 
secretary  of  the  League,  and  the  general  secretary 
of  the  League  is  instructed  to  publish  it  in  all 
its  details  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 
Just  as  you  can  go  to  the  court-house  and  see 
all  the  mortgages  on  all  the  real  estate  in  your 
county,  you  can  go  to  the  general  secretariat 
of  the  League  of  Nations  and  find  all  the  mort- 
gages on  all  the  nations.  This  treaty,  in  short, 
is  a  great  clearance-house.  It  is  very  little  short 
of  a  canceling  of  the  past  and  an  insurance  of  the 
future." 

2.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas,  outside 
territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except  as 
the  seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  international 
action  for  the  enforcement  of  international  covenants. 

Contrary  to  false  assertion,  the  freedom  of  the 
seas  was  not  withdrawn  from  discussion  by 
Great    Britain.     What    England    insisted    upon 

302 


WERE  THE  FOURTEEN  POINTS  IGNORED? 

was  that  the  phrase  should  be  defined  before 
any  agreement  was  reached.  Nor  was  it  possible 
for  the  Peace  Conference  to  lay  down  the  defini- 
tion. The  essence  of  the  "freedom  of  the  seas" 
is  that  the  governance  of  the  seas  shall  rest 
upon  the  consent  of  the  governed.  Fourteen 
neutral  nations  were  not  represented  at  the  Peace 
Conference.  These  countries  are  now  in  the 
League  of  Nations,  and  it  will  be  the  duty  of 
this  world  court  to  frame  a  sea  code  that  will 
forever  free  the  ocean  lanes  from  tyranny  and 
obstruction.  It  will  be  done  and  it  is  the  only 
way  in  which  it  can  be  done. 

3.  The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  barriers 
and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions 
among  all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace  and  asso- 
ciating themselves  for  its  maintenance. 

The  treaty  provides  specifically  for  the  re- 
moval of  duties  on  German's  exports  and  im- 
ports in  many  cases  where  such  reduction  is 
necessary  to  her  economic  rehabilitation.  It 
was  not  "possible*'  to  grant  blanket  exemptions, 
for  the  simple  reason  that  while  German  manu- 
factures continued  throughout  the  war,  the 
manufactures  of  France,  Italy,  Belgium,  and 
England  were  either  crushed  outright  or  partially. 
A  certain  protection  is  wise  and  necessary  until 
Allied  industries  have  been  restored  in  some 
degree,  but  the  barriers  are  temporary,  and  the 
League  of  Nations  is  given  full  power  to  put  the 
spirit  of  the  third  Point  into  effect. 

4.  Adequate  guaranties  given  and  taken  that  national 
armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  points  consistent 
with  domestic  safety. 

303 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

This  pledge  is  nobly  fulfilled  in  Article  VIII 
of  the  Covenant.^ 

5.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjust- 
ment of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observance 
of  the  principle  that  in  determining  all  such  questions  of 
sovereignty  the  interests  of  the  populations  concerned  must 
have  equal  weight  with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  govern- 
ment whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

This  pledge  was  fulfilled  by  an  abrogation 
of  the  secret  treaty  that  divided  Germany's 
colonial  possessions  among  England,  France,  and 
Japan.  It  was  one  of  the  President's  first  battles 
and  one  of  his  greatest  victories.  Lifted  out  of 
the  chattel  class,  Germany's  former  colonies 
are  now  independent  entities  under  the  adminis- 
tration and  protection  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

6.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory  and  such  a 
settlement  of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will  secure 
the  best  and  freest  co-operation  of  the  other  nations  of  the 
world  in  obtaining  for  her  an  unhampered  and  unembar- 
rassed opportunity  for  the  independent  determination  of 
her  own  political  development  and  national  policy  and 
assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into  the  society  of  free 
nations  under  institutions  of  her  own  choosing,  and  more 
than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind  that  she 
may  need  and  may  herself  desire. 

The  treatment  accorded  Russia  by  her  sister  nations 
in  the  months  to  come  will  be  the  acid  test  of  their  good 
will,  of  their  comprehension  of  her  needs  as  distinguished 
from  their  own  interests,  and  of  their  intelligent  and  un- 
selfish sympathy. 

President  Wilson  defeated  the  attempt  to  use 
armed  force  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Bolshevik 

iSee  Chapter  XXI. 


WERE  THE  FOURTEEN  POINTS  IGNORED? 

regime,  secured  the  withdrawal  of  conflict 
troops,  protected  the  territorial  integrity  of 
Russia  against  schemes  of  conquest,  and  gained 
the  adoption  of  a  policy  that  puts  the  future  of 
Russia  in  the  hands  of  the  Russians  themselves. 
As  far  as  the  antagonistic  policy  of  Lenin  has 
permitted,  aid  has  been  given,  and  when  the 
distracted  country  desires  a  return  to  civilized 
intercourse  her  place  in  the  League  of  Nations 
is  waiting  for  her,  likewise  every  assistance  in 
her  economic  rehabilitation. 

7.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be  evac- 
uated and  restored,  without  any  attempt  to  limit  the 
sovereignty  which  she  enjoys  in  common  with  all  other  free 
nations.  No  other  single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve 
to  restore  confidence  among  the  nations  in  the  laws  which 
they  have  themselves  set  and  determined  for  the  govern- 
ment of  their  relations  with  one  another.  Without  this 
healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  interna- 
tional law  is  forever  impaired. 

Is  there  any  question  that  this  has  been  done? 

8.  All  French  territor^^  should  be  freed  and  the  invaded 
portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia 
in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  has  un- 
settled the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years,  should 
be  righted,  in  order  that  peace  may  once  more  be  made 
secure  in  the  interest  of  all. 

Is  there  any  question  that  this  has  been  done? 

9.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be 
effected  along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 

The  Trentino  and  Triest  have  been  restored 
to  Italy,  also  part  of  Istria,  part  of  Dalmatia, 

305 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

and  various  Adriatic  islands.  Only  Fiume  has 
been  withheld  and  Fiume  was  never  an  Italian 
war  objective,  but  a  post-armistice  demand. 

10.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among 
the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should 
be  accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  develop- 
ment. 

As  the  President  explained  in  his  note  to  Ger- 
many on  October  i8th,  this  point  had  undergone 
a  radical  change.  "Since  that  sentence  was 
written  and  uttered  to  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,"  he  said,  "the  government  of  the 
United  States  has  recognized  that  a  state  of 
belligerency  exists  between  the  Czechoslovaks 
and  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  Empires, 
and  that  the  Czechoslovak  National  Council 
is  a  de  facto  belligerent  government  clothed 
with  proper  authority  to  direct  the  military  and 
political  affairs  of  the  Czechoslovaks.  It  has 
also  recognized  in  the  fullest  manner  the  justice 
of  the  nationalistic  aspirations  of  the  Jugoslavs 
for  freedom." 

These  changes  were  accepted  by  the  Central 
Powers  and  became  part  of  the  basis  of  settle- 
ment. As  a  consequence  Czechoslovakia  is  a 
republic  and  the  Jugoslavic  state  is  pursuing  its 
destiny.  GaHcia  and  Silesia  have  had  the 
Austrian  yoke  lifted  from  them,  and  the  stolen 
portions  of  Rumania  have  been  restored. 

11.  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be  evac- 
uated; occupied  territories  restored;  Serbia  accorded 
free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea;  and  the  relations  of  the 
several  Balkan  States  to  one  another  determined  by  friendly 
counsel  along  historically  established  lines  of  allegiance  and 

306 


WERE  THE  FOURTEEN  POINTS  IGNORED? 

nationality;  and  International  guaranties  of  the  political 
and  economic  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of 
the  several  Balkan  States  should  be  entered  into. 

Evacuation  has  been  brought  about  in  full 
degree:  Serbia's  right  to  a  free  and  secure  access 
to  the  sea  was  responsible  for  the  President's 
resistance  to  the  Italian  claim  to  Fiume,  and 
Article  X  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  gives  the  promised  guaranties  of  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity  to  the  new 
states. 

12.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire 
should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the  other 
nationalities  which  are  now  under  Turkish  rule  should  be 
assured  an  undoubted  security  of  life  and  an  absolute 
unmolested  opportunity  of  autonomous  development,  and 
the  Dardanelles  should  be  permanently  opened  as  a  free 
passage  to  the  ships  and  commerce  of  all  nations,  under 
international  guaranties. 

The  Dardanelles  are  open  to  the  world,  and 
every  one  of  the  oppressed  nationalities  is  being 
given  help  that  will  enable  it  to  come  to 
strength  and  independence.  The  action  of  the 
Senate  compelled  the  withdrawal  of  the  United 
States  from  the  further  discussion  as  to  the  full 
settlement  of  the  Turkish  question,  and  as  a 
consequence  the  exact  status  of  Turkish  sover- 
eignty is  still  undetermined. 

Both  British  and  French  governments  are  of 
the  opinion  that  the  Sultan  should  be  permitted 
to  keep  his  hold  on  Constantinople.  Banking 
interests  are  back  of  the  French  demand,  while 
the  English  position  is  the  result  of  a  fear  that 
the  Mohammedans  of  India  will  resent  the 
21  307 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

expulsion  of  the  Turk  from  the  holy  city  of 
Stamboul.  The  President,  however,  though 
barred  by  the  Senate  from  taking  any  share  in 
the  debate,  has  insisted  upon  American  interest 
in  the  settlement.  He  is  steadfast  in  his  insist- 
ence that  the  "anomaly  of  the  Turks  in  Europe 
should  cease"  and  "no  arrangement  that  is  made 
can  have  any  permanency  unless  the  vital  in- 
terests of  Russia  in  these  problems  are  carefully 
provided  for  and  protected,  and  unless  it  is 
understood  that  Russia,  when  it  has  a  govern- 
ment recognized  by  the  civilized  world,  may 
assert  its  right  to  be  heard  in  regard  to  the 
decision  now  made."  A  final  settlement  is  yet 
to  be  reached. 

13.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  be  erected  which 
should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  indisputably 
Polish  populations,  which  should  be  assured  a  free  and 
secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  whose  political  and  economic 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  should  be  guaranteed 
by  international  covenant. 

An  independent  Poland  has  been  erected, 
and,  as  in  the  case  of  Russia,  its  future  depends 
upon  its  people.  The  indisputably  Polish  parts 
of  Galicia  and  Silesia  have  been  restored  and 
plebiscites  are  planned  for  districts  where  the 
ethnic  Hues  are  not  clearly  drawn.  Dantzig 
has  been  made  a  free  city  under  the  administra- 
tion of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  Poland  has  a 
corridor  that  leads  to  the  port. 

14.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed  under 
specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording  mutual 
guaranties  of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity 
to  great  and  small  states  alike. 

308 


WEE  STHE  fourteen  POINTS  IGNORED? 


Thhs  has  been  done  and  forty  countries  have 
enter  td  the  League  of  Nations.  The  Central 
Powers,  temporarily  excluded  until  they  evince 
a  willingness  to  fulfil  treaty  obligations,  Mexico, 
banned  for  very  much  the  same  reasons,  and  the 
United  States  of  America,  dragged  back  by  a 
Republican  majority  in  the  Senate,  are  the  only 
great  states  still  outside  the  society  of  nations. 

Let  there  be  an  end  to  the  lie — circulated  by 
malignants  and  accepted  by  the  half-baked — 
that  the  Fourteen  Points  were  "thrown  into  the 
discard."  Every  one  of  them  was  written  into 
the  treaty,  and  the  result  will  stand  for  all  time 
as  a  monument  to  the  courage  and  faith  of 
Woodrow  Wilson.  With  the  Republican  Senate 
demanding  a  **hard  peace"  and  screaming 
denunciation  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  and  with 
the  Premiers  of  Europe  standing  like  iron  for 
the  letter  of  the  bond,  the  President  might  well 
have  surrendered  to  overwhelming  odds,  but 
instead  of  that  he  fought  the  fight  and  conquered. 

The  Germans,  in  their  heart  of  hearts,  know 
well  that  the  peace  is  written  in  fairer  terms 
than  they  ever  expected.  Had  it  not  been  for 
the  attitude  of  Senator  Lodge  and  his  Republi- 
can associates,  Germany  would  have  accepted 
the  treaty  without  any  large  demur,  and  by 
now  would  be  working  back  to  prosperity  and 
the  esteem  of  the  world.  As  it  is,  she  counts 
upon  the  Republican  party  to  force  America 
into  a  repudiation  of  the  peace,  thereby  entail- 
ing a  confusion,  a  general  weakness,  that  may 
enable  her  to  escape  entirely. 


)T 


Y 

0^' 


XXI 

THE    LEAGUE    OF   NATIONS 

BEFORE  taking  up  the  tortuous  course  of  the 
political  intrigue  that  resulted  in  Americans 
exclusion  from  the  League  of  Nations,  the  inter- 
ests of  clarity  and  understanding  may  be  served 
best  by  a  detailed  consideration  of  the  Covenant 
that  stirred  the  Americanism  of  Republican 
Senators  to  the  depths,  or,  rather,  to  the  dregs. 
That  so  short  a  document,  and  one  so  simple, 
should  stand  confused  and  distorted  in  the 
popular  mind  is  at  once  a  bitter  commentary 
upon  the  impudence  of  politicians  and  the  intel- 
ligence of  the  citizenship.  In  view  of  the  pass 
to  which  the  country  has  been  brought  by  this 
combination  of  falsehood  and  ignorance,  it  were 
well  to  give  national  application  to  the  Oregon 
pamphlet  law,  putting  a  printed  copy  of  every 
fundamental  proposal  in  the  hands  of  each 
elector  for  his  information  and  protection. 

The  most  cursory  reading  of  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations  gives  the  lie  to  every 
attack  made  upon  it.  In  no  sense  is  it  a  super- 
state that  has  been  created,  nor  yet  an  inter- 
national legislature.  It  is,  at  most,  merely  an 
international  conference  for  purposes  of  dis- 
cussion, co-operation,  and  peace,  its  powers 
dependent    entirely    upon   the   free   consent    of 

310 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

members.  To  those  confident  enough  to  expect 
that  the  horrors  of  the  Great  War  would  win 
the  nations  of  the  world  to  a  courageous  advent- 
ure in  real  partnership,  the  outcome  is  disap- 
pointing, for  the  Covenant  is  essentially  a  cau- 
tious document,  instinct  with  concession  to 
precedent  and  prejudice.  It  is,  however,  a 
corner-stone  upon  which  to  build,  and  there  is 
always  the  great  hope  that  the  nations  of  earth, 
realizing  eventually  the  necessity  and  practica- 
bility of  the  League,  will  complete  the  structure 
in  pride  and  power  and  glory.  Even  to-day, 
with  all  its  weaknesses,  its  careful  obeisance  to  the 
traditions  of  sovereignty,  it  stands  as  the  greatest 
aspiration  since  the  cry  of  the  Galilean — human- 
ity's one  ladder  from  the  pit. 

The  first  draft  of  the  Covenant — fruit  of  weeks 
of  consultation,  compromise,  and  revision — ^was 
pubHshed  February  14,  1919,  and  was  not  only 
referred  back  to  the  nations  party  to  the 
Peace  Conference,  but  was  also  submitted  to 
the  representatives  of  thirteen  neutral  govern- 
ments. President  Wilson,  for  instance,  return- 
ing to  America,  advised  with  the  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee  of  the  Senate,  as  well  as  with 
many  leaders  of  thought,  and  carried  back  to 
Paris  a  large  number  of  suggestions,  criticisms, 
and  actual  amendments.  Other  delegates  acted 
similarly,  and  the  Covenant,  vastly  revised,  was 
adopted  unanimously  by  the  representatives  of 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  in  plenary 
conference  on  April  29,  191 9.  This  painstaking 
preparation  is  reflected  in  the  language  and  pro- 
visions of  the  Covenant. 

311 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Article  I  sets  down  conditions  governing 
admission  and  withdrawaL  The  thirty-two  Al- 
lied and  Associated  states  and  thirteen  neutral 
states  are  regarded  as  original  members,  and 
arrangement  is  made  for  the  future  admission 
of  the  Central  Powers  and  Russia.  Any  nation 
may  withdraw  by  giving  two  years'  notice,  pro- 
vided that  **all  its  international  obKgations  are 
fulfilled,'*  but  the  question  of  fulfilment  is  left 
absolutely  to  the  conscience  of  the  state  itself. 

Articles  II  to  VII,  inclusive,  are  concerned  en- 
tirely with  the  organization  of  the  League.  There 
is  to  be  a  permanent  Secretariat,  with  positions 
equally  open  to  men  and  women.  Geneva  is 
selected  as  the  seat,  and  the  membership  is 
divided  into  an  Assembly  and  a  Council.  In 
the  Assembly  each  nation  will  have  three  repre- 
sentatives, but  only  one  vote.  It  is  without 
executive  authority,  being  simply  a  conference 
body.  What  power  the  League  possesses  is 
vested  in  a  Council  of  nine,  with  the  United 
States,  the  British  Empire,  France,  Italy,  and 
Japan  as  permanent  members  and  the  other 
four  members  to  be  elected  by  the  Assembly. 
Provision  is  made  for  the  inclusion  of  Germany 
and  Russia  in  this  Council  when  they  are  ready 
for  membership. 

It  is  stated  explicitly  that  both  Council  and 
Assembly  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as 
occasion  requires,  but  that  the  Council  shall 
meet  once  a  year  without  fail.  If  the  Covenant 
held  nothing  else,  this  provision  would  justify 
its  adoption.  The  Great  War  demonstrated  be- 
yond question  that  conference  between  the  na- 

312 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

tions  of  earth  is  one  of  the  most  certain  means 
of  preventing  the  international  misunderstand- 
ings that  lead  to  war.  Heretofore  such  con- 
ference could  not  be  held  except  by  the  voluntary- 
action  of  all  the  parties.  In  July,  1914,  Sir 
Edward  Gray  exhausted  effort  to  bring  about  a 
meeting  of  the  powers  to  consider  the  dispute 
between  Austria  and  Serbia.  Germany  rejected 
the  proposal  and  World  War  resulted.  Had  the 
League  of  Nations  existed  at  the  time,  a  meeting 
would  have  been  called  on  the  instant  and  Ger- 
many would  have  been  obliged  to  attend.  Be- 
cause there  was  no  such  conference,  with  its  open 
discussion,  7,000,000  dead  men  fill  soldiers' 
graves,  20,000,000  maimed  and  blinded  men 
constitute  a  world  problem,  and  ^200,000,000,000 
— the  cost  of  it  all — burdens  the  back  of  human- 
ity with  debt  and  despair. 

It  is  a  fact  that  Germany  has  admitted  that 
Berlin  expected  Great  Britain  to  keep  out  of 
the  war.  If  a  conference  had  been  held  in  1914, 
Great  Britain  would  have  made  clear  to  Germany 
that  she  meant  to  stand  by  her  treaty  obliga- 
tions, and  the  Kaiser  would  not  have  dared  to 
strike.  The  regular  meetings  of  the  Assembly 
and  Council  will  not  only  make  for  peace,  but 
they  will  make  for  friendship  and  understanding. 

Article  VIII  proceeds  to  the  fulfilment  of  one 
of  America's  principal  war  aims,  even  as  it  has 
been  a  world  dream.  There  is  frank  admission 
that  the  maintenance  of  peace  requires  the  reduc- 
tion of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point 
consistent  with  national  safety.  All  members 
of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  not  conceal 

313 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

military  and  naval  information  from  one  another, 
and  that  there  shall  be  full  and  frank  inter- 
change of  advice  as  to  their  military  and  naval 
programs.  The  Council  is  to  determine  and 
recommend  for  the  consideration  of  each  govern- 
ment what  mihtary  equipment  and  armament 
is  fair  and  reasonable  in  proportion  to  the  scale 
fixed  in  the  general  program  of  disarmament, 
taking  into  account  the  geographical  situation 
and  circumstances  of  each  state.  Thereupon 
each  state,  acting  in  its  own  sovereignty  and 
according  to  its  own  laws,  shall  consider  the 
recommendations  of  the  Council,  and  decide 
how  they  can  be  made  effective. 

The  weakness  of  it  all  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
Council  can  only  "recommend."  It  remains  in 
the  power  of  Congress,  the  House  of  Commons, 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  or  any  other  parHa- 
mentary  body,  to  disregard  the  recommenda- 
tion, plunging  the  world  anew  into  armament 
competition.  There  is,  however,  a  force  of  moral 
opinion  that  may  be  depended  upon.  If,  for 
instance,  the  rest  of  the  world  agrees  to  quit 
the  mad  business  of  mortgaging  the  national 
energy  for  battle-ships  and  standing  armies,  it 
is  not  conceivable  that  America  will  permit 
Congress  to  upset  the  program. 

Article  VIII  also  declares  against  private  man- 
ufacture and  traffic  in  the  munitions  and  imple- 
ments of  war,  and  the  Council  is  given  authority 
to  work  out  a  plan  to  end  the  evil.  Article  IX 
constitutes  a  permanent  commission  to  advise 
the  Council  on  these  matters,  and  on  military, 
naval,  and  air  questions  generally. 

314 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 
The  much-discussed  Article  X  reads  as  follows: 

The  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  respect  and 
preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial 
integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of  all  Mem- 
bers of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in 
case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggression  the  Council 
shall  advise  upon  the  means  by  which  this  obligation  shall 
be  fulfilled. 

In  its  essence  it  is  nothing  more  than  the 
application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  whole 
world.  Ever  since  1823  the  United  States  has 
said,  "We  will  respect  and  preserve  as  against 
external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and 
the  political  independence  of  every  state  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere."  All  that  Article  X  does 
is  to  extend  this  protection  to  the  new  nations 
called  into  being  by  the  arms  and  ideals  of 
America.  As  a  result  of  the  Great  War,  Poland, 
Czechoslovakia,  the  Jugoslavic  Federation,  and 
scores  of  other  oppressed  peoples  have  come  at 
last  to  a  place  in  the  sun.  The  question  that  the 
Peace  Conference  had  to  face  was  this:  Were 
these  young,  hopeful  states  to  be  left  to  struggle 
in  daily  fear  of  aggression  and  conquest,  or 
were  they  to  be  guaranteed  the  peace  that  was 
their  one  hope  of  successful  growth.?  There 
was  but  one  answer  that  could  have  been  given 
in  decency  and  honor,  and  it  is  contained  in 
Article  X. 

Instead  of  involving  America  in  every  Euro- 
pean quarrel,  as  enemies  allege,  it  is  America's 
one  chance  of  keeping  out  of  European  quarrels. 
Every  great  war  in  history  has  had  its  origin 
in  the  territorial  ambitions  that  strong  nations 

315 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

have  sought  to  advance  at  the  expense  of  weak 
nations.  Unless  these  ambitions  are  checked, 
America  may  not  know  peace  any  more  than 
the  rest  of  the  world.  When  an  Austrian  prince 
was  killed  in  the  unknown  city  of  Sarajevo  was 
it  dreamed  then  that  his  death  would  call  two 
million  young  Americans  to  arms.?  That  South 
America,  Asia,  Africa,  and  the  Orient  would  be 
compelled  to  unsheathe  the  sword.?  There  is 
no  longer  any  such  thing  as  isolation  for  any 
nation.  Every  quarrel  holds  the  danger  of  be- 
coming a  world  quarrel.  The  one  intelligent 
action  is  to  strike  at  the  root  of  the  evil,  and  this 
is  the  sole  purpose  of  Article  X.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  annals  of  humanity  there  is  a  world 
agreement  that  one  nation  will  not  attempt  to 
seize  the  possessions  of  another,  and  the  pledge 
is  guaranteed  by  international  concert. 

There  is  no  greater  lie  than  that  Article  X 
impairs  the  right  of  an  oppressed  people  to 
rebel  or  that  it  abridges  the  right  of  a  people 
to  change  their  form  of  government  whenever 
they  see  fit.  The  word  "external"  means  just 
what  it  says.  If  the  populations  of  Ireland, 
Egypt,  and  India  choose  to  fight  against  what 
they  conceive  to  be  tyranny,  that  is  Great 
Britain^s  business.  If  the  Itahans  come  to  pre- 
fer democracy  to  constitutional  monarchy,  that 
is  Italy's  business.  Internal  revolution  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  League.  It  is  obvious, 
however,  that  domestic  rebellion  may  possibly 
affect  the  peace  of  the  world,  and  the  Covenant, 
while  admitting  this,  also  gives  a  very  human 
recognition  to  the  fact  that  rebellions  are  never 

316 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

without  cause.     Article  II,  therefore,  contains  a 
paragraph  of  amazing  significance: 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately  affecting 
any  of  the  Members  of  the  League  or  not,  is  hereby  de- 
clared a  matter  of  concern  to  the  whole  League,  and  the 
League  shall  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and 
effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations.  In  case  any 
such  emergency  should  arise  the  Secretary-General  shall  on 
request  of  any  Member  of  the  League  forthwith  summon 
a  meeting  of  the  Council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  friendly  right  of  each  Mem- 
ber of  the  League  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Assembly 
or  of  the  Council  any  circumstance  whatever  affecting 
international  relations  which  threaten  to  disturb  inter- 
national peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  nations 
upon  which  peace  depends. 

The  closing  paragraph  was  written  by  the 
President  himself  and  is  his  method  of  fulfilling 
America's  war  pledge  that  bound  us  to  the  rescue 
of  the  "rights  of  small  nations."  Ireland,  for 
instance,  could  not  possibly  figure  at  the  Peace 
Conference  because  she  was  not  a  territory 
directly  affected  by  the  war.  Nor  can  Ireland 
be  considered  by  America  to-day  under  the 
present  diplomatic  system.  Under  Article  II, 
however,  America  has  the  right  to  appear  before 
the  bar  of  world  opinion  as  counsel  for  Ireland 
and  for  any  other  people  whose  treatment  has 
outraged  the  American  sense  of  fair  play.  While 
the  various  delegations  of  the  Irish,  the  Hindus, 
and  the  Egyptians  were  listening  enchantedly  to 
the  playing  out  of  their  tragedy  of  futility  before 
the  Senate  in  Washington,  the  President  was 
challenging  the  world  with  this  statement  of 
purpose: 

317 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

We  can  force  a  nation  on  the  other  side  of  the  globe  to 
bring  to  that  bar  of  mankind  any  wrong  that  is  afoot  in 
that  part  of  the  world  which  is  likely  to  affect  good  und  -r- 
standing  between  nations,  and  we  can  oblige  them  to  show 
cause  why  it  should  not  be  remedied.  There  is  not  an 
oppressed  people  in  the  world  which  cannot  henceforth 
get  a  hearing  at  that  forum,  and  you  know  what  a  hearing 
will  mean  if  the  cause  of  those  people  is  just.  The  one  thing 
that  those  who  are  doing  injustice  have  most  reason  to 
dread  is  publicity  and  discussion,  because  if  you  are  chal- 
lenged to  give  a  reason  why  you  are  doing  a  wrong  thing 
it  has  to  be  an  exceedingly  good  reason,  and  if  you  give  a 
bad  reason  you  confess  judgment  and  the  opinion  of  man- 
kind goes  against  you. 

At  present  what  is  the  state  of  international  law  and 
understanding?  No  nation  has  the  right  to  call  attention 
to  anything  that  does  not  directly  affect  its  own  affairs. 
If  it  does,  it  cannot  only  be  told  to  mind  its  own  business, 
but  it  risks  the  cordial  relationship  between  itself  and  the 
nation  whose  affairs  it  draws  under  discussion;  whereas, 
under  Article  XI  the  very  sensible  provision  is  made  that 
the  peace  of  the  world  transcends  all  the  susceptibilities 
of  nations  and  governments,  and  that  they  are  obliged  to 
consent  to  discuss  and  explain  anything  which  does  affect 
the  understanding  between  nations. 

Where  before,  and  when  before,  may  I  ask  some  of  my 
fellow-countrymen  who  want  a  forum  upon  which  to  con- 
duct a  hopeful  agitation,  were  they  ever  offered  the  oppor- 
tunity to  bring  their  case  to  the  judgment  of  mankind? 
If  they  are  not  satisfied  with  that,  their  case  is  not  good. 
The  only  case  that  you  ought  to  bring  with  diffidence  before 
the  great  jury  of  men  throughout  the  world  is  the  case  that 
you  cannot  establish.  The  only  thing  I  shall  ever  be  afraid 
to  see  the  League  of  Nations  discuss,  if  the  United  States 
is  concerned,  is  a  case  which  I  can  hardly  imagine,  where 
the  United  States  is  wrong,  because  I  have  the  hopeful  and 
confident  expectation  that  whenever  a  case  in  which  the 
United  States  is  affected  is  brought  to  the  consideration 
of  that  great  body  we  need  have  no  nervousness  as  to  the 
elements  of  the  argument  so  far  as  we  are  concerned.    The 

318 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

glory  of  the  United  States  Is  that  it  never  claimed  anything 
to  which  it  was  not  justly  entitled. 

Sir  Frederick  Polbck,  in  his  valuable  work  on 
The  League  of  Nations^  comments  on  this  privilege 
very  pointedly: 

Various  Irish  writers,  including  some  who  deserve  serious 
attention,  have  raised  the  question  whether  the  standing 
problem  of  Irish  autonomy  can  come  before  the  League  of 
Nations.  There  is  only  one  way  in  which  this  could  happen 
— namely,  that  the  government  of  the  United  States  should 
declare  Irish-American  sympathy  with  unsatisfied  national- 
ist claims  in  Ireland  to  be  capable  of  disturbing  good  under- 
standing between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
That  is  a  possible  event  if  a  solution  is  not  reached  within 
a  reasonable  time,  but  it  is  more  likely  that  a  confidential 
intimation  from  the  United  States  would  not  only  precede 
a  formal  reference  to  the  Council,  but  avoid  the  necessity 
for  it. 

Articles  XII,  XIII,  XIV,  XV,  XVI,  and 
XVII  deal  entirely  with  the  fundamental  pur- 
pose of  the  League — that  is,  the  prevention  of 
war.  Every  member  of  the  League  solemnly 
agrees  that  it  will  never  go  to  war  without 
first  having  done  one  or  another  of  two  things: 
(i)  either  submitting  the  matter  in  dispute  to 
arbitration,  in  which  case  it  promises  abso- 
lutely to  abide  by  the  verdict,  or  (2)  submit- 
ting it  to  discussion  by  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  agreeing  to  place  all  the 
documents  and  all  the  pertinent  facts  before 
the  Council  for  discussion  and  publication.  The 
Council  is  to  have  a  maximum  of  six  months  in 
which  to  consider  the  matter,  and  if  the  decision 
is  not  acceptable,  the  aggrieved  nation  further 
agrees    that    it    will    wait    an    additional   three 

319 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

months  to  permit  of  mediation,  conciliation, 
and  compromise.  Even  allowing  no  time  for 
preliminaries,  there  are  nine  months  of  discus- 
sion, not  private  discussion,  not  discussion  be- 
tween disputants,  but  discussion  between  those 
who  are  disinterested  except  in  the  maintenance 
of  the  peace  of  the  world,  and,  above  all,  a  dis- 
cussion held  in  the  open  for  all  the  world  to  hear 
and  judge. 

A  constant  and  popular  attack  has  been  that 
these  provisions  will  bring  purely  domestic 
questions  within  the  purview  of  the  League. 
The  language  of  the  Covenant  is  explicit : 

Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to  any 
question  of  international  law,  as  to  the  existence  of  any 
fact  which  if  established  would  constitute  a  breach  of  any 
international  obligation,  or  as  to  the  extent  and  nature  of 
the  reparation  to  be  made  for  any  such  breach,  are  de- 
clared to  be  among  those  which  are  generally  suitable  for 
arbitration. 

Mr.  Elihu  Root  wrote  this  definition  himself, 
and  the  President,  carrying  it  back  to  Paris, 
had  it  inserted  verbatim. 

In  event  that  any  member  of  the  League  dis- 
regards the  provisions  for  arbitration  and  dis- 
cussion it  shall  be  thereby  deemed  ipso  facto  to 
have  committed  an  act  of  war  against  the  other 
members  of  the  League,  which  undertake  im- 
mediately to  "subject  it  to  the  severance  of  all 
trade  and  financial  relations,  the  prohibition 
of  all  intercourse  .  .  .  and  the  prevention  of 
all  financial,  commercial,  or  personal  intercourse" 
with  the  Covenant-breaking  state.  It  is  the 
economic  boycott — a  thing  more  terrible  than 

320 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

armies.  Not  a  nation  in  the  world,  with  the 
possible  exception  of  the  United  States,  could 
endure  it  for  six  months. 

In  the  event  of  the  improbabihty  that  the 
economic  boycott  is  not  efficacious,  the  Council 
of  the  League  is  empowered  to  recommend  what 
effective  force  the  members  of  the  League  shall 
severally  contribute  to  the  armed  force  of  the 
League  in  proceeding  against  the  Covenant- 
breaking  state.  In  view  of  the  explicit  safe- 
guards placed  around  this  provision,  it  is  incred- 
ible that  RepubHcan  Senators  should  dare  to 
continue  the  assertion  that  the  League  has  the 
power  to  declare  war  and  to  send  American 
soldiers  to  their  death  in  foreign  countries. 
It  is  the  right  of  the  Council  merely  to  recom- 
mend. The  recommendation  must  be  unani- 
mous, so  that  the  American  representative  will 
have  to  concur  first  of  all.  It  is  then  referred 
to  Congress,  in  the  case  of  America,  and  it  would 
be  for  the  Senate  and  the  House  to  approve  or 
reject,  for  it  is  in  Congress  alone  that  the  Con- 
stitution vests  power  to  declare  war. 

Articles  XVIII,  XIX,  and  XX  deal  a  death- 
blow  to  secret  diplomacy.  Every  treaty  and 
international  engagement  in  the  future  is  to  be 
registered  with  the  Secretariat  for  immediate  pub- 
lication, and  is  not  to  be  considered  binding  until 
so  registered.  All  previous  obligations  inconsistent 
with  the  Covenant  are  abrogated,  and  there  is  pro- 
vision for  the  reconsideration  of  treaties  from  time 
to  time  in  order  to  see  that  their  justice  is  a  con- 
tinuing quality.  This  also  was  written  by  the 
President,  and  is  the  method  by  which  he  hopes 

321 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON      ; 

to  do  away  with  all  the  secret,  unjust  arrange- 
ments of  the  past  that  the  Peace  Conference  was 
without  power  to  touch. 

Article  XXI   excludes   the  Monroe  Doctrine 
from  the  operation  of  the  League  in  these  ex- 
plicit words,  "Nothing  in  this  Covenant  shall  i 
be  deemed  to  affect  the  validity  of  international 
engagements  such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or  : 
regional  understandings,  like  the  Monroe  •  Doc- 
trine, for  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace." 
Yet  this   plain  language  did  not  suit  Senator 
Lodge  and  his  associates,  and  more  than  twenty  ] 
reservations    were    submitted   to    "protect   the 
Monroe  Doctrine." 

Article  XXII  deals  with  those  colonies  and  ter-  i 
ritories  which,  as  consequence  of  war,  have  ceased 
to  be  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  state  which  i 
formerly  governed  them,  and  which  are  inhabited  I 
by  peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves,  j 
The  principle  is  declared  that  their  well-being  i 
and  development  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civiliza-  ; 
tion.  Provision  is  made  for  putting  these  peo-  i 
pies  under  the  protection  of  advanced  powers  1 
who  will  be  responsible  for  the  administration  I 
of  the  territory  under  conditions  which  will  j 
guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  or  religion,  i 
subject  only  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  ! 
and  morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses  such  as  the 
slave  trade,  the  arms  traffic,  and  the  liquor  ; 
traffic,  and  the  prevention  of  the  estabhshment 
of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases  and  \ 
of  military  training  of  the  natives  for  other  than  j 
police  purposes  and  the  defense  of  territory,  \ 
and  will  also  secure  equal  opportunities  for  the  ■ 
322  ] 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

trade  and  commerce  of  other  members  of  the 
League.  A  permanent  commission  is  to  be 
constituted  to  receive  and  examine  the  annual 
reports  of  the  Mandatories  and  to  advise  the 
Council  on  all  matters  relating  to  the  observ- 
ance of  the  mandates. 

Article  XXIII  provides  for  periodic  interna- 
tional conferences  to  secure  and  maintain  fair 
and  humane  conditions  of  labor  for  men,  women, 
and  children;  for  the  supervision  of  agreements 
with  regard  to  the  traffic  in  women  and  children, 
opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs;  for  the  general 
supervision  of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion; to  secure  and  maintain  freedom  of  com- 
munications and  of  transit  and  equitable  treat- 
ment for  commerce;  and  to  take  steps  in  matters 
of  international  concern  for  the  prevention  and 
control  of  disease.  As  the  President  has  said 
truly,  it  is  the  heart  of  humanity  that  beats 
in  these  noble  provisions.  For  the  first  time  in 
history  there  is  international  recognition  of  the 
rights  of  those  who  toil,  and  an  inspiring  deter- 
mination to  view  industry  in  the  light  of  two 
thousand  years  of  Christian  progress. 

Article  XXIV  places  under  the  direction  of  the 
League  all  international  bureaus  already  estab- 
lished by  general  treaties  if  the  parties  to  such 
treaties  consent.  Article  XXV  puts  the  League 
behind  Red  Cross  organizations,  and  Article 
XXVI  provides  that  amendments  shall  take 
effect  when  ratified  by  the  Council  and  by  a 
majority  of  the  Assembly.  Nations  are  given 
the  option  of  accepting  the  amendment  or  with- 
drawing from  the  League. 

22  323 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Where  is  there  any  surrender  of  sovereignty? 
Where  is  the  necessity  for  that  "Americaniza- 
tion" so  passionately  demanded  by  RepubHcan 
Senators?  At  most  the  Covenant  is  no  more 
than  the  subscription  of  the  nations  of  the  world 
to  certain  principles  of  conduct  that  have  their 
base  in  honor,  justice,  and  high  aspiration. 
When  all  is  said  and  done,  its  powers  rest  entirely 
upon  an  appeal  to  public  opinion. 

Nor  is  it  the  case  that  these  principles  are 
put  forward  as  academic  propositions:  they  are 
already  in  action.  It  is  no  longer  a  question 
whether  any  country  is  for  the  League  or  for  a 
League.  The  thing  is  done:  the  fact  is  accom- 
plished. On  January  lo,  1920,  the  League  of 
Nations  came  into  being  and  is  at  work!  At 
this  time  of  writing  its  membership  is  as  fol- 
lows: Argentine,  Australia,  Belgium,  Bolivia, 
Brazil,  British  Empire,  Canada,  Chile,  Colom- 
bia, Czechoslovakia,  Denmark,  France,  Greece, 
Guatemala,  Italy,  Japan,  India,  Liberia,  New 
Zealand,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Panama,  Para- 
guay, Persia,  Salvador,  Siam,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  South  Africa,  Uruguay,  Venezuela. 

China  has  joined  by  ratifying  the  Austrian 
treaty,  and  the  following  four  states  have  applied 
for  admission  to  the  League:  San  Marino,  Lux- 
embourg, Iceland,  Georgia.  Only  the  United 
States,  of  all  the  great  nations,  holds  aloof. 

The  League  of  Nations,  therefore,  is  a  going 
concern.  The  first  meeting  of  the  Council  was 
held  in  Paris  on  January  i6th,  when  the  initial 
organization  was  effected  and  the  Saar  Basin 
Frontier  Commission  appointed.    A  second  meet- 

324 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ing  was  held  on  February  nth  in  London,  when 
the  Council  named  a  governing  commission 
for  the  Saar  Basin,  a  High  Commissioner  for 
Danzig,  accepted  the  obligation  offered  in  the 
Pohsh  Treaty  for  the  protection  of  minorities, 
approved  plans  for  the  organization  of  the  Per- 
manent Court  of  International  Justice,  for  free- 
dom of  communication  and  transit,  and  for  the 
International  Health  Office,  and  summoned  an 
International  Finance  Conference.  The  Saar 
Basin  Governing  Commission,  consisting  of 
Rault  of  France,  Alfred  von  Boch  of  Sarrelouis, 
Major  Lambert  of  Belgium,  Count  de  Molkte 
Hvitfeldt  of  Denmark,  and  Waugh  of  Canada, 
assumed  its  duties  February  26th  with  a  proc- 
lamation to  the  people  notifying  them  of  their 
administration  by  the  League,  and  will  continue 
in  office  until  the  plebiscite  in  1935  decides  the 
permanent  fate  of  the  district. 

The  High  Commissioner  of  Danzig  has  already 
proposed  plans  for  a  constituent  assembly  and  a 
permanent  constitution,  and  an  election  has 
been  called. 

As  a  first  step  for  the  creation  of  a  permanent 
court  of  international  justice,  these  world-famous 
jurists  were  appointed:  Ehhu  Root  of  the  United 
States,  Akidzuki  of  Japan,  Altamira  of  Spain, 
Devilaqua  of  Brazil,  Descamps  of  Belgium,  Drago 
of  the  Argentine,  Fadda  of  Italy,  Fromageot  of 
France,  Fram  of  Norway,  Loder  of  Holland, 
Philhmore  of  Great  Britain,  and  Vesnitch  of 
Jugoslavia.  Pending  their  convening,  a  special 
committee  of  experts  has  brought  together  all 
the  pertinent  data  and  prepared  a  general  scheme. 

325 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

A  third  meeting  of  the  Council,  held  in  Paris  on 
March  13th,  approved  plans  for  sending  a  League 
Commission  of  Inquiry  into  Russia  and  took  the 
first  steps  for  the  prevention  of  typhus  in  Poland. 

A  fourth  meeting,  held  in  Paris  on  April  9th, 
answered  the  request  of  the  Supreme  Council 
that  the  League  take  a  mandate  for  Armenia 
with  the  statement  that  it  would  assume  a 
general  oversight,  but  did  not  have  the  necessary 
force  to  administer  the  territory  directly. 

The  Secretariat,  a  permanent  trained  interna- 
tional staff  chosen  for  special  knowledge  rather 
than  for  nationality,  and  intrusted  with  gather- 
ing information,  preparing  plans,  and  carrying  out 
recommendations,  has  been  organized  and  divided 
into  these  sections:  Legal,  Mandates,  Interna- 
tional Health,  Transit,  International  Bureaus,  Po- 
litical, Administrative  Commissions,  Economics, 
Pubhc  Information,  Financial. 

The  International  Labor  Office  is  already  at 
work  under  the  direction  of  Albert  Thomas  of 
France,  with  a  governing  body  of  twenty-four 
representatives  of  labor  and  capital  drawn  from 
the  most  important  industrial  states:  the  Inter- 
national Health  Office  has  been  established,  and 
the  Permanent  Commission  of  Freedom  of  Com- 
munications and  Transit  is  preparing  to  call  a 
world  conference  for  the  purpose  of  working 
out  plans  that  will  put  the  great  highways  of 
nature  at  the  disposal  of  all  peoples.  Treaties 
are  being  registered  and  prepared  for  publica- 
tion, and,  most  important  of  all,  the  Permanent 
Commission  on  Disarmament  has  commenced 
its  great  work. 

326 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

The  budget  of  the  League,  as  tentatively 
agreed  upon,  calls  for  ?2, 500,000  for  the  first 
fiscal  year,  a  sum  to  be  divided  among  the  mem- 
bers. Already  over  half  the  money  has  been 
paid  in,  Canada,  for  instance,  contributing 
$64,000  as  her  share.  And  a  battle-ship  costs 
$15,000,000! 

The  question  for  decision  is  not,  "Shall  there 
he  a  League  of  Nations?"  but,  "Shall  the  United 
States  join  the  League  of  Nations  .f^" 

It  is  only  a  question  of  months  when  every 
other  nation  in  the  world  will  be  a  member  of  the 
international  concert.  Germany,  Austria,  Hun- 
gary, and  Russia  will  undoubtedly  be  invited  to 
join  when  the  assembly  meets  in  September  and 
Rumania,  the  Hedjaz  and  the  Serbs-Croat-Slo- 
vene state  will  come  in  with  the  completion  of 
the  Turkish  treaty. 

Is  the  United  States  to  stay  out  and  to  stand 
alone,  denying  and  defying  the  aims  and  aspira- 
tions that  we  ourselves  gave  to  the  world? 


XXII 

HOW  THE   TREATY   WAS    KILLED 

inPHE  Senate  received  the  Peace  Treaty  on 
VI  June  lo,  191Q.  The  Senate  killed  it  on 
March  19,  1920.  ]  The  Paris  Conference  con- 
sumed less  than  four  months  in  framing  the 
document,  and  was  subjected  to  daily  denuncia- 
tion for  its  dilatory  tactics,  R^pubilcrii)  lenders 
blaming  the  President  particularly  for  what  they 
professed  to  consider  "criminal  delay.'*  The 
Senate  took  ten  months  merely  to  destroy. 
It  was  time  that  could  have  been  saved  by  the 
practice  of  elementary  honesty,  for  the  defeat 
of  the  treaty  was  the  bitter  and  unchanging 
resolve  of  Senator  Lodge  and  his  fellow-partizans 
from  the  very  first.  The  ten  months  of  haggle 
had  no  other  purpose  than  the  poisoning  of  the 
public  mind  by  every  variety  of  falsehood,  every 
appeal  to  prejudice  that  could  be  devised  by 
unscrupulous  minds. 

The  "round  robin"  of  March  4,  1919,  declaring 
the  hostility  of  thirty-seven  Republican  Senators 
to  the  League  of  Nations,  no  matter  what  the 
.  form,  was  followed  by  parliamentary  moves  of  a 
nature  to  guarantee  the  success  of  the  pljt. 
A  Republican  fiHbuster  ended  the  regular  session 
of  the  Sixty-fifth  Congress  without  the  passage 
of   a    single    appropriation    bill,    leaving    every 

328 


HOW  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

department  of  government  bare  of  money  to 
discharge  obligations  or  to  carry  on  its  work. 
This  shameless  disruption  of  the  pubhc  business 
was  the  method  adopted  to  force  the  President 
to  call  a  special  session,  thereby  enabling  the 
Lodge  group  to  continue  its  nagging,  obstructive 
attack  upon  the  work  of  the  Paris  Conference. 
With  the  government  facing  bankruptcy,  the 
President  had  no  alternative  and  the  Sixty-sixth 
Congress  was  called  in  special  session  on  May 
19th. 

Taking  advantage  of  their  majority  of  one, 
for.  the  conviction  of  Truman  Newberry  as  an 
office-purchaser  dismisses  him  from  decent  con- 
sideration, the  Republicans  reorganized  the 
Senate  with  no  other  view  than  the  discrediting 
of  the  President  and  the  rejection  of  the  treaty. 
Senator  Lodge,  whose  hatred  of  Mr.  Wilson  had 
reached  the  point  of  mania,  was  made  chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  and  other 
members  of  the  safe  Republican  majority  were 
Borah,  Johnson  of  California,  Brandegee,  Fall, 
Knox,  Moses,  New,  Harding,  and  McCumber. 
All  of  them,  save  the  last,  shared  Senator  Lodge's 
bitter  enmity  to  the  President,  and  were  openly 
and  violently  opposed  to  the  League  of  Nations, 
Senator  Borah  declaring  that  he  wcwild  fight  it 
even  though-advocated  py-the  '^^'io^r^\^- 
kind."  The  treaty,  as  a  matter  of^course,  was 
referred  to  this  committee,  and  in  this  hostile 
keeping  it  remained  until  September  loth,  when 
it  was  finally  reported  out,  burdened  down  with 
reservations.that  m^ade  ratilication^  a  farce* 

ThrDtrghetrt>-tWs  period- neither  Senate  nor 
329 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON  , 

House  concerned  itself  with  any  other  business,  \ 
and  the  recoip  of  Congress  may  be  searched  in  ! 
vain  for  months  more  empty  of  sdrvice,  so  utterly 
disregardful  t)f  the  national  welfare.     Through- 
out March   and   April    RepubHcan  leaders  had  i 
shaken  the  country  with  their  cries  for  a  special  i 
session,  specifically  protesting  t|iat  they  did  not  \ 
desire  to  bother  the  President,  T)ut  were  merely  I 
desirous  to  proceed  to  the  immediate  enactment  \ 
of    necessary  t  reconstruction  /legislation.     The  ] 
President  in  his  message  was  at  pains  to  set  forth  i 
the  domestic  problems  that  pressed  for  solutioti. 
The  Repubhcah  majority  paid  as  little  attention  ; 
to  these  suggestions   as  they  did   ro   their  own  ' 
pkvfges.     Of  all  the  vital  questions  that  pleaded  ; 
for  settlement — [taxation,  the  industrial  problem, 
the  increased  cpst  of  living,  [reclamation   bills,  ' 
railroads,   army   reorganization,   the   mercantile  i 
marine — none  of  these  things  Was  carried  through  1 
to  any  conclusion  except  the?  railroad  bill,  and  i 
not  even  that  imtil  the  last  days  of  February, 
1920,   sa\v    .hr   passage  of  a  slipshcv   .neasure. 
Casting   aside    ill   pretense   6f  interest   in    any  j 
program  of  reconstruction,  the  Republicans  in 
Congress  gave  tjhemselves  entjiusiastically  to  the  1 
mean  besmirchinent  of  Amemca's  war  achieve- 
ment   and    the !  base   repudiation   of  American-'^ 
ideals. 

A  veritable  madness  seemed  to  possess  them,  ] 

and   each    day    saw    the   delivery   of   blows   at  ^  , 
the  very  foundation  of  American    unity.     The 

forces     of     hyphenation     were     boldly     called  ' 
into  bemg  and  no  eJfort  was  spared  to  revive 

and     exaggerate     the     divisive     prejudices    cf  i 

330                      "  ' 


HOV/  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

American  life.  Professional  Germans,  silent 
throughout  the  war  for  fear  of  treason  charges, 
emerged  from  retirement,  Charles  Nagel  going 
so  far  as  to  issue  a  pamphlet  attacking  the 
League  of  Nations  and  arguing  against  the 
return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France.  Dele- 
gations of  Irish,  ItaHans,  Egyptians,  Hindus, 
and  other  races  were  brought  to  Washington 
and  given  elaborate  hearings  under  the  '  ihe 
assumption  that  the  Senate  had  power  to  redress 
their  grievances.  '  Than  Senator  Lodge  none 
knew  better  that  the  undoubted  wrongs  of  these 
oppressed  peoples  could  be  remedied  by  two 
methods  only:  either  by  armed  force  or  by  the 
moral  pressure  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Since 
it  was  madness  to  assume  that  the  United  States 
would  declare  war  against  Great  Britain  in 
behalf  of  Ireland,  India,  and  Egypt,  the  only 
course  was  an  appeal  to  the  world  court  provided 
by  the  Covenant — a  court  in  which  America 
would  have  the  right  to  plead  the  case  of  op- 
pressed peoples.  Blind  with  prejudice  and  pas- 
sion, and  urged  on  at  every  step  by  the  hypo- 
critical applause  of  the  Republican  group,  Irish, 
Hindus,  and  Egyptians  deserted  the  sanities  of 
judgment  and  joined  in  the  attack  upon  the 
League  in  which  lay  their  one  hope.  It  is  note- 
i  worthy  that  not  at  any  time  did  Senator  Lodge 
support  any  of  the  numerous  proposals  to  express 
American  dissent  from  English  rule  in  India  or 
Egypt,  and  when  the  Democratic  Senators,  at 
the  last  moment,  introduced  a  reservation 
declaring  for  Irish  independence,  he  fought  it 
with  the  utmost  vigor. 

331 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON  | 

A  synopsis  of  the   Peace  Treaty  was  given 

to  the  world  on  May  8th,  but  at  the  insistent  \ 

request  of  France  and  England  it  was  decided  j 

that  the  complete  document  should  not  receive  ] 
publication  until  signed  by  the  Germans.     This 
synopsis  was  branded  as  a  "cheat''  by  the  Re- 
publican  Senators,  and  even  when  it  was  seen 

to  be  a  very  complete  and   faithful    summary  i 
there   was   no   word   of   apology   or   retraction. 

Day  after  day  the  RepubHcan  majority  played  ; 

the  game  of  European  imperialism,  denouncing  j 

the  President  for  his  efforts  to  secure  a  peace  i 

of  justice    and    upholding   the    reactionaries   of  j 

France  and  England  in  every  contention.     On  : 

June  9th    Senator   Borah    presented   a  copy  of  : 

the  Peace  Treaty  to  the  Senate,  admitting  frankly  ; 

that  he  had  received  it  from  the  correspondent  : 

of  the  Chicago  Tribune,  who  had  smuggled  it  into  , 

the  United  States  from  Germany.     He  justified  ' 

his   action  by  charging  that  other  copies  were  \ 
in  the  country,  even  intimating  that  the  President 
had  permitted  the  financiers  of  Wall  Street  to 

receive    these    advance    copies    for    their    own  i 

sinister  uses.     The  President  by  cable  demanded  i 

an   instant   investigation   and   these   facts  were  \ 

developed:  that  Mr.  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  one  of  : 

the   financial   advisers   of  the   American   Peace  ■ 

Delegation,  had  given  a  copy  of  the  treaty  to  \ 

Mr.  Henry  P.  Davison  in  his  capacity  as  head  \ 
of  the  Red  Cross,  and  that  Mr.  Davison,  although 
aware  that  it  was  to  be  held  in  confidence,  had 
passed  on  his  copy  to  Senator  Root,  and  that 

Senator  Root,  in  turn,  had  given  it  to  Senator  \ 

Lodge.     Meanwhile    Senator    Lodge    sat    silent  | 

332  ; 


HOW  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

throughout  Senator  Borah's  speech  in  which 
the  President  was  accused  of  giving  advance 
information  to  Wall  Street. 
^Germany  signed  the  Peace  Treaty  on  June 
28th  and  the  President  returned  to  America  on 
July  SthJ  He  presented  the  treaty  personally  to 
the  Senate  on  July  nth  and  placed  himself  unre- 
servedly at  the  disposal  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  virtually  asking  to  be  invited 
before  it.  Senator  Lodge  and  his  associates 
sneered  at  the  request,  and  in  order  to  gain  any 
contact  at  all  the  President  was  forced  to 
summon  individual  Senators  to  the  White  House. 
After  some  fifteen  or  twenty  had  taken  advantage 
of  this  opportunity  to  get  first-hand  information. 
Senator  Lodge  decided  that  it  would  be  wise  for 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  meet 
with  the  President,  but  he  managed  to  delay 
the  conference  until  August  19th.  The  printed 
report  of  the  meeting  shows  that  the  President 
submitted  himself  to  interrogation  and  cross- 
examination  without  reserve,  going  into  every 
detail  of  the  treaty  and  conducting  himself  with 
the  utmost  frankness.  He  recalled  that  when 
he  had  consulted  with  the  committee  in  March, 
taking  up  with  them  the  first  draft  of  the  Cove- 
nant, suggestions  and  criticism  had  been  asked, 
even  urged,  in  the  hope  that  every  objection 
might  be  brought  out  into  the  open. 

Such  representative  Republicans  and  pubHc 
men  as  ex-President  Taft,  Judge  Hughes,  and 
Senator  Root  had  also  been  furnished  with 
copies  of  the  Covenant  and  requested  to  analyze 
it  with  a  purpose  to  correct  its  weaknesses  and 

333 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

its  faults.  Mr.  Taft,  as  a  result  of  his  careful 
study,  submitted  four  amendments:  (i)  that  the 
vote  of  the  Council  should  be  unanimous  in 
order  to  safeguard  the  United  States  against  any 
combination  on  the  part  of  the  other  powers; 
(2)  exclusion  of  all  domestic  questions  from  the 
purview  of  the  League;  (3)  explicit  provisions 
for  withdrawal;  (4)  revision  of  the  armament 
schedule  every  five  or  ten  years. 

Judge  Hughes  joined  in  the  recommendations 
of  Mr.  Taft  and  made  the  further  suggestion 
that  there  should  be  specific  exemption  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  also  that  it  should  be  made 
plain  that  a  nation  would  not  have  to  accept 
a  mandatory  without  its  consent.  Mr.  Root 
supported  the  amendments  of  Mr.  Taft  and  Mr. 
Hughes  and  proposed  these  original  amendments 
of  his  own:  that  subjects  suitable  for  arbitration 
should  be  clearly  defined,  that  a  permanent 
court  of  international  justice  should  be  created, 
and  that  the  guaranty  of  territorial  integrity  in 
Article  X  should  run  for  five  years  only. 

These  amendments,  the  President  explained, 
had  been  presented  to  the  Peace  Conference  and 
all  but  one  of  them  had  been  accepted  without 
question,  and  were  now  part  of  the  Covenant. 
The  proposal  that  the  guaranty  of  territorial 
integrity  should  be  limited  to  five  years  had  been 
rejected  on  the  ground  that  the  matter  was 
covered  by  the  provision  that  gave  any  nation 
the  right  to  withdraw  from  the  League  two 
years  after  giving  notice.  In  every  other  respect 
the  suggestions  of  Mr.  Taft,  Judge  Hughes,  and 
Senator  Root  had  been  followed. 

334 


HOW  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  expressly  reserved, 
immigration,  tariffs,  and  natural^ation  were  rec- 
ognized as  domestic  questions  iwith  which  the 
League  would  not^  deal;  not  otie  single  recom- 
mendation of  the/ League  could/  become  binding 
upon  the  United j^States  withoujt:  the  formal  con- 
sent of  Congress|  America  could  not  be  made  a 
mandatory  excebt  by  congressional  act;  the 
right  of  withdrawal  at  the  jbnd  of  two  years 
was  absolutely  unconditional, /the  question  as  to 
whether  the  natiqn  had  fulfilled  its  international 
obligations  being  a  questio/i  for  the  nation's 
own  decision;  the  provision  that  the  action  of  the 
Council  must  rest  upon  an  unanimous  vote 
guarded  the  United  States/  against  any  danger 
of  a  combination  by  other  icountries;  in  case  of 
attack  upon  the  United  States  there  was  no 
question  as  to  'our  right  to  defend  ourselves 
without  reference  to  the  League. 

Answering  the  charge  that  the  Covenant  had 
been  interwoven  with  the  Peace  Treaty  for  the 
purpose  of  forcing  the  Senate  to  accept  the  one 
in  order  to  get  the  other,  he  pointed  out  that  the 
execution  of  the  treaty  rested  entirely  upon  the 
League  machinery,  i  What  Vas  asked  of  Ger- 
many could  not  be  delivered  in  a  day  or  in  a 
month,  but  stretched  over  miny  years.  It  was 
not  merely  a  questiop  of  enforcing  the  terms, 
but  even  more  a  matter  of  adjusting  the  terms 
from   time   to  time   irt   the   ir  terests   of  justice 


justice 

old  governments 

;  were  established, 


and  restoration.     The  j  form  o 
had  been  changed  and  ^ew  one 
creating  intricate  problems  wHich  called  for  the 
constant  attention  of  a^  indep|pndent,  impartial, 

335 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

and   civil   body.     France,   Italy,    and    England, 
antagonistic  to  the  Covenant  at  first,  had  been   \ 
won  to  its  support  only  when  they  saw  that  its   ! 
machinery  was  indispensable  for  the  continuous  / 
administration  of  the  treaty. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  the  attack  upon  ■ 
the  President  for  his  "obstinacy."     As  directed 
by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  he  had 
assisted  in  the  preparation  of  a  treaty.     When  - 
he  returned  from  Paris  and  handed  this  treaty 
to  the  Senate  his  work  was  concluded.     There 
was  nothing  further  for  him  to  do  in  the  matter,  j 
He   could   not   suggest   alterations   or   agree  to 
changes  without  repudiation  of  his  own  signa- 
ture.     When  his  advice  was  asked  he  gave  it. 
At  all  times  he  was  willing  to  accept  any  reserva-  : 
tion  which  did  not  impair  validity  or  compromise  ' 
integrity.     During  the  conference,  and  repeatedly  \ 
thereafter,   he   assured   the   Senate  that  it  was  | 
perfectly    legitimate    to    interpret    the    articles,  | 
for  while  he  was  convinced  that  their  meaning  j 
was  clear,  it  was  their  right  to  make  the  obvious  \ 
still  more  obvious.     He  had  no  objection  what-  ' 
soever  to  reservations  explaining  our  constitu- 
tional  method,    declaring   that    Congress    alone 
can  declare  war  or  determine  the  causes  or  oc-  j 
casions  for  war,  and  that  it  alone  can  authorize  | 
the  use  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  J 
on   land   or  on  the   sea.     If  they   could   make 
clearer    the    intention    to    reserve    the    Monroe 
Doctrine  he  would  be  glad  to  have  them  do  it.  . 
If  they  could  find  any  more  expHcit  words  to 
exempt  our  domestic  affairs  from  the  operation  \ 
of  the  League,  he  would  welcome  them.     If  they- 

336 


HOW  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

wanted  to  state  that  each  nation  should  be  the 
judge  as  to  whether  its  international  obligations 
had  been  fulfilled,  well  and  good. 

Notwithstanding  these  explanations,  and  dis- 
regarding the  plain  meaning  of  the  Covenant 
itself,  the  RepubHcan  Senators  commenced  an 
attack  that  is  without  parallel  for  sheer  dis- 
honesty^ Senator  Sherman  insisted  that  the 
whole  seat  of  American  government  was  to  be 
transferred  to  Geneva,  and  that  Congress  was 
left  without  power  to  pass  an  appropriation  bill 
unless  specifically  authorized  by  the  Council  of  the 
League.  In  one  of  his  outbursts  of  billingsgate 
he  shouted  that  "history  would  forget  the  reign 
of  Caligula  in  the  excesses  and  follies  of  the 
American  government  operated  under  the  League 
of  Nations  by  President  Wilson  and  Colonel 
House."  The  charge  was  made  repeatedly  that 
the  Council  had  usurped  the  right  of  Congress  to 
declare  war,  and  that  "one  million  American 
men  would  be  required  to  meet  the  responsi- 
bilities and  duties  of  soldiers  in  foreign  lands." 

Senator  Sherman  even  went  so  far  as  to 
attempt  to  appeal  to  religious  prejudice,  insisting 
that  "twenty-four  of  the  forty  equal  votes  of  the 
Christian  nations,  members  of  the  League,  are 
spiritually  dominated  by  the  Vatican.''  On  the 
other  hand,  Senator  Reed  of  Missouri  clamored 
that  the  black  races  would  rule  the  world  through 
the  League  of  Nations, while  Senator  Johnson  was 
convinced  that  England  would  control  the  earth. 
As  these  partizan  arguments  fell  of  their  own 
weight,  the  attack  switched  and  an  outcry  arose 
that  Great  Britain  had  six  votes  to  America's  one, 

337 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

owing  to  the  fact  that  Canada,  Australia,  New 
Zealand,  South  Africa,  and  India  were  individual 
members  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Not  a 
Senator,  however,  took  the  trouble  to  point  out 
that  the  League  also  included  Panama,  Cuba, 
Guatemala,  Haiti,  Liberia,  Honduras,  and  Sal- 
vador, every  one  of  them  virtually  under  control 
of  the  United  States.  Nor  was  it  explained  that 
all  of  these  countries  have  membership  in  the 
Assembly  only,  a  body  without  executive  power. 
In  the  face  of  these  facts  Senator  Lodge,  Senator 
Lenroot,  Senator  Johnson,  and  Senator  Reed 
introduced  reservations  that  "the  United  States 
shall  be  entitled  to  cast  a  number  of  votes  equal 
to  that  which  any  member  of  the  League  and 
its  self-governing  dominions,  or  parts  of  empire 
in  the  aggregate,  shall  be  entitled  to  cast,"  other- 
wise America  would  refuse  to  consider  itself 
bound  by  any  note.  As  a  result,  the  friendship 
of  Canada  changed  to  bitterness,  and  the  Winni- 
peg Free  Press  expressed  Canadian  resentment 
in  these  words:  "They  ought  to  know  that 
Canada's  actual  status  in  the  world  is  that  of  a 
nation  quite  free  from  external  control.  Yet 
they  persist  in  their  demand  that  Canada — a 
kindred  nation,  their  nearest  neighbor  and  their 
best  customer — should  be  degraded  and  put  lower 
in  the  scale  of  countries  than  the  half-caste 
Greaser  repubhcs  of  the  West  Indies  and  Central 
America,  which  are  mostly,  in  point  of  fact, 
political  and  commercial  dependencies  of  the 
United  States." 

More  than  one  hundred  and  sixty  reservations 
and  amendnients  were  offered  from  first  to  last, 

338 


HOW  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

the  whole  attempt  being  to  deceive  the  people 
into  h:Iieving  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had 
not  been  protected,  that  the  right  of  Congress 
to  declare  war  had  been  taken  away,  that 
domestic  questions  had  not  been  exempted,  etc., 
etc.  This  alleged  "Americanization''  of  the 
treaty,  however,  was  no  more  tlian  a  blind  for 
Senator  Lodge's  real  purpose,  which  was  con- 
cealed in  the  following  reservation  to  Article  X: 

The  United  States  assumes  no  obligation  to  preserve  the 
territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  other 
country  or  to  interfere  in  controversies  between  nations — 
whether  members  of  the  League  or  not — under  the  pro- 
visions of  Article  X,  or  to  employ  the  military  or  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  under  any  article  of  the  treaty 
for  any  purpose,  unless  in  any  particular  case  the  Congress, 
which,  under  the  Constitution,  has  the  sole  power  to  declare 
war  or  authorize  the  employment  of  the  military  or  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  shall  by  act  or  joint  resolution 
so  provide. 

Here  was  a  direct  repudiation  of  responsibility, 
a  flat  refusal  to  subscribe  to  the  principles  of 
the  League,  a  surly  declination  to  accept  any 
obligation  of  partnership.  In  its  essence  it  was 
a  return  to  the  policy  of  isolation.  If  war  should 
come,  Congress  would  take  notice  of  the  matter, 
deUberate  the  causes,  and  in  due  time  decide 
upon  a  proper  course.  But  as  for  standing 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  nations  of  the 
world  in  an  effort  to  prevent  war — that  was  un- 
thinkable! What  was  it  to  the  Senate  that  new 
nations  appealed  to  us  for  protection?  That 
it  was  the  voice  of  America  that  had  thrilled 
the  world  with  a  call  to  disarmament  and  arbitra- 
^  339 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

tion?  That  the  airplane  and  submarine  had 
proved  that  our  supposed  "isolation"  was  a 
delusion?  There  was  a  Democratic  President 
to  be  discredited — a  national  election  to  be  won! 

The  President's  tour  was  a  fatal  blunder.  In 
Paris  he  had  slaved  night  and  day,  and  the  tre- 
mendousness  of  the  strain  had  told  heavily  upon 
a  constitution  already  impaired  by  the  drudgeries 
and  anxieties  of  war.  Breaking  but  indomitable, 
he  gathered  himself  together  for  one  last  appeal 
to  the  people,  and  the  effort  carried  him  to  the 
grave's  edge.  In  the  hour  of  his  collapse  the 
Republican  press  and  Senate  leaders  jeered  that 
his  illness  was  a  "fake,^'  and  when  its  serious- 
ness became  apparent  Senator  Moses  led  the 
chorus  that  the  President  had  suffered  a  stroke. 
With  Woodrow  Wilson  ill  —  the  one  man  in 
Washington  with  the  Covenant  in  his  heart 
and  soul,  as  well  as  on  his  lips — the  tragedy  of 
political  intrigue  rushed  swiftly  to  its  appointed 
conclusion. 

On  November  14th  the  "knife-thrust"  reser- 

^The  Chicago  Tribune  succeeded  in  enlisting  the  services  of  a 
Dr.  Arthur  Dean  Bevan,  who  did  not  scruple  to  declare  in  a  written 
statement  that  the  trouble  was  "permanent  and  not  a  temporary 
condition,"  and  that  Mr.  Wilson  "should  under  no  circumstances 
be  permitted  to  resume  the  work  of  such  a  strenuous  position  as 
that  of  President  of  the  United  States.  The  strain  and  responsi- 
bility of  such  a  position  would  bring  with  them  the  danger  of  a 
recurrence  of  such  attacks  and  might  hasten  a  fatal  termination." 
On  February  loth  Dr.  Hugh  H.Young  of  Johns  Hopkins,  one  of 
the  physicians  in  attendance  on  the  President,  declared  Mr.  Wilson 
to  be  "organically  sound,  able-minded  and  able-bodied,  and 
branded  current  reports  as  Mies  without  justification.'  ,  .  .  The 
President  walks  sturdily  now  without  assistance  and  without 
fatigue.  And  he  uses  the  still  slightly  impaired  arm  more  and  more 
every  day.  As  to  his  mental  vigor,  it  is  simply  prodigious.  In- 
deed, I  think  in  many  ways  the  President  is  in  better  shape  than 
before  the  illness  came." 


HOW  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

vation  of  Senator  Lodge  was  adopted  and  the 
seven  compromise  reservations  of  Senator  Hitch- 
cock were  rejected.?  On  November  19th,  the 
closing  day  of  the  special  session,  the  Republican 
alignment  was  a  Macedonian  phalanx.  Throw- 
ing off  disguise,  the  so-called  "mild  reserva- 
tionists"  stdod  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the 
outright  "nulliHers,"  and  gibed  at  Hitchcock's 
determined  effort  to  gain  a  hearing  for  sub- 
stitute reservations. 

"Leave  the  door  open!''  cried  the  Democratic 
leader. 

**The  door  is  closed,"  Lodge  answered. 

Moving  forward  with  energy  and  precision, 
the  Lodge  program  swept  through,  and  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  was  rejected  and  a  state  of  war 
continued.  Senator  Brandegee  shouted  glee- 
fully that  this  was  the  end  of  "a  pipe  dream," 
and  Senator  Lodge  announced  his  determination 
to  force  the  President  to  negotiate  a  separate 
treaty  of  peace  with  Germany. 

After  the  Christmas  holidays  the  Democratic 
Senators,  hopeful  cf  cCxxipromise,  arranged  a 
series  of  bipartizan  conferences.  The  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty  reservations  were  boiled  down 
to  fourteen  and  agreement  was  reached  on  all 
but  one.  Senator  Lodge  refusing  to  change  so 
much  as  a  comma  in  his  "knife-thrust."  Sud- 
denly enough  there  was  announcement  from  the 
Repubhcan  camp  that  the  treaty  would  be 
called  up  again  on  February  17th.  There  is 
little  doubt  that  this  was  due  to  the  insistence 
of  party  leaders,  all  of  whom  found  themselves 
in  a  position  of  exceeding  embarrassment.     On 

341 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

one  side  stood  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
sincerely  desirous  of  a  League  of  Nations  and 
sick  of  the  interminable  Senate  wrangle,  while 
on  the  other  side  there  was  the  painful  fact 
that  Senator  Lodge  had  committed  the  party 
agai?ist  the  League  of  Nations,  His  hatred  of 
Wilson  made  him  impossible  of  control  and  his 
position  as  Senate  leader  made  it  impossible 
to  repudiate  him.  The  one  remaining  course, 
therefore,  was  further  discussion  in  order  to 
CO  fi^se  pubHc  opinion^, 

On  January  31st  the  debate  was  punctuated 
by  an  interruption  of  amazing  significance. 
Lord  Grey,  arriving  in  England  from  his  service 
in  Washington  as  British  ambassador,  wrote 
an  open  letter  to  the  London  Times  in  which  he 
made  it  plain  that  Great  Britain  had  no  objec- 
tions to  the  Lodge  reservations  as  a  whole. 
What  had  been  confused  now  stood  clear. 
Throughout  his  adult  hfe  Senator  Lodge  has 
been  an  ardent  supporter  of  the  Anglo-American 
accord,  and  his  attitude  on  the  treaty  was  at 
once  a  surprise  and  a  be^vilderment.  The  Grey 
letter  came  as  a  key  to  the  puzzle,  for  it  was 
now  apparent  that  Lodge  and  his  group  had  been 
acting  throughout  in  British  interests  if  not 
under  British  inspiration. 

No  sooner  had  the  President  left  Paris  in 
February,  1919,  than  the  Conference,  under  the 
direction  of  Lloyd  George  and  Balfour,  pro- 
ceeded to  repudiate  the  agreement  of  January 
25th  that  provided  for  the  League  of  Nations 
as  an  integral  part  of  the  treaty.  On  March 
4th,  the  day  before  the  President's  saihng.  Lodge 

342 


HOW  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

and  thirty-seven  Republican  Senators  signed 
the  "round  robin"  of  protest  against  the  inclu- 
sion of  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  treaty, 
linking  up  tightly  with  the  Balfour  action  in 
Paris.  As  has  been  described,  the  President 
defeated  the  plot,  and  the  British  and  French 
imperialists,  having  failed  to  destroy  the  Cove- 
nant as  a  whole,  naturally  decided  that  the  next 
best  thing  was  to  take  out  its  heart.  The  Lodge 
reservation  to  Article  X,  which  guaranteed  the 
small  nations  of  the  world  from  annexation 
and  plunder,  was  the  method  chosen. 

What  more  could  the  British  Empire  ask 
than  the  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  safe- 
guard the  territorial  integrity  and  political 
independence  of  weak  peoples?  At  its  hand, 
waiting  to  be  seized,  were  the  wide  stretches  of 
Mesopotamia,  Persia,  and  the  Hedjaz,  and  an 
Egyptian  protectorate  that  might  well  be  turned 
into  a  title  in  fee  simple!  America  alone  had 
the  will  and  the  power  to  block  the  program  of 
imperiahsm,  and  the  Repubhcan  majority  stood 
ready  to  tie  America's  hands.  France  was  no 
less  delighted  with  the  prospect,  having  the 
Saar  Basin  and  the  Rhine  Valley  in  sight,  and 
Japan  saw  in  the  Lodge  reservation  an  escape 
from  its  bothersome  obhgation  to  abstain  from 
Chinese  conquest.  All  the  old  rapacities,  seem- 
ingly laid  forever  by  the  adoption  of  the  League 
of  Nations  Covenant  with  its  solemn  promises, 
were  restored  in  all  their  former  virulence  by 
the  "knife-thrust''  that  destroyed  the  guaranty 
of  territorial  integrity  against  external  aggression. 
It  was  at  the  Grey  letter,  and  the  whole  con- 

343 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

spiracy  of  the  European  medievalists,  that  the 
President  struck  in  his  letter  of  March  8th  when 
he  said: 

Any  reservation  which  seeks  to  deprive  the  League  of 
Nations  of  the  force  of  Article  X  cuts  at  the  very  heart 
and  life  of  the  Covenant  itself.  Any  League  of  Nations 
which  does  not  guarantee  as  a  matter  of  incontestable 
right  the  political  independence  and  integrity  of  each  of  its 
members  might  be  hardly  more  than  a  futile  scrap  of  paper, 
as  ineflPective  in  operation  as  the  agreement  between  Bel- 
gium and  Germany  which  the  Germans  violated  in  1914. 

Article  X,  as  written  into  the  Treaty  of  Ve  sailles,  repre- 
sents the  renunciation  by  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  which 
before  the  war  had  begun  to  find  so  many  interests  in  com- 
mon in  the  Pacific,  by  France,  by  Italy — by  all  the  great 
fighting  powers  of  the  world,  of  the  old  pretensions  of  politi- 
cal conquest  and  territorial  aggrandizement.  It  is  a  new 
doctrine  in  the  world's  affairs  and  must  be  recognized,  or 
there  is  no  secure  basis  for  the  peace  which  the  whole  world 
so  longingly  desires  and  so  desperately  needs.  If  Article 
X  is  not  adopted  and  acted  upon  the  governments  which 
reject  it  will,  I  think,  be  guilty  of  bad  faith  to  their  people 
whom  they  induced  to  make  the  infinite  sacrifices  of  the 
war  by  the  pledge  that  they  would  be  fighting  to  redeem 
the  world  from  the  old  order  of  force  and  aggression. 

Every  imperialistic  influence  in  Europe  was  hostile  to 
the  embodiment  of  Article  X  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  its  defeat  now  would  mark  the  complete 
consummation  of  their  efforts  to  nullify  the  treaty.  I  hold 
the  doctrine  of  Article  X  to  be  the  essence  of  Americanism. 
We  cannot  repudiate  it  or  weaken  it  without  at  the  same 
time  repudiating  our  own  principles. 

The  imperialist  wants  no  League  of  Nations,  but  If,  in 
response  to  the  universal  cry  of  the  masses  everywhere, 
there  is  to  be  one,  he  is  interested  to  secure  one  suited  to 
his  own  purposes,  one  that  will  permit  him  to  continue  the 
historic  game  of  pawns  and  peoples — the  juggling  of  prov- 
inces, the  old  balances  of  power,  and  the  inevitable  wars 

344 


HOW  THE  TREATY  WAS  KILLED 

attendant  upon  these  things.     The  reservation   proposed 
would  perpetuate  the  old  order. 

Does  any  one  really  want  to  see  the  old  game  played 
again?  Can  any  one  really  venture  to  take  part  in  reviving 
the- old  order?  The  enemies  of  a  League  of  Nations  have 
by  every  true  instinct  centered  their  efforts  against  Article 
X,  for  it  is  undoubtedly  the  foundation  of  the  whole  struct- 
ure. It  is  the  bulwark,  and  the  only  bulwark,  of  the 
rising  democracy  of  the  world  against  the  forces  of  im- 
perialism and  reaction. 

It  was  a  voice  crying  in  the  wilderness.  The 
Republican  majority,  secure  in  the  backing  of 
the  Anglo-American  banking  interests,  counting 
happily  upon  the  revival  of  pro-Germanism,  the 
irritation  of  the  Italians  over  Fiume,  and  the 
just  but  headlong  angers  of  the  Irish,  were 
committed  to  their  course.  Senator  Root,  tak- 
ing orders  as  always,  swallowed  his  original 
advocacy  of  Article  X  and  solemnly  urged  the 
"Americanization"  of  the  treaty.  Mr.  Taft, 
after  offering  a  compromise  reservation  that  was 
accepted  by  the  Democrats  and  as  promptly 
rejected  by  the  Lodge  group,  subsided  and 
soon  began  to  purr  against  the  Organization 
knee. 

On  March  19th  the  treaty,  with  the  Lodge 
knife  deep  in  its  heart,  came  up  for  a  final  vote, 
and  was  rejected  a  second  time. 

This  was  not  the  end.  The  final  act  in  the 
drama  of  treachery  remained  to  be  played.  In 
early  May  the  RepubHcan  majority  in  the  House 
passed  a  resolution  declaring  an  end  to  the  state 
of  war  with  Germany.  On  May  15th  the  Re- 
publican majority  in  the  Senate  approved  a 
peace  resolution  by  Senator   Knox  ending  the 

345 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

state  of  war  with  Austria-Hungary  as  well  as 
with  Germany. 

Only  six  months  before — in  December,  191 8 — 
Senator  Cabot  Lodge  had  shouted  these  words: 
*'We  cannot  make  peace  in  the  ordinary  way. 
We  cannot,  in  the  first  place,  make  peace  except 
in  company  with  our  allies.  It  would  brand  us 
with  everlasting  dishonor  and  bring  ruin  to  us 
if  we  undertook  to  make  a  separate  peace." 

It  is  this  "everlasting  dishonor"  that  the  Knox 
resolution  entails;  it  is  this  "ruin"  that  the 
Knox  resolution  invites. 


XXIII 

THE    GREAT   AMERICAN   TRADITION 

IT  is  distinctly  a  question  whether  the  virtues 
of  traditions  are  not  outweighed  by  their 
vices,  for  while  benefits  are  negative,  the  injuries 
are  positive.  Granted  that  they  serve  as  in- 
centives and  standards,  it  is  even  more  the  case 
that  they  dull  the  edge  of  independent  action 
and  close  the  mind  to  the  necessities  of  change. 
There  is  also  the  fact  that  every  tradition,  at 
some  time  or  other,  loses  its  original  meaning 
and  becomes  a  mere  incantation.  Certainly  a 
wise  people  will  never  disregard  the  lessons  and 
experiences  of  the  past,  but  their  wisdom  will 
put  equal  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  studying 
every  new  question  in  the  Hght  of  progress. 

The  principal  argument  against  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  the  one  having  greatest  weight 
with  the  average  citizen  who  has  a  worship  of 
names  rather  than  a  respect  for  facts,  is  the 
constant  assertion  that  Washington,  in  his 
Farewell  Address,  warned  the  people  of  the  United 
States  against  "entangling  alliances."  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  phrase  was  coined  by  Thomas 
Jefferson  in  his  inaugural  speech  in  1800.  By 
way  of  proving  that  the  author  himself  did  not 
regard  it  as  an  inflexible  rule  of  conduct,  Jeffer- 
son was  willing  to  *' marry  the  British  fleet"  in 

347 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

1802  and  urged  an  offensive  and  defensive  alli- 
ance with  Great  Britain  in  1823. 

Throughout  the  trying  days  of  the  American 
Revolution  there  was  no  fear  as  to  the  dangers 
of  "entangling  alliances."  The  embattled  Col- 
onies asked  help  wherever  they  thought  that 
they  could  get  it,  and  the  request  was  not  based 
upon  any  appeal  to  selfishness,  but  upon  the 
broad  ground  that  a  triumph  for  popular  govern- 
ment in  America  would  react  beneficially  upon 
European  institutions.  Franklin  in  France  and 
Adams  in  Holland  specialized  in  this  type  of 
pleading,  and  the  alliance  with  the  French  in 
1778  was  brought  about  by  love  of  liberty  rather 
than  by  any  hope  of  material  gain. 

The  first  stages  of  the  French  Revolution 
evoked  only  sympathy  and  enthusiasm  in  the 
United  States,  but  as  moderate  leaders  were 
overthrown  and  Paris  ran  red  with  blood,  senti- 
ment changed  radically.  As  Washington  saw 
it  from  where  he  sat,  democracy  had  ceased, 
leaving  anarchy  as  a  threat.  When  France 
went  to  war  with  England  in  1793  she  sent 
Genet  to  the  United  States  to  demand  a  fulfil- 
ment of  our  treaty  obhgations.  Hamilton, 
always  British  in  his  sympathies,  argued  that 
the  alliance  had  been  made  with  Louis  XVI 
and  that  the  dethronement  of  the  king  canceled 
the  contract.  Jefferson,  on  the  other  hand, 
insisted  that  the  treaty  was  between  the  two 
nations,  and  that  honor  demanded  a  scrupulous 
adherence  to  our  pledges.  The  logic  of  Jeffer- 
son's contention  has  long  since  been  conceded, 
and  there  is  no  question  that  the  proclamation 

348 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  TRADITION 

of  neutrality  was  a  repudiation  of  our  bargain. 
Washington,  however,  justified  it  on  the  theory 
that  the  alliance  was  defensive  only,  but  his 
principal  argument  was  based  upon  our  "de- 
tached and  distant  situation."  What  he  de- 
clared then,  and  what  he  set  forth  in  detail 
in  his  Farewell  Address,  was  a  policy  of  isolation. 
His  words  were  these:  "Europe  has  a  set  of 
primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none  or  a 
very  remote  relation.  Hence  she  must  be  en- 
gaged in  frequent  controversies,  the  causes  of 
which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns. 
Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to 
implicate  ourselves  by  artificial  ties  in  the 
ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her  politics  or  the 
ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of  her 
friendships  or  enmities.  Our  detached  and  dis- 
tant situation  invites  and  enables  us  to  pursue 
a  different  course. . , .  Why  forego  the  advantages 
of  so  peculiar  a  situation.?" 

Will  it  be  said  that  the  conditions  described 
by  Washington  remain  unchanged?  That  fast 
boats,  the  cable,  the  wireless,  the  airplane,  and 
the  submarine  have  left  untouched  our  "de- 
tached and  distant  situation".?*  Washington 
also  warned  against  "the  spirit  of  innovation" 
and  "dangerous  experiments."  Why  not  con- 
!  strue  them  as  declarations  against  the  incan- 
descent light,  steamships,  aircraft,  and  railroads? 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  words  of  Washington's 
Farewell  Address  had  barely  ceased  to  echo 
before  events  proved  that  America's  "detached 
and  distant  situation"  was  more  imaginary  than 
real.     In  less  than  twelve  years  we  were  com- 

349 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

pelled  to  enter  upon  three  wars  with  trans- 
atlantic peoples — France,  the  Barbary  pirates, 
and  England.  When  Napoleon  forced  Spain  to 
cede  Louisiana  to  France,  and  launched  his  ill- 
fated  expedition  against  Santo  Domingo,  Presi- 
dent Jefferson  expressed  his  wiUingness  to  "marry 
ourselves  to  the  British  fleet  and  nation,"  if  such 
action  should  be  necessary  to  guard  the  New 
World  against  imperiahsm. 

Instead  of  minding  their  own  business  the 
fathers  never  lost  an  opportunity  to  declare  in 
favor  of  democratic  movements,  no  matter  in 
what  part  of  the  world.  Washington,  receiving 
the  colors  of  the  French,  said,  "My  anxious 
recollections,  my  sympathetic  feeling,  and  my 
best  wishes  are  irresistibly  excited  whensoever, 
in  any  country,  I  see  an  oppressed  nation  unfurl 
the  banner  of  freedom." 

President  Monroe,  in  his  annual  message  to 
Congress  in  1822,  specifically  referred  to  Amer- 
ican sympathy  for  the  Greek  revolt  against 
Turkish  tyranny,  and  also  spoke  boldly  of  our 
interest  in  the  revolutionary  movements  in 
Spain,  Italy,  and  Portugal.  The  crushing  of 
these  democratic  uprisings  by  the  Holy  Alliance 
aroused  our  indignation  and  protest,  and  as  a 
consequence  of  our  apprehensions,  entangling 
alliances  were  not  only  considered,  but  seriously 
proposed.  When  the  Holy  Alliance  resolved  to 
re-establish  Spain's  despotic  control  over  her 
South  American  colonies  President  Monroe 
called  upon  Jefferson  and  Madison  for  advice 
in  the  crisis,  and  the  correspondence  is  rich  in 
illumination   for  those  modern   statesmen  who 

350 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  TRADITION 

insist  that  the  fathers  were  parochial  in  their 
outlook.  In  order  to  check  the  spread  of 
imperiahsm  to  the  New  World,  Jefferson  was 
wiUing  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  urging  that  it  would  **  prevent  instead 
of  provoking  war."  Madison  went  even  farther 
in  his  consideration  of  the  world  as  a  whole. 
It  was  his  idea  that  America  and  Great  Britain 
should  stand  together  in  support  of  free  govern- 
ment everywhere^  declaring  in  favor  of  the  Greek 
cause  and  expressing  "avowed  disapprobation" 
with  respect  to  the  ruthless  policy  of  the  Holy- 
Alliance  in  Spain.  As  he  stated  flatly  in  a  letter 
to  Jefferson,  "With  the  British  power  and  navy 
combined  with  our  own  we  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  in  the  great 
struggle  of  the  epoch  between  liberty  and 
despotism  we  owe  it  to  ourselves  to  sustain 
the  former  in  this  hemisphere  at  least."  Under 
the  influence  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  Secretary 
of  State,  President  Monroe  dissented  from  the 
suggestions  of  Jefferson  and  Madison,  and 
decided  upon  an  independent  declaration  against 
European  interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  New 
World.  The  argument  of  Adams  was  based 
upon  the  fear  that  an  English  alliance  might  tie 
America's  hands  in  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana, 
also  on  the  sure  knowledge  that  the  British  fleet 
would  back  up  the  declaration  anyway. 

As  early  as  1824  the  policy  of  isolation  was 
openly  recognized  as  a  thing  of  the  past.  Daniel 
Webster,  then  Secretary  of  State,  urged  the 
appointment  of  a  commissioner  to  Greece  and 
made  the  following  statement  as  to  American 

351 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

policy  in  words  that  might  have  been  written 
to-day  in  support  of  the  League  of  Nations: 

As  one  of  the  free  states  among  the  nations,  as  a  great 
and  rapidly  rising  Republic,  it  would  be  impossible  for  us, 
if  we  were  so  disposed,  to  prevent  our  principles,  our  senti- 
ments, and  our  example  from  producing  some  effect  upon 
the  opinions  and  hopes  of  society  throughout  the  civilized 
world  .  .  .  the  great  political  question  of  this  age  is  that 
between  absolute  and  regulated  governments  .  .  .  whether 
society  shall  have  any  part  in  its  own  government  .  .  .  our 
side  of  this  question  is  settled  for  us  even  without  our 
volition  .  .  .  our  place  is  on  the  side  of  free  institutions. 

It  may  now  be  required  of  me  to  show  what  interest  we 
have  in  resisting  this  new  system.  What  is  it  to  us,  it  may 
be  asked,  upon  what  piinciples  or  what  pretenses  the 
European  governments  assert  a  right  of  interfering  in  the 
affairs  of  their  neighbors?  The  thunder,  it  may  be  said, 
rolls  at  a  distance.  The  wide  Atlantic  is  between  us  and 
danger;  and,  however  others  may  suffer,  we  shall  remain  safe. 

I  think  it  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  this  to  say  that  we  are 
one  of  the  nations  of  the  earth;  that  we  have  an  interest, 
therefore,  in  the  preservation  of  that  system  of  national  law 
and  national  intercourse  which  has  heretofore  subsisted  so 
beneficially  for  us  all.  .  .  .  The  enterprising  character  of 
the  age,  our  own  active,  commercial  spirit,  the  great  increase 
which  has  taken  place  in  the  intercourse  among  civilized 
and  commercial  states,  have  necessarily  connected  us  with 
other  nations  and  given  us  a  high  concern  in  the  preservation 
of  those  salutary  principles  upon  which  that  intercourse  is 
founded.  We  have  as  clear  an  interest  in  international 
law  as  individuals  have  in  the  laws  of  society. 

When  the  liberal  thought  of  Europe  rose  in 
revolt  against  the  theory  of  divine  right  Anierica 
did  not  sit  idly  by,  but  took  an  active  and 
decisive  part  in  encouraging  the  revolutionary 
movement.  No  sooner  had  the  representatives 
of  the  various  German  states  met  at  Frankfort 

352 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  TRADITION 

to  form  a  new  government  than  Mr.  Donelson, 
our  Minister  in  Berlin,  was  ordered  by  the  Presi- 
dent "to  proceed  to  Frankfort  and  there,  as 
the  diplomatic  representative  of  the  United 
States,  recognize  the  provisional  government  of 
the  new  German  confederation;  provided  you 
shall  find  such  a  government  in  successful 
operation."  These  instructions  were  issued  on 
July  24,  1848,  and  in  August  of  that  year  Donel- 
son was  appointed  Envoy  Extraordinary  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  the  Frankfort  gov- 
ernment. In  1849  Mr.  Donelson  received  fur- 
ther an  even  more  authoritative  instruction,  and 
the  following  passage  will  show  America's  faith: 

From  what  intelligence  we  have  been  enabled  to  gather 
on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  we  understand  that  there  are, 
at  this  time,  two  parties  in  Germany,  each  seeking  to 
establish  a  constitution  for  a  Germanic  Empire;  and  that 
the  essential  difference  between  them  consists  in  this — 
that  one  of  them  desires  to  form  a  constitution  which  has 
for  its  basis  a  recognition  of  the  principle  that  the  people 
are  the  true  source  of  all  power;  and  the  other,  a  constitution 
based  on  the  despotic  principle  that  kings  hold  their  power 
by  divine  right,  and  that  the  constitutions  to  be  established 
under  their  auspices  are  boons  granted  to  the  people,  by 
them,  as  the  only  legitimate  sources  of  power.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  for  me  to  say  to  you  that  all  the  sympathies  of  the 
government  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  with 
the  former  party. 

Louis  Kossuth,  coming  to  the  United  States  in 
1849,  stirred  Americans  to  intense  sympathy 
with  the  Hungarian  revolt  against  Austrian 
absolutism,  and  President  Taylor  even  went 
so  far  as  to  appoint  a  special  agent  with  authority 
to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  Hungarian 

353 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

state  "in  event  of  her  ability  to  sustain  it." 
When  the  Hungarian  rebels  were  crushed  Presi- 
dent Fillmore  approved  a  joint  resolution  of 
Congress,  passed  March  3,  1851,  declaring  the 
sympathy  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
with  Kossuth  and  his  associates,  and  authorizing 
"the  employment  of  some  of  the  pubKc  vessels 
which  may  be  now  cruising  in  the  Mediterranean 
to  receive  and  convey  to  the  said  United  States 
the  said  Louis  Kossuth  and  his  associates  in 
captivity."  An  American  ship,  proceeding  to 
Turkey,  rescued  Kossuth  and  his  fellow-exiles, 
and  on  their  arrival  in  the  United  States  they 
were  formally  received  by  the  President  and  by 
Congress,  and  were  the  guests  of  honor  at  a  great 
official  dinner.  The  Austrian  government  en- 
tered vigorous  protest  against  these  various 
breaches  of  neutrality,  but  the  reply  of  Webster 
contained  no  single  word  of  regret  or  apology, 
and  transgressed  every  rule  of  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence in  its  bold  assertion  of  American 
interest  in  popular  government. 

In  1870,  when  the  French  Republic  came  into 
being  for  the  third  time.  President  Grant  cabled 
instructions  to  recognize  it  instantly  and  to  con- 
gratulate the  French  people  on  restoring  a 
government  "disconnected  with  the  dynastic 
traditions  of  Europe." 

More  and  more,  as  time  went  by,  the  policy  of 
isolation  was  disregarded  as  occasion  demanded, 
although  still  retaining  its  hold  upon  the  Amer- 
ican imagination.  Liberia,  the  negro  republic 
in  Africa,  was  founded  by  the  Colonization 
Society  of  the  United  States,  and  was  and  is, 

354 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  TRADITION 

to  all  effect,  an  American  protectorate.  In  1884 
we  sent  delegates  to  an  international  conference 
in  Berlin  to  put  firmer  foundations  under  the 
Congo  Free  State,  and  in  1890  the  United  States 
took  part  in  another  conference  of  world  powers 
at  Brussels  for  the  prevention  of  the  Central 
African  slave  traffic. 

In  1900  American  troops  joined  with  those  of 
England,  France,  Russia,  and  Japan  in  the 
suppression  of  the  Boxer  uprising  and  shared 
in  the  joint  occupation  of  Peking.  Had  we  had 
the  courage  then  to  assert  ourselves  as  a  world 
power,  with  a  definite  stake  in  world  peace  and 
justice,  China  would  not  have  been  partitioned 
and  a  new  order  might  have  been  inaugurated. 
As  it  was,  we  contented  ourselves  with  a  bom- 
bastic assertion  of  interest  in  China's  "territorial 
and  administrative  entity,"  and  then  retired  to 
our  "detached  and  distant  situation"  while  the 
other  powers  looted  and  annexed. 

In  1906  President  Roosevelt  sent  Mr.  Henry- 
White  to  serve  as  America's  representative  at 
the  Algeciras  conference,  called  by  the  Kaiser 
to  dispute  French  control  in  Morocco.  The 
United  States  was  absolutely  without  direct 
interest  in  Moroccan  aflTairs,  and  our  participa- 
tion had  no  other  purpose  than  the  preservation 
of  the  European  balance  of  power.  Even  at  that 
time  the  Kaiser  was  eager  for  war  with  France, 
and  under  President  Roosevelt's  instruction 
America  took  her  place  by  the  side  of  England, 
Italy,  and  France  in  serving  notice  that  the 
peace  must  be  kept.  At  every  point  the  ac- 
tion was  in  flat  violation  of  the  policy  of  isola- 
24  355 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

tlon  and  an  intelligent  acceptance  of  changed 
conditions. 

At  various  times,  and  always  pointedly,  we 
have  protested  against  the  treatment  of  Jews, 
Armenians,  and  other  oppressed  peoples,  risking 
diplomatic  ruptures  with  Rumania,  Russia,  and 
Turkey,  and  no  outcry  was  raised  when  the 
United  States  met  with  other  world  powers 
at  The  Hague  in  1899  to  work  out  a  program  of 
peace.  Even  while  pohticians  were  mouthing 
the  words  of  Washington  international  co-opera- 
tion was  progressing  by  leaps  and  bounds,  and 
in  1914  the  peoples  of  the  world  were  banded 
together  in  these  activities :  the  Universal  Postal 
Union,  the  International  Radio-Telegraphic  Bu- 
reau, the  Danube  and  Suez  Canal  Commission, 
the  International  Office  of  Public  Health,  the 
Union  for  the  PubHcation  of  Customs  Tariffs, 
the  Sugar  Commission,  the  International  In- 
stitute of  Agriculture,  the  International  Union 
for  the  Protection  of  Industrial  Property,  the 
International  Bureau  at  Zanzibar  for  the  Repres- 
sion of  the  Slave  Traffic,  as  well  as  in  sanitary 
councils  and  various  monetary  and  metric  unions. 

It  remained  for  the  Great  War,  however,  to 
shatter  forever  the  fantastic  theory  that  we  were 
still  living  in  the  days  of  the  Colonies,  with  sailing- 
craft  as  the  only  means  of  transatlantic  communi- 
cation. From  the  first  our  "detached  and  dis- 
tant situation"  was  an  absurdity  disproved  by 
British  Orders  in  Council  primarily,  and  then  out- 
raged by  the  unrestricted  operations  of  the 
German  U-boats.  For  three  and  a  half  years 
we  clung  to  the  rags  of  an  outworn  policy  before 

3S^ 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  TRADITION 

daring  to  face  facts.  The  question  to  be  decided 
to-day  is  whether  we  are  to  face  the  future  with 
open  eyes  or  resume  the  bandages  of  tradition. 
Washington's  words  in  opposition  to  perma- 
nent alHances  with  other  countries  are  quoted 
continually,  but  httle  indeed  is  said  about  other 
portions  of  the  Farewell  Address  that  explain 
and  qualify.     For  instance,  there  is  this  passage: 

With  me  a  predominant  motive  has  been  to  endeavor 
to  gain  time  to  our  country  to  settle  and  mature  its  yet 
recent  institutions,  and  to  progress,  without  interruption, 
to  that  degree  of  strength  and  consistency  which  is  neces- 
sary to  give  it,  humanly  speaking,  the  command  of  its  own 
fortunes. 

And  again;  pointing  out  the  benefits  of  the 
union  of  the  thirteen  states: 

What  is  of  inestimable  value,  they  must  derive  from 
union  an  exemption  from  those  broils  and  wars  between 
themselves  which  so  frequently  afflict  neighboring  countries 
not  tied  together  by  the  same  government.  .  .  ,  Here,  like- 
wise, they  will  avoid  the  necessity  of  those  overgrown 
military  establishments  which  under  any  form  of  govern- 
ment are  inauspicious  to  liberty,  and  which  are  to  be 
regarded  as  peculiarly  hostile  to  republican  liberty.  .  .  . 
Is  there  a  doubt  whether  a  common  government  can  embrace 
so  large  a  sphere?  Let  experience  solve  it.  To  listen  to 
mere  speculation  in  such  a  case  were  criminal.  .  .  .  The  ex- 
periment, at  least,  is  recommended  by  every  sentiment 
which  ennobles  human  nature. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  permanent  isolation 
was  not  in  Washington's  mind,  and  that  his 
vision  swept  the  future  and  saw  the  enormous 
benefits  of  union.  Just  as  his  soul  sickened  at 
the  sight  of  nations  banding  in  selfish  groups  for 

357 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

the  attainment  of  mean  objectives  or  to  secure 
protection  against  rapacity,  so  did  it  leap  to  the 
dream  of  a  great  fraternity.  Neither  isolation 
nor  neutrality  was  his  end,  but  merely  the 
means.  Peace  was  his  goal,  and  were  he  alive 
to-day,  looking  out  over  a  country  grown  to  a 
population  of  110,000,000,  seeing  the  guardian 
oceans  bridged  by  modern  science,  and  hearing 
the  supplication  of  war-sick  nations,  pleading  for 
a  universal  alliance  in  the  interests  of  disarma- 
ment and  peace,  can  there  be  any  doubt  as  to 
his  decision? 


CONCLUSION 

EVERY  fact  in  the  case  has  the  clearness 
of  crystal. 

America  did  not  take  arms  to  avenge  Belgium 
or  in  repayment  of  any  debt  of  gratitude  to 
France  or  as  a  duty  demanded  by  the  peril  of 
civilization.  Our  entrance  into  the  Great  War 
was  compelled  by  the  sound  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.  We  fought  for  ourselveSy  for  our 
institutions,  for  our  right  to  hfe,  liberty,  and 
the  pursuit  of  happiness  in  accordance  with  our 
own  desires  and  definitions. 

It  required  three  and  a  half  years  of  violated 
neutrality  to  tear  the  bandages  of  tradition 
from  our  eyes,  but  when  the  wrappings  were 
finally  removed  we  saw  that  America's  "de- 
tached and  distant  situation''  had  never  been 
more  than  a  vain  hope.  Just  as  the  murder  of 
an  Austrian  archduke  in  an  obscure  Balkan 
town  was  turning  the  United  States  into  a  vast 
military  camp,  so  had  we  been  drawn  into  every 
world  war  of  the  past,  and  so  would  we  be 
drawn  with  equal  inevitability  into  every  world 
war  of  the  future. 

The  vision  of  the  President  shot  light  through 
the  gathering  darkness.  If  forty-eight  sovereign 
states,  each  with  its  diverse  interests,  were  able 
to  live  in  friendly  and  profitable  union,  why  not 
the  several  nations  of  the  world  .^^     What   end 

359 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

was  served  by  armaments  that  could  not  be 
better  served  by  arbitration  and  adjudication? 
To  such  a  tremendous  simphcity  were  all  of  his 
proposals  reducible. 

The  whole  world,  sick  of  the  dog-eat-dog 
tradition,  rose  in  gladness  at  his  call.  Every- 
where people  looked  with  new  eyes  upon  the 
horror  of  destruction  that  laid  Europe  waste, 
and  saw  it  as  the  logical  consequence  of  their 
tribal  hates  and  superstitions.  The  voice  of  the 
Nazarene,  ringing  ineffectually  through  two 
thousand  years,  was  heard  at  last,  and  deeps  of 
fraternity  were  stirred. 

The  AlHed  governments  accepted  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  League  of  Nations  as  though  they 
had  been  handed  down  from  Sinai,  and  the 
thundering  ideals  of  the  President  imparted  a 
subHme  militancy  to  the  invincible  pacifism  of 
America.  A  war  against  war!  Mothers  gave 
their  sons  that  the  dream  might  be  made  to 
come  true,  and  men  went  to  death  with  a  new 
courage.  Shouted  as  a  great  slogan,  it  reached 
the  deluded  peoples  of  the  Central  Powers,  under- 
mining the  structure  of  fears  and  lies  that  kept 
their  hearts  in  shadow.  The  collapse  of  the 
Prussian  war  machine  was  not  physical  only, 
but  a  sheer  spiritual  disintegration. 

In  the  hour  of  victory  the  President  went  to 
Paris,  a  decision  forced  upon  him  both  by  the 
Constitution  and  his  conscience.  He  had  laid 
down  the  principles  that  enemy  and  Allies  alike 
were  now  accepting  as  the  terms  of  the  peace, 
and  they  called  for  interpretations  that  he  alone 
had  the  right  and  the  power  to  make.    Before  his 

360 


CONCLUSION 

ship  was  well  at  sea  a  program  of  repudiation 
was  under  way.  The  Repubhcan  majority  in 
the  Senate,  concerned  only  with  officeholding 
and  office-seeking,  set  about  his  ruin,  careless 
of  hurt  to  the  nation. 

The  President  sailed  to  frame  a  peace  of 
justice,  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  new  world 
order  in  which  the  sanities  of  discussion  should 
replace  the  brutalities  of  bloodshed.  The  Senate 
snarled  that  the  peace  must  be  **hard"  and  that 
the  League  of  Nations  was  a  "visionary  project" 
that  should  be  left  to  the  future.  The  President 
was  denounced  as  one  without  authority  to 
speak  for  America,  and  the  Senate  placed  itself 
at  the  disposal  of  the  AlHes  for  the  ratification 
of  any  treaty  that  they  chose  to  make. 

The  imperiahsts  of  Europe,  reviving  at  this 
offer  of  partnership,  hastily  substituted  knives 
for  palm  branches.  Instead  of  a  conference  of 
comrades,  thinking  in  terms  of  the  New  Day, 
the  President  found  a  chque  of  enemies  thinking 
in  the  old  terms  of  balanced  power  and  secret 
diplomacy.  He  fought  them  and  he  beat  them. 
Without  help  from  a  single  source,  betrayed  at 
home  and  ambushed  abroad,  ringed  about  with 
foes  and  deserted  by  a  world  returned  to  its 
selfish  personal  preoccupations,  he  won. 

In  its  essence  the  Peace  Treaty  marks  man- 
kind's greatest  victory  over  the  baser  emotions. 
Its  angers  and  greeds  are  matters  of  word  and 
gesture  rather  than  defined  intent,  and  wait 
merely  for  a  calmer  mood  to  be  wiped  out  en- 
tirely. The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
lacks  much  of  the  virility  that  was  hoped,  but 

361 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

in  its  solemn  agreements  are  provisions  for  dis- 
armament, arbitration,  open  dealing,  and  respect 
for  the  territorial  integrity  and  political  inde- 
pendence of  weak  peoples.  Frail  enough  in  all 
seeming,  but  still  a  ladder  from  the  quicksands 
to  the  heights. 

For  ten  months  the  Republican  majority  held 
the  treaty  in  its  hostile  keeping.  For  ten  months 
the  politicians  avoided  discussion  of  the  Cove- 
nant's noble  purposes,  confining  themselves  to  the 
meannesses  of  misrepresentation  and  distortion. 
Where  once  a  Webster,  a  Clay,  and  a  Calhoun  de- 
bated great  issues  in  conscience  and  high  ability 
there  was  the  squabble  of  hucksters.  And  at  last 
the  definite  repudiation  of  every  war  aim,  every 
ideal,  every  hope  for  which  mothers  gave  their 
sons,  for  which  youth  died  or  lived  to  know  the 
disfigurements  that  are  worse  than  death. 

With  what  result? 

The  world  that  loved  us  now  hates  us.  We 
hate  ourselves.  The  unity  that  was  our  pride 
has  been  torn  into  tatters  by  the  pull  and  haul 
of  a  revived  and  multipHed  hyphenation.  The 
voice  of  America  is  a  polyglot  screech,  every 
separate  blood  strain  chorusing  some  hymn  of 
passion  under  the  leadership  of  this  or  that 
political  group.  A  war  record  unparalleled  for 
courage,  initiative,  nobihty,  and  utter  unselfish- 
ness has  been  dragged  through  the  gutters  of 
abuse  and  slander.  The  shame  of  it,  the  sadness 
of  it  all,  is  relieved  by  no  ray  of  light. 

The  RepubHcan  party,  as  it  stands  at  present, 
represents  the  lowest  form  of  political  life.  Those 
once  fought  against  so  nobly  by  an  outraged  rank 

362 


CONCLUSION 

and  file  are  in  despotic  control  and  the  "lions"  of 
191 2  are  now  jackals  hopeful  of  scraps.  Babbling 
about  "poor  Germany'*  where  a  year  before  it 
hurled  obscene  hatred  at  the  "  accursed  Hun,"  tak- 
ing money  from  Anglo-American  banking  inter- 
ests one  moment  and  wheedling  Irish-Americans 
the  next,  crying  out  against  the  czarism  of  Palmer 
even  while  it  applauds  the  "  Sailor  Shoot'*  program 
of  Wood,  yeUing  Americanism  and  indefatigably 
fanning  tJKe  angers  of  Italians  and  Greeks  and 
Germans,  cheering  a  Sims  as  he  shames  the  war 
record  of  the  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  sneer- 
ing at  every  military  achievement  of  America, 
preaching  a  gospel  of  provincialism  and  repudia- 
tion in  the  interests  of  a  high-tariff  and  ship-sub- 
sidy policy — the  Republican  organization  has  the 
touch  of  some  poisonous  nettle,  bringing  a  rash 
wherever  it  touches.  Drunk  with  a  conviction 
of  triumph,  lavish  with  millions  collected  from 
war  profiteers,  the  party  of  Lincoln  lurches  to 
the  election  without  other  standards,  principles, 
or  ideals  than  the  division  of  spoils.  The  per- 
sonal platforms  of  its  candidates  range  from 
demagoguery  to  rankest  reaction,  from  an  absurd 
provincialism  to  militarism,  yet  every  man  oper- 
ates his  convictions  under  an  agreement  to  sur- 
render them  in  the  interests  of  "harmony." 

The  Democratic  party,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
not  an  organization,  but  a  process  of  disintegra- 
tion. With  the  President  ill,  his  ancient  enemies 
have  made  the  most  of  opportunities  denied 
them  during  the  last  eight  years  and  the  witch 
doctors  of  Bourbonism  and  Bossism  are  busily 
brewing  their  old-time  poisons.     As  devoid  of 

363 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

principles  as  the  Republican  leaders,  but  without 
the  money  and  power  to  make  their  corruptions 
epidemic,  the  Democratic  politicians  have  left 
the  highroad  and  are  groping  about  in  the  by- 
ways of  chicane  and  compromise. 

There  is  no  compromise.  Honesty  is  not  a 
thing  that  lends  itself  to  fifty-fifty  arrangements. 
Pledges  are  either  kept  or  broken.  America 
should  join  the  League  of  Nations  in  faith  and 
honor  or  else  America  should  stay  out.  Middle 
ground  is  marsh  and  quagmire.  The  so-called 
"Americanization"  of  the  Covenant  is  nothing 
more  than  the  Republican  attempt  to  poison  the 
wells  of  pubHc  opinion.  Mr.  Taft,  Senator  Root, 
and  Judge  Hughes  studied  the  first  draft  criti- 
cally and  thoroughly,  and  their  amendments 
were  incorporated  virtually  as  written.  As  for 
reservations,  if  there  are  words  in  the  English 
language  that  can  make  clearer  the  exclusion 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  domestic  questions, 
the  right  of  withdrawal,  recognition  that  not 
one  American  soldier  can  be  called  to  arms 
without  the  formal  action  of  Congress,  and  that 
"external  aggression"  is  a  phrase  that  has  no 
concern  with  internal  revolution,  the  President 
has  stated  repeatedly  that  he  will  welcome  them. 
All  but  one  of  the  so-called  reservations  are 
merely  bombastic  restatements  of  the  plain 
meaning  of  the  Covenant.  This  one — the  Lodge 
"knife-thrust" — is  in  no  sense  a  reservation,  but 
a  nulHfication.  It  seeks  to  obtain  the  benefits 
of  the  League  for  the  United  States  without 
assuming  a  single  responsibility  or  exerting  the 
least  influence  to  shape  the  world  forces  that  our 

364 


CONCLUSION 

ideals  called  into  being.  It  demands  dishonor 
as  an  American  privilege,  and  stands  as  an 
insane  attempt  to  return  the  country  to  an 
*' isolation"  that  it  never  possessed  at  any  time 
and  which  is  now  a  patent  madness.  The 
"knife-thrust''  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the 
Lodge  resolution  for  a  "separate  peace,"  even 
as  it  paved  the  way  for  it.  The  President  spoke 
truly  when  he  declined  to  draw  any  fine  dis- 
tinction between  "nulHfiers"  and  "mild  nulli- 
fiers."     There  is  no  difference. 

The  issues  are  clean  cut.  On  the  one  hand 
there  is  the  League  of  Nations  with  its  relief 
from  the  crushing  burdens  of  armament,  its 
removal  of  the  causes  of  war,  its  recognition  of 
human  rights  and  human  aspiration,  its  simple 
machinery  for  the  amicable  adjustment  of  inter- 
national disputes,  and  its  release  of  the  fraternal 
impulse  from  the  dead  weights  of  savage  tradi- 
tions— a  tremendous  theory  of  spiritual  progress 
that  will  permit  America  and  the  world  to  go 
about  the  decent  business  of  Hfe  in  peace  and 
friendship.  Flexible,  elastic,  invitational  to 
change,  the  present  and  future  defects  of  the 
Covenant  can  be  remedied  and  will  be  remedied, 
just  as  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
has  been  amended. 

On  the  other  hand  there  is  refusal  to  enter 
the  League  of  Nations,  the  repudiation  of 
pledges,  the  betrayal  of  small  nations  and  weak 
peoples,  a  return  to  the  "balance  of  power," 
and  a  perpetuation  of  the  old  order  with  its  evil 
emphasis  on  navies,  armies,  division,  intrigue, 
and  rapacity. 

365 


THE  WAR,  THE  WORLD,  AND  WILSON 

Peace  and  prosperity  versus  war  and  bank- 
ruptcy! Honor  versus  dishonor!  Intelligence 
versus  insanity! 

The  peoples  of  earth  are  ready  and  waiting. 
Their  hate  of  America  is  no  more  than  the  bitter- 
ness of  a  great  disappointment,  born  of  America's 
seeming  betrayal.  The  evils  and  injustices  of 
the  Old  World — the  tragedies  of  oppression  such 
as  Ireland  and  Egypt — are  not  the  result  of 
popular  demand,  but  the  perversions  of  govern- 
ments. Given  a  League  of  Nations,  with  its 
lifting  of  ancient  fears,  and  the  men  and  women 
of  England,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  and  other 
predatory  powers  will  rise  to  control  and  point 
the  way  to  the  high  ground  of  justice  and  fra- 
ternity. Hurled  back  on  their  hopes,  who  can 
tell  to  what  extremes  the  peoples  of  the  world 
will  be  carried  in  their  agony,  grief,  and  despair? 

At  this  moment  the  wretched  populations  of 
central  and  eastern  Europe  are  perishing  by 
the  thousands,  blown  Hke  leaves  on  the  icy  winds 
of  death.  Men,  women,  and  little  children  starve 
singly  or  in  huddles — gnawing  the  roots  of  the 
field,  padding  city  streets  hke  famished  beasts — 
victims  of  a  misery  so  vast,  so  profound,  that 
the  ravages  of  disease  are  welcomed  as  a  merciful 
release  from  the  horror  of  living.  Not  a  factory 
is  in  operation  in  Poland,  Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania,  Serbia,  and  parts  of  Austria,  the 
workers  sitting  idle,  hopeless,  yet  the  docks  of 
Liverpool  and  Rotterdam  are  piled  high  with 
the  raw  materials  that  would  start  the  wheels 
of  industry  in  every  stricken  land,  restoring 
health,  courage,  and  prosperity.     Charity  is  not 

366 


CONCLUSION 

the  remedy:  all  that  these  people  ask  is  the 
chance  to  help  themselves.  Credit  is  the  one 
answer.  Had  the  United  States  entered  the 
League  of  Nations  in  the  beginning,  this  concert 
of  the  world  would  have  long  since  worked  out  a 
system  of  credit,  and  instead  of  idleness,  despair, 
famine,  and  pestilence  there  would  now  be  order 
and  energy  and  dawning  happiness. 

This  is  the  thought  that  is  bitter  In  the  mind 
of  Europe,  and  out  of  that  bitterness,  if  permitted 
to  continue,  what  dark  purposes  may  not  come  ? 
And  if,  in  the  arrogance  of  our  strength,  we 
declare  ability  to  beat  back  the  armed  hate  of 
the  world,  what  barrier  may  be  erected  against  the 
creep  of  disease,  the  contagion  of  anarchy?  And 
if  such  a  wall  be  raised — high  enough  and  strong 
enough  to  shut  out  the  angers  and  the  pleadings  of 
betrayed  humanity — how  shall  our  traitor  lives 
be  guarded  from  the  loathing  of  our  souls  ? 


THE    END 


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